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This thesis uses the influential philosophy of Gilles Deleuze to understand 
the relationship that photography has with time. Deleuze's concept of the 
time-image, developed in his books on cinema after the philosophy of 
Henri Bergson, offers a glimpse of pure duration. From this he proposed a 
taxonomy of cinema in which certain cinemas represent time abstractly via 
movement (movement-images), whilst other cinemas engage perception 
of time directly (time-images). Time unfolds from the latter non- 
chronologically, because they force the viewer into contemplation of the 
act of photography itself. The result is the crystalline structure of memory- 
images that form perception and interpretation.
Deleuze initially dismissed the photograph as incapable of representing 
time in this direct manner, since photographs (as photogrammes) are the 
basis for the sensory-motor schema upon which the movement-image 
depends. The thesis re-investigates this situation and sets out the 
conditions in which photographs can, in fact, represent time directly, and 
without connection to this schema. From then on the thesis examines the 
crystal-image and the connection between photographs and cinema: both 
the act of photography and photography as an object in a relationship with 
memory.
Chapter One demonstrates how Deleuze's initial dismissal of photography 
can be re-oriented by returning to the essential conditions of the time- 
image. The chapter argues for some photographs to be considered as 
crystal images, as they fulfil three necessary conditions established from 
Deleuze’s work: Time-images must demonstrate a splitting of time beyond 
the image’s apparent connection to movement; time-images must be free 
of depicting space and time as interdependent, and must make ‘tense’ 
irrelevant to the image; time-images must be self-referential in order to 
create free indirect discourse between perception and the objects 
perceived. Chapter Two uses Deleuze’s work on Leibniz to demonstrate 
the connection between cinema and the photograph suggested in Chapter 
One, and proposes that they are connected by a genetic element: the pure 
optical situation (opsign) that they share. The extraordinary diversity that is 
apparent between cinema and the-photograph is challenged by 
understanding this genetic element as a monad, a single entity with pleats
3and folds that are viewed as entirely different. To demonstrate this, the 
chapter considers films in which photographs, or photography, are 
referenced, and where the problems of their representation of reality are 
questioned. These films, In the Street, kids, Funny Face, and L’Annee 
derniere a Marienbad, are proposed as crystal-images that rely upon this 
monadic connection to be made apparent. Chapter Three considers the 
context of Henri Bergson’s writing on memory and cinema. It compares the 
cinema of the Lumieres to the photography of Eugene Atget in order to 
demonstrate the division of time by perception that Bergson, and then 
Deleuze, suggest. The chapter also accounts for the relegation of the 
photograph in criticism to a medium that is unable to depict time as a 
passing, and which is therefore persistently connected with death, as it is 
by Walter Benjamin and Roland Barthes. Chapter Four employs the 
photographs of Cindy Sherman as a case study to demonstrate the 
fragmentation of subjectivity and objectivity that occurs in their reference to 
film and visual culture. The critical responses these images provoke in 
writers demonstrate the structure or ‘environment’ of the crystal image -  in 
this case promoted by the images’ narrative ability, or narrativity. Chapter 
Five considers the process of photography that is at the heart of the crystal 
environment. The coming into being of the photographic image is 
understood via Deleuze’s notion (with Felix Guattari) of becoming. The 
chapter uses the early experimental filmmaking of Andy Warhol, 
particularly My Hustler, Poor Little Rich Girl, and Empire, to explore the 
artist and his work as a demonstration of this becoming in photography. 
Becoming is the essential seed of photography’s direct representation of 
time, and Warhol’s work -  which reduced artistic production to ‘one 
extreme function’ -  presents the photographic image in its role as opsign 
before intervention by perception, criticism, and practice separates cinema 
from photography, and consequently creates the conception of 
photography and time which provoked the study in this thesis. The thesis 
has a short Conclusion that looks beyond the study of time represented in 
photography to propose conditions of the time-image in relation to painting 
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The philosophical backbone of this thesis is the concept of the time-image 
that Gilles Deleuze uses in his two-volume study of cinema. Cinema 1:
The Movement-lmage (1983) and Cinema 2: The Time-image (1985) 
reconsider cinema practice and history, and re-orient them around a 
discussion of time and perception that Deleuze had developed from the 
work of Henri Bergson 1. The books are not an attempt at a written history 
of cinema, although Deleuze himself has described as a “natural history” 
of sorts. His aim instead was to classify cinema according to images, 
signs, and compositions “as one classifies animals”2. Deleuze intentionally 
avoids orthodox classifications of cinema such as division by genre, public 
taste, or genealogy, and instead guides the reader toward two basic 
understandings of cinema: the movement-image, whose narration is based 
upon a rational organisation of time and space, and cinema of the time- 
image, which breaks such a system of representation to confront directly 
our perception of time. It is from these two types of image that all cinema 
has developed.
Deleuze’s proposal of the movement-image and time-image is not one of 
opposing systems of meaning or necessarily conflicting modes of 
representation, but two alternate flourishings of the same principles of 
cinema, one (movement-image) that has its ontological basis in the 
movement within the cinema apparatus, and one (time-image) that exploits 
any awareness of this reliance, thus (arguably) leaving it behind. The 
movement-image as a classification accounts for much of the mainstream, 
or the majority of cinema that has been often defined as that of ‘classical 
narrative’ (cinema “of the American tradition” as Deleuze has i t 3). 
Deleuze’s first volume is an elaboration of the differing types of movement- 
image cinema that have grown from one fundamental concept: the cinema 
apparatus’ division of time into discrete and static units -  frames or 
photogrammes on the film strip -  which it reconstitutes to give the
1 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-image, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam, (1983), 2nd edn, (London: Athlone, 1997). (M I) Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time- 
image, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, (1985), 2nd edn, (London: Athlone, 1994).
(TI)
2 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations 1972-1990, trans. by Martin Joughin, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995), p. 46.
8impression of time through the representation of movement in space. 
Deleuze saw the photogramme as an immobile section of time because it 
fixed movement into stasis or equilibrium. He saw the reconstituted 
cinema image (or shot) as a mobile section of time, because it strung 
these photogrammes together to create an image of motion. Time is 
presented through the depiction of motion in a sensory-motor schema, a 
perceptive organisation of space-time based rationally and informed by 
culture: the hands on a clock organise the perception of time by 
connecting it to movement in space that is recognised through habit. In the 
analysis of cinema, Deleuze develops this as the image of action (action- 
image) that ensues or is born of the opposition or duel between values 
that logically act and counteract -  of which cause and effect is the defining 
example: “...situation-action, action-reaction, excitation-response...” 4 
Time in cinema proceeds only according to the logic reflected in the 
mechanical projection of photogrammes that pass in series consecutively 
and without variation. The organizing principle within the apparatus and in 
the image it throws up is chronology: the logic of the action-image created 
is, in a way, a reflection of the movement of the film through the 
camera/projector.
From this key concept, Deleuze classifies movement-image cinema as a 
system of representation that organizes itself around larger and larger 
sections in chronological order. The shot is an extension of the 
photogramme; montage is extrapolated from the shot, and from montage 
flows narrative based on cause and effect. However, Deleuze was not 
satisfied that this cinema adequately expressed time in a way that truly 
mirrored or engaged our own perception of it. Drawing on his work on 
Bergson (as he had done in the concept of the movement-image),
Deleuze identified certain cinemas that did not rely on the sensory-motor 
schema in order to depict time, and which instead depicted it directly 
through a disruption of this schema. The organizing principle is not 
chronology, but the disruption of chronology that reveals time understood 
only as change, that Bergson described as duration (duree). This is
3t i ,  p. 211.
4 M I, p. 206.
9cinema of the time-image. In detaching itself from the chronology, this 
cinema does not offer any direct readings or perceptions that might be 
based on a sensory-motor recognition, as in the movement-image.
Instead, interpretations and reinterpretations can be understood as 
unfolding in time from a cinematic image that confronts the perception of 
time directly and in the absence or disruption of the sensory-motor 
schema.
Deleuze’s crystal-image, which can be seen as a character -  or genus -  of 
the time-image, is of particular interest to us since its own confrontation 
with perception allows it to be used to understand the photograph and the 
photographic image in general. The crystal-image is so called because it is 
created by the complex interpretation and reinterpretation of an image that 
unfolds without a pre-given direction. Such a constant re-evaluation of an 
image is brought on or provoked by a sudden of the challenge made by 
subjectivity on objectivity. Shots in film that linger a little too often, the 
constant use of mirrors, or a mobile camera, are, for Deleuze, examples of 
when the subjective perception of film is forced into a awareness of itself 
as subjective, but also of its relationship with the values of objectivity 
commonly reserved for cinema that relies upon the cause and effect logic 
of narrative time and space. This exchange or discourse unfolds in time or, 
as Deleuze suggests, in an experience of time that exists before any 
organisation by perception. The crystal-image is therefore a glimpse of the 
open-ended duration of which Bergson conceived; hence its 
characterisation as a time-image. It is an image of this duration in which 
there is not only perception, but also the perception of that perception, a 
kind of self-consciousness. This is never simply a ‘reflexivity’, or basic self- 
awareness, since the same self-awareness is part of this complex 
interaction. Instead Deleuze views this relationship as one of being in 
circuit, since not only is it is an unbroken exchange (the circuit is a perfect 
example of irreducible movement), but its only direction or progression is 
to lead on to further reinterpretations: “...the actual optical image 
crystallizes with its own virtual image, on the small internal circuit. This is
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the crystal image....” 5 It is the constant emanation of mental images that 
creates the crystalline structure.
The issue of reflexivity in cinema and the fragmenting of unified subjective 
responses to the cinema -  a fragmentation that characterises the crystal -  
suggest a reason for renewed interest in Deleuze’s work. Recent years 
have seen a resurgence in the study of the Cinema books, accompanied 
by a similar interest in Deleuze’s wider career as a philosopher. Sparked 
perhaps by Deleuze’s untimely death in 1995, this re-discovery of writings 
that were originally published in the 1980s has come at the same time that 
those philosophical approaches that dominated that decade are 
diversifying -  if not waning. On the one hand, psychoanalytic, gender- 
based, or spectatorship-led accounts of cinema, such as those that 
flourished in the UK journal Screen in the 1970s and 1980s, have been 
predicated on a singular or unified spectator. Strategies used to 
understand oppositional or divergent spectator positions, including the 
feminine or homosexual gaze, still relied upon discrete and essentially 
fixed values. The structural accounts of film practice that these 
approaches involve, such as in the identification of unified spectator 
positions based on class, race or gender, are inadequate to deal with the 
malleability, diffusion, and stratification of film practitioners and audiences 
alike. On the other hand, it is also possible that ‘Screen theory’, as it has 
come to be known, has reached that end of its life as a defining paradigm 
of film analysis, and just as the medium itself seems in the throes of 
considerable change in terms of material production and development, so 
the analytical community searches for different paradigms to follow. 
Moreover, Screen theory’s political stance -  its championing of the 
Brechtian cinema of Jean-Luc Godard, or oppositional strategies of 
representation based on confrontation with gender hierarchies -  is based 
on a cinema that is self-aware yet direct and without ambiguity in its 
address.
Deleuze’s approach actually represents a moving on from Screen theory in 
all these respects, a divergence exemplified by a similar interest in a
5 TI, p. 69.
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politicised de-stabilisation of gender, class, or race hierarchies. Deleuze’s 
ideal political cinema is one whose resistance is altogether more indirect, 
though no less formidable, in that it seeks to break down cinema’s 
established representation systems -  whether mainstream or oppositional. 
In a philosophical approach common across much of his other work, 
Deleuze re-evaluates the binary logic of mainstream and resistance in 
culture as being incapable of accounting for the diversity, multiplicity, and 
heterogeneity of that culture. The values of subject and object, which 
underpin the spectatorship analysis of recent film criticism, involve just 
such a binary system of organisation. Whilst the cinema books are not a 
direct attack on Screen theory by name, Deleuze’s attempt in the volumes 
to move beyond the limiting values of subject and object represent part of 
his overall understanding of a culture in which cinema is an enormous 
part. The time-image, for Deleuze, represents a frequent instance in 
cinema when the limits of such values are often revealed.
Deleuze’s philosophy is not without its critics, and perhaps rightly suffers 
from its self-conscious cinephilia, which can provide for examples that 
seem erratic or otherwise only guided by Deleuze’s personal interest. In its 
change of analytical focus from the role of reception to that of the material 
construction of affect in general, it can invite accusations of naivete, or 
technological determinism, but this would be to misunderstand Deleuze’s 
approach. In connecting cinema’s relationship to perception with its 
apparatus (and the effect of the apparatus’ principles on the 
representation of time and space), Deleuze’s brings a philosophy of 
perception of cinema to a philosophy of perception in cinema, and finally 
to narrative and authorship: thus making it a philosophy of form as well as 
of politics.
Photography in particular invites a Deleuzean reading based on the 
concept of the crystal, and in relation to the discourse of subject and 
object. The crystal-image relies upon an actual image, located in the 
apparatus, in exchange with the virtual image of its interpretation, and the 
discourse of photography -  with its attendant discussion of veracity 
against selectivity or personal response -  suggests an immediate
12
comparison. We can recognise this immediately in cinema that involves an 
exposition of photography; such as when photographs are essential to film 
narratives, but especially when these photographs are used to question 
the nature of photography in the process of filmmaking. Similarly, the 
lingering camera serves to remind us that objects are being photographed, 
whilst the use of mirrors marks the presence of the camera through its 
visible absence. However, perhaps the most important analysis we will 
make is that this kind of self-consciousness is not simply demonstrated in 
cinema, nor even in cinema that references photography alone. By 
contrast it is a characteristic noticeable across photographic media; in 
cinema and the photograph.
The photograph has largely been ignored by orthodox criticism on the 
grounds that it is incapable of depicting time as a passing. This is perhaps 
because the photograph has been reduced in popular conception to the 
frame from which cinema is constituted. The photograph is often 
considered ‘time-less’, as negating time, or as simply poor in comparison 
to cinema; Andre Bazin, for example, might have talked of cinema as 
‘change mummified’, but photography, for him, ‘embalms time’ itself.6 
However such an approach only considers time as chronology, and does 
not consider the possibility of an image of time that is not based upon a 
sensory-motor schema. Looking at a photograph offers its own experience 
of time altogether; one that is very different from chronological time, and 
which can only be considered in terms of pure duration. The crystal-image, 
which involves an unfolding of time from the image, already offers itself as 
possible means of demonstration that, in photography, it is the case that 
‘time-less’ does not necessarily mean ‘duration-less’.
*  *  *
The Photograph in Bergson and Deleuze
In order to proceed in the thesis and fully engage texts across cinema and 
photography that might offer the crystal-image of time in this way, this
13
opening chapter explores more closely Deleuze’s ideas and their 
foundation in Bergson. Deleuze’s approach to film (we shall employ a film 
as a useful analogy of this later in the chapter) offers a complex view of 
the relationship between perception and time that can, in turn, be used to 
reconsider the photograph as time-image.
Deleuze himself is initially dismissive of the photograph as a potential 
time-image. In conflating the photograph with the frame of a film strip, 
Deleuze is satisfied with its part in the sensory-motor schema and as only 
capable of presenting the first level of signification from which the 
movement-image develops. Deleuze thus ties the photograph (or 
instantaneous image as photogramme) to the false movement of cinema, 
as developed in Bergson’s Creative Evolution of 1907, and from which the 
movement-image is a result:
Cinema, in fact, works with two complementary givens: 
instantaneous frames which are called images; and a movement or 
a time which is impersonal, uniform, abstract, invisible, or 
imperceptible, which is ‘in’ the apparatus, and ‘with’ which the 
images are made to pass consecutively.7
However, Deleuze’s own approach to the cinema books is to re-read 
Bergson, and invest an understanding of cinema with a deeper 
understanding of the time-image. Indeed, Deleuze largely stays away from 
Creative Evolution in favour of Bergson’s earlier Matter and Memory from 
1896.8 Matter and Memory was written as an investigation of the 
perception of time, and deals with a simple relation between duration and 
motion-matter-image. Although Bergson went on to deal with cinema 
directly in 1907, Deleuze goes back (as he describes) to the earlier 
delivery of the philosophy of the movement-image and time-image in order 
to reconsider Bergson’s original approach. 9
6 Andre Bazin, 'The Ontology of Photographic Image', in What is Cinema, California, UoC, 1967, 
rpt. in Alan Trachtenberg, ed. Classic Essays on Photography, (Connecticut, Leete's Island, 1980), 
|jp237-245, p. 242.
M I, p. 1. See also Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (1907), trans. by Arthur Mitchell, (New 
York, Macmillan, 1911), p. 322. (CE)
8 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory (1896), trans. by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer 
(1911), (New York, Zone, 1996), 5th edn. (M M )
9 M I, pp. 47-48.
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Deleuze directly confronts Bergson’s thesis on time throughout the cinema 
books, and develops the work on Bergson he started in the 1950s and 
which includes his Bergsonism of 1966 10. The methodology that Deleuze 
employs, in going back to the source and beyond, points towards our own 
methodology. It is Bergson’s concept of time, and Deleuze’s 
understanding of it, which must provide a point of departure for us. 
Moreover, it is in Deleuze’s own words, and in particular his chapter on the 
crystal-image, that we find the key to an understanding of the photograph 
as time-image.
The reason why Deleuze never fully explores the photograph as time- 
image is clear: its part in the sensory-motor-schema renders it antithetical 
to Deleuze’s conception of a direct image of time. Bergson’s own 
understanding was based on this assumption. Cinema reconstitutes 
movement through the successive projection of single photographic 
images. To do this it must return movement, albeit abstractly, to an image 
which artificially creates stasis:
Photography is a kind of ‘moulding’: the mould organizes the 
internal forces of the thing in such a way that they reach a state of 
equilibrium at a certain instant (immobile section). 11
Deleuze’s conception of the photograph, and of its treatment of 
movement, appears to be under the shadow of Bergson’s theory. At a 
crucial point in Matter and Memory, Bergson likens the photograph to the 
organization of memory into abstract and discrete recollection images 
(other consequences of which we shall see later).
The whole difficulty of the problem that occupies us comes from the 
fact that we imagine perception to be a kind of photographic view of 
things, taken from a fixed point by that special apparatus which is 
called an organ of perception...But is it not obvious that the
10 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism (1966), trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, (New 
York, Zone, 1997). (B)
11 M I, p. 24.
15
photograph, if photograph there be, is already taken, already 
developed in the heart of things and in all points of space? 12
This passing notation strengthens this view of the photograph, particularly 
in its parallels with cinema, for cinema of the movement-image (of the 
sensory-motor schema) organizes duration into similar abstract and 
discrete units of space-time. Perception is perspectival (“the discarding of 
what has no interest for our needs”), and creates an image on the brain as 
a perception-organ that acts individually and which reflects its image of the 
universe as if in the ground glass or mirror that it is unable to penetrate 
without refraction or distortion. On the other hand, Bergson offers a 
universe that is already an infinite multiplicity of viewpoints that makes up 
the whole -  as suggested by Leibniz, who we will look at later. The screen 
or mirror for this is a plane of immanence that Deleuze suggests is made 
up of “as many eyes as you like”, from which the eye that senses is “one 
movement-image amongst others...because the eye is in things” 13. Thus 
perception is a limitation of the whole by an interested point of view (“What 
you have to explain, then, is not how perception arises but how it is 
limited.. .reduced to the image of that which interests you” 14) that easily 
assumes the specular paradigm of photography. From this difference -  
between the objective as the myriad of viewpoints and the subjective as a 
privileged, interested, one -  Deleuze develops an idea from Pier Paolo 
Pasolini of a cinema image as always having the proposal of this 
difference within it:
Now Pasolini thought that the essential element of the 
cinematographic image corresponded neither to a direct discourse, 
nor to an indirect discourse, but to a free indirect discourse 15.
12 M M , p. 39.
13 Gilles Deleuze, L ’Image-mouvement, (Lecture at Universite Vincennes St-Denis, 1982), 
http://www.webdeleuze.com/TXT/CINEMAl.html: “ ...il y a autant d'yeux que vous voudrez, 
mais l'oeil au sens que vous pouvez lui donner n'est qu’une image-mouvement parmi les autres, 
done ne jouit strictement d'aucun privilege...C'est parce que l'oeil est dans les choses.”
See also M I, p. 76: “ ...a subjective perception is one in which the images vary in relation to a 
central and privileged image; an objective perception is one where, as in things, all the images 
vary in relation to one another, on all their facets and in all their parts.”
14 M M , p. 40.
15 Ibid, p. 72.
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This ‘proposition’ exists in all photogrammes for Deleuze, and flourishes 
as a discourse whilst it remains part of, or as an alternative to, the 
sensory-motor schema that constitutes its organisation into the action- 
image. Deleuze’s adoption of Pasolini, which will become essential to the 
argument in this thesis, immediately suggests that the photograph 
contains a similar proposition as does the cinematographic image.
However, at this point Bergson’s understanding of a perception governed 
by the metaphor of photography (“we imagine perception to be a kind of 
photographic view of things") deserves interrogation. The first 
photographs, whether by scientist, artist, or amateur, were instruments for 
the construction of tableaux, in the traditions of the picturesque. 
Photography was conceived to create privileged views of time and space. 
As photographic science surpassed eagerly anticipated landmark 
moments (the development of fine lenses, fast emulsions, colour 
processes) it became immersed in an understanding of the world through 
division and differentiation. It became more important to divide time into 
smaller and smaller elements rather than explore the experience of time 
as a passing. The experiments of the Lumieres and Edison in the 1890s 
were to reconstitute time from images which were previously valued for 
their stasis. The conception of a moving image strung together from 
photographs was one of putting movement back into an image whose 
immobility had been considered one of its virtues. Early photographs of 
empty streets, a popular choice for the daguerreotype in the 1840s, were 
empty because the movement of pedestrians and vehicles could not be 
arrested. Photographic technology quickly advanced from a period in 
which movement could not be frozen by its long exposures, to the 
capturing of action as discrete images of hiatus taken from movement. The 
photograph was to eventually be prized for its ability to privilege certain 
views -  as much of time as of space. 16
A principle argument that can be made of Bergson’s use of cinema as a 
metaphor for perception is that it contradicts history. The idea of cinema or
16 Beamont Newhall, 'The Conquest of Action', in The History o f Photography, (New York: 
MoMA, 1982), ppl 17-141.
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photography being the model for biological perception sounds absurd, as 
much for Deleuze himself as it might to neuroscientists, because sensory 
perception -  if not affection -  is fundamental. However, the use and 
expectations of the photograph, as object and as metaphor, suggest that 
whilst sensory perception might be unaffected, the perception-image (and 
subsequent affection-image) might not be. Let us offer an explanation for 
this conundrum.
Bergson was by no means alone in identifying the ways in which 
perception divides duration into discrete elements, and in using 
photography as a throwaway metaphor for it (although his use of the 
Cinematographe is less than throwaway). Photography was and has been 
used as a model or paradigm by various people. To demonstrate this we 
can use two examples of such ‘photographic’ discourse, firstly in 
nineteenth century literature (as an example of popular culture), and 
secondly in a contemporary scientific approach (in this case cognitive 
neuroscience or psychology). The first occurs a few years before 
Bergson’s 1896 thesis, and the second is a discussion that proceeds from 
the late 1960s to the present day.
The first example is the novel L’Eve future, by Villiers de I’lsle Adam, 
which was published in 1886 17. Villiers’s novel recounts an attempt by a 
fictional inventor (based very closely on Thomas Edison) to create an 
artificial intelligence in the shape of the wife of an English nobleman (Lord 
Ewald), in order to replace the nobleman’s real (and undesirable) wife. The 
novel is filled with rich descriptions of technologies both recently revealed 
and anticipated by popular culture. As such, scenes in Edison’s 
apartments and laboratory describe established inventions, such as the 
telegraph, telephone, and phonograph, which had already become 
instrumental in affecting the daily life of urban middle-class readers (L’Eve 
future had appeared earlier in the magazine La Vie Moderne 18). Similarly 
those inventions whose emergence was then little more than dreamed of 
are described to similar effect: at one point the inventor shows Ewald a
17 Villiers de PIsle Adam, L 'Eve Future (Tomorrow’s Eve) (1886), trans. by Robert Martin Adams 
(1982), (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001).
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moving picture, in colour and with sound, of a woman who had once been 
the model for the robot (andreid) that he has built. Early on, in a chapter 
entitled ‘Snapshots of World History’, Villiers laments, through the 
character of Edison, the absence of photographers to record epochal 
moments of biblical history and mythology19. In one passage photography 
is both suggested as conflating time and space to fix the image or view of 
such events, and offered as a paradigm for the creation of those 
‘moments’ in the narrative of history. History and mythology (with 
personnel reduced to their cartes-de-visite) at once assume the principle 
characteristic of the nineteenth century photographic album, whose own 
purpose was similarly to turn the family into narrativised (and thus socially 
ratified) history:
Photography too has come along very late...Too bad. For it would 
have been delightful to possess good photographic prints (taken on 
the spot) of Joshua Bidding the Sun Stand Stili, for example. Or 
why not several differing views of The Earthly Paradise, taken from 
The Gateway of the Flaming Swords', the Tree of Knowledge', the 
Serpent; and so forth? Perhaps a number of shots of The Deluge, 
Taken from the Top of Mount Ararat? [...] And photographs of all 
the beautiful women, including Venus, Europa, Psyche, Delilah, 
Rachel, Judith, Cleopatra, Aspasia, Freya, Maneka, Thais, 
Akedysseril, Roxalana, the Queen of Sheba, Phryne, Circe, 
Dejanira, Helen, and so on down to the beautiful Pauline 
Bonaparte! to the Greek veiled by law! to Lady Emma Harte 
Hamilton!20
Thus the whole of history is reduced to a staccato procession of discrete 
elements, reduced to particular views or images of significant figures. The 
predominance of the (gendered) ‘view’ suggests a spatial imperative 
clearly informed by the nineteenth century popularity of photography of the 
exotic - a power structure which demands noting. The passage is
18 Ibid. See Translators Introduction, p. xiv.
19 Unsurprisingly, Villiers doesn’t quite explain how the moving pictures are achieved, and hints at 
a strip of “transparent plastic encrusted with bits of tinted glass” that passes between a lens and a 
powerful reflector (p. 117). (Interestingly, the subtitle 'snapshots' is probably an anachronism in 
translation from 'photographies': The term was not commonly used until after the first Kodaks 
were released in 1888. Ibid Newhall)
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nonetheless an example of the reduction of the passing of time into 
tessellated passage of privileged views as fixed states.
This reduction of events into ever-smaller discrete elements is echoed in 
our second example, a recent study into the understanding of emotions 
and the operations of the brain in their formation. Joseph LeDoux has 
incorporated a model of affective perception called ‘Flashbulb Memory’21. 
Paralleling Villiers’s use of great events of antiquity, LeDoux uses the 
assassination of John F. Kennedy as an example of a world event that had 
the significant popular resonance. LeDoux suggests that the increase in 
adrenaline as a result of an event that has a significant consequential 
effect on the perceiver improves the brain’s ability to recall the event in 
extraordinary detail (mirroring Bergson’s formulation that perception will 
grasp only things which are most interesting to it). The defining paradigm 
for this is the anecdotal ‘rehearsal’ of the moment one heard that Kennedy 
had been shot, but similar events (such as the space shuttle Challenger 
disaster, the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, and the recent events in 
New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania) just as easily apply. LeDoux 
attributes the Flashbulb Memory theory to an earlier article by Roger 
Brown and James Kulik who demonstrate this principle of consequentiality 
22. People will remember those events that have economic or political 
significance to them, particularly if this has ramifications in terms of civil 
rights in the workplace or, in basic terms, to put food on the table -  as 
Kennedy’s assassination did. They further suggest Flashbulb Memory as 
only an analogy or metaphor since these recollections are indiscriminate in 
the same way that photographs are:
...there is something strange about this recall...Indeed, it is very 
like a photograph that indiscriminately preserves the scene in which 
each of us found himself [sic] when the flashbulb was fired.
What relegates this to metaphor, rather than paradigm, is the intervention 
of selective memory, which they do not see paralleled in the photograph:
20 Ibid, pp. 21-22.
21 Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, (New York: Simon &  Schuster, 1996), p. 206-211.
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An actual photograph, taken by flashbulb, preserves everything 
within its scope’ it is altogether indiscriminate...In short, a flashbulb 
memory is only somewhat indiscriminate and is very far from 
complete. 23
Brown and Kulik proceed with the assumption of indiscriminate objectivity 
and impartiality on the part of the photograph, forgetting or neglecting the 
subjectivity that points the perspectival and discriminating view of the 
camera’s lens. Similarly, they neglect the malleable subjectivity of their 
informants, who are as likely to recall the mediation of the events as they 
are the ‘hearing of the news’. Brown and Kulik disqualify two 
questionnaires because they recount the event in this manner, whilst 
LeDoux adds the intervention of the media as a caveat for the idea of 
Flashbulb Memory24 What this demonstrates is that, in proposing the 
idea, they then go on to produce a quantitative test based on the 
‘photographic view’ as a defining paradigm, all the while negating it as 
anything more than a metaphor. They test the memories people have of 
the mediation of the event (hearing the news), which itself is dominated by 
television, radio, intercom, newspapers etc. as if that mediation had no 
bearing on their affective responses. Interesting also is Brown and Kulik’s 
stress upon the ‘live’ nature of Flashbulb Memory, which emphasises an 
easy reliving of the events as if these were different to the recollection of 
other, more banal events. This interesting sidebar -  both of the living 
potential of the photographic and the way we live through memory -  will 
resurface again and again in this thesis.25
22 Roger Brown and James Kulik, ‘Flashbulb Memories’, in Cognition 5, (1977), pp. 73-99. 
Considering their use of the Kennedy example, this article and its subject invite comparisons with 
contemporary accounts of the World Trade Centre attacks in particular.
23 Ibid pp. 74-75.
24 Ibid, p. 78. See LeDoux, 1996, p. 209.
25 Similarly, in more recent events that have been witnessed ‘as they happen’, it is difficult to 
discern the event itself from the mediation of it. This was particularly evident during the Gulf War, 
and during the attacks in New York. The media itself constitutes part of the event, since some of 
the traumatic effects of the event (in the case of the World Trade Centre at least) were due to the 
telepresence of people watching across the globe. In spatial terms, it is never clear where the 
mediated ‘here’ ends and the event ‘over there’ begins. Furthermore, in the case of both the death 
of the Princess of Wales and the New York attacks, the narrative-led organisation of the events by 
the media proceeded almost instantaneously, thereby confounding an easy separation of 
‘ independent’ perception of the events and their ‘mediation’ all the more.
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Brown and Kulik themselves draw on the work of Robert B. Livingston, 
whose concept of a “Now print!” action of memory provides the foundation 
for their own 26 The “Now print!” order is a ‘concatenation' of sensory 
perceptions that fulfil the requirements of memories that must be retained 
in order to survive. Brown and Kulik’s development of this idea is as much 
a proposal of why these memories might be important as it is an analysis 
of the quality and quantity of the memories involved. Since then, LeDoux 
has used the idea to explain the complex relationship between emotional 
memories, and memories of emotion27. Nonetheless, both Flashbulb 
Memories and the “Now Print!” order are examples of scientific 
approaches that see memory as a process that fixes the past into discrete 
elements, whether based on a survival mechanism or other emotional 
stress. More recently, Hubert D. Zimmer and Ronald L. Cohen’s 
introduction to a collective publication in the field of cognitive psychology -  
Memory for Action -  describe the various theories of episodic memory 
based on actions performed, rather than input received cognitively 28. 
These include actions situated in the past, but also actions ‘encoded’ in 
such a way as to be performed later: such action-memories, or in 
Bergsonian terms action-images of memory, are stored as if contracted 
together and ready to unravel or otherwise spring out. However it is 
described and accounted for, memory follows a similar pattern in Villiers, 
LeDoux et al, and now in this performance based approach. Despite 
focussing on what they call actions that are “‘smaller’ than everyday 
actions”, the authors of Memory for Action demonstrate Bergson’s idea of
26 Robert B. Livingston, ‘Reinforcement’, in Gardner Quarton, Theodore Melnechek and Francis 
O. Schmitt eds., The Neurosciences: A Study Program, (New York: The Rockefeller University 
Press, 1967), pp. 568-577. The “Now Print!” order involves the analogy of print media, and 
possibly early computer printouts as an analogy of the storage of memory as data. Brown and 
Kulik suggest that Livingston misses the role that the media has in recording events in his use of 
the metaphor, and go on to propose reasons for this memory to exist before the analogy is used to 
name it -  echoing Deleuze’s critique of Bergson below.
27 Livingston’s work continues to employ technological metaphors In his book Sensory 
Processing, Perception and Behavior, (New York: Raven Press, 1978), Livingston quietly 
suggests holography (a technology in vogue at the time) as a potentially useful metaphor, amongst 
others (p. 30).
28 Hubert D. Zimmer, Ronald L. Cohen, ‘Remembering Actions; A Specific Type of Memory?’, in 
Hubert D. Zimmer, Ronald L. Cohen, Melissa J. Guynn, Johannes Engelkamp, Reza Kormi-Nouri, 
Mary Ann Foley, Memory fo r Action: A Distinct Form o f Episodic Memory?, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).
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memory-images, imagined as fixed views, just as easily as the others do
29
There is the suggestion here that, whilst these mental processes existed 
independently of the invention of photography (or any of the other 
technologies similarly used), photography and similar media have come to 
affect, if not actually be a part of, the events that are remembered. There 
is no adequately explained separation between the world, its events, and 
the photographs that represent them, since to experience these events is 
to experience their mediation in concert. Furthermore, there is a theme 
running under all these that suggests that media technologies such as 
photography have been developed partly in response to the need not only 
to remember significant events and their consequences, but also to fix 
them sufficiently enough to make sense of them. The Memory for Action 
approach ratifies memory finally as an operation that makes sense of the 
experience by organising it into discrete memory-images (it doubly 
supports Bergson’s thesis, since what are shots but reflections of these 
action-memories?) with the act of photography as a prime example.
Bergson’s tendency to use photographic imagery to describe perception 
and recollection is perhaps forgivable because the discussion of popular 
technology is seductive in any case (as demonstrated in Villiers, and there 
are plenty of contemporary examples). Bergson’s argument is convincing 
as a beautifully wrought metaphor. However, it is clear that photographic 
technologies were developed partly as a response to an urge to organise 
perception that could only be met by photography, and later cinema. In 
these terms we might answer Deleuze’s famous interrogation of Bergson 
and say that, yes, there really was a cinematographic perception before 
cinema 30 Bergson's use of cinema and photography was no less a simple 
use of metaphor than a conscious effort to understand the effect modernity 
was already having on perception. In seeing it only as metaphor, we
29 Ibid, p. 18.
30 This is the question that Deleuze asks at the beginning of Cinema I: “Does this mean that for 
Bergson the cinema is only the projection, the reproduction of a constant, universal illusion? As 
though we had always had cinema without realising it?” See M I, p. 2. Deleuze’s questioning is of 
Bergson’s model of perception as cinematographic; a model that apparently only offers itself after 
cinema’s invention . See Bergson CE.
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neglect the fact that perception has become ruled by the technologies that 
once were perceived to have 'freed' it. It is now clear that, for whatever 
reason, photography is employed to fix the passage of time into a discrete 
element, or fixed state or view, and this follows a pattern set by the 
operation of memory. All of this suggests that photography was all but 
ignored by Bergson and his contemporaries as a medium capable of 
imaging duration, a view reflected in Bazin and other later scholars. 
Deleuze’s work is no exception.
There is, of course, an alternative view. As the technologies of cinema (as 
a time medium) and photography (as a medium that negates time) have 
an identical material base, is it not possible that our perception of them 
might have more similarities than we would ordinarily acknowledge? Is it 
not possible that the contemplative affect of a photograph, the time spent 
lingering over a stilled image, might not be experienced from a shot; or 
that an experience of dynamism in movement and time might not be felt 
from a still image? Furthermore, is it not possible that the contemplation of 
the photographic image might be an experience of duration?
Deleuze extrapolates the sense of contemplation in his discussion of 
Bergson’s ‘glass of sugared water’ from Creative Evolution:
In this respect, Bergson’s famous formulation, “I must wait until the 
sugar dissolves” has a still broader meaning than is given to it by its 
context. It signifies that my own duration, such as I live it in the 
impatience of waiting, for example, serves to reveal other durations 
that beat to other rhythms, that differ in kind from mine. 31
The wait exposes the experience of duration as an internal perception.
The dissolving sugar cannot be measured in chronology, and there is no 
visible sign that the glass has completely passed from one state to 
another. But just as the glass of water is dislocated from external 
chronology, so is the photograph. The experience of duration is not 
dependent upon external images, suggesting that not only is perception of 
duration internal, and that we are internal to duration; but that any image
31 B, p. 32. c.f. MM, p. 10.
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holds the possibility of such a contemplation, whether an image of a glass 
and its contents, or a photographic image. A memory-image, or 
photograph, might create a fixed state or view extracted from the passing 
duration, but the experience of duration continues nonetheless. Might it 
not be a mistake to assume that the photograph replaces perception?
After all, do we not perceive the photograph as a photograph at some 
level, so as to constitute an awareness of its immobility that is comparable 
with Bergson’s waiting for his glass of sugared water?
A return to Bergson and his philosophy is appropriate, because it allows us 
to see why such a misconception occurs when viewing cinema and 
photography in relation to each other. Deleuze reviews Bergson’s 
misconception in terms of cinema, and it is also possible for us to do the 
same in terms of photography. This requires a review of Deleuze also. The 
solution comes through a correction of the perceived difference between 
the two, and an understanding of the philosophy of difference in general. 
As Michael Hardt has pointed out, Deleuze himself adopts Bergson’s 
approach to difference, in Bergsonism and after.32 A similar approach 
might be useful for us.
Essentially, we can see that the difference perceived between cinema and 
photography is a misconception. They undoubtedly differ, but it is the 
difference itself that we must take issue with. Cinema and photography 
share a common practical connection; that of the frame and its material 
base. This means that they are not different in nature, although the 
popular misconception amounts to just that. Deleuze’s dismissal of 
photography also highlights this misconception when he compares cinema 
to the photograph directly.
The still life [in Ozu] is time, for everything that changes is in time, 
but time does not itself change, it could itself change only in another 
time, indefinitely. At the point where the cinematographic image
32 Michael Hardt, Gilles D eleuze-A n  apprenticeship in philosophy, (Minnesota, University of 
Minnesota, 1993), pp. 1-26.
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most directly confronts the photo, it also becomes most radically 
distinct from it .33
However in sharing a common physical base, the shot and the 
photogramme, or cinema and photography, are only radically distinct from 
each other on the condition that they remain part of the same whole. 
Where we perceive difference in the nature of the two media, we should 
actually observe differences in degree within a single medium. Common 
sense directs us to see cinema and photography as essentially different, 
because we experience cinema in entirely different circumstances to 
photography; and yet the fact remains that when we see films we are 
watching a succession of photogrammes that are easily understood as 
photographs, as Christian Metz notes. We will show as does Metz, how 
rather than separated, cinema and photography are joined by “the 
principle of the taking” 34. First though, such a connection suggests that 
questions might be asked of Bergson’s later conception of cinema. His 
opinion of cinema was based on his understanding photographs as 
immobile sections from which cinema is created. Where we might perceive 
a difference in kind, because one depicts movement and time whilst the 
other is static, he only saw a difference in degree.
But if this strengthens his argument of ‘false movement’, then how can we 
conceive of a Deleuzean approach to the photograph? Deleuze does not 
discount that cinema is made up of still images in succession. His principle 
argument is that cinema language (principally of the movement-image) 
exploits the abstract characteristics of the shot. Whilst photogrammes are 
immobile sections, they can be strung together to create shots, or mobile 
sections. These are then organized into sequences of montage, and yet 
again into chronological narrative. Each level is a discrete unit of time that 
flows directly from movement, but remains part of a closed system. 
Deleuze does not attack the physical basis of cinema, but the organization 
of narrative cinema that is centred on the sensory-motor schema. In order
33 TI, p. 17.
34 Christian Metz, 'Photography and Fetish', in October 34, Fall, 1985, pp81-91, p. 82: “And at 
this point, after all, a film is only a series of photographs.”
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to present the time-image, Deleuze looks at cinema that goes beyond or is 
independent of movement and which disrupts narrative and montage 
based on chronology, suggesting that the time-image might exploit this 
characteristic in the photograph. If the photograph could also be seen as a 
dislocation of the image from chronology it might therefore be considered 
as a proposition of a free-indirect discourse. Some photographs could 
have the potential to be those most explosive images of time -  the crystal- 
images -  that we see in cinema. In the crystal-image, time bursts beyond 
the frame from the exchange between the actual and the virtual, made 
possible by the free-indirect proposition as an exchange between the 
scene photographed and the act of photographing, or filming, it. This is an 
act not exclusive to cinema or photography, but which constitutes their 
principle commonality.
On the other hand, this destroys the particular connection between the 
photograph and the sensory-motor schema. The photograph never offers 
any direction for time to proceed from its image, this is only added after, 
either when another photograph is used in succession (as in cinema), or 
when the perception-image seeks to use photographic language to make 
sense of it. We shall see that the photograph offers a depiction of cronos, 
but not chronos. Recollection experienced as a photographic image, to 
use Bergson’s analogy, demonstrates the mechanics of re-collection itself, 
but does not provide a fulfilling explanation of the photograph in return.
By demonstrating the time-image’s independence of the sensory-motor 
schema, Deleuze opens up a reading of the possibilities of the photograph 
as a time-image; but the difference commonly perceived between cinema 
and photography still stands in our way. The fields of cinema and 
photography study have rarely mixed. For those scholars to whom 
Deleuze himself turns in his cinema theses, including Andre Bazin and 
Christian Metz, cinema is conceived as different from photography through 
negation of time: “Movement and plurality [in cinema] both imply time, as 
opposed to the timelessness of photography which is comparable to the 
timelessness of the unconscious and of memory...” as Metz later
suggested 35. In a complex reading of the dualistic negation of one by the 
other, Metz argued that “Film gives back to the dead a semblance of life...” 
(p.84) but also that film is “less a succession of photographs than, to a 
large extent, a destruction of the photograph, or more exactly of the 
photograph’s power and action” (p.85). This difference is viewed as one 
based on the absence of time in the photograph (seen here as its peculiar 
power), rather than their material differences. An alternative view should 
be taken of this difference: if photography and cinema share a material 
commonality in the act of taking, as Metz suggests, then they might also, 
contrary to Metz, share a characteristic representation of time. The 
difference between time and timelessness should be seen as one of 
degree, rather than a difference in kind.
Cinema and photography culture -  the discourses that surround them -  
creates an ‘ideal’ set of circumstances for a classical cinema, or a pure 
photography: cinema has developed its language around montage and the 
transparency of its apparatus. Conversely, in photography study there is a 
state of ‘pure’ photography that freezes a decisive moment to take it out of 
chronological time, and to flatten it into an abstract and tactile paper 
image. Where Cinema hides its manufacture of false movement, the 
Photograph makes its physical ontology explicit.
However, such a theoretical organization is blind to the movement 
between the two, both in the practice and reception. How can such a strict 
definition account for experimentation with the form of cinema by avant- 
garde filmmakers who draw attention to cinema’s ontology by 
foregrounding it? What of filmmakers who reject the chronology of cause- 
and effect narrative, or the montage or editing conventions of classical 
storytelling? They do not fit into such a narrow organization of cinema 
practice. Similar questions can be asked of photography. As the 
photographic images of cinema and photography share the flat picture 
plane, so photography has come to borrow conventions of composition 
from cinema. Even in history, pioneers such as Eadweard Muybridge, 
have sat comfortably in neither the pantheon of photographers, nor the
35 Metz, 1985, pp81-91, p. 83.
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pantheon of filmmakers. How should the apparent difference between 
photography and cinema cope with this?
An alternative view of cinema should be taken up that sees photography 
and cinema as abstract points in a single medium. Organisations into 
genres, movements, or practices, are therefore merely the creation of sets 
within larger sets that unfold to become an ever-growing singular entity 
(Deleuze’s open-whole). The states of ‘classical’ cinema and ‘pure’ 
photography can only be seen as nominal, even idealized or perspectival, 
values that have been identified over time by criticism, and as such remain 
purely critical ones. In recognizing this we also see another way of 
reviewing Deleuze’s approach to the time-image. The free-indirect 
proposition occurs when the physical aspects that make up the image are 
foregrounded; something which photography finds easy. The image 
created thus depends upon the nature of this reflexivity: Eisenstein’s 
cinema, whose strongest political points relied on movement in film 
created from the juxtaposition of otherwise static images in series, 
interpolates this juxtaposition from photography, which is why Deleuze 
sees his filmmaking as a paradigm of the movement-image. Eisenstein’s 
cinema is a cinema opposition based on the time/timelessness relationship 
established in photography and that reflects Metz’ later analysis: 
movement and time is constituted from immobile sections (as timeless) 
that act as extended photographs -  the montage of Kerensky’s battle with 
Kornilov in October is an example. The time-image, on the other hand, is 
the fulfilment of the free-indirect discourse as a dislocation from the 
progression of images that make up the movement-image, a progression 
often accelerated by music -  as in October. The time-image becomes a 
reality for Deleuze when sound and image become separated, and the 
image is considered on its own terms as a purely optical situation. The 
time-image foregrounds time/timelessness as an exchange, rather than an 
opposition. The strength of any political filmmaking is not through the 
opposition to but rather the awareness of and subsequent dislocation from
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all language systems -  classical, post-classical, counter-cinema (Wollen) -  
that seek to organise this exchange into opposition 36.
We should therefore ask ourselves if Deleuze’s study of the dicisign -  the 
free-indirect proposition -  in cinema could not be extended to a study of 
the dicisign in photography and, more importantly, to the continuum of 
which they are both a part. The movement-image exists for both cinema 
and photography, but in stepping away from the movement-image, we find 
that all forms of cinema and photography exhibit the self-consciousness of 
the dicisign. The relationship between photography and cinema should no 
longer be seen as a confrontation based on external difference, but should 
be given instead the paradoxical description: a single heterogeneity - one 
medium whose discourse gives rise to a multiplicity of forms. It is from this 
multiplicity that the time-image arises, and such differences should only be 
seen as internal to the medium as a whole. The differences between 
cinemas and photographies are differences in intensity, rather than 
extensity: they are all photography. Where the intensity in cinema might 
come from speed, in the photograph it exists in its infinitesimal slowness. It 
is no longer appropriate to identify where cinema and the photograph 
meet, for there is no ‘no-man’s-land’ across which they stare at each other, 
or for them to cross. Instead of a bi-partite schema of opposing poles, 
there is a continuum that exists across the photographic medium that is 
bursting with variations of the photographic process. If Deleuze found the 
time-image in cinema, can we therefore not find it in the photograph? 
Furthermore, where does the cinema-as-time-image end, and where does 
the photograph-as-time-image begin?
The next chapter will consider the multiplicity that emanates from the 
singular photographic image. By looking at Deleuze’s own choice of 
cinema directly, the chapter reconsiders his approach to the optical 
situation in general, and the photographic image in particular. This will 
create points of departure (or lines of flight) for the later studies. The 
photograph-as-time-image is a constituent of time-image cinema but for
36 Peter Wollen, ‘Vent d’est: Godard and Counter Cinema’, in Readings and Writings, (London: 
NLB, 1982), pp. 79-91.
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our purposes its relationship to duration should be considered under its 
own conditions. Furthermore, those conditions exist for it across 
photography as a whole.
In many ways, what this means is a realignment of Deleuze’s central 
ideas. It is a bigger task than simply that of chalking off the various 
occasions that any writer has established the lack of contiguity between 
the photograph and cinema. Instead it is a matter of re-approaching the 
work of Deleuze to understand the conditions of the time-image and the 
ontology of photography that might fulfil them.
The aim is to demonstrate that the photographic time-image is possible 
when considering the conditions that Deleuze places on it, and from then 
begin to discuss the possibility of the photograph as crystal-image. First of 
all, in order to fully demonstrate how the photograph offers a potential 
time-image, we must consider the relationship between perception and 
photography by demonstrating in turn the relationship between duration 
and perception. To do this, we must return to cinema.
★  *  *
Introducing recollection and duration: A Matter of Life and Death
In Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger's 1946 film A Matter of Life and 
Death, pilot Peter Carter (David Niven) suffers brain damage after bailing 
out of his stricken plane over the North Sea. After this near-death 
experience, his position on Earth becomes hotly contested between the 
doctor trying to cure him, and the fantastical bureaucrats of the next world, 
whose oversight it was that caused him to survive the plane crash in the 
first place. During the film, as this battle of wits ensues, Carter is given 
over to a series of nervous attacks during which time around him stops. 
The first occurs while his new-found lover June sleeps,
Conductor #71: She cannot wake, we are talking in space, not in 
time.
Carter: Are you cracked?
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Conductor #71: Look at your watch. It has not moved since you 
said, so charmingly, “Drink darling?” Nor will it move. Nor will 
anything move ‘til we finish our little chat.
This is later followed by an ‘interlude’ whilst Carter sleeps. Conductor #71 
re-affirms their independence from the ‘tyranny of time’:
Slide 4
These attacks are always signposted by depictions of time of differing 
abstraction, and the most striking of these interrupts a table tennis game. 
The ticking sound of the ball as it is passed from player to player is 
abruptly stopped, ball in mid-air, as if a clock were stopped. Time itself 
appears to be interrupted. In this silent world, the present exists only as an 
internal experience. Chronological, abstract time has been halted, and his 
experience is only one of pure change or duration. What is left is the time 
of Carter's mind as he argues and debates with his conductor. These 
interludes unfold as he wishes, and as each discussion or argument grows 
more complex and intense. Time, no longer governed by movement or 
sound, is simply duration: as long or as short an impression of being as it 
needs to be.
The film is significant for us because it introduces possibilities of 
considering time, the experience of time, and perception internal to time. It 
is useful to consider this film as a way into an understanding of the theory 
of duration underpinning Deleuze’s cinema books. At its deepest level, life 
exists as absolute change, a duration defined only by the interaction of 
objects and perceptions. Duration is the foundation of life, a transition or 
change that is substance itself. Duration, as Deleuze describes of 
Bergson’s concept, “is a becoming that endures” 37.
Separated from the abstract representations of time, the interludes are 
direct images of this duration. They bear no relation to the chronological
37 B, p. 37.
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organization of time that surrounds them; they are visibly and sensibly 
different. In the physical world, time is organized through movement in 
space, a sensory-motor schema. Yet this is incommensurable with the 
pure inorganic duration in which Carter experiences his interludes. Carter’s 
experience of time within these interludes is governed by his own 
perception; reduced to its most fundamental relation of memory and 
duration. Throughout the film, he is forced to deal with his predicament 
through a discussion of life perceived through his own recollection. This 
comes to a final denouement as he is forced to argue over not only his 
own past, but also a greater past of his race. The political aims of the film 
in 1946 give rise to an unfolding of recollection as the past of the English 
and Carter’s own past are contracted 38. This ongoing situation in the film 
presents a characteristic of a Bergsonian or Deleuzean understanding of 
duration and memory; namely, that duration and memory are co-existent, 
one as a becoming that endures, and one as the recollection of that 
becoming, a perception-image. In memory, Bergson notes that we first 
place ourselves into the past in general, and then into regions of the past, 
in an operation he called a contraction-image. This past continues to exist 
as a virtual image; it continues to grow as change endures. It is a virtual 
co-existence of past and the present that recollects it. In the film, for 
example, Carter continues to return to the chronological present of June 
and the others, creating past as the film progresses. As he argues for his 
life, he draws upon his actions in the past that co-exists with his own 
autonomous present -  the present of his own perception. Carter’s falling in 
love in the chronological present co-exists with his non-chronological 
interludes of perception. At the end of the film he draws upon a present 
that is also past, in a world (an other world) that will eventually become the 
present.
This compounding of memory exposes a sense of duration free of organic 
chronology bound to movement in space. Memory is the perception of 
duration: the image of this non-chronological change. Chronological time
38 The film has been acknowledged as an exercise in trans-Atlantic co-operation, but also as 
having tacit criticisms of the impending socialist bureaucracy that the newly elected Labour 
government of Clement Attlee might bring in. For a useful analysis and review of these various 
readings, see Ian Christie, A Matter o f Life and Death (BFI Film Classic), (London: BFI, 2000).
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considers that time has passed (by the organization of history through 
recollection-images) and that time will continue to pass and become future 
(by the contracting of all possible events into the concept of future). 
Memory is therefore a dualistic image of duration that forks or splits into 
two directions, one that considers the past, and another that considers the 
future. This is acknowledged in Deleuze’s 1966 reading of Bergson.
...we find ourselves in a movement -  which we will examine later-  
by which the “present” that endures divides at each “instant” into 
two directions, one oriented and dilated toward the past, the other 
contracted, contracting toward the future...It is clear that memory is 
identical to duration, that it is co-extensive with duration... 39
We can see this forking of perception in Carter’s disorienting relationship 
with time in the film. Chronos is ruptured by his interludes, and cronos 
bursts outward in this rupture: the Earthly-time of Carter’s affair with June 
continues chronologically, whilst chronology is annihilated in his un-Earthly 
interludes. Time flows directly in the Earthly world, and indirectly in the un- 
Earthly world, but the free-indirect discourse exists between the two: as 
Carter moves between worlds, his perception-image of the Earthly world 
changes according to events in it. As he discusses possibilities as virtual 
images of perception, they come to pass and are actualized, whilst the 
consequences of these events later make those events virtual images of 
recollection. At this point the two become not only reversible, but also 
indiscernible from each other, and the actual world and the virtual world 
become crystallized together. Carter’s interludes are therefore crystal- 
images of time, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter:
But here we can see that the opsign finds its true genetic element 
when the actual optical image crystallizes with its own virtual image, 
on the small internal circuit. This is the crystal image, which gives 
us the key, or rather the ‘heart’ of opsigns and their compositions. 
The latter are nothing other than slivers of crystal images. 40
39 B, p. 52.
40 TI, p. 69.
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As the film progresses, the differences between them become less and 
less discernible until the two reach a point of indiscernibility, from this point 
comes the forking of time which presents the extraordinary power of 
cronos. Recollection-memory and contraction-memory are both projected 
in heterogeneous directions from this point, as Deleuze notes in his 
chapter on the crystal-image in Cinema 2:
Time has to split at the same time as it sets itself out or unrolls 
itself: it splits into two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all 
the presents pass on, while the other preserves all the past. Time 
consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we see in the 
crystal. 41
The splitting of time exposes the nature of image of duration as cronos, an 
image which Deleuze sees as 'non-organic' in that is confounds 
progression in any linear or predetermined way in favour of simple overall 
change.
Let us now explore the relationship between chronology and duration that 
this crystal-image of time exposes. It is Bergson’s Matter and Memory, and 
in particular the first chapter ‘On the Selection of Images’, that provides the 
anchor for Deleuze’s understanding of perception that he takes to he 
cinema books 42. This is more fully developed on its own accord in 
Bergsonism, in which Deleuze uses Bergson’s intuitive approach to 
ontology as a platform for an understanding of duration. Experience is a 
composite of duration and space; one giving us internalized progression 
(‘a becoming that endures’), and the other giving us an exteriority without 
progression (space and movement). Consciousness is the exchange 
between the two. Memory is composed of recollection-images and 
contraction-images -  the two basic directions of perception. It is from 
recollection that perception flows, and the brain makes sense of its world 
by organizing recollection. Part of this organization is chronology as the 
organization of heterogeneous duration -  as expressed in the 
dissymmetrical split -  into a homogeneous progression based on
41 TI, p. 81.
42 M M , pp. 17-77.
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movement in space. This is visible also in cinema chronology in general, 
which uses the logical progression to create a sense, or image, of time 
through the observation of movement. The hands of a clock (or the 
photogrammes on a strip of film) express time only through their ordered 
homogeneity. Duration (or cronos) still endures as a non-chronological 
becoming, but is hidden from common sense by an image based on a 
sensory-motor schema. Duration as pure becoming is obscured by a 
chronology that “denatures it”. 43
The formulation of chronology constitutes a ‘leap into ontology1, a leap that 
is constituted as discrete sections, or recollection-images. The formulation 
of cinema chronology can therefore be understood as an organization of 
recollection also. Rather than following the free-indirect proposition offered 
by the opsign, cinema chronology seeks to organize such images into a 
composition that mirrors recollection, an operation that arouses Deleuze 
and Bergson's suspicion. This organization is a mirror of perception: a 
“psychologization” enacted in order to make sense of Being. The brain 
seeks to create discrete recollection-images from the continual whole of 
memory in order to make sense of i t44.
It is the operation of memory that is disrupted in A Matter of Life and 
Death. One of the consequences of Carter’s interludes is their effect on his 
memory. At times he is able to remember only parts of his experience, and 
others he is drawn toward precise recollection of his actions; still other 
times his memory of the events are questioned themselves, as his doctor 
assumes that they are dreams. At the same time however, he associates 
his interludes with action- images or sensations (he associates the 
Conductor with a peculiar smell -  fried onions). As the interludes progress, 
these distinctions between his perception-images and dream-images are 
made more and more indistinct. This is a merging of the two experiences 
of time into a circuit. Finally the difference between the two levels of 
perception, internal duration and external chronology, are exposed. Space 
is irrelevant in the interludes -  he cannot interact with the space around
43 B, p. 38.
44 Ibid, p. 57.
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him whilst he converses with the Conductor; the bell in his study will not 
ring, he cannot alter the positions of the table-tennis players -  he 
experiences pure internalized duration and is separated from external 
time. Towards the end of the film, whilst he undergoes a life-saving 
operation - an actual image - the true test of his love for June and of his 
right to stay alive is argued in a giant virtual courtroom. As he wins his 
battle of wits, the virtual courtroom is actualized whilst the surgical theatre 
now appears as a dream-image. The film has moved from self- 
consciousness (dicisign) to pure optical situation, or crystal-image.
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When Carter perceives the arrested moment of his interludes with the 
other world, he enters the image just as we might experience the 
photograph. Time in photography is arrested, and the image does not itself 
move. Chronology does not pass on for the photograph, just as it does not 
for Carter in his interludes; but just as Carter experiences a duration 
internal to chronology, so too does the photograph present such a 
duration. All of these are paralleled in the film by the Doctor’s Camera 
Obscura, which takes its occupants into an inner world which observes the 
constant duration of the outside. Perception in the photograph is not 
regulated by external forces, and we experience its duration as Bergson 
did the duration of his glass of water. Our perception changes as we look 
at the photograph, and we are internal to that change. A Matter of Life 
and Death then presents to Carter the chance to do in reality what we do 
every day with photography; it is a fantastical extension of a very real 
occurrence. Detached from a sensory-motor connection, the photograph 
exists as a non-chronological perception image.
We can see now that there is a glimpse of pure duration in the 
photographic image. Where we view the photograph as a discrete element 
internal to chronology, it is easy to forget that it also presents an indirect 
proposition of duration. Like Peter Carter, we are internal to this becoming. 
But Carter’s experience of pure duration is characterized by his knowing 
his interludes are distinct from chronological time; they are not pure
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recollection-images nor are they pure dream-images, but instead 
constitute images of their exchange. This is a reflexivity not guaranteed in 
photography. Photographic language often blinds us to the image of 
duration offered, just as the cinema of the movement-image makes itself 
transparent. The reflexivity of Carter’s interlude -  perception within the 
frame of another perception -  is characteristic of the crystal-image; and 
though the photograph does not always demonstrate this reflexivity, it 
does not mean it cannot. Moreover, Carter’s ability to experience duration 
self-consciously -  to perceive it as different from chronology -  brings us to 
Deleuze’s ultimate re-reading of Bergson’s theses on time:
Bergsonism has often been reduced to the following idea: duration 
is subjective, and constitutes our internal life...But, increasingly, he 
came to say something quite different: the only subjectivity is time, 
non-chronological times grasped at its foundation, and it is we who 
are internal to time, not the other way around.45
We must alter our perception of photography accordingly. We should not 
consider the photograph as an immobile section of chronology, but instead 
we should review it as a glimpse of duration; a duration that we are 
internal to.
We recognize duration when we question chronology and its abstract 
division of time, and can recognize the glimpse of duration in the 
photograph by questioning its connection to the sensory-motor schema, 
and looking at photographs that present a ‘self-conscious’ image. This is a 
dual action: the photograph's independence of the schema is 
demonstrated by the fact that it must be connected or organized into the 
schema. The two forces created from this push it towards an objective but 
abstract chronology, and expose the subjectivity within its glimpse of time. 
These forces create an unequal exchange in which one is in the process 
of actualization, and the other in the process of virtualization. The glimpse 
of duration, the free-indirect proposition, in the photograph is neither a 
consequence of its connection to the sensory-motor schema, nor its 
independence from it. It occurs in the indiscernibility between these two 
values.
45 T I,p . 82.
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*  *  *
Memory, tense and photography
Deleuze’s approach to the photograph is characterized by the orthodox 
treatment of photography exhibited by cinema criticism, and yet Deleuze’s 
work, and the work of those around him, still provide the basis of a 
rethinking of the photographic image.
The influence of film criticism, and particularly European criticism, is 
apparent in Deleuze’s writings, and also his understanding of the 
photograph. His approach can be likened to that of Christian Metz and, 
before him, Andre Bazin. For Metz 46, Bazin 47, and Barthes 48, an 
understanding of photography was reached by comparisons made with 
cinema 49. Like Deleuze, they saw photography only through its limitations, 
its paucity, in comparison to the cinematic image. Peter Wollen shares this 
conclusion that photography has no parity with cinema 50. The photograph 
has a distinct contiguity with the time and the place at which it was taken, 
but its relationship with time is characterized by immobility, rather than any 
mobility that can be developed from it. It is a powerful argument, supported 
by histories and critical studies written before and after Deleuze, and on 
the face of it there seems no need to challenge or extend such a strongly 
established understanding.
The role of the photograph as photogramme is central to these 
comparative studies 51. Christian Metz described cinema as ‘unfolding’ the
46 Metz, 1985. See also: Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: the Imaginary Signifier, 
London, Macmillan, 1982.
47 Bazin, 1967. See also: Siegfried Kracauer, 'Photography', in Theory o f Film: Redemption o f  
Physical Reality, (Oxford, OUP, 1960), rpt. in Trachtenberg, A. ed. Classic Essays on 
Photography, (Conneticut, Leete's Island, 1980), pp245-269.
48 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida (La Chambre Claire),(1980), trans. by Richard Howard, 4th 
edn. (London: Vintage, 1993) (CL). See also Image Music Text (1977), trans. by Stephen Heath, 
3rd edn. (London: Fontana, 1982).
49 Alan Trachtenberg points to an older practice of cinema criticism (now lost) in which this is a 
common paradigm. See Alan Trachtenberg, ed. Classic Essays on Photography, (Connecticut, 
Leete's Island, 1980), p237.
50 Peter Wollen, 'Fire and Ice', in Photographies 4, 1984, rpt. in John X. Berger &  Olivier Richon, 
eds. Other than itself: writing photography, (Manchester, Comerhouse, 1989) (no page numbers). 
See also: Peter Wollen, 'Photography and Aesthetics', Screen 19:4, 1978/79, pp9-28.
51 M I, p. 82.
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photograph into the shot, from which movement is derived 52. This is the 
immobile section of the shot in Deleuze. The shot is simply a series of 
photographs that presents the impression of movement. For the most part, 
the photograph remains fixed to movement and the sensory-motor schema 
because of this ellipsis of time, or division, that the photogramme 
individually creates. But as Wollen has noted, movement itself is not a 
necessary feature of action cinema 53. Cinema is a becoming ‘strung 
together’ from instantaneous images as determinants. The shot itself does 
not move, but it is a string of shots that implies movement abstractly. The 
photograph here is only a photogramme of reality waiting to be connected 
in a series that is the paradigm of cinematic movement. The photograph is 
therefore a privileged instant, or formal transcendental element of motion, 
from which movement can be derived, and from which time flows. This is a 
conclusion that leads Deleuze to consider the photograph as simply a 
constituent of the cinematic image early on in his thesis 54.
When reduced to the constituent of the shot, the photograph is treated 
simply the photogramme, and a common sense understanding of 
photography flows from this identification. Photography and 
cinematography (the process of the photogramme) share the recording of 
reality that in Charles Peirce’s terms is its indexic value, and in Barthes’ is 
the eidos 55. But whereas the photograph can become a mould of space, 
the mobile section (the shot) presents a similar mould of change; a 
situation Deleuze notes, after Bazin, in his first chapter of Cinema 1 56.
This conception of the shot is rooted in the history of instantaneous 
photography exemplified by Eadweard Muybridge. At the time of 
Muybridge, visual culture was familiar with a movement-image in 
inventions that utilized an already understood science of the phi-effect. 
Hand crafted amusements like the zoetrope depicted a movement that 
flowed directly from a sensory-motor schema - an impression of motion, 
whilst the use of photographs in the kinetoscope had the affect of
52 Metz, 1985, p.82.
53 Wollen, 1984.
54 M I, pp2-5.
55 Barthes, R. Camera Lucida (La Chambre Claire) (1980), trans. by Richard Howard (London, 
Vintage, 1982), p. 60. (CL)
56 M I, p. 24.
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presenting a movement-image contiguous with reality. De Duve, Metz and 
Wollen all see Muybridge’s studies in animal locomotion as a natural 
precursor to the science of cinematography. Muybridge was not only adept 
in the sciences of photography, but was personally experienced in the pre- 
cinematic forms, and in particular through his own drawings for the 
zoopraxiscope57.
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Muybridge’s ‘shots’, the images presented in sequential order, are 
immobile sections that rely upon the sensory-motor schema. They 
demonstrate the photograph’s own immobility, as the photograph as 
photogramme exists only as a constituent of an unfolding movement- 
image. Time flows from movement organically in the sensory-motor 
schema imaged by the photogramme in series. Ultimately, the 
photogramme is a set that refers to another set (the shot) and this in turn 
refers to the whole of the horse’s canter.
The above is a powerful historical argument that D.N Rodowick has seen 
as the seed of cinema’s indirect representation of time 58, and which limits 
the photograph to being the photogramme for cinema. The difference is 
highlighted by Christian Metz, whose emphasis of the photograph’s 
“immobility and silence” conflates the two as figurations of death. In so 
doing Metz predicates the photograph’s ontology as one based on a 
relationship with movement. Sound, as argued by Metz, substantiates 
movement and time in cinema, and without sound, photography cannot 
unfold over time in the same way that cinema is able to. Like Deleuze, he 
saw that cinema’s difference from photography was its ability to add an 
auditory sphere to connect the plurality of shots and become an 
experience of time 59. Montage, the creation of movement from the shot, is 
made possible by the out-of-field (or off-frame) space implied by sound 
between successive shots that maintain a continuity. The fictional space -
57 Kevin MacDonnell, Eadweard Muybridge: the man who invented the moving picture, (London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p i32. See figure 1.
58 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, (London, Duke Press), 1997, p. 9.
59 Metz, 1985, p. 83.
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Deleuze’s sensory-motor situation - is implied by a movement-image 
temporally structured by the auditory sphere. The movement-image can 
provide a substantial out-of-field space, whereas the photograph can only 
imply this as possibility.
This strong link between the photograph and the movement image is, 
however, a red herring. For in Deleuze, sound and image must be 
dislocated from their causal link to each other in order to create the 
possibility of the time-image. They must be liberated from their motor- 
material link and become pure opsigns and sonsigns in order to go beyond 
the movement-image60. Divorced from a material connection to sound, the 
photograph is an opsign - its silence and immobility is its foundation as a 
time-image. The opsign and the sonsign are by no means interdependent, 
and cinemas such as early neorealism, which had to begin a cinema 
practice from scratch, had no synchronized sound 61. By treating the 
auditory and optical separately but still within the cinematic image,
Deleuze potentially frees the photograph from this reliance on sound in 
order to depict time.
What remains unconsidered in the orthodox approach is the photographic 
paradox: the conflict between the photograph as an image and as and 
image of something. Andre Bazin merely saw the contiguity between 
image and object as the unique nature of the photograph, thus solving any 
such problems62. However, Thierry De Duve locates the paradox of the 
photograph as the collision of its superficial and referential series 63. The 
photograph is neither completely objective nor completely subjective, and 
yet criticism still attempts to places these values upon it. In De Duve, the 
photograph is balanced between a state of transparency (referential), such 
as in the instantaneous image in which the ‘photography’ is imperceptible, 
and a state of the pictorial (superficial) in which the ‘photography’ is 
foregrounded. No matter how objective it appears to be, there is always a 
self-consciousness that threatens to overwhelm any assumed verite. De
60 TI, p. 6.
61 M I, p. 212.
62 Bazin, 1980, p. 241.
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Duve singles out the example of Muybridge’s animal locomotion studies as 
an extreme example of an ‘aesthetic controversy’: the horse’s 
“unexpected, yet ‘true’ postures” revealed by photography contradict the 
artist’s role in representing the sensation of their motion 64. This is the free- 
indirect proposition (dicisign) that becomes the free-indirect discourse 
when it reaches the point of this reflexive and often-uncontrollable 
explosion of self-reference. As rationalising discourses seek to create 
stable and distinct values for the photograph, this conflict constitutes a 
near-unresolveable paradox.
On another note, Barthes, Metz, Wollen and others, all consider the 
photograph as immobile 65. Bound to the scene depicted, it cannot be 
dislocated from the movement in space that it describes. And as time flows 
from movement in the sensory-motor schema, this creates a paradox in 
time demonstrated by its apparent representation of past moment. This is 
why in Bergson’s Matter and Memory we found that perception was 
imagined as a photograph, a fixed view of things, and that this assumption 
dominated the human understanding of perception and especially memory 
66. The brain picks images from a continuum of points of space that exist 
independently and act upon each other. In freezing any one of these, the 
photograph is a false image of memory. It can only depict an abstract time. 
This is a privileged instant, artificially grabbed from a time that flows 
indivisibly -  a virtual, or indirect image of time. It can only be a modulation 
or cast -  “The photograph embalms time” as Bazin sees it -  of a state of 
equilibrium that is artificially dislocated from an ongoing duration 67.
This false connection between memory and the photograph is rooted in 
the representation of moment which photography occupies in popular 
imagination, as we saw earlier. The photographic memory is seen through
63 Thierry DeDuve, 'The Photograph as Paradox', in October 5, Summer 1978, pp. 113-125, (p.
114).
64 Ibid. p. 115.
65 CL, pp. 78-79. This is a convergence of Saussure and Peirce in Barthes' last book. The analyses 
by De Duve, Metz, and of course Deleuze all use Peirce's Semiotics as the principle linguistic tool, 
largely because of the photograph's perceived contiguity with the referent; a fact initially pointed 
out by Bazin. Camera Lucida concentrates on this referentiality, albeit with a less structured 
approach.
“  B,p. 38. See also, M I, p. 61.
67 Bazin, 1980, p. 243. See also Bazin, A. What is Cinema, (California, UoC, 1967), p. 61.
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a regime of tense, in that the past is separated from the present of 
consciousness, analogous to Bergson and Deleuze’s ‘leap into ontology’. 
Peter Wollen has seen this as a sense of an ever-receding ‘then’, a fixed 
point, which recedes from the moment of looking at the image, and which 
“has no fixed duration" in itself. This leads to a division between cinema as 
imposed reading time, and photography as free re-writing time. Wollen 
develops this after Christian Metz, who suggested that the time of the 
image collides with the ‘time of the look’, an indivisible and unregulated 
time 68. Photography is not reliant upon a depiction of time regulated by 
movement. Wollen attacks the idea of the tense of the photograph, and 
does so by referring instead to the photograph’s own internal temporal 
structure, or ‘aspect’. Tense can only present the moment in relation to the 
present moment of description, but the photograph contracts all pertinent 
images of time: there is the present of the photographic image; the past it 
represents; and the future of that past, which becomes the present of the 
image. This echoes Bergson, in that past, present and future are 
perception images that all flow from re-collection. Furthermore, as Deleuze 
notes, Bergson identifies these images as co-existent with perception: 
There is contraction because “recollection-becoming-image enters into a 
coalescence with the present.” 69 The past does not, in fact, exist. It is only 
an image of memory that co-exists with the present as a contraction of the 
past in general, and regions of the past in particular.
The movement-image is a constitution of still-images founded on the 
organization of the past in general and in particular. It is an organization of 
recollection images, whose ontology is perceived through their difference 
from the present. They constitute a past as an other. Their value is not 
only time, but also an abstraction of time: in another word, tense. Duration 
is organized into recollection-images and contraction-images in the same 
way that language is an organization of utterances into sense:
Far from recomposing sense on the basis of sounds that are heard 
and associated images [opsigns and their compositions], we place
69
Metz, 1982, p. 43. 
B, p. 65.
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ourselves at once in the element of sense, then in a region of this 
element.70
This concept of recollection is demonstrated in the ‘cone’ that Bergson 
uses in Matter and Memory and that Deleuze takes to his studies. This 
cone demonstrates the whole of memory, and the regions that make up 
the recollection images that perception contracts in the present. Any 
particular recollection image also contains an image of the whole of 
recollection, and both co-exist with the present. Tense is annihilated in 
favour of contraction:
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“The past AB coexists with the present S, but by including in itself 
all the sections A’B\ A” B” , etc., that measure the degrees of a 
purely ideal proximity or distance in relation to S. “ 71
This contraction-image is the aspect of duration. The photograph’s aspect 
only refers to itself and its direct depiction of time. Without a motor material 
connection, the photograph is a state of zero duration -  a contraction. It 
proposes a free-indirect discourse, as without duration it is not structured 
by direct discourses that rely on the sensory-motor schema. Signification 
can be radical and random. From this we can establish a ‘condition’ of the 
photographic time-image that to be met: all photogrammes (and hence 
photographs) go from the dicisign (a free-indirect proposition brought on 
by the photographic paradox) toward the opsign (the pure optical situation 
divorced from the sensory-motor schema). But only some flourish as time- 
images.
For Deleuze, the photograph as a material constituent of cinema (as the 
photogramme) can occupy only the first level of signification; a ‘firstness’ 
that Deleuze observes by following the semiotic study of Charles Peirce. 
Because the photograph offers a connection to the sensory-motor schema
70 B,p. 57.
71 B, p. 59. See also MM, pp. 161-163.
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(and hence cinema language) it offers a potential that we can see as this 
‘firstness’:
Firstness is thus the category of the Possible: it gives a proper 
consistency to the possible, it expresses the possible without 
actualizing it, whilst making it a complete mode72.
Deleuze also notes, however, that Peircean semiotics cannot deal with the 
zero state that offers the chance of language to develop. It can deal with 
the logic of language but not the proposition of language. In a later 
recapitulation of Peirce’s work, Deleuze proposes that the first order of 
perception exists within this zero-ness. The orders of language are simply 
organized forms that flow from a pure potentiality that exists within a zero 
state. This points to a perception that is outside the logical regime of 
semiotics 73. The first order perception-image frames the perception that 
precedes it. It is the dicisign, perception within the frame of another 
perception, or the self-consciousness that we have already identified in the 
photographic paradox. The dicisign resolves the paradox of the 
photograph into a potentiality. Language in photography, as in cinema, 
flows from this image. In order for a photograph to be a time-image, it must 
be freed from its language by dealing directly with it. This is a reflexivity 
not in terms of a binary opposition, but instead as a self-consciousness of 
the language of which the photograph is a part. The photograph exists in 
language as a sign and a carrier of signs, but language has attributed to 
the photograph values of referentiality or superficiality that in their turn 
constitute the first order of meaning before the photograph becomes such 
a carrier. The photograph as time-image must exist in the gap between 
image and language, between objective and subjective, by not only 
offering this state of zero-duration, but also that of a camera- 
consciousness74. This zero-state exists because of, rather than in spite of, 
the exchange between superficial and referential. In order to depict 
duration, the time-image must also be an image of the change that it 
provokes itself: as Bazin has noted, “the image of things is likewise the
72 M I, p. 98.
73 TI, pp. 25-44, Chapter 2: The Recapitulation of Signs and Images.
74 M I, p. 76.
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image of their duration” 75. The image must draw attention to its own act of 
perception; to itself as cinema or as photography.
From the zero state time can only burst outward. This suggests that 
Deleuze’s initial understanding of the photograph as static equilibrium was 
misguided, the photograph as individual image cannot contain the 
explosive force of the absolute zero of time. According to De Duve, the 
photograph (and in particular the photo-de-pose), offers a glimpse of this 
force. The “empty form of all potential tenses”, the photograph is also “the 
absolute zero of time”. However it also offers a splitting of time into a “not 
anymore and not y e t76, an illogical and irrational proposition that 
describes the time that has past, and the moment that will not proceed. 
Empty of a logically based depiction of time, what is this time shown in the 
photograph? It is the traumatizing non-chronological time, which shatters 
the temporal flow of space-time, and projects “the immensity of past and 
future” 77 out into the ‘time of the look’, the out-of-field. We have thus 
discovered the true potential of the photograph as time-image: the non- 
chronological time -  or cronos -  that is crucial to Deleuze’s concept of the 
time-image, is also a potential of the photograph. It is now simply a matter 
of seeking out the ways in which Deleuze’s own understanding of the time- 
image can be used to qualify this. To understand the time-image, we must 
understand the conditions of the free-indirect proposition. Fundamentally, 
we can understand the photographic time-image by ‘paring’ from it the 
situations that limit the photograph to the sensory-motor schema, and by 
so excluding the motor-material, understand the photograph as pure 
opsign.
*  *  *
Three Photographs: from free-indirect proposition to crystal-image
Cinema begins with the division of movement photographically, or more 
precisely photogrammatically. The history of photography is written as a 
history of the discrete instant: the photograph’s perceived power is
75 Bazin, 1980, p. 242.
76 DeDuve, 1978, p. 116-117.
47
balanced on an ability or inability to freeze time. Once this was achieved, it 
ceased to be the focus of discussion, and was overtaken by the analysis 
of composition and, lately, photographic language. The discussion of time 
and photography is now almost exclusively dealt with via a discussion of 
cinema, and the few discourses surrounding the still photograph tend to 
focus on the use of stroboscopy, ultra-high speed photography, or more 
interestingly, time-lapse photography.
Thierry De Duve points to the condition of the photograph in which time is 
depicted as a passing. Duration is depicted indexically, and metaphorically 
enunciated by the blurring of the timed exposure. Duration is a 
evanescence of time, from presence to absence, and is therefore the 
immobility and silence of the funerary that De Duve and Metz both 
describe 78.
But time-lapse photography offers something different. The Futurists used 
the technical limitations of photography at that time to explore movement. 
Antonio Bragaglia’s time-lapse photographs describe movement within a 
discrete element of time. This representation is of the indivisibility of 
movement and is closer to the superficial arts that prefer the picturesque 
than it is to the referential. Bragaglia's photographs present movement as 
an element of the picturesque, and hence time is only a discontinuous 
material element used in the description of motion. The depiction of time is 
secondary to the representation of action. Bragaglia’s photographs, if they 
reflect a memory-image at all, it is the episodic memory that we saw in 
Zimmer and Cohen above.
Slide 8
Time-lapse photography is directly descended from the photo-de-pose, in 
which the depiction of time is made primarily for aesthetic reasons, and 
appears continuous with nature. The picturesque in this manner is
77 M I, p. 32.
78 DeDuve, 1978, p. 123. See also Metz, 1985, pp. 83-84.
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perfectly demonstrated in Pablo Picasso’s pictures taken with Gjon Mili, in 
all of which Picasso draws in the air with a ‘pencil of light’.
Slide 9
Picasso drawing with the pencii of light: Bull, by Gjon Mili (1949),79 is a 
concrete image of duration. Like Muybridge’s galloping horse, it is an 
immediately apparent depiction of time expressed by movement. But this 
image presents a passage of time, which Muybridge’s images individually 
do not. The studies in animal motion only present time when seen in situ, 
either through projection or as a collage. They present time through the 
unfolding of the photograph into a shot, binding them to the sensory-motor 
schema. Bull, on the other hand, presents time within the frame of the 
image. It is a modulation of space and of time.
Deleuze was keenly aware that the single image could present montage, 
or an impression of time and movement, from within the frame, and we 
see this in Cinema 2 80. Similarly, Bull gives time to the photograph and 
presents montage within the image. It gives us the sense of time -  the 
durative -  within the instant -  the punctual. Picasso’s whole body has 
moved to create the image of the bull in the air, but he is also caught 
within the punctuality of the photograph, and in particular the flash burst. 
This is a collision of the instantaneous photograph with the timed 
exposure; a collision that presents itself as the possibility of free-indirect 
discourse, or an oscillation between the binary positions of the objective 
(the instantaneous image as referential to nature) and the subjective (the 
time exposure as the aesthetic picturesque).
As a durative image Bull is a cell of time, like the traditional photo-de-pose. 
Unlike the motor material photogramme, a single unit that conveys 
movement only as part of a series, it has no divisible units from which 
movement derives, and time flows, or unfolds, within the photograph. But 
as a cast or modulation of time -  Bull is a set. Bull can only imply a fixed
79 Baldassari, A. Picasso and photography: the dark mirror, (Paris, Flammarion, 1997), p221.
80 TI, pp. 16-17.
49
duration; the drawing of the bull in the air starts and ends. It reflects a 
memory-image in the form of the “Now Print!” order. In so doing the image 
organizes time into a discrete element, and whilst the frozen body of 
Picasso might impress upon us a flow of time beyond the moment, the 
limits of the air-drawing give us the boundaries of that moment. Instead of 
presenting an immobile section, it presents the mobile section, analogous 
to the shot. Just as the photograph is a mould of space, so it is a mould of 
time. Bull cannot imply an out-of-field so crucial to Deleuze’s concept of 
the time-image. The out-of-field is a forking of thought, or memory, a 
possibility of a splitting of time which this image is denied 81. The out-of­
field only exists when unfettered from the sensory-motor schema, and not 
organized into a set.
The outcome from the absence of the out-of-field should not have been 
unexpected. Bazin’s concept of the photograph as a cast is dependent 
upon the relation of movement to time. The idea of a cast implies not only 
an imprint or modulation, but also stasis and self-containment. As 'casts' 
the timed exposure photographs of Picasso are discrete elements 
discontinuous from time as a flow. They unfold only within themselves and 
present a set or section of time contiguous with movement. Bull can only 
be a mobile section of time, and an indirect image of duration
BulFs temporal ellipsis, demonstrated by the air-drawing, defines the 
image as a discontinuous set. It is a camera-consciousness, a proposition 
of free-indirect discourse, but this is directed toward the photograph’s 
ellipsis. It can only present us with the potentiality of the time-image, a 
glimpse of a beyond of the movement-image, as seen from within the 
mobile section. It can imply a beyond of the movement-image, but only 
that.
We should be careful of concentrating too much on the photographic 
image that attempts to express time through the indivisibility or continuity 
of movement, since they create an artificial ellipsis of time. An important 
condition of the time-image is therefore apparent: The photographic time-
81 IbidTI, p. 52.
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image must express an unrolling or splitting of time beyond the boundaries 
of the image, and beyond the mobile section of the sensory-motor 
schema.
For the photograph to exist as a time-image it must be a pure opsign that 
exists independently of movement in space. In order for a photograph to 
be a pure image of duration, it must exist as an irrational break from the 
motor material. Deleuze could see the time-image in the shot, but only 
when irrationally dislocated, or discontinuous from the organic logic of the 
sensory-motor schema 82. Bull is a confinement of the image of time, as 
much as it is a confinement of the image of space. The pencil of light’s 
trace never leaves the frame of the photograph, whilst the action never 
leaves the section of time that the exposure marks out. Bulfs dynamic 
image of time and space is reliant upon an entirely internalised logic.
Such a situation occurs in the photography of Henri Cartier Bresson, and 
in particular his Pont de I’Europe from 1932 83. An instantaneous image, 
the type of which Cartier Bresson was famous for, it is perhaps most 
closely related in Deleuzean analysis to the privileged instant; one of the 
initial determinants for cinema. However, Pont de I’Europe is a privileged 
instant which provides the irrational image of the pure opsign, for the 
privileged instant in this case is also De Duve’s ‘impossible posture’. The 
movement has been performed, yet the photograph refers to it in the act of 
happening. It is both past and present. The photograph presents a 
paradox in its treatment of motion
Slide 10
This simple paradox destroys the logical contiguity between the 
photograph and its referent, the contiguity that is crucial to the linguistic 
regime of Peirce that DeDuve, Metz and Deleuze all draw upon. For the 
time-image, contiguity is crucial not in space between image and referent, 
but in time between past and present. The photograph is outside the
82 Ibid TI, p. 214.
83 This photograph is also known as “Behind the gare St. Lazare”.
51
implied logic of language, since although it can refer to the objects, it 
cannot adequately refer to the motion or time of these objects. Whilst the 
event remains in the past, the linguistic relation of it cannot but remain in 
the present. The impossible posture defies the organic logic of the motor- 
material and the depiction of time as logical progression -  chronological 
time.
Pont de I’Europe is much more than a collision of past and present. It 
implies an out-of-field of the photograph, a continuance of time and space. 
Time no longer flows from movement, for that movement has been halted, 
or annihilated, by the photograph - and yet change will endure. Past and 
future divide from Pont de I’Europe in a forking of time. The event has 
happened, it is in the state of happening, and it is in the process of, or 
proceeding to happen. It is in the past, it is passing, and it will continue to 
pass. Tense is annihilated in favour of aspect. It is almost the same as 
Barthes’ concept of the ‘not anymore and not yet to which De Duve refers 
- almost because where Barthes saw immobility as a negative value, a 
semblance of death, using Deleuze we can see this as the seed for non- 
chronological time -  ‘the non-organic Life which grips the world’ 85.
Pont de L’Europe presents an image independent of organic relations with 
other images, and therefore able to flourish properly as an opsign. Each 
aspect of time runs into the other in Pont de I’Europe, objectivity and 
subjectivity run into each other as Wollen has noticed, and as such Pont 
de I’Europe is the free-indirect proposition, or dicisign of the time-image. 
Time in Pont de I’Europe is not chronos (chronological time) but cronos, 
the time of the time-mage.
Conversely, now that we understand Wollen’s thesis on the photograph as 
zero-ness of perception, we realize that it was appropriate for Deleuze to 
see the photograph as the determinant of cinema. As cronos, Pont de 
I’Europe is the foundation of the time-image, a photograph in which the 
paradoxical nature of the treatment of reality has created a potentiality for
84 DeDuve, 1978, p. 115.
85 TI, p. 81. See also Deleuze’s discussion of the crystal-image as a “seed image”, pp. 74-75.
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the bifurcation of non-chronological time. Not connected by the motor- 
material, it is a connection of thought and time; it is a direct time-image. 
There is, in this, another of the conditions of the photographic time image: 
The photograph must depict cronos in order to be a time-image. It must be 
free of depicting space and time as logically connected, and must offer the 
foundation of time in the annihilation of tense.
A question remains: How can we reconcile the photo-de-pose with the 
dicisign? The photo-de-pose, in De Duve’s words “liberates an 
autonomous and recurrent temporality” 86 but as a ‘time exposure’ it is 
closely linked to the timed-exposure (such as Bull). In order to be a 
dicisign the image must offer the free-indirect proposition that the timed- 
exposure cannot. Creating an ellipsis in time, the timed exposure traps the 
photograph in the immobile silence to which Barthes, Metz and others 
have equated the state of death. But through De Duve we can see this as 
a liberation of sorts. For him, the photograph is both moment and 
monument, a past moment given the possibility of re-staging again and 
again. It is the paradox of the photograph exhibited by the photo-de-pose 
in the same way as had been exhibited by the snapshot. Past and present 
exist within the photograph, so that the photo-de-pose, rather than 
appearing as discontinuous as De Duve would have it, now projects 
outward in a splitting of time as had the instantaneous image. This 
“illogical conjunction of the here and the formerly” as expressed by 
Barthes, is amended and reconstructed by De Duve to create a 
proposition for the shattering of chronological time 87.
(The photograph as time-image cannot be divided into easily recognizable 
categories such as these. While the photo-de-pose rarefies the image to 
include one focal point, the instantaneous image is saturated with them. 
We must recognize such simple distinctions as purely critical values. We 
can only see such terms as ‘snapshot’ and ‘photo-de-pose’ as points of 
reference used to describe a medium that is by its nature a continuum of 
formal characteristics.)
86 DeDuve, 1978, p. 116.
87 Roland Barthes, Image Music Text (1977), trans. by Stephen Heath, 3rd edn (London, Fontana,
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Nan Goldin, an artist who obsessively records the people around her, took 
the photograph Edwidge behind the bar at Evelynes, NYC, in 1985 88. 
Taken with a flashgun, it combines the aesthetic characteristics of modern 
portraiture (of the modern photo-de-pose) with the formal characteristics of 
the instantaneous image. As a snapshot, it is exemplary of the free-indirect 
proposition because of its frank dealing with the photographic paradox 
(interestingly, Deleuze saw the perfect opsign as the image of the 
everyday)89. Furthermore, and representative of much of Goldin’s other 
work, we can say that it is a pure time-image. Edwidge behind the bar at 
Evelynes, NYC, is demonstrative of the photograph that draws attention to 
its own paradox -  it is the photo-de-pose within the snapshot, the durative 
within the punctual. It contains all the tenses within it, but as an 
instantaneous image, it annihilates those tenses to create an image of 
zero duration. From this zeroness, it offers the free-indirect proposition that 
enables the depiction of time directly.
Slide 11
The imposed reading time of tense is inverted to become a free re-writing 
time, Wollen’s version of the proposition. The marker of this frame of 
perception is the flash glare, which has created a photogramme that does 
not act as the syntagma of cinema, but instead isolates it from the flow of 
chronology, or logical time. The flash glare in Bull could not cut loose the 
image from the temporal ellipsis which Picasso’s movement implied. 
However, in Edwidge the image is not dependent upon the sensory-motor 
schema. It is aberrant from logical time, dislocated from chronology 
because time in all aspects is within the image and yet bursts outward.
This pressure is a result of the saturation of the image. The flash glare is 
just one of a myriad of points of entry into the image. At a crucial moment, 
the importance of Deleuze’s understanding of montage within the image 
becomes clear. Just as the tracking shots in Resnais, or the depth of field 
in Welles, create a movement independent from the camera, so Goldin’s
1982), p. 44. (IM T)
88 Nan Goldin, ed.( Ballad o f sexual dependency, (London, Seeker and Warburg, 1986), p. 101.
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photograph, with its huge mirror absent of easily defined reflections, 
creates a potential for free montage within the image 90.
The image presents a further paradox: As photo-de-pose, it is rarefied 
around the image of Edwidge, just as Bull was rarefied around Picasso. 
But just as Pont de I’Europe had been saturated by the patterns of posters 
and puddle -  the leaping man has a mirror image in the water, but also in 
the acrobat on the poster behind him - Edwidge is also saturated. Instead 
of time splitting, time shatters. The time of the image is incommensurable 
with its space, and bursts from within it. There are many possible 
reflections, and many further possible points of entry into the image, from 
the bottles with their own reflections of the flash burst, across the image to 
the deep recesses of the space that continues out-of-field. Each acts as its 
own point of indiscernibility between the image as we see it - the actual 
image; and the image as we imagine it within the time of the look - the 
virtual image. Each point within the image has its own little exchange 
between what we can see and what we can imagine as dream-images, 
world-images or recollection images. The mirror is crucial to this, as it 
creates a series of oppositions between the people or objects and their 
own reflections. Combined with Edwidge’s attentive stare out of the image, 
they create a depth into which we plunge. Such oppositions are mutual 
images (after Deleuze, yet again), mutual because they bring together the 
actual images and the possible virtual images that issue from them to 
create an exchange between the two. The virtual image is no sooner 
actualized as recollection-, dream- or world-image than it virtualizes the 
actual image in an unequal exchange. The alternation of these is passed 
through the points of indiscernibility that both saturate and rarefy the 
image: the image presents not one exchange but many, as if they were 
individual facets on a crystal; and what is described is the crystal of time, 
or the crystal-image.
It has been important to bring ourselves slowly to this revelation, and to 
carefully discount each connection with movement that has prevented us
89 TI, p. 15.
90 Ibid TI, p. 70.
55
from seeing photography as capable of producing the opsign. The overall 
aim of this thesis is to explore the specific nature of the crystal image; how 
Deleuze understands it; and crucially how it affects our understanding of 
the boundaries between the photographic and the cinematographic. This 
journey needs to start from a simple understanding. It is as a crystal image 
that Edwidge moves from indirect proposition, the unequal exchange of 
subjectivity and objectivity, to a time-image that is more completely 
realized.
The photograph presents the free-indirect proposition in a unique way. As 
part of the sensory-motor schema, the photogramme is bound to cinema 
by its representation of time through action in space. But the photograph is 
liberated from this when its deals with its own ontology rather than the 
depiction of space-time. There is only a true opsign when the photograph 
is dislocated from paradigmatic movement and time, a movement that 
continues unchanged beyond the image. Duration is absolute change, and 
Goldin presents a direct photography that seeks not only to record reality 
but to record the change brought about in reality by its very act. In 
imaging its own change, the photograph is a direct image of duration. The 
saturation of the image with myriad reflections causes multiple durations to 
unfold from a single image of duration. Mirrors are a visual 
acknowledgement of the eye of the camera, for only a mirror can truly 
stare back. Whilst Edwidge looks off behind the camera, the reflection in 
the mirror confuses the eye in the same way that the mirror in Edouard 
Manet’s A Bar at the Folies-Bergere of 1881-2 confuses the eye and 
redirects from the girl’s inquisitive gaze.
Slide 12
In both images, the reflections are virtual images that are actualized by 
their real counterparts. Any one reflection leads to multiple virtual images 
in an explosion of the crystal. But where the flashgun is a signifier of the 
real photographer, the man in the mirror in Manet’s painting may or may 
not be the artist. The similarity between Goldin’s photograph and Manet’s 
painting is astonishing, and the crystal-image-as-painting remains an
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alternative direction that a Deleuzean study could take. The truly striking 
connection that these images share is the relationship between the girl 
and the people around, or behind, her. In Manet’s painting, they are made 
limpid by the painting’s surface; they do not recede into the background. 
Yet they are virtualized, made opaque, by asymmetry of the mirror, which 
deflects attention back to the girl facing us. In Edwidge, this relationship is 
made more indistinct, and the action of indiscernibility more volatile. 
Instead of guaranteeing a photographer, (a popular conception of the 
photograph is that it can guarantee a referent, whereas a painting cannot), 
Goldin is both present and absent, made visible by the flash’s glare, and 
hidden by it. Where the painting gives us the question of the painter’s 
identity, the photograph questions the photographer’s existence. This 
brings us back to the crystal and its reflexivity. The flash glare is both the 
reality depicted and the act of depiction, the perception and the frame of 
perception. It is a paradoxical relationship -  an exchange -  between the 
reality recorded and the act of recording with can only be truly recognized 
as a time-image, in which objectivity and subjectivity run into each other 
and time forks against the logic of chronology. Goldin photographs herself, 
but she has no concrete form to tie the image to the motor material as 
Picasso does. She is a virtual image only actualized by the flash glare, but 
without definite form, the flash glare becomes a virtual image of Goldin. 
She is there, and she is not there. She seeks to change reality by 
recording it, but her presence in reality is a central part of that act. The 
perception of duration is the perception of constant action/reaction, and 
Goldin’s photograph is within this gap between action and reaction: it is 
the image of affection, or affection-image. As Deleuze puts it, the time- 
image exists in this gap, the interval between perception and action, and 
Edwidge behind the bar at Evelynes, NYC presents the photograph as 
existing within that gap 91. It is contiguous with the change in reality it 
provokes, and the act of narration occurs within its own description. This 
brings us to a final condition of the time-image:
The photographic time-image must offer the act of depiction within the 
reality depicted. Only when it refers to itselfwhen the photograph 
addresses its ontology by drawing attention to its own nature and making,
91 Ibid TI, p. 46.
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can it truly present the proposition that leads to free indirect discourse and 
the dislocation of the image from abstract time. It is this reflexivity that 
often leads to a direct representation of opposition, but here it is simply a 
proposition waiting to be fulfilled.
*  *  *
Conclusion:
The conditions of the photographic time-image
Above all, Deleuze’s books provide a way of considering the conditions 
under which the photograph can be a time-image, despite his treatment of 
photographs in general. Deleuze has little time to deal with a thorough 
understanding of the photograph, his task in the cinema volumes is 
already considerable. Coupled with this is the irrelevance of a 
concentrated effort to deal with photography in the cinematic context. 
Historically, there is no reason why Deleuze should pay much attention to 
the photograph. For him, they have very separate lives that parted 
irreconcilably at the advent of cinema. But Deleuze does give us the 
opportunity to understand the photograph by describing its limitations. 
Furthermore, he also provides us with the conditions of the time-image 
that we can apply to photography ourselves. Deleuze’s account of cinema 
therefore asks the initial question, and goes on to give us the tools to 
answer it. He gives us the means to define the determinants of the 
photograph as time-image, and from these we have been able to organize 
such determinants into a few simple conditions.
The photograph must offer a splitting or forking of time from the image. 
The timed exposure cannot do this, for it creates an unnatural ellipsis of 
time presented through its motor connection with action. The passing of 
objects in space is the marker of time within the image. Time flows 
organically from their movement. These photographs act as artificial sets 
within a flow of time that is presented only abstractly through its 
dislocation. They can only hint at time that continues outside this immobile 
section. It is offered by the timed exposure only as an index of action, and 
all of its depiction of time is turned inwards. The timed exposure is thus a
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movement-image, and is directly related to the shot in cinema. They share 
a common ancestry in the photography that sought to ‘conquer’ action, 
and as such, the timed exposure is a form that can be seen to run from 
Daguerre to Eisenstein.
The direct image of time can occur only when the image is dislocated from 
the logic of organic depiction. Pure duration is not connected to 
movement, and in particular is not governed by the rational order of space­
time. The pure image of duration must therefore constitute an irrational 
break, or aberrance, from such a connection. In the photograph, this 
motor-connection is implied by tense, and only the annihilation of tense 
can lead to the photographic time-image. The photograph must offer a 
zero state of perception in which the inward orientation of time is lost and 
time can only project outward with immense force.
Deleuze described time that is not organically rooted to movement as 
cronos, and it is this non-chronological time that exists in the zero state of 
the photograph. The photograph in this sense shares the nature of the 
photogramme as a foundation for the ordered time of the movement- 
image. It is not surprising that cinema scholars understood the photograph 
as the building-block of cinema for, as Deleuze has shown us, from this 
non-organic state of duration comes the organic state of abstract time 
depicted by the movement-image. However, the impossible posture of the 
snapshot offers a free-indirect proposition of cronos. Dislocated from a 
past, the image must create past at the same time as its present, and the 
present will become the future to that past. Tense no longer relates to the 
movement related, and is subsumed in favour of the aspect of duration. 
What is presented is a bit of time in its pure state.
Central to Deleuze’s philosophy of the cinema is his view of the universe 
as a-centred; the ‘free-indirect proposition’ constitutes a description of 
incidents in which this is realised by cinema. Without the anchoring of 
organic time, perception can flow between values that in the organic world 
are crucial to action, but in pure duration are simply nominal. This is the 
free-indirect discourse, a discourse that occurs not in the imposed reading
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time of action cinema, nor in the abstract ellipsis of the timed exposure 
photograph. Instead this discourse is an exchange between subjective and 
objective that occurs in the free re-writing time (after Wollen and Metz). 
This is the potential of the image that gives rise to, and is a determinant of, 
the time-image across cinema and the photograph.
In photography, subjectivity and objectivity reach this state of excited 
alternation when the camera is used as a frame of perception, or ‘camera- 
consciousness’. Like cinema, photography that refers to the action of 
objects in time and space is limited to the movement-image. From this, the 
state of verisimilitude or psychological realism is almost as much a part of 
photography as of cinema. But as Deleuze has seen in cinema, so we also 
can see that when photography refers to its own taking it places 
perception within the frame of perception and creates the dicisign. It is 
liberated from the motor material and has the capability to go beyond the 
movement-image. From this understanding we can consider the shape 
and variety of the time-image in photography, but more importantly, we 
can consider the complex relationship between cinemas and 
photographies that can be seen to merge with each other. That is the task 
of Chapter Two.
The order of chapters thus proceeds as follows: Now that we have some 
conditions for the photographic time image, Chapter Two considers the 
connection between cinema and photography that the photogramme 
provides. It does so by looking at cinema that references photography, a 
study that is partly expected of this thesis partly expected of this thesis. 
Chapter Two deals with the photographic image’s genetic element, its 
opsign, and Chapter Three has the dual task of considering the 
photograph's representation of time and how the opsign (as a photograph) 
came to be subdued as an immobile section by criticism and historical 
analysis.
Following this, we must at some point directly confront the ‘seed’ of 
Deleuze’s approach to the photograph. In considering Bergson’s two 
theses at the centre of Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema, Chapter Three will
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reconsider the photographic time-image and the very action of memory 
and perception on duration. It will consider the types, flavours, or 
characters of time that Deleuze develops in the cinema books, and in his 
earlier work. Crucially, it will consider these in relation to a photography 
and a cinema that have been either routinely associated with death 
(Eugene Atget), or routinely dismissed from film studies (cinema of the 
Lumieres).
One thing that this leaves is a concise study of the operation of the crystal 
in the photograph, which is studied in Chapter Four. Cindy Sherman’s 
early images are useful because they reference directly the cinematic 
image. Subjective responses to her work are defined by experiences of 
cinema, and cinema narrative. The crystal-image remains as the direct 
references are cast aside, thus doubling its extraordinary complexity and 
power. Formally, Sherman’s are crystal-images because of their use of 
faces, mirrors, costume, and mise-en-scene. They are completed as 
crystals because, in various analyses of them, we can see them being 
actualised by critics as we watch. The analyses of Laura Mulvey, Rosalind 
Krauss, and others, make these crystal-images particularly dynamic.
Ultimately, we will have to engage with one of Deleuze’s more widely 
known philosophical tropes -  that of ‘becoming’ -  and also try and 
understand more deeply the process -  or becoming -  of photography that 
creates the internal circuit of the crystal-image. Chapter Five sets about 
this. 'Becoming' raises the issue of authorship, and specifically auteurshlp, 
perhaps more than in other chapters. Authorship as a becoming presents 
a motivated cinema that is powerful in its disruption of all direct discourses, 
this is what gives it (for Deleuze) its particular political dimension. 
Deleuze’s cinephilia was informed by film studies practice that placed the 
director at the centre of meaning for a film (an approach paralleled in 
photography study). It is not surprising that he should see directors as 
much as philosophers in film as others have seen him as a philosopher of 
film. The problem of authorship in cinema and photography criticism never 
quite goes away. Nevertheless, one of the jobs of Chapter Five is to finally 
deal with this by studying an author who took pains to disappear from the
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image of himself as author -  Andy Warhol. The fact that he is often 
considered a Modern artist/author par excellence, whose name or image 
dominates even mildly pertinent discussion around him, serves only to 
demonstrate how completely his image has come to fulfil that artist’s 
becoming-imperceptible. Warhol’s life was spent as much creating the 
persona as it was retreating secretly from it, and as he made himself 
imperceptible, his experiments in doing so, his screen-prints but most 
especially his films, have continued to assume a larger symbolic greatness 
that dwarfs those subjects (the Empire State Building, Marilyn Monroe) he 
employed. Warhol’s becoming-imperceptible is interesting because it 
demonstrates the processes of photography, including their own 
exchanges, circuits and becomings, that provide the seed of the crystal- 
image. We will come to explain this in due course. First, though, we must 
go back to the relationship that the film has with the photograph.








Garrett Stewart's exemplary study of the photograph in cinema has noted 
that in depicting the photographic, either through inset photograph or in 
the freeze-frame “The motion picture stalls upon a glimpse into its own 
origin and negation at once”, and that “Each offers an instance, above and 
beyond plot imperatives, of cinema’s empanelling an inquiry into its own 
affective and cognitive disposition.”1 Chapter One proposed that 
photography should be seen in continuum with cinema, rather than 
separate from it, and Stewart’s conclusion initially seems to support this. 
Since photography now offers a time-image that Deleuze had not 
previously seen, we might assume that it is this link between cinema and 
photography that is at the heart of the crystal-image itself. This presents us 
with the task of understanding both the nature of this connection, and the 
way in which it manifests itself in the image. Stewart’s study suggests that 
the reference of photography by cinema is indicative of a reflexivity in 
which the act of photography -  and the role of the camera as its subjective 
tool -  is brought into question. This neatly reflects the role of the camera 
as an identification of a subjective consciousness (the foregrounding of the 
photographer’s eye). We now need to put this connection to the test by 
considering texts, and the approaches made to them, in the light of their 
reference to the photographic image or to photography. We will 
understand how the photographic image creates the internal circuit, or free 
indirect discourse, from which the crystal-image emanates, and we shall 
see how the photographic image as medium and trope is essential to it.
We shall also understand the shape and form of a photographic continuum 
that is so diverse that it embraces even the most strictly exclusive 
disciplines of cinema and photography.
Stewart’s study has shown us that not only are certain expectations placed 
upon any study of cinema and photography together, to neglect to 
consider these is to do so at one’s peril. For instance both have, at the 
core of discourses surrounding them, the friction between subjectivity and 
objectivity. Deleuze identified the complex relationship between subject
1 Garrett Stewart, Between Film and Screen: Modernism’s Photo Synthesis, (Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 10.
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and object as poorly represented by any simple binary system. Instead, he 
suggested that situations of camera-consciousness give rise to a free- 
indirect proposition and that these expose the fluid reflexivity of the 
subject-object relationship. In short, this chapter is an investigation into 
just such a camera-consciousness. The heart of the crystal-image, lies in 
the essentially photographic.
This is how cinema and photography can be seen as in continuum when, 
by many accounts, there exists a fundamental difference between them. 
With such strongly established concepts of ‘classic’ cinema and ‘straight’ 
photography (the photography of Ansel Adams, for example), discussions 
that connect cinema and photography routinely focus upon the 
photogramme as a shared material basis, as is demonstrated in Stewart’s 
study. Deleuze was not convinced by the reliance on the practical nature 
of cinema in Bergson’s 1907 Creative Evolution (we shall deal with ‘why’ 
more closely in Chapter Three,). Instead he chose to concentrate, in those 
early chapters of The Movement-image, on the role of subjectivity, and 
especially the free-indirect discourse, the camera-consciousness, so 
crucial to the time-image. Deleuze’s taxonomy of cinema is based on the 
process of subjectivity that cinema offers, and in order to understand the 
complex interaction of the objective and subjective, and hence more fully 
understand the free-indirect discourse, Deleuze turns to the pure optical 
situations that flow from the photographic image. Such optical situations 
appear in both the photograph and in cinema, as we have seen: the time- 
image flows from still images, or a collection of still images, since the 
cinema of the time-image never escapes its construction from the film 
strip. Underpinning the time-image then, is not so much any particular 
photographic process but photography itself. Whilst he decries the 
photogramme as an immobile section, the photographic image as a 
process is the essential seed of the time-image.
The cinema books themselves bridge the gap between his early work on 
Nietzsche and Bergson and Deleuze’s later work on Leibniz. Leibniz’s 
idiosyncratic view of the universe is of a complex, folding structure that he 
called the monad. The monadic universe is a structure without centres,
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and in which there is only a continuum of pleats and folds. In this universe 
there is no fixed subjectivity but instead only the possibility of points of 
view, or inflections, that take in the whole. The only centres of the monad 
are those that are taken up in order to comprehend the monad itself, and 
the only divisions are those made by a particular point of view. Any 
appearance of multiplicity is accounted for in the pleats of the monad, and 
any amount of diverse elements is simply folds and pleats of a singular 
structure.
Leibniz offers us much more than this. To divide the continuum is to divide 
one monad into a series of monads, to an indivisible degree. The subject, 
which Deleuze replaces with the point of view, is just such an ephemeral 
inflection, and the monadic universe is thus reflected in a monadic subject. 
The Folds emphasis on the Baroque immediately offers a case study of 
philosophy and its relationship with aesthetics. As he did with Bergson, 
Deleuze returns to Leibniz’s original work, and deals with it in the context 
of the culture of which he was part. The Fold is a recontextualization of 
Leibniz in the Baroque. Leibniz was not only the Baroque philosopher par 
excellence, as Deleuze would have it, but the Baroque permeates his 
philosophy. To use Leibniz in application is therefore to deal with the 
Baroque in some way.
The Baroque appears in our argument in the interplay between subject 
and object, characterized in the main by the inner world (or upper floor) of 
the soul and the outer world (lower floor) of matter that reflect each other. 
The inflection between them, the fold, is a point-of-view, or prehension of 
the world by the soul. Therefore the world is divided, in the Baroque and in 
general, into areas which reflect the soul, and those that reflect the 
material. In The Fold, Deleuze takes this representation through painting 
and architecture, emphasising in each turn the visible separation of the 
two worlds, and the role of the fold as a staircase, or threshold, between 
them. This leads Deleuze to conceive of the two levels as reflecting and 
interacting with each other. For Deleuze, this means that the text, whether 
painting, book, or even film, reflects the monadic form of the culture that 
produced it.
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This occurs most often in the cameras (and the photographic and 
representational practices) that bring any photography into being. For 
Vilem Flusser, the camera cannot help but be an agent in such 
representation. By its operation, its mechanics, the camera carries out not 
the commands of the photographer who wields it with apparent freedom, 
but rather it carries out the encoded program of its makers. Built up over 
generations, according to laws so naturalised that they have become 
imperceptible, these encoded instructions ensure the dimensions and 
characteristics of the abstract image created, whilst the camera becomes 
a black-box in practice and in fact. But the camera is only a set of codes 
within another -  sets within sets -  that ensure the cultural and critical 
reception of photographs, so that programming widens to become 
information:
If one now attempts a criticism of apparatuses, one first sees the 
photographic universe as the product of cameras and distribution 
apparatuses. Behind these, one recognizes industrial apparatuses, 
advertising apparatuses, political, economic management 
apparatuses, etc...the whole complex of apparatuses is therefore a 
super-black-box made up of black-boxes.2
Photographs of all kinds are created according to an ideological 
programming as well as scientific one. This programming informs the 
image from the very object of the camera (with manual controls informed 
by pictorial ideologues) outward to the social conditions of the act of 
photography. Indeed, for Flusser:
The camera functions on behalf of the photographic industry, which 
functions on behalf of the industrial complex, which functions on 
behalf of the socio-economic apparatus, and so on (p. 30).
...the structure of the cultural condition is captured in the act of 
photography rather than in the object being photographed (p. 33).
2 Vil6m Flusser, Towards a Philosophy o f  Photography, trans. by Anthony Mathews, (London: 
Reaktion, 2000, c. 1983), p. 71. (TPP)
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...choice is limited to the categories of the camera, and the freedom
of the photographer remains a programmed freedom (p. 34).
Thus the workings of the ‘black-box’ are hidden from us, and we know 
enough only to understand “how to feed the camera...and how to get it to 
spit out photographs”3. Flusser’s is a philosophical picture of culture that 
synthesises Marx, Althusser, the Frankfurt School, Leibniz, and finally 
Deleuze4. But the real intersection of Flussers ‘nomadological’ text and 
Deleuze’s work is in his treatment of the image and its relation to the world 
5. The photograph is the image of a concept, and in this case, it is the 
concepts of the Cartesian camera that are imagined, not the free will of the 
photographer. The photograph’s extraordinary resemblance to reality 
results in the acceptance, if not the expectation, of a direct link with reality. 
Jonathan Crary has noted this, and suggests that the optics of the camera 
affirms the objectivity of the “infallible metaphysical eye”, since the optics 
of the camera mimic those of the human eye6. This connection (and the 
trust placed in its images) is a central element of the camera- 
consciousness -  and necessitates, as Crary does -  understanding the 
camera (or more precisely, the camera obscura) itself.
Leibniz also provides us with connection between cinema and 
photography; but not in the way in which Deleuze envisioned them. The 
time-image and the photograph share one vital genetic element -  the 
opsign -  despite the fact that Deleuze saw the photograph as an immobile 
section. The opsign is the point of indiscernibility between virtual and 
actual, and Deleuze is wrong to relegate the photograph to a simply 
material value. For the relationship between cinema and photography to 
be monadic, there has to be a single fold that runs between them, and that 
is reflected in any inflection (in any text) on that fold. As Leibniz, Deleuze, 
and Flusser suggest, the text will reflect the whole that composes it.
3 Ibid, TPP, p. 27.
4 Flusser’s “super-black-box” echoes the hierarchy of Deleuze’s “sets within sets”.
5 Noted by Hubertus von Amelunxen, Afterword to: Vilem Flusser, Towards a Philosophy o f  
Photography, trans. by Anthony Mathews, (London: Reaktion, 2000, c. 1983), p. 86. The 
significance of this observation will shortly become clear.
6 Jonathan Crary, ‘The Camera Obscura and its Subject’, in Nicholas Mirzoeff ed. The Visual 
Culture Reader, (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 245 -  252, p. 251.
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Therefore, if the genetic element must be shared across cinema and 
photography, it must be clearly visible in situations where cinema and 
photography would ordinarily seem diametrically opposed; that is to say, 
when cinema quotes photography, either through camerawork or through 
the narrative use of photographs. Since the genetic element is neither 
cinema nor photography, but an essential part of both, the opsign can only 
be in the photographic image itself, and the discourse can only be based 
around the ‘photographic’ in general. This chapter is therefore an 
investigation of the genetic element. The challenge is to take to texts an 
understanding of the discourse surrounding the photographic image, and 
demonstrate how the exchange of subject and object, is reflected in them. 
This should not just occur in avant-garde cinema, and not just in cinema 
that quotes photographs, but also in cinema that puts the veracity of the 
photographic image at stake, whether avant-garde or mainstream.
*  ★  *
Subjectivity and the Baroque Camera.
This chapter rejects the conceptual difference between cinema and 
photography that is centred on an ontology of negation. This conception is 
based on the comparison with cinema, and on an understanding of 
photography only as an agent of subtraction: photography is cinema’s 
origin and negation, cinema can do what photography cannot. As Stewart 
and Raymond Bellour note, the discussion of photography within film 
serves only to reflect film’s abundance when ‘grasped through the spectre 
of photography”.7 Where cinema and photography meet textually is the 
site of photography’s diminution. But this leaves unconsidered any 
approach to photography based on its historical and critical antecedents, 
whether in comparison with painting, or for its own sake. In the pages of 
Critical Inquiry an interesting alternative analysis of photography has 
emerged. This views its conventions as drawn from those pre-eminent in 
art and design in the two or three hundred years between the 
Renaissance and the beginning of the nineteenth century: Immediately 
substituting the contest of death with a contest of truth. At stake here is
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less a discussion of the differences between the cinema and photography, 
but instead the autonomy of the photographic image in general. The 
photographic image might be chemically made, but it is culturally shaped.
A real paradox exists between physics and point of view.
Whilst Deleuze never fully consolidates his attack on the notion of the 
subject in the cinema books, his later work on Leibniz, particularly on the 
Monadologie, more properly deals with the idea of a point-of-view. In The 
Fold, he continues his attack on the Cartesian subject by taking a view of 
the world and the mind based on Leibniz’s influential anti-Cartesian 
philosophy, and the culture of the Baroque that surrounded it.8 At the 
same time as attacking Leibniz for proposing a unified perspective based 
on relativism, The Fold is also a ‘rehabilitation’ of Leibniz, as John Mullarky 
has noted.9 Deleuze reclaims Leibniz in the same way as he had done 
Bergson, and goes back to the former to explore the role of point-of-view 
as an inflection that strikes the monadic fold at a tangent -  creating a 
relative, yet self-aware, apex of vision.
This is what offers us a chance to see beyond the merely physical 
connection of cinema and photography. Cinema and photography share a 
common base (the photogramme) but also an ever-changing relationship 
formed, as folds, by cultural distinctions. Furthermore Cinema and 
Photography as critical values should not be seen as a spatial modulation 
of this folding monad (ie. Two separate things -  or as different in kind), but 
now a temporal modulation in a ‘continuous development of form’.10 The 
critical distinctions of classical cinema, or ‘straight’ photography are really 
only points of relative stasis in the development of photography and film 
criticism. They act as inclusions -  or inhesions - of forms, but as critical 
values they exist only in time, as events, or objectiles. Since film studies 
and photography studies view these paradigms in retrospect, it is now 
easy to see this temporal characteristic. Cinema and Photography’s critical
7 Raymond Bellour, ‘The Film Stilled’, Camera Obscura 24, (1991), pp. 98-123, p. 105.
8 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. by Tom Conley, (London: Athlone, 
1993). (F)
9 John Mullarky, “Deleuze and Materialism: One or Several Matters?”, in South Atlantic 
Quarterly, Vol. 96, No. 3, (Summer 1997), pp. 439-464, p. 455.
10 F, p. 19.
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values (and the genres, movements, or oeuvres that are perceived within 
them) are misleading, as they create an image of the photographic 
medium as a tessellated and fragmented collection of forms -  and obscure 
any continuity, such as an unfolding of one to become another. This is a 
side-effect of the monad in general, and cinema in particular, as Deleuze 
notes in his commentary on Leibniz in The Time-image:
Leibniz...showed that the world is made up of series which are 
composed and which converge in a very regular way, according to 
ordinary laws. However, the series and sequences are apparent to 
us only in small sections, and in a disrupted or mixed-up order, so 
that we believe in breaks, disparities and discrepancies as in things 
that are out of the ordinary.11
In fact, the monad is a continuum in which any division can be made, and 
where
...the resolution into particular reasons can go on into endless 
detail, because of the immense variety of things in nature and the 
ad infinitum division of bodies.12
This is why Deleuze attaches importance to the everyday in cinema. Any 
division or inflection reflects every division. Every becomes any, and any 
particular point is merely a reduction of every possible point ad infinitum. In 
the monad, any-instant-whatever becomes every-instant-whatever. This is 
the structure of multiplicity in unity: a genetic element stretches across 
pleats and folds, creating a unity of multiplicity -  the appearance of the 
monad -  in the concetto. The concetto, as the apex of a cone, is therefore 
a view of the monad that fully realises the relationship between the one 
and the multiple as everything and the one -  any and every.13 We now 
have a cinephoto monad -  the photographic form that folds and pleats to 
become Cinema and Photography.
Before finally coming to the concetto, Deleuze first recasts the subject in
11 TI, p. 14.
12 Nicholas Rescher, G. W. Leibniz’s Monadology, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1991), p. 128.
13 F, p. 126-7
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Leibnizian terms. Unhappy with the term ‘subject’, with its connotation of 
Cartesian perspectivism, Deleuze’s superject is a point of inflection in the 
monad, a threshold where the soul meets the material; expressive of the 
shifting nature of the point-of-view. The superject is the organisation of 
perception based on what is most useful to perception: an operation of 
inherence or inclusion by the soul. But Deleuze adds to this his work on 
Bergson, and concludes that the superject creates a virtual image of the 
material world, thus actualising it in the folds of the soul. This constitutes 
the point-of-view.
A soul always includes what it apprehends from its point of view, in 
other words, inflection. Inflection is an ideal condition or a virtuality 
that currently exists only in the soul that envelopes it.14
The superject finds its instrument in the camera obscura, although not the 
camera obscura or lucida that inspired Fox-Talbot, Wedgwood and 
Daguerre. Their post-enlightenment camera obscura, was a tool of 
drawing upon to be used singly, and in which the individual eye organised 
the image and the whole camera’s orientation; a tool to which we remain 
exterior. Its role as instrument can only support the organising principles of 
Cartesian order: the ‘Flusserian’ programming was already taking shape. 
But in the Baroque camera obscura the viewer is placed inside the cell of 
the camera, and watches a moving image on a white table or sheet. The 
inner subjectivity and the outer world are separated, but the fold of the 
lens yet remains to connect them. The viewer inhabits a variable 
perception within the camera obscura, and watches an image that is a 
reflection of the variable outer world. To understand the photographic 
image, we must bypass the Cartesian camera, and refer instead to the 
camera as an inner cell that actualises a virtual world into an image in 
time.
The camera-consciousness is therefore a foregrounding of the superject 
as an ideal condition of the soul, rather than an ideal condition of the 
object perceived. Crucially, this can be identified in what Deleuze later 
describes as a prehension of a prehension: a self-enjoyment of its own
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becoming that pluralises the monadic space.15 This leads to a 
nomadization of the monad by a self-enjoyment that is “the very essence 
of an event”, as Tom Conley notes.16 The camera-consciousness draws 
attention to itself as an event of perception, a way of seeing that exists in 
time, and that is subject to the variation of point-of-view. This means that 
we should consider cinemas that are driven by the camera as Leibniz’s 
Gestaltung, an inflection that materialises an image of the world, but 
foregrounds this very action.17 We must see the camera-consciousness as 
a threshold between the world and the soul, in such a manner that the 
world reflects the soul. Therefore filmic texts will present a monadic 
material world, and this will be reflected in their monadic representation of 
time. The threshold, or fold, between them will be the camera.
Deleuze incorporates Leibniz into his thought by separating Bergson’s 
decentred virtual universe from the impression or prehension of the world 
as a centred, organised geography. The monad is just such a prehension, 
and must be made distinct from the world it perceives through inflection. 
This is where Baroque architecture, and in particular the camera obscura, 
manifests the threshold between the inner ‘cell’ and the outer world. The 
monad has no windows, but as Deleuze notes, folds replace holes (as well 
as wholes) in the Baroque. Rather than windows acting as apertures to 
see the visible world, instead the world is visualised, actualised and 
organised in the inner walls of the monad. This is why the camera obscura 
is the perfect architecture of the Baroque. The camera obscura does not 
let the visible in directly, but its complicated folding of optics focuses an 
organized and actualised image of ‘moving, living folds’ on its canvas. 
Deleuze’s appreciation of the Baroque and subjectivity is to see the 
camera obscura for what it does as an apparatus in creating an apparently 
autonomous image of the outside on the walls of the inside. The canvas 
has been replaced by polished metal, gelatine, and later celluloid, and the 
screen has replaced trompe I’oeil. The chemistry of photography and the 
optics of the camera, to which are pinned the values of objectivity in
14 Ibid, F, p. 22.
15 Ibid F, p. 78.
16 Tom Conley, “From Multiplicities to Folds: On Style and Form in Deleuze”, in South Atlantic 
Quarterly, Vol. 96, No. 3, (Summer 1997), pp. 629-646, p. 642.
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modern photography, hide the camera’s real roots in the Baroque: The 
perspectival view has replaced the monadic. Crary notes that:
The monadic viewpoint of the individual is authenticated and 
legitimized by the camera obscura, but the observer’s physical and 
sensory experience is supplanted by the relations between a 
mechanical apparatus and a pre-given world of objective truth.18
In these terms, the photographic image is, in fact, the site of contest 
between the referential and the aesthetic, just as the camera itself is a site 
of contest between the objective optics and the point-of-view. The paper 
print or filmic photogramme represents an attempt to fix the monadic and 
unfolding image after a rational fashion, as it were, whilst all the time the 
fact of the photograph as a point-of-view threatens to disrupt the artifice of 
objectivity.
This means that the manner of perceiving, as camera-consciousness, will 
reflect the objects perceived. That is why the crystal image reflects the 
operations of the narrative. The crystal-image is a product of a baroque 
(Baroque) camera. In La regie du jeu, one of Deleuze’s often quoted 
examples, the depth of field ‘ensures a nesting of frames, a waterfall of 
mirrors, and system of rhymes between masters and valets’19. The mobile 
camera pans horizontally like the lens of the Baroque camera obscura, 
and moves across as well as into labyrinthine interior, all the while 
reflecting the fluidity between the roles of master and servant. In Renoir’s 
film, it is the large country house and its environs that present the inner 
and outer worlds.
Whether an actualized labyrinth, as in La regie du jeu's mobile camera, or 
the virtual abyss created by mirrors in Lady from Shanghai, the labyrinth is 
an essential element of the monad. A labyrinthine material world reflects 
the inner soul in such a way that a consciousness of vision is forced into 
the open. It would be wrong to characterise all time-images as 
labyrinthine, but the shape of the crystal image already presupposes, with
17 F, p. 35.
18 Crary, 1998, p. 245.
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its unfolding of time, a labyrinthine structure in its actualisation of the 
virtual world. If we follow Deleuze through Leibniz, we will find that the 
crystal image is an inner monad of actualised images, each an event in 
time, reflecting the virtual world that is photographed. In the crystal image, 
actions and places that are filmed will take on the pattern of the 
labyrinthine, and that in turn will reflect the folds of the crystal. The 
labyrinth is a consistent presence in Deleuze’s work, and The Fold is on 
one level an understanding of the order, or possibility of the labyrinth. He 
conceives it as the perfect expression of the monadic relation of the one 
and the multiple: the intricacies and complexities of an ever changing 
universe are simply enfoldings and unfoldings of a single entity that only 
appear as discrete and contrasting or opposing elements. The playful 
study of films that follows here tries to tease out some of these.
The identification of the point-of-view is what Mullarky has described as 
Deleuze’s ‘top-down’ approach: a recuperation of the singular way of 
seeing from the abyssal variation of point of view.20 The seed of the time 
image is truth as variation, rather than as fixity. Deleuze recognises 
Leibniz in this, as the time-image allows for the expression of all 
possibilities from all situations, destabilising causality in such a way that 
“time puts truth into crisis”.21 Since the crystal image offers a “webbing of 
time embracing all possibilities”, it is the crystal-image that facilitates the 
compossible, the actualisation of the variation of truth and the creation of a 
particular point of view 22. All events are actualised, but rather than 
annihilate each other, they remain crystallized and change from the 
compossible to the incompossible. It is this co-existence that creates the 
folding labyrinthine structure of the crystal image.
*  *  *
19 TI, p. 84-85.
20 Mullarky, 1997, p. 458.
21 TI, p. 130-132.
22 F, p. 62.
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Truth and the photographic image.
It is odd that modern critics who believe that the photographic 
process should be the starting point for criticism have had very little 
to say about what the process is, how it works, and what it does 
and doesn’t guarantee.23
Deleuze’s understanding of photography is based on the idea (after Andre 
Bazin, in his case) of the shared existence of photograph and object: the 
foundation of approaches to photography that accept the photograph as a 
definitive representation, or final truth, of the moment. This is a legacy of 
the Cartesian philosophy that influenced the culture of photography from 
its outset, and that led to an invention of a photography that satisfied the 
rules and conventions of the picturesque.
Whilst the journal Screen has concentrated on the post-Benjamin 
discourse of photography and post-modernity, and whilst October has 
concentrated more on the ontology of the photographic image in the face 
of other plastic arts, Critical Inquiry has debated instead the role of truth 
and representation in the photographic image and its ideological basis in 
artistic convention. The dialogues in Critical Inquiry are a direct inquest 
into the role that Cartesian perspective and causality has played in 
establishing the representational values often taken as given in the 
photographic image.
E.H. Gombrich challenges the association of the camera obscura, as a 
tool of drawing, with human perception 24. The camera’s optics unnaturally 
fix perception, whereas, for Gombrich, natural perception includes an 
awareness of environment and the ability to move in it. The post- 
Enlightenment camera obscura supported the principles of representation 
that Gombrich identifies in the ancient Greek standards of mimesis, taken 
up by Descartes:
23 Joel Snyder, Neil Walsh Allen, “Photography, Vision and Representation”, Critical Inquiry 2, 
(Autumn 1975), pp. 143-169, p. 148.
24 E. H. Gombrich, “Standards of Truth: The Arrested Image and the Moving Eye”, Critical 
Inquiry 8, (Winter, 1980), pp. 237-273.
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...the negative rule that the artist must not include in his image 
anything the eye-witness could not have seen from a particular 
point at a particular moment.25
This is the ‘eye-witness principle’ that Joel Snyder and Neil Walsh Allen 
termed ‘the visual model’, and that leads to an image that was an event in
both space and time, a point of relativity from which the world was viewed.
26
This is the argument also taken up by Deleuze in his attack on Cartesian 
relativism. Linear perspective creates an artificial centre for a decentred 
universe, and through which the universe is seen in an “architecture of 
vision”, according to Michel Serres. Deleuze takes up Serres’ argument 
and reverses the role of point-of-view. The point-of-view perceives the 
world through inhesion or inclusion based on negation or subtraction of 
information not deemed useful or having sufficient cause or reason to be 
within the perspectival ‘cone’ of vision. Deleuze never completely denies 
relativism: “A soul always includes what it apprehends from its point of 
view”.27 Instead he demonstrates this elastic point-of-view as the 
organisation and actualisation of the decentred, virtual world, and the real 
character of relativity. This is an attempt to understand the perception of 
truth and the relationship between truth and the point-of-view. Relativism, 
point-of-view, and perspectivism are not the apprehension of a 
disorganised world into an order based on cause and effect, but instead 
are the apprehension of the variation of such order:
In each area point of view is a variation or a power of arranging 
cases, a condition for the manifestation of reality...28
For Gombrich, perspectivism relies on causality and a trust that the viewer 
will believe the image because of their own environmental experience, 
‘correcting’ any distortions made by optics and including or excluding parts
25 Ibid, Gombrich, 1980, p. 246.
26 Snyder and Allen, 1975, p. 149.
27 Ibid F, p. 22.
28 Ibid F, p. 21.
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that would not normally be visible.29 Thus the causality of optics is effaced 
by a conception of causality based on a naturalised point-of-view.
Causality has its basis in reason, and in the Monadologie Leibniz 
announces that nothing is true without there being sufficient reason.30 
Gombrich’s ‘corrections’ are sustained by such reason, or so it would 
seem. But this action is outweighed by the pictorial conventions that have 
been attached to the ‘visual reason’. The rectangular photographic image, 
for example, is a convention imposed upon the photograph for economic 
reasons that hide ideological ones. Rectilinear images fit rectilinear paper 
easily, and allow for more of the film to be used. However, rectilinear 
images also follow the conventions of art practice promoted by those 
photographers who, even in the face of the enormously popular (and 
rarely rectilinear) daguerreotype portrait, strove to have their photographs 
accepted on an equal footing with painting. The work of Henry Robinson 
and Oscar Rejlander, for example, echo the motivations of Fox-Talbot, and 
demonstrate to us a facet of the photographic program that exists even 
today31.
For Snyder and Allen, the camera’s apparent autonomy creates a sense of 
inevitability:
...a feeling that a photograph is the end result of a series of cause- 
and-effect operations performed upon ‘physical reality,’ that inclines 
us to impute a special sort of veracity to photographs...32
This obscures any possibility of the photographer’s eye guiding 
perception. It is hidden behind a notion of photographic truth based on 
optics and chemistry -  things that can be trusted empirically -  that are 
thoroughly mixed with conventions of representation so as to confuse the
29 Gombrich, 1980, p. 241. Gombrich notes that it takes variation of optics to ‘jolt us out of our 
complacency’.
30 Rescher/Leibniz, 1991, p. 110-120.
31 John Tagg has written of the development of early portrait photography -  particularly 
daguerreotypy -  as inheriting the traditions of portrait painting. John Tagg, The Burden o f  
Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories, (London: MacMillan, 1988). See also, 
Beaumont Newhall, The History o f  Photography: from 1839 to the present day, (New York : 
Museum of Modem Art, 1949).
32 Snyder and Allen, 1975, p. 157.
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one for the other.
Despite this, Roger Scruton, in his essay ‘Photography and 
Representation’, maintains that, in the ‘ideal photograph’, the image is in 
causal relation to the object33. Causality according to logic supplies the 
reason behind the image’s ‘truth’. For Scruton, in the photograph the 
“appearance is not interesting as the realization of an intention [as in 
painting] but rather as a record of how an actual object looked.”34 He 
extends this to all photography, and announces that the drama of cinema 
is the drama of the action photographed, with the camera merely a 
‘gesturing finger’. The ‘gorgeous irrelevancies’ of photography obscure the 
dramatic aim: the masterpiece of La regie du jeu is dramatic before it is 
cinematic.
Scruton’s limited analysis characterises the acceptance of perspectivism 
and the ‘eye-witness’ principle. Interest in a photograph stems from, and 
leads to, an interest in the object pictured, as in Bazin. The photograph 
never assumes the role of the object pictured, and the viewer never makes 
the mistake, but that acknowledgement serves only to strengthen the 
apparent causal link. Once accepted as natural, anything culturally 
attached, such as the conventions of artistic realism, are also accepted 
with similar ease. Scruton's approach is thus the antithesis of the plasticity 
advocated by Deleuze, despite the foundation of both approaches in 
Bazin. For Scruton the photographic image is a waxwork, “wedded to the 
creation of illusion”. The camera leaves nothing to the imagination, and 
instead saturates the image with detail: it “can present us with what we 
see, but cannot tell us how to see it.”35 Thus Scruton does not question 
photography’s adequacy in presenting the real in all forms, even though 
realism relies on such an adequacy, as Colin MacCabe attests.
MacCabe’s seminal analysis of realism demonstrates the classical realist 
text as a tool of ideology “in which there is a hierarchy amongst the 
discourses which compose the text and this hierarchy is defined in terms
33 Roger Scruton, “Photography and Representation”, Critical Inquiry 7, (Spring 1981), pp. 577- 
603, p. 578.
34 Ibid p. 581 and p. 579.
35 Ibid p. 602 and p. 590.
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real” because they present the world according to cause and effect: “The 
classical realist text cannot deal with the real as contradictory”. But this 
has the double operation of placing the subject in a position of Cartesian 
“dominant specularity”, and adequacy becomes a function that supports 
the realist image as objective -  as in Scruton.37 MacCabe’s political 
comment is simple, and is certainly demonstrated by those cinemas 
whose opposition to the mainstream is through forced distanciation as a 
direct rejection of it. This is a genealogy in cinema that can be traced back 
to Eisenstein, whose political motives were reflected in his filmmaking 
strategies. Eisenstein’s montage of attractions is based on the directness 
of his static images in opposing any fluid experience of duration. Deleuze’s 
call for a politics of cinema relies instead on an approach that is an 
antecedent of the very direct discourses of either the mainstream or its 
opposition. This is the antecedence of the ‘beyond’, since Deleuze sees 
the political power of cinema as existing before language, before 
information. No amount of information, even the blasts in Eisenstein’s 
shocking montages, will overcome or defeat those forces against which 
cinema as an art must rail, since these are direct discourses:
“...no information, whatever it might be, is sufficient to defeat 
Hitler...what makes information all-powerful...is its very nullity, its 
radical ineffectiveness...it is necessary to go beyond information in 
order to defeat Hitler or turn the image over.”38
MacCabe and Scruton diverge in politics - MacCabe's idea of resistance 
(shadowed by Peter Wollen's for example) is of a cinema that 
counterpoints the language of classical realism 39. MacCabe and Wollen 
see Godard, for example, as a filmmaker of distanciation and direct 
resistance. Deleuze diverges from this because he sees the filmmaker 
instead as criticizing “two sides at once”. Godard’s is a cinema of “pure 
speech-acts” because it emerges from the debris of its attack on language 
itself. Direct discourses of power and resistance are predicated upon
36 Colin MacCabe, “Realism and the Cinema: Notes on some Brechtian theses”, in Screen 15, No.
2, (Summer 1974), pp. 7-27, p. 8.
37 Ibid p. 12.
38 TI, p. 270.
Damian Sutton -  The Crystal Image
80
defined truths and falsehoods, but a politically active cinema can only 
come from an indirect-discourse that is an acknowledgement of the 
monadic variation of truth: and understanding that a point-of-view is 
apprehended from the any and every of variation.
*  *  *
Any and Every: The monadic in Helen Levitt’s In the Street.
Helen Levitt’s short film In the Street is a useful place to begin to explain 
the monadic variation of photography. Coming from the lyrical tradition of 
American photography of the 1940s and 1950s, In the Street foregrounds 
the tension between objectivity and subjectivity that was evident in still 
photography at that time.
Levitt had already exhibited her work at New York’s Museum of Modern 
Art by the time she collaborated with Janice Loeb and writer James Agee 
on the 1952 short film. Levitt’s early work emerged under the influence of 
photographers such as Walker Evans and Ben Shahn, and others 
including Loeb, Agee, and Berenice Abbott (all from the background of 
New American Photography), but also the then relatively-unknown 
photographer Henri Cartier-Bresson, who visited New York in 1935.
Slide 14
Levitt’s photography demonstrates the New Photography’s emphasis on 
what W.J.T. Mitchell describes as the ‘concrete social encounter’ between 
the photographer as eye of power and the subject as victim.40 The 
photographic image was a site of the contest of truth, and the work that 
emerged from this period has attracted criticism. Abigail Solomon-Godeau 
and Martha Rosier have both questioned its acceptance of the 
transcriptive nature of photography as one that hides the photographer’s
39 Wollen, 1982.
40 W.J.T. Mitchell, “The Photographic Essay: Four Case Studies”, in Picture Theory, 2nd edn. 
(London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 281-322, p. 288. Mitchell identifies the ‘photo­
essay’ as a key form at this time. See Evans’ and Agee’s work for Fortune magazine: See James 
Agee and Walker Evans, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men: Three Tenant Families, (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1941).
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political aim behind his or her use of a medium that ‘guarantees’ truth.41 
Mitchell’s tacit description of this style of photography as an ‘open 
espionage’ takes this up in respect of Barthesian semiology. The 
photograph’s ideological power relies upon the markers of its apparent 
objectivity: the conventions of photographic representation that have come 
to be seen as the ‘correct’ way to take truthful photographs. The ideologies 
behind the formations of these conventions have been obscured (as 
Flusser describes) to the extent that the ‘look’ of such photography 
guarantees ‘honesty’ to reality in representation. Such photographs 
confound Barthes' ideas: these photographs connote denotation itself42. 
Objective transcription is part of a social, political or journalistic act, but the 
characteristics of reportage that have become most often used themselves 
act as quotation marks around the subject. Such an emphasised point of 
view created tension with the notion of documentary truth that was fast 
emerging in critical discourse; questioning truth as perceived through the 
photographer’s selectivity. Unlike her photography, Levitt’s film is largely 
without such an inflection. By the time of In the Street, shot in 1945/46, 
only a short opening intertitle written by Agee demonstrates a connection 
with the lyrical style that coloured this tradition and which fed off this 
conflation of truth and point-of-view:
The streets of the poor quarters of great cities are, above all, a 
theatre and a battleground. There, unaware and unnoticed, every 
human being is a poet, a masker, a warrior, a dancer; and in his 
innocent artistry he projects, against the turmoil of the street, an 
image of human existence. The attempt in this short film is to 
capture this image. 43
But the tension between the transcriptive and the subjective is evident in 
Agee’s essay for the 1965 retrospective book on Levitt, A Way of Seeing: 
The artist’s task is not to alter the world as the eye sees it into a 
world of aesthetic reality, but to perceive the aesthetic reality within 
the actual world, and to make an undisturbed and faithful record of
41 See Abigail Solomon Godeau, Photography at the Dock, (Minnesota, University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991). See also: Martha Rosier, ‘In, Around, and Afterthoughts (On Documentary 
Photography), in The Contest o f  Meaning, ed. by Roger Bolton, (Boston: M IT, 1989), pp. 303-341.
42 See Roland Barthes, ‘The Photographic Message’, in IM T, pp. 15-32.
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the instant in which this movement of creativeness achieves its 
most expressive crystallization.44
Agee presents Levitt’s work as driven by the faithfulness of the camera to 
reality, but through an awareness of the changing fiction of reality itself. 
Max Kozloff, writing much later, also demonstrates this tension by 
describing her photography as the least tainted by the photographer’s 
presence, but nevertheless possessing a relativity in its way of seeing 45
The connection between cinema and photography in Levitt’s work is clear, 
not least in her developing career as a film editor for the MoMA. In the 
Street was conceived as “a cinematic version of Levitt’s photographs” to 
be undertaken by Levitt, Loeb, and Agee.46 Levitt saw the photograph as a 
‘sympathetic expression’, perhaps requiring an essay to focus that 
expression. To create an independent ‘intellectual vehicle’, their combined 
interest was to make a film that was also the equivalent of the lyric poem:
In the Street was produced by a photographer who was practically trained 
in, and visually influenced by, the emerging paradigms in film editing, and 
whose co-producers extended the photo-essay ‘projects’ of the 
transcriptive and the lyric.
In the Street thus demonstrates the continuum between cinema and 
photography. Monadic in its representation of space it follows that is will 
also be monadic in time. Levitt’s silent images of East Harlem, mostly 
filmed during the summers of 1945 and 1946, are accompanied by a 
soundtrack written and performed by the MoMA’s resident accompanist, 
but essentially they remain separate from any linear causality of logical
43 Opening intertitle from In the Street, (US. d. Helen Levitt, with Janice Loeb, James Agee, 1952).
44 James Agee, ‘A Way of Seeing’, in Helen Levitt, A Way o f  Seeing, (New York: Viking Press, 
1965), pp. 3- 8 &  pp. 73-78, p. 4.
45 Max Kozloff, ‘A Way of Seeing and the Act of Touching: Helen Levitt’s Photographs of the 
Forties’, in The Privileged Eye: Essays on Photography, 2nd edn, (Alberquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1988, (1987)), pp. 29-42, p. 30.
See also: Maria Morris Hambourg, ‘Helen Levitt: A Life in Part’, in Helen Levitt, (San Francisco 
Museum of Modem Art, 1991), pp. 45-64, p. 54. This tension is demonstrated in Levitt’s 
approach, in which she employed a right angle finder so that she never appeared to look at her 
subjects when photographing them, to make them relax “as if  they were inside”: an approach she 
leamt from Shahn and Evans. The orthodox viewfinder of Levitt’s movie camera meant she looked 
directly at her subject once more, and no ‘alibi’ is given to the photographer in her act of 
perceiving.
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progression. The critics who have taken a great interest in Levitt’s work 
have all focused at some point on Levitt’s New York as a continuum, or 
eternal and indivisible theatre, and In the Street is no exception. Max 
Kozloff describes the continuum as one emphasised through touch, in 
which the day to day activities of the people becomes a mass of touching 
from which a subjective viewpoint must find fixity. Touch is the enfolding 
and unfolding, ‘in abundance’, of the street. Kozloff emphasises Levitt’s 
way of seeing, mirroring Agee, as the disjointed and subjective isolation of 
episodes from the ongoing spectacle of the street.47 The act of touching is 
thus a monadic fold upon which the way of seeing is the inflection. For 
Kozloff, the children “are small explosive parentheses on weary streets” 
which offer themselves up to the subjective eye 48 For Sandra Phillips, 
each new game or mime offers up a variation on that which went before, 
and only the children’s own actions create the points of departure for the 
photographer to follow. Thus the film follows these games throughout, and 
the order of cause-and-effect is replaced by an order of dance and play 
that has deeper roots in lyrical performance 49
Slide 15
Phillips contrasts this with Levitt’s treatment of the city itself as a labyrinth 
of purified abstraction. She notes how the city at this time presented a 
decentred and uniform space that excited the formalist attentions of city 
planners and artists alike. The streets themselves are not identifiably New 
York streets, and there are none of the landmarks that have come to 
represent New York in photography. New York’s landmarks offer artificial 
centres opposed to Levitt's rhizomorphic city. Levitt's is a decentred 
existence, and one in which any street is every street. Thus the New York 
of Helen Levitt immediately reflects Deleuze’s city:
What can be apprehended from one point of view is therefore 
neither a determined street nor a relation that might be determined 
with other streets, which are constants, but the variety of all
46 Ibid Hambourg, 1991, p. 58.
47 Kozloff, 1988, pp. 34-38.
48 Ibid p. 33.
49 Sandra S. Phillips, ‘Helen Levitt’s New York’, in Helen Levitt, (San Francisco Museum of
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possible connections between the course of a given street and that
of another. The city seems to be a labyrinth that can be ordered.50
This exchange of ‘any’ and ‘every’ exists in time also, and it is what makes 
In the Street a crystal image of time. The spatial framing or ellipsis that the 
city undergoes in Levitt’s viewfinder is reflected in the temporal ellipses of 
each shot, and the film in general. Just as each street corner, stoop or 
gutter becomes an object in space separated from the continuum of 
touching, so the act of filming creates an object in time in each shot.
Levitt’s shots extend themselves just long enough for each to become a 
‘pause’, a temporal concetto that temporarily fixes the moment. The 
pause, for Phillips, becomes “a metaphor for passing”, a “sense of the 
eternal in the momentary” in which every moment is presented in this ‘any- 
moment’.51 That is why the games in Levitt’s are not organised games but 
instead they represent the ‘ongoing theatre’ of dance and play. Any 
organisation, such as dressing up or the preparation for tag-games, are 
fragmentary glimpses of order that are soon disrupted by the unexpected 
crowding of faces around the camera, accompanied by unexpected 
syncopation in the soundtrack. The momentary appearance of a privileged 
instant only serves to emphasis its reality as any-instant-whatever.
Slide 16
The street life, which takes place on the stoop of each apartment and 
shop, is an unfolding and enfolding of action without division. As Deleuze 
suggests in his elaboration of baroque philosophy, the enfolding and 
unfolding of matter reflects a similar multiplicity of the soul. In this respect, 
the inner world of the city, its soul, is in the children, who actualise briefly 
in dance, mime and play the virtual world they see around them.
Modem Art, 1991), pp. 15-46.
50 F, p. 24. The point of view that apprehends the streets is Levitt’s camera, which at once sees the 
street and the city. Levitt’s film eschews the title ‘In the Streets’ for the more generic In the Street 
precisely because of this.
51 Phillips, 1991, p. 29. Phillips compares Levitt's work with Weegee, whose photography 
presented people as the soul of the city, forced out onto the street by murder, fire, and public 
gatherings.
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The stoop thus acts as a threshold between this soul and the world, but 
also a place of threshold between the child and the adult. The teenagers 
are inner folds in the monad, who reflect the film itself, and the space and 
time of the street. The adolescents are the point of indiscernibility between 
the young children and the old people who inhabit the street: carriers of all 
the compossible futures and the all the games that they have played that 
become not necessarily true pasts: The incompossible actualisations of 
the soul of the street. Above all, they represent the threshold between the 
truth of variation of the point of view, and the fixing of truth in the ideology 
of the individual. This is what Deleuze was so suspicious of, and it is this 
threshold that Agee sees as presented in Levitt’s work:
Adolescence is a kingdom of fallen and still falling angels, but it is 
yet a kingdom, with its own kind of wild-animal glamour, with 
profundities of grave purity which are peculiar to it; with its 
unappeasable hunger and pity; and its own awful threshold to the 
world beyond, to that Babylonian captivity in which dreams are 
either manufactured by outside authorities or rest, as a rule, forever 
unformed and unsatisfied.52
*  *  *
Truth and the Labyrinth in Larry Clark’s kids.
In each child, from very early, the germ of the death of childhood is 
at work.53
The teenage years present a threshold between an inner world of 
unexplored possibilities (the world of childhood), and an outer world of 
fixed ideologies and lived experiences (the adult world). But as Agee goes 
on to demonstrate above, this has a darker side. In Larry Clark’s kids, 
teenagers are his subject, but his is a departure from the ethnographic 
depiction of teenagers and children in In the Street and instead towards a 
more serious aspect of this moment in life. The tension in Levitt’s film was 
centred on the approach she took as a filmmaker who had grown up in the
52 James Agee, ‘A Way of Seeing’, in Helen Levitt, A Way o f  Seeing, (New York: Viking Press, 
1965), pp. 3- 8 &  pp. 73-78, p. 76.
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traditions of the New American photography. This rests on the New 
American Photographer’s use of ‘real’ people and ‘real’ situations. 
Conversely, the teenagers of kids are far from ‘real’, but instead actors 
chosen to play the parts that Clark bases on people he once knew.
With the development of characters, kids can concentrate on the various 
images of childhood and adulthood merging in the teenager in a way that 
In the Street only hints at. The stoops, parks and streets are a stage upon 
which images of childhood -  comic books, skateboarding, sexual naivety -  
are actualised alongside images of adulthood -  violence, drug-taking and 
rampant sexuality -  to such an extent that at times they are difficult to 
discern from each other. The city in kids is full of such liminal spaces that 
are neither inside nor out, but instead are stages as thresholds. The 
sidewalks and stoops, but also the park and the open-air swimming pool 
are spaces that mix the public and private. Later their sexual meanderings 
are played out in packed living rooms and bedrooms at a party. In the 
streets, the teenagers verge towards innocent childhood play, but when in 
the bedrooms of their friends, this innocence is lost in favour of an 
emerging adulthood, kids opens with a series of lingering images of two 
teenagers about to have sex. This extended series of shots, of “innocent 
angels... having sex, smoking pot, drinking beer, having fun” as they later 
do, exposes the tension between the transparency of the camera in fiction 
film and the camera as gesturing finger in documentary. This in turn 
reflects the tension between innocence and decadence, childhood and 
adulthood, and subjectivity and objectivity that runs throughout the film 
and is its main narrative theme, as Amy Taubin notes:
This shot, which seems to last forever but might be as brief as 20 
seconds, gives us time to become self-conscious about our own 
response as we confront the activity that most adults want to shove 
out of sight, or at least turn into an abstraction.54
Slide 17
53 Ibid p. 76.
54 Amy Taubin, “Chilling and Very Hot”, Sight and Sound, Vol. 5, No. 11, (November 1996), pp.
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This shot becomes a mise-en-abyme for the whole film, in presenting in 
the first few seconds of the film the labyrinth of viewpoints that are 
compossible, and which each are crystallised before making way for 
another. In Clark’s book Teenage Lust (1983) one photograph of an act of 
fellatio is repeated with minor variation over twenty pages, producing the 
same effect of placing the twin subjects of photography and looking within 
their own frame. The enhanced longevity ruptures chronology, and it is 
from this rupture that the time-image grows. In this rupture is also visible 
the fold of the cinephoto monad.
The fact that childhood and adulthood meet in so many liminal arenas is 
testament to the city itself as a teenage space in which the worlds of 
matter and soul are almost indistinguishable. The city is a labyrinth of 
liminal spaces that are stages for the teenage threshold, in which places of 
fixity -  adult spaces -  are few and far between. Clark’s city is also a 
labyrinth in time as well as in space, since the teenagers act as adults in 
the sex clinic, in the bedroom, and act as children in the streets and in 
front of their parents, in a way that changes and exchanges with such 
volatility that they become indistinguishable through the day. The ellipsis of 
the film -  24 hours in the life of these teenagers -  is an object in time as 
much as the streets and parks are objects in the liminal, fluid landscapes 
of the kids’ lives.
This shifting status of the teenagers is reflected in the shifting approach to 
subjectivity that critics noted in Clark’s film. Like Levitt, Clark made his film 
after already establishing himself as a photographer. As with Levitt, kids 
can be seen as a film version of earlier photographic works, in particular 
Clark’s Tulsa (1971) and Teenage Lust. Clark’s own assertion that he has 
‘always been a storyteller’ is supported by his aim to make a film version of 
Tulsa, and an overriding ambition to be a filmmaker.55 His career 
demonstrates a development from a visual style influenced by the
16-19, p. 16.
55 See Michael Cohen, ‘Discussion with Larry Clark’,
htThP://www.artcommotion.com/VisualArts/indexa.html, (27/06/00), and also: Scott Tobias,
“Larry Clark: I wanted improv...I’m always looking for the unexpected image, the unexpected 
action”, htThP://theavclub.com/avclub3507/bonusfeaturel3507.html, (04/07/00); Jutta Koether, 
‘ Interview with Larry Clark’, in Journal o f  Contemporary Art, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 30-50.
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documentary of the New American photography (particular that of Robert 
Frank) to one influenced by cinema, video and the mass media 56.
Slide 18
In kids the camera is more than a ‘gesturing finger’ and instead exploits 
the tension between what is expected of documentary filmmaking and the 
emphasis on what appear as committed points-of-view. Clark described 
Tulsa as “documentary with a fictive quality”, in contrast to the reverse in 
kids.57 Thus Clark’s progress from Tulsa to kids is one also from 
photography as a contest of truth to a mixture of fiction, kids refuses to 
present one single viewpoint, but instead follows Clark’s intention of 
presenting ‘one theme from different angles’ to such an extent that critical 
opinion of the film is markedly divided.
As Snyder and Allen noted, even the control of exposure in photography 
implies a process of selection rather than an autonomous adequacy, thus 
creating a problem of photographic truth. A resolution to this might be to 
discard the notion of a paradox as a problem at all; at least a problem that 
must be solved in favour of a truth or a fiction. Kendall Walton concludes 
that ideas such as those of Bazin (and hence Scruton) rely upon the value 
that is invested in photography as “a continuation or culmination of the 
post-Renaissance quest for realism”.58 Walton opts to handle Bazinian 
ontology with care, and questions instead the photographic fiction rather 
than the photographic real. Rather than the photographic image being a 
paradox of autonomy, Walton instead chooses to see it as a discourse of 
subjectivity and a ‘mixture of fictions’. For Walton, the act of looking 
overshadows any other particular detail. More recently, Walton has 
eschewed the emphasis on reality in favour of a notion that to see the 
photographic image is always to accept it as fiction. This is a 
misconception that is a result of the urge to solve the paradox of truth and
56 Teenage Lust contains sequences of photographs as if  they were photogrammes, whilst Larry 
Clark 1992 (1992) and Teenage Lust both contain re-photographed teen posters and television 
screens.
57 Cohen, 2000.
58 Kendall L. Walton, “Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism”, Critical 
Inquiry 11, (December 1984), pp. 246-277, p. 246-247.
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fiction in terms of one value or the other. The paradox, or mixture, of 
fictions is a direct result of the inability of rational discourses (whether 
those of fiction, such as Walton’s, or those of truth, such as the cognitive 
scientific approach) to account for the exchange of values that gives the 
photographic image its particular power. Photographic images provoke the 
responses they do because they confound rational discourses. Walton 
reminds us that the object was photographed, and that we cannot escape 
the subjectivity that selected, composed, framed and shot it. To look at the 
photograph is to see an object in the Bazinian sense, but it is also to see 
the object as seen. This is the mixture of fictions:
We have now uncovered a major source of the confusion which 
infects writings about photography and film: failure to recognize and 
distinguish clearly between the special kind of seeing which actually 
takes place, between the viewer’s really seeing something through 
a photograph and his fictionally seeing something directly. 59
Walton rejects the Cartesian ‘dominant specularity’ in favour of a 
Deleuzean monadic point-of-view: The photograph is always a way of 
seeing, “...not truth according to the subject, but the condition in which 
truth of a variation appears to the subject”.60
However, as we have found, the discourse between subjectivity and 
objectivity in cinema falls too easily into the trap of relativism. Deleuze 
instead picks up relativism and reorients the ‘truth’ of relativity. Deleuze’s 
post-Leibniz concept of relativism is the expression of the free-indirect 
discourse, and the free-indirect discourse is the real truth of photography. 
All photography contains the discourse between fictionally seeing directly 
and really seeing through photography. Criticism and historicism fixes this 
exchange, and creates the values of objectivity (the truth of empirical 
evidence, for example) and subjectivity (the truth of spirit, or point of view), 
that are essential for the classical or the radical. However these are 
artificial values actualized from an indivisible exchange. Photographic truth 
does not lie in these values, but instead in the exchange from which they
59 Ibid, p. 254.
60 17 ~ On
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are set, and the exchange is the fold. Cognitivists might put forward the 
notion that the eye’s vision is always reliable and its data empirical. In 
Bergsonian terms, there is always a fundamental perception-image. On 
the other hand, the brain continually makes sense of vision, and 
perception becomes affection as interpretation occurs:
There is hardly any perception which may not, by the increase of 
the action of the object upon our body, become an affection...So it 
does seem, then, as if there were a difference of degree and not of 
nature between affection and perception.61
affection-image) in order to act (action-image). Regardless of the eye’s 
data, it cannot be separated from these attempts to make sense of it. This 
includes, in the viewing of a photograph, the awareness of it as a created 
image. The perception-image always includes a perception of the 
photographic image as just that. This is where the circuit develops its 
momentum. The paradox can be solved, but only in renaming it after what 
it is -  an exchange.
This exchange occurs in time, since any instant whatever of the film 
presents at once the same element -  the fictional discourse -  of every 
instant. Clark’s work, for example, exposes the cinephoto monad not 
simply because he ‘always wanted to be a filmmaker’, not even because 
(like In the Street) kids often looks like a collection of filmed photographs, 
but because his work places the photographic exchange within the frame.
Like In the Street, kids is a baroque film. Clark’s teenagers appear “lit from 
within” as Taubin describes it, especially in the scenes where the tension 
of their emerging sexuality is exposed: at the swimming pool and at the 
party. At the party, the camera pans along the semi-naked bodies of the 
young boys whose stretching bodies appear out of the gloom like the 
subjects in a Caravaggio or a Fiorentino. As in Baroque figure painting, 
which took a naturalistic human form and attenuated it to reflect the 
convulsions of hell or the ecstasies of heaven in the earthly body, their 
pale bodies, half adorned by the armour of skate culture (cut-off jeans,
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exposed torsos), carpet the floor of the apartment as if they were 
themselves one folding mass stretching between the two worlds. The party 
becomes a grotesque of El Greco with the cherubic young boys watching, 
as if they were angels, the world of the teenagers’ sexuality unfold, while 
they themselves pass around a joint. Taubin rejects this scene as out of 
place amongst the rest of the film’s realist camerawork, but it is this 
sequence, preceded by the scene at the swimming pool and climaxing in 
two scenes of teen sex, that merges the beauty, vitality, horror and 
sadness of the flourishing of teenage sexuality.
Slide 19
kids is also a film of the baroque city because, like In the Street, it presents 
its liminal spaces as indivisible folds of the decentred city. It is impossible 
to ignore the labyrinth in Deleuze. The Deleuzean model of the universe 
that follows in his work on Bergson (and of course the cinema books) 
cannot help but define the acentred universe as a labyrinth of sets, and 
sets within sets. But to deal with the labyrinth is also to deal with the 
characters that inhabit the labyrinth, especially those that populate the 
mythology of the Minoan maze that inspired Nietzsche and Deleuze.
The labyrinth and its mythology are metonymic of the philosophical search 
for truth that Deleuze develops in Nietszche and Philosophy. The people 
of the labyrinth characterize the various approaches to this quest: Ariadne 
and her thread represent a becoming: the search itself. In contrast 
Theseus and the minotaur represent ideology; a fixed and centred truth.
But Dionysus and the labyrinth represent the joy of the search, a search 
for affirmation in which the only truth that exists is the search itself. The 
knowledge, or joy, of that search -  the fact that the search is the real truth 
- is the being of becoming.62 Rose Pfeffer notes that Nietzsche looks on 
‘the firm truth’ as an illusion, just as the centre of a labyrinth holds only 
nominal value. Nietzsche’s call is for a “philosopher with integrity”, for
61 M M , p. 53.
62 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson, (London: Athlone, 1983 
(1962)), p. 188-9 (NP)
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whom knowledge is in the passionate search or process, not the result63 It 
is easy to see now how Deleuze forms an interest in Nietzsche, and later 
in Bergson and Leibniz. It is the free-indirect discourse -  the exchange 
between objective and subjective -  that is more important than a nominal 
fixity of the subjective positioning. The unified subject is merely an 
ideological or epistemological ‘truth’ that obscures the more important 
aspect of perception, that of the exchange that the mind has with an a- 
centred world in constant becoming.
For Deleuze the labyrinth is the site of Nietzsche’s own ‘problem of truth’.64 
Pfeffer acknowledges Nietzsche’s identification with the god Dionysus 
through the joy of knowledge as a process of “ceaseless questioning”.65 
Deleuze has Nietzsche’s ‘Dionysian longing’, thus the mythological 
Labyrinth becomes a useful metaphor. The story of Theseus, and 
especially that of Ariadne, is a story of the passionate search for truth in 
which Ariadne’s love (and the thread) is the “innermost secret of inquiry”.
It is possible to make a Nietzschean/Deleuzean reading of kids: Jenny is a 
convincing Adriadne in search of truth. The story of kids is as much about 
Jenny’s search for a truth as it is about Telly, whose quest to deflower 
virgins appears initially to drive the narrative forward. Instead, as we found 
with In the Street, it is the camera that is the driving force through the 
labyrinth, as through the camera we are most often offered the views that 
Jenny will see. The camera follows her past experiences, as much as it 
prefigures her future. Telly’s deflowering of the anonymous girl at the film’s 
beginning is a re-enactment of the encounter that Jenny later describes as 
having been between her and Telly; whilst the camera that hovers over the 
fumbling comatose kids at the party predicts her viewpoint as she later 
stumbles over them to the bedroom where she finally finds Telly. As she 
walks through the city from the sex clinic, Clark’s framing places Jenny in 
long shot with the Empire State Building far in the distance.
63 Rose Pfeffer, Nietzsche: Disciple o f Dionysus, 2nd edn. (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 
1974), p. 121-2.
64 NP, pp. 185-188.
65 Pfeffer, 1974, p. 121.
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Slide 20
The city has lost its centre, and Jenny now has to search for her own 
thread of knowledge that will lead her out of the labyrinth. Her search for 
Telly is one of affirmation, since he has given her the disease (AIDS) that 
will end both their lives, and by telling him she might stop his own search. 
As she journeys across the city, always one step behind Telly, it is as if 
she were winding up the thread until it leads her finally to him.
Jenny is ultimately doomed in this quest. Like Theseus, Telly will abandon 
her to her fate, and to her death. Deleuze takes up the story of Dionysus, 
who saves Ariadne from her island and receives from her a double 
affirmation of his own. But in one version of the myth it is Theseus who 
returns to the island to find Ariadne dead. This is no less an affirmation, for 
Telly, as Theseus, receives only the affirmation of his own death in Jenny. 
For Deleuze, Ariadne’s double affirmation to Dionysus (her search for 
knowledge affirms his) is a release for her from the ressentiment -  the 
reflection in woman of masculine power and dominance -  to her own 
power and knowledge. The search for Jenny has been her becoming, as 
the labyrinth is the becoming in Deleuze. But for Jenny there is no 
Dionysus, and her search culminates in her rape at the hands of Casper 
while in a drug-induced stupefaction. His forced advances are reflected in 
her vague (un)willingness, reaffirming only the circular action of the 
disease she carries. As Ariadne she affirms only that Casper is the Bull; 
that her future and theirs is already decided.
Slide 21
The film ends with two shots that repeat and encapsulate both the shifting 
point of view and the aggressive camerawork that highlights it. That Telly’s 
aggressive misogyny should end with a picture of such innocence is a 
contradiction that enforces Clark’s aim that the film should treat one theme 
from different angles. After following Telly in his quest and visualising his 
roaring entrance into the adulthood that will end all too soon, the camera
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offers us the other perspective that he is, after all, just a child. That bell 
hooks should find this so disturbing only serves to demonstrate how 
uneasily Clark’s film adopts any fixed point-of-view:
Suddenly they are made to look like innocent children. This scene 
undermines the violence of their encounter by suggesting that its 
outcome has been bliss.66
hooks directly attacks Clark’s particular vision of the truth of the teenagers 
in New York: “The question, of course, is whose truth is being told?” She 
directly addresses the film as one that presents the sexually titillating when 
it should, perhaps, be objective. Yet neither hooks nor the film itself offers 
a distinct and fixed viewpoint, and we might argue that Clark has not 
achieved one even if he had tried to. Instead he has achieved a more 
accurate picture in expressing the liminal situation of the kids as the real 
truth of their existence, encapsulated in this shot, as if it were taken from 
his earlier Teenage Lust.
This film cuts from this to the partly comatose Jenny, as Casper rapes her. 
This shot returns us to the beginning of the film, and acts as a mise-en- 
abyme in just the same way. The camera has driven the film, and it is 
Clark’s exploitation of a photographic realism -  what one reviewer 
described as the “meticulous grooming of perfection” -  that has created a 
webbing of all possible points-of-view: a time-image that exists in “shots 
that go on just too long enough and no more”.67 bell hooks describes 
Clarks lingering camerawork as if it were a series of still pornographic 
images that aid in our own “seductive identification”.68 But placing the 
image within its own frame of perception in this way leads not to a single 
viewpoint but instead invites an unceasing questioning of the truth of the 
image itself. It suggests that various possible readings of kids, such as the 
Nietzschean ones above, are ultimately only crystallisations that proliferate 
from shots that linger ‘just too long’.
66 bell hooks, “White Light”, Sight and Sound, Vol. 6, No. 5, (May 1996) pp. 10-12.
67 Leslie Felperin, Review of kids, Sight and Sound, Vol. 6, No. 5, (May 1996) pp. 54-55.
68 hooks, 1996, p. 12.
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★ ★ ★
Subject and Object in Stanley Donen’s Funny Face.
In the light of our study, it is possible for us to see the appearance of the 
cinephoto monad readily in the work of Larry Clark and that of Helen 
Levitt. As photographer-turned-filmmaker, they each present a very safe 
example of the monadic connection, whilst as filmmakers removed from 
the mainstream of Deleuze’s movement-image, they foreground their 
photography as pure optical situations of the time-image. In short, they 
each present almost too easy an example of the crystal-image. The real 
test of the cinephoto monad must come in a more mainstream (but not 
necessarily any less a time-image) cinema, and in a more tacit 
acknowledgement of cinema’s photographic origins. A more stringent test 
would be on a mainstream film in which the technical reference to the 
photography in its production would be reflected in its narrative. In Stanley 
Donen’s 1956 Funny Face, the acts of photography depicted merge with 
the film’s cinematography, whilst this is reflected in the film’s merging of 
star and character.
Funny Face contains both the elements of classical Hollywood in general 
and the elements of the reflexive musical so popular in the 1940s and 
1950s. Its Cinderella narrative addresses popular interest in romance, 
whilst its song and dance numbers are exemplary of the genre’s emphasis 
on visual pleasure. As in other musicals, the numbers in one way suspend 
the narrative, and in another advance it. The action in Funny Face crosses 
from the offices and bookstores of New York, to the fashion houses and 
cafes of Paris. Jo Stockton (Audrey Hepburn) is accepted into each new 
milieu that she encounters by way of a song and dance number. In this 
way Funny Face exemplifies the ‘classic’ formula of musical that came out 
of Hollywood at that time; from its director Stanley Donen and its two stars, 
Hepburn and Fred Astaire, to its Pygmalion story and its easy use of 
pastiche and parody. It is an unusual place to find a radical display of 
cinema’s own ontology -  its origins in the photographic image.
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As Deleuze notes, dance in cinema maps out the directions in life of its 
characters, particularly in the musicals of its fifties heyday. In the musicals 
of Astaire and Donen, the dance that maps the world, and the dance that 
is taken over by the movement of the world, become indistinct. Peter 
Kramer notes that Funny Face’s photography sequences act in much the 
same way, in that they act as romantic interludes as the traditional musical 
numbers do.69 They suspend the story to give purely visual pleasure, but 
they also advance the story in presenting Jo’s rise to stardom through her 
romance with Avery. Each number -  and each photography sequence -  
present the choices that she has to make along the way, including whether 
or not to give up her quest for philosophical truth in favour of her obligation 
to her new employers, Quality magazine. The photography sequence 
presents a point of bifurcation in the narrative that emanates from a 
moment of both visual pleasure and narrative projection.
The story of Jo’s passage and development as a model and woman is 
contracted into a pivotal sequence made up of photography sessions in 
which, Avery directs, and is then directed by her. The film contracts them 
to act as if they were a single musical number. Donen’s exploitation of the 
flat picture plane of the photograph -  with its links to the sensory motor 
situation -  leads to the pure optical and sound situations of the time- 
image: As each image strobes from one colour wash to the next, each 
movement is accompanied by a burst of sound.
Slide 22
These sequences therefore present us with all the possible allusions to 
photography that Garrett Stewart and others have noticed: the inset 
photograph, the freeze frame, and the exposure of the film’s structure 
(especially in negative). Jo’s maturation as a model in this sequence is 
shown by her awkwardness in the first few (she is unable to move) to her
69 Peter Kramer, “’A Cutie With More Than Beauty’ : Audrey Hepburn, the Hollywood Musical 
and Funny Face”, in Musicals: Hollywood and Beyond, ed. by Bill Marshall &  Robynn Stilwell, 
(London: Intellect, 2000), pp. 62-69. See also: Stephen Winer, “Dignity - Always Dignity: Betty 
Comden and Adolph Green’s Musicals”, in The Velvet Light Trap No. 11, (Winter 1974), pp. 29- 
32.
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mobility at the sequence’s climax (she is unable to stop). Her acceptance 
into the world of fashion parallels her similar acceptance into that of 
philosophy, through an earlier jazz number. Jo journeys from one life- 
affirming choice to the next until she is offered both the world of fashion 
and the world of philosophy by Avery’s proposal of marriage. Kramer notes 
how Audrey Hepburn’s roles have been received as characters poised 
‘forever at her moment of momentous choice’, and each musical number 
or photography sequence presents bifurcating paths that fork to create 
wider and wider possibilities. These still images, fixed for a moment as 
photographs-within-film, do not represent death as we found in Barthes 
and Bazin, but instead they contain the possibility of a life unfolding in time 
from each image. This is where we confront the central problem of 
difference between cinema and photography, as they saw it.
Death is the recurring theme in comparisons between cinema and 
photography. Stewart’s study begins and ends with death, and in particular 
the stasis that the freeze-frame or inset photograph imposes on the 
movement of film.70 However, whilst he attempts to resist this equation, it 
becomes one that he finds increasingly difficult to avoid:
Narrative cinema, in other words, when fastening upon a single 
image, can invoke the deathlike stasis of photography. 71
Thus the photograph’s metonymy of death is transferred to the film: The 
photograph is a memento mori for the filmic spectator. Photography is the 
determinant of cinema, but its role is then reduced to that of the 
photogrammes that make up the film-strip: “Cinema dies, dies back into 
film...”72 But this one-dimensional view takes the photographic image as a 
given constituent of cinema that can only present movement, time and 
hence life, when strung together in a becoming (ie. in the process of 
cinema).
It is the photographic image at the base of both cinema and photography 
(as disciplines) that is the matter in question. This is the substance of the
70 Stewart, 1999, pp. III-X I, and p.321.
71 Ibid p. 49-50.
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cinephoto monad -  the photographic image (and its constituent acts, 
processes, uses, and consumption). Both Deleuze and Garrett Stewart 
question the arbitrary separation of photography and film, but in attacking 
Deleuze’s analysis, Stewart actually brings the two approaches to their 
consensus. He takes up Deleuze’s initial understanding of the movement 
image:
Thus the photogramme is inseparable from the series which makes 
it vibrate in relation to the movement which derives from it’ (83). In 
what sense inseparable? Would we not want to put it the other way 
around as well: that the strip (and its thrown image) is inseparable 
from the photogrammes that compose it?73
However, we might ask the question of both Deleuze and Stewart’s 
analyses: Is the movement-image ever perceived as a string of 
photogram(me)s? Indeed, cinema is accepted as photography before it is 
accepted as a string of photographic images. Whether acknowledged as a 
string of fixed shots or not, there is an acknowledgement of the 
photographic act. It is the photographic image that is the essential and 
binding element of cinema and photography. We must conceive, therefore, 
of the photographic image not defined specifically as the fixed image, but 
instead in the act of photography. Time-image cinema is made up of 
photogrammes in series, just as the movement-image is. The distinction 
here is crucial: the movement-image depends upon the practical nature of 
cinema as its defining paradigm, and exploits it. On the other hand, the 
time-image is also constituted of photogrammes in series, but remains 
independent of its attachment to the sensory-motor schema. It does not 
need a direct acknowledgement of the practical base of cinema, and in 
fact thrives without it. The time-image is merely dependent on the act of 
photography, which both cinema and the photograph share. Photographs 
can be time-images or movement-images, just like cinema, depending on 
their necessary connection to, or freedom from, the sensory-motor 
schema. To equate the photograph with death simply because of its often- 
assumed relationship with chronology is to miss the depiction of time that
72 Ibid p. 321.
73 Ibid p. 88.
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the photographic image might offer. The frame of perception in the time- 
image (whether in cinema or photography) is not placed around the 
photogramme -  or any material base perse -  but instead around the 
photographic image or act.
This returns us to Funny Face. If each photographic interlude, or ‘number’ 
offers a ‘moment of momentous choice’, then each of them presents, not 
the metonymy of death, but that of life. Furthermore the particular narrative 
for Jo, that of the tension between philosophy and the soul and that of 
fashion and the material, is reflected in the photographs that punctuate 
each sequence. The crystal-image does not emanate from the inset 
photograph nor the freeze-frame, but the act of photography that they 
reflect; as focussed around Jo, and particularly around Audrey Hepburn as 
Jo.
Hepburn is never properly separated from the characters she plays, and 
they never become independent of Hepburn’s own real-life image. The film 
is richly reflexive of both the musical genre, and of the photography culture 
that it parodies but, at the same time, is deeply indebted to. Fashion 
photographer Richard Avedon already had a working relationship with the 
ingenue Hepburn, and in life and art her image already mixed the 
cosmopolitan glamour of America with the old-world glamour of Europe, 
and especially Paris. The film blends her character with her existing star 
persona, and through much of the film’s middle sequence in the 
Montmartre cafes, she wears the same gamine costume that she had 
made famous in 1954’s Sabrina, and which had become a trademark of 
the Hepburn ‘look’. A key moment in Sabrina has Hepburn framed by a 
doorway to create a silhouette that would be as recognisable on screen as 
her face in later films. She thus becomes herself a seed of the crystal- 
image:
The actor is bracketed with his public role: he makes the virtual 
image of the role actual, so that the role becomes visible and 
luminous...But the more the virtual image of the role becomes
Damian Sutton -  The Crystal Image
100
actual and limpid, the more the actual image of the actor moves into
the shadows and becomes opaque 74
Deleuze has much to say about the instant recognisability of images in his 
later work on the face 75. Faciality is a powerful drive that is elemental to 
the organisation of the visible world, and the Hollywood star system is a 
particularly good example of it. Hepburn’s star persona is a fictional 
exchange, in which at stake is not the reality of actor or character, but their 
aesthetic value. This is reduced to the Hepburn silhouette that appears in 
Sabrina, and which reappears in Funny Face in a scene in which 
Hepburn’s public persona most closely matches her character’s. The 
awkward and confused innocent escapes the frivolity of the fashion world 
for the more intense intellectual pleasures of philosophy76. The 
facialization of Hepburn is reliant on her costume and hair-style, and her 
body becomes a recognisable landscape that can be at once exotically 
desirable and homely and familiar (emphasising both the European and 
American elements of her star persona).
Slide 23
In the musical it is routinely the musical numbers that expose the mixture 
of star and character, since we are always made aware that it is Astaire or 
Gene Kelly dancing, whilst at other times they remain ‘believable’ in their 
characters. Just as the musical numbers outline the movement of the 
world, according to Deleuze, so it is the ‘dancer’s individual genius’ that 
allows this to occur. In these sequences we are not watching Gene Kelly’s 
character, we are watching Kelly, but when we return to the film’s implicit 
narrative, this interlude has made it all the more believable. The musical is 
therefore “a gigantic dream, but an implied dream, which in turn implies
74 TI, p. 72.
75 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia 
(1980), trans. by Brian Massumi, 3rd edn. (London: Athlone, 1996). (THP)
76 Funny Face's thematic division is between the world of the mind and the world of the body. 
Philosophy and intellectual growth are represented by jazz and bebop, whilst joy and physical 
fulfilment (in Jo’s case, quite literally a blossoming) are represented by popular and traditional 
melody. Astaire, whose background was in both jazz and traditional musical, bridges the gap as 
both star and character.
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the passage of a presumed reality in the dream.”77 Funny Face’s 
photography sequences are like dream sequences, except that it is the 
photography itself that is the dance, and the model Hepburn is the dancer. 
Hepburn is caught between herself-as-object (playing her character) and 
Hepburn the subject, and this becomes most indiscernible in the opening 
credits and later ‘studio’ renditions of the title song. Hepburn’s character 
and her own persona as international model and film star become 
indistinguishable, and give way to the later modelling sequence in which 
we watch Hepburn the model at her best. This more explicit facialization of 
Hepburn reduces her face to a series of black holes on white walls so that 
the image of Hepburn-as-Jo has become a series of abstract connections 
from the outset. This image, which appears at the beginning of the film as 
the ‘funny face’ in question, presents neither a realistic picture of Hepburn 
or her character, but a reduction of the two to a series of simple elements. 
The image facializes the indiscernibility between Hepburn and Jo, in the 
same way that its composition is never completely black holes on white 
walls or vice-versa. This is a facialization that exists to capture the 
indiscernibility between star and character, since it is on this indiscernibility 
that the plot (and audience identification) depend. This is an exchange 
between character and star that exists in the photograph as if caught in a 
loop, of circuit.
Slide 24
From this indiscernibility emanates a labyrinth of choice reflected, once 
again, in the city. Jo’s search for a philosophical truth is reflected in her 
chase across Paris to the house of the mythical (and mythological) Flostre, 
the philosopher whose works have been an alternative spur for her travel 
to Europe. The labyrinth leads us to Being, and Being is the bull (Flostre is 
the bull in Funny Face, as it was Casper in kids). The Paris of Funny Face 
is a labyrinth divided in the Baroque manner, with the underground cafes 
and country retreats as the folds of the soul, and streets of the city as the 
pleats of matter. Jo is the fold between them, constantly poised between 
the philosophical and the material, and the photograph of Hepburn-as-Jo,
77 Ibid TI, p. 61-2.
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reduced to black holes on a white wall, is the facialization of the enfolding 
of philosophical and material. It is a visual labyrinth reflecting the film's 
narrative labyrinth. Avery offers a marriage (her Ariadne, his Dionysus) of 
her wisdom and his photography; her search for truth amongst the 
intellectuals of Paris has educated him as much as the glamour has 
seduced her. In Nietzsche and Deleuze’s version of the Labyrinth myth the 
god Dionysus comes to rescue Ariadne from the ressentiment78. Dionysus 
is the affirmation of truth in the search, and for Nietzsche it is Dionysus 
who reveals himself to be the Labyrinth, and the Labyrinth to be the 
search. The proposal Jo the material world of fashion photography 
combined with the search for philosophical truth. In return, Avery’s ennui is 
cured by that search. Jo’s acceptance is therefore a Nietzschean double­
affirmation.
*  *  *
Tensions of description in Dans le labyrinthe and 
UAn nee derniere a Marienbad
The photographic image should be recognised less through a contest of 
accuracy or truth, and rather more as a mixture or exchange of fictions 
from which time unfolds in perception. At stake here are the conventions of 
subject and object that pervade critical analyses of both cinema and 
photography. To expose these conventions, is ‘to make the machinery of 
photography grind’. One such person to achieve this, and to whom 
Deleuze turns considerable attention, is Alain Robbe-Grillet, and in 
particular his 1961 film L’Annee derniere a Marienbad (Marienbad).
For Deleuze, Marienbad provides an excellent example of the crystal 
image (“...the entire Marienbad hotel is a pure crystal, with its transparent 
side, its opaque side and their exchange”), and he devotes considerable 
attention to the film and its makers. Marienbad’s director was Alain 
Resnais, who all but acted as cameraman (by his own admission) in 
adapting Robbe-Grillet’s richly descriptive script (published simultaneously
78 I f  we followed the pattern of Nietzsche’s ressentiment each photograph o f Jo would be a little 
death that signalled her death as a woman. However, such a conclusion privileges the tense
Damian Sutton — The Crystal Image✓ C*
103
as a cine-roman). The relationship between Robbe-Grillet and Resnais 
gives rise to many possible interpretations as has the film’s often 
intentionally opaque plot, some of which are dealt with here. Jean-Louis 
Leutrat states the obvious when he suggests that “there are two L’Annee 
derniere a Marienbad, a film signed ‘Alain Resnais’, and a screenplay 
signed ‘Alain Robbe-Grillet’” 79. Whilst Deleuze comes down very firmly on 
the side of Robbe-Grillet as the film’s creative force, there are many 
reasons to consider the visual influence of Resnais, who had worked with 
Marguerite Duras in the adaptation of her novel for his earlier film 
Hiroshima mon amour, an earlier attempt to ‘visualise the thoughts’ of two 
lovers drawn together by the tragedies of war.80
In Hiroshima mon amour the parallel accounts of the lovers are visualised 
as intertwining stories that unfold through editing and mobile camerawork. 
For Marienbad, the film’s images are extended tableaux, as if each were a 
separate recollection-image, and the camerawork for each is a tension 
between the mobile camera driven by Robbe-Grillet’s script and the static 
images of Resnais. This is the result of the director Resnais conceiving 
and representing Robbe-Grillet’s script in the form that confounds 
cinematic logic most easily, whilst continuing to follow a readable 
continuity of sorts. In order to highlight cinema as being a process of 
reading, or subjectively interpreting (which was Robbe-Grillet’s desired 
effect for literature in his nouveaux-romans), Resnais produces a cinema 
that corresponds to something else that must be read -  a comic.
Given the mythology of the antipathy that existed between them, it is 
possible to understand the frustration the director must have felt when 
presented with a script that included the large amount of description that 
Robbe-Grillet’s contains. However, despite this, Resnais made very few 
changes to it, all of them with the consent of Robbe-Grillet, and relied
perceived in photography, and not the time that unfolds from the photographic image.
9 Jean-Louis Leutrat, L 'Annee derniere a Marienbad (BFI Film Classic), trans. by Paul 
Hammond, (London: BFI, 2000), pp. 52-61. For different interpretations of Marienbad, see 
Kawin, Kline, Houston and Kinder, below. See also Thomas Beltzer, ‘Last Year at Marienbad: An 
intertextual meditation’, in Senses o f Cinema (internet journal), 
htThP://www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/00/10/marienbad.html, (24/11/00).
80 Georges Sadoul, ‘Notes on a New Generation’, in Sight and Sound, (August 1959), pp. 111-117, 
pp. 114-115.
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almost entirely on the visuals to maintain a high level of creative input of 
his own. This makes Resnais’s visual vocabulary all the more relevant.
During the years from 1949, in which American comics were banned in 
France, Resnais had copies of his favourite, the Chicago Tribune’s ‘Dick 
Tracy’, sent to him. Resnais had more time for this simple strip than the 
complex and sophisticated bandes dessinees for which France in famous. 
There are immediate visual similarities between ‘Dick Tracy’ and 
Marienbad. Scott McCloud notes how Chester Gould’s illustration for the 
strip (a style continued by current artists Dick Locher and Michael Kilian) 
uses “...bold lines, obtuse angles, and heavy blacks to suggest the mood 
of a grim, deadly world of adults...” 81
Slide 25
This perhaps explains the significant emphasis of blacks and whites in the 
interiors of Marienbad -  suggesting an intense adult, mental, world of 
games, in comparison with the muted and low contrast tones outside, a 
space for sensual play and physical seduction.
Slide 26
Comic strip panels do not, as the cinematic shot does, express a singular 
moment, but instead an attenuated passage of time. Whereas cinema can 
present the ‘whole’ of narrative progression as if in actuality through 
sequences of editing, the panel of a comic strip can only present what 
Lawrence Abbott calls the ‘characteristic moment’ 82 Thus a scene that 
might take up a few minutes in real time to occur, and also to read, is 
compressed into a single frame: a time that unfolds to include the past and 
the future as the eye scans eccentrically over the image to pick up both 
the words of the characters and any narration. Thus reading a panel of a 
comic strip, Abbott suggests, is as much an act of reading an image as it is
81 Scott McCloud, Understanding Comics: the invisible art, (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 
126.
82 Lawrence L. Abbott, ‘Comic Art: Characteristics and Potentialities of a Narrative Medium’, in 
Journal o f  Popular Culture, 19:4, (Spring 1986), pp. 155-176, p. 167.
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of reading a text, and yet neither can fully articulate the moment on their 
own. This is the comic strip’s ekphrasis. According to William Mitchell, 
ekphrasis is a description of an image that cannot completely serve this 
function. Reciprocally, the image cannot fulfil its description in words. Both 
must be seen together, and yet the inconsistencies between the two give 
rise to complex exchanges of meaning resulting from an imbalance. The 
power of ekphrasis -  and hence its common use in poetry -  lies in the 
images that flourish from the inability of image and word to represent each 
other adequately 83.
Slide 27
Marienbacf s visual structure is composed of shots presenting 
characteristic moments in the same way. In this shot the actors freeze 
whilst the camera tracks 180 degrees around them. Duration is 
compressed into a particular moment, characteristic of memory, but not 
necessarily of actual time. In such shots the eye is free to wander over the 
surface of the image, without the pressure of editing. Hence its similarity 
with comic monstration. This is not the only visual echo of comic strip 
narration: the labyrinthine space of the hotel is compressed by deep 
staging, in which both the foreground and background are in sharp detail. 
Difficult to achieve in cinema this type of deep staging is a staple of comic 
illustration. Cinematographer Sacha Vierny used specially made bifocal 
lenses that hold the near foreground and background in sharp focus at the 
same time - something which cinema finds it difficult to do routinely. Now 
commonplace, this innovative approach allowed Resnais to compress the 
action of a scene - particularly dialogue - into a single frame. This slows 
the progression of shots by discounting the need for alternation between 
speakers, and thus allows the meditative pace of the film's editing to be 
reflected in the single shot.
Slide 28
83 Mitchell, 1995, p. 154.
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Having achieved this compression via deep-staging rather than by 
shooting flat compositions in themselves, Resnais then shot along 
corridors, or across halls and gardens. The represented space of the hotel 
and its events mutates and unfolds according to the memories and 
fantasies of X and A, causing it to change shape in successive sequences. 
As the shape of the hotel changes, so the time sequence of events 
changes accordingly. Characters of Marienbad appear to occupy the same 
time and space -  the same image - as their memories and fantasies 
collide.
Slide 29
In the comic-strip the viewer’s eye follow the passage of time along the 
passage of space, creating a continuity that is logical in comic strips -  
according to the reading of comics from left to right, in space and in time. 
Resnais takes this ‘continuity principle’ to Marienbad, where such a 
viewpoint more easily emphasises the unreliable subjective spectator 
position. The conventions of one medium expose the conventions - as 
conventions - of another. Resnais achieves with the camera what Robbe- 
Grillet achieved with his prose. Each image is a tableau in which the eye 
wanders, and in which movement is presented within frame and in space, 
rather than in time: “Throughout Resnais’ work we plunge into a memory 
which overflows the conditions of psychology...”, as Deleuze suggests. 84
To concentrate on the visual influence of Resnais as director is to risk 
neglecting what Robbe-Grillet brings to the film. For Deleuze, Robbe- 
Grillet is concerned with the ‘perceptual present’ analogous to the 
Bergsonian image of duration. Marienbad is created through the friction 
between this and Resnais’ tableaux as images in an ‘architecture of 
time’.85 The idea of a single perceptive present is echoed by Eugene 
Archer, who describes Marienbad as a melange of past, present and 
future that was influenced by the new novel.86 It is also emphasised by
84 TI, p. 119.
85 Ibid p. 104.
86 Eugene Archer, “Director of Enigmas: Alain Resnais”, in The Emergence o f Film Art, ed. by 
Lewis Jacobs, (New York: Hopkinson &  Blake, 1969), pp. 336-340, p. 337.
Damian Sutton -  The Crystal Image
107
Bruce Kawin, for whom it is an excellent example of his concept of a 
‘mindscreen’ cinema in which dream-images are just as valid as memory- 
images in subjective experience. However, where Kawin emphasises a 
camera that is not self-conscious and a world that is not a film. Subjectivity 
is thus privileged rather than viewed as part of an exchange.
Beyond time and memory Deleuze’s interest is in Robbe-Grillet’s attack on 
subjectivity and objectivity, expressed in Marienbad but also his 1959 
novel Dans le labyrinthe (the year Deleuze finished his work on Nietzsche 
and was poised to return to Bergson). Far from providing a concrete 
narration, the photographic image in Marienbad and the rich and repetitive 
description of Dans le labyrinthe, serve only to offer a myriad of differing 
interpretations and conclusions that unfold in the subjectivity of the 
spectator, whilst events depicted have as evidence of veracity only the 
images that the film, or the book, gives. The autonomy of photographic or 
narrative image is immediately put under pressure.
In structure and style, Marienbad is a perfected version of Dans le 
labyrinthe, in that much of the earlier novel is written with precise and 
repetitive description that prefigures the visual repetition of camera 
movement and shots in Marienbad. In both, events and places that appear 
to be similar are revealed to be different, and familiar characters and 
spaces often appear alien. In Dans le labyrinthe streets and street-corners 
merge and become indiscernible. Descriptions of the painting that the 
soldier sees merge with descriptions of the rooms that he visits, as do its 
characters with the people around him. Robbe-Grillet’s description 
constructs a material world that is a labyrinth of half-remembered vistas, 
and confusion of place and person, ‘virtual’ painting and ‘actual’ reality. A 
scene in Dans le labyrinthe, in which the description moves across the 
represented space of the cafe painting to rest on the young boy sat 
beneath, gives no impression of difference between either depiction. Each 
is as real or as virtual as the other. In a parallel movement in Marienbad, 
the camera at several times pans across the same hall to rest on a 
different vista through the window, whilst the out-of-field continuity of the 
baroque gardens emphasised by editing is confounded in later scenes.
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In this sense, Resnais achieves with the camera what Robbe-Grillet 
achieved with his prose. In actual fact, the film’s images do support X’s 
descriptive, repetitive and malleable voice-over, since they are both 
revealed as unreliable. But they do so in a coterminous - even poetic - 
way. This is what Mitchell has called “ekphrastic fear”; the moment when 
we realise that verbal and visual representation are misaligned:
This is the moment of resistance or counterdesire that occurs when 
we sense that the difference between the verbal and the visual 
representation might collapse...87
In these situations, new variations of events and their consequences are 
produced by the inability for word and image to be fully adequate to each 
other. Such events, Mitchell suggests, are the products of a desire for the 
potential inherent in these strange mis-coincidences to be released. To 
read these words or see these images is to search for a centre around 
which to orient the story of the film or the book.
There are many objects and events that offer themselves as a potential 
nexus, or virtual centre ‘dans le labyrinthe’. The painting is one of these, 
but also the photograph of the soldier in full dress uniform that hangs in 
the room where the soldier dies. For Robbe-Grillet, photographs can offer 
proof, but also create confusion, and several passages are taken up with 
the soldier’s attempts to animate the moment of the photograph in his 
mind. For the soldier the imagined moment of the photograph merges with 
possible memory, and the mapping of possible situations becomes one 
particular event that is described as if it were a memory of his own of 
leaving for the front. Whether the photograph is of our soldier or not is 
irrelevant, in this passage recollection-images vibrate with dream-images 
to the point that any soldier becomes every soldier:
A coat with flaps folded back, puttees, heavy marching boots: the 
uniform is that of the infantry, as witness also the helmet with the 
chin strap and the complete gear of packs, kit-bag, flask, belt 
cartridge-cases, etc...the total effect is neat and as it were,
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lacquered, due no doubt to skilful touching-up by the specialist who 
made the enlargement; the face itself, graced with a conventional 
smile, has been scraped, changed, softened, that now it has no 
character left, and resembles for ever all those pictures of soldiers 
about to leave for the front...88
In Marienbad, the question of objectivity and the veracity of the 
photograph, is asked of the camera. For Deleuze, the reflexive awareness 
of the camera was the key to his understanding of cinematic time: key 
because such reflexivity is manifest in the doubt that comes with the 
apparent objectivity of the camera. For A, in Marienbad, the photograph is 
a site of contest between memory of terror and dream of bliss. In the 
scene from the cine-roman, A is surrounded on her bed with photographs 
she has discovered in her dressing-table of herself taken by X, as 
evidence of their affair, and more particularly the violence of his advances. 
This leads directly to a flashback in Robbe-Grillet’s directions, in which X 
enters the room and violently rapes her. For the film however, this scene is 
excised and replaced by the same discovery, but this time of many copies 
of the same -  banal -  holiday snapshot of A in the garden at 
Fredericksbad or Marienbad. Following this is a scene in which the nature 
of X’s advance is inconclusive. This changes the emphasis of the 
photographic image. In the cine-roman, the scattered images, encroach 
and overwhelm her as X does:
Toutes les photographies qu’elle a trouvees tout a I’heure dans le 
secretaire sonts etalees autour d’elle: sur le lit, sur la table de nuit, 
sur le tapis, le tout dans un grand desordre.89
Resnais replaces this with A playing ‘nim’ (the game we see X and M 
playing) with the same photographs. The site of contest is changed from 
the depiction of many different photographs, to the photograph as object of
87 Mitchell, 1994, p. 154.
88 Alain Robbe-Grillet, In The Labyrinth, trans. by Christine Brooke-Rose, (London: Calder and 
Boyars, 1967 (1959)), p. 56-57.
89 Alain Robbe-Grillet, L ’Annee derniere a Marienbad, texte integral, (Paris: Les Editions de 
Minuit, 1961), p. 162. “After a while, all the photographs that she found in the writing-desk where 
strewn all around her: on the bed, on the night-stand, on the carpet, all of them in a great disarray” 
(My translation)
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proof in general: For A, the single experiment can neither prove nor deny 
his account of their affair. This is the problem with ekphrasis: as Mitchell, 
notes, “Words can ‘cite’, but never ‘sight’ their objects”90.
Slide 30
Both X’s account and A’s memory fail to explain adequately this 
photograph, or any of the photography in the film. This moment of 
photographic reflexivity simply serves to reiterate that what we see is, in 
fact, true, but only true to the narrative accounts on offer through X or A. 
The camera is identified as their subjective viewpoint, but leaves us no 
closer to making sense of their accounts. This is what finally returns us to 
Deleuze, and the problem of truth. For A, in Marienbad, the photograph is 
a contest of memory versus dream which is reflected in her account of 
meeting X in her room and his conflicting rapport. As with the streets and 
rooms of Dans le labyrinthe, all the rooms in the hotel look the same, as X 
describes, except the one in which he may or may not have raped her. 
The contest is thus between memory of terror and dream of bliss, with 
photographs as the nexus of this contest of accounts: a nexus of terror 
and play. The photographic image offers a vibration between dream and 
memory as in Dans le labyrinthe. The photographs of the script offer 
uncontestable images of both their meeting in the garden and the rape. 
Each is a ‘plunge into memory’, as Deleuze has it.
That A leaves with X resolves nothing, since it can be the result of her 
believing his account, or merely being seduced by it. The doubt remains, 
but rather than being a value of negation, it is one that implies the 
compossibility of all pasts. Jefferson Kline’s psychoanalytic reading 
attributes the substitution or displacement of the rape-scene to Resnais, 
since it is present in the script but not in the film.91 Kline also notes that 
because of Resnais’s famous attention to detail (such as the naming of 
Robbe-Grillet’s opening play-within-the-film, Rosmer) such details 
deconstruct the narrative, as mise-en-abyme, to engender re-readings.
90 Mitchell, 1994, p. 152.
91 Jefferson T. Kline, Screening the Text, (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 71.
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Whether or not this subtraction is the work of Resnais or Robbe-Grillet is 
contestable, since this approach to detail, as in the case of H.M (Henri 
Martin) in Dans le labyrinthe, is a device of ‘sabotage’ for Robbe-Grillet.92 
The play and the game do indeed present a mise-en-abyme, as does the 
cafe painting in Dans le labyrinthe, and the idea that such details should 
offer an individual ‘nexus’ of possible readings points towards the game of 
nim that A plays with photographs as just such a detail. But the singular 
photograph suggests that it is the photographic image perse that is the 
site of contest, rather than any particular image. All the film’s photography 
is contestable, since there is no anchorage to memory or to imagination 
offered. Kline has missed the point, since every image, and any image, is 
a mise-en-abyme. The camera is a vibration between an objective view, 
the photographic image, and a subjective perception (dream or memory), 
echoing not only Resnais’s ‘photography of thought’, but also Robbe- 
Grillet’s obsessive description. It should not be forgotten that the script 
that Robbe-Grillet penned provides a further momentum to the exchange 
of fictions. Whilst in the film the narration of X, and A’s rebuttals or 
breakdowns, appears to drive the cinematography to create folding world 
of the Marienbad hotel, the script is still driven by the omniscient narrator 
of the scriptwriting process. This echoes his conflation of writer/narrator in 
Dans le labyrinthe, since the prepositions of ‘he’ and ‘I’ are both used to 
confuse the reader.
For David Meakin, Robbe-Grillet’s heavy description sets out to destabilize 
the order that is imposed on perception in the traditional novel.93 The 
result is a labyrinth of compossibilities that emanate from each description, 
guided only occasionally by Robbe-Grillet. To follow the description is to 
create mental images in the mind, each having its own autonomy as an 
actualisation of the story. The description thus goes from the real to the 
possible in the Bergsonian sense. This playful approach to narration in 
Marienbad is reflected in both the proliferation of games (chess, checkers, 
and especially nim) that contrast with A’s moments of terror in Marienbad,
92 Robbe-Grillet identifies himself with the famous saboteur Henri Martin, who threw sand into his 
ship’s engine, as if  Robbe-Grillet himself were a saboteur of bourgeois fiction. The soldier in Dans 
le labyrinthe is trying to deliver a parcel that had belonged to a soldier called Henri Martin.
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and in the contrast between the soldier’s moments of humour with the 
young boy and his own terrible fear of illness and death in Dans le 
labyrinthe. Thus a series of tensions are set up around description: 
Play/terror; falsity/veracity, fiction/memory, narration/vision. These 
exchanges, decentred and without anchorage, lead to a shattering of 
order:
In Last Year in Marienbad, and in all his work, Robbe-Grillet put into 
play a new asynchrony, where the talking and the visual were no 
longer held together, no longer corresponded, but belied and 
contradicted themselves, without it being possible to say that one 
rather than the other is ‘right’: something undecidable between the 
two.94
Robbe-Grillet’s intention is to expose the real truth from within: to expose 
the oscillation between order and disorder that is the real truth of the 
world, a vibration of the objective and the subjective. For Robbe-Grillet, the 
order imposed through logic, causality and perspectivism can ultimately be 
laid at the door of Descartes, and has achieved such autonomy that 
Robbe-Grillet identifies with the saboteur of the engine, whose purpose is 
to throw sand into the workings to make the machine grind.95 In this way, 
each image or inflection by Robbe-Grillet is a dicisign, a perception placed 
within the frame of perception. In both Dans le labyrinthe and in Marienbad 
the source of narration or vision is constantly in question as a fiction, and 
the result is an exchange or vibration that acts as a seed for the time 
image as a labyrinth of interpretation.
Both film and novel provide a material labyrinth of streets, corridors, a 
baroque garden in Marienbad, and a kitchen/parlour in Dans le labyrinthe. 
These are the pleats of matter in Deleuze, in that both the soldier’s quest 
to deliver his parcel, and X’s Dionysian (or Thesean) pursuit of A, are both 
straightforward searches that include and traverse a labyrinth: “As Leibniz
93 Alain Robbe-Grillet, Dans le labyrinthe, Intro, by David Meakin, (London: Blackwell, 1983, 
(1959)), pp. 11-12.
94 TI, p. 250.
95 Alain Robbe-Grillet, “Order and Disorder in Film and Fiction”, trans. by Bruce Morrisette, 
Critical Inquiry 4, (Autumn 1977), pp. 1-20.
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stated, there can never be ‘a straight line without curves intermingled’”.96 
But it is the rational trajectory -  the attempt to make sense of the labyrinth 
-  that provides the momentum of this search. As Beverly Houston and 
Marsha Kinder suggest, espousing the anti-Cartesian trajectories offered 
by the film, viewers should ‘be carried along’ by it, rather than attempt to 
create a coherent and causal whole from it.97
What carries the viewer along, and is thus the fold between the upper and 
lower worlds, is the camera. For Meakin, the intermediary level of the 
labyrinth between that of matter and soul is the artistic creation, or 
interplay between objective description and subjective perception that 
provides the ‘total labyrinthine effect’. The photographic image for 
Marienbad acts as the fold between the real and the virtual. However, this 
creates a much more complex crystal than that which Deleuze initially 
describes, since as we have found, this film (and the others in this chapter) 
place their own material basis within the frame also. The photograph as 
object, and the photographic image as revealed in photographic effects, 
are vibrations at the heart of the crystal image, and each creates a 
labyrinth of possibility, or incompossibility, that emanates from it.
Incompossibility finally denies a fixed reading of either Marienbad (or any 
of our films). We might be satisfied with A as Ariadne, but is X Dionysus 
or Theseus? Is M Theseus or the Bull? We might prefer one reading in 
particular: X’s account is the labyrinth, he is the labyrinth, A’s departure 
with him is an affirmation of this, and is an escape from the ressentiment 
represented by M. This would not adequately suppress other possible, or 
compossible, outcomes and readings: critical writing on Marienbad is 
replete with these. For Robbe-Grillet, no specific order should prevail in 
Marienbad, and indeed, we should abandon the rational binarism of order 
and disorder that instructs us to create coherent readings anyway. Instead 
we should embrace Robbe-Grillet’s idea of a decentred text that remains 
interesting only whilst ‘unrecuperated’.
96 F, p. 14.
97 Beverly Houston &  Marsha Kinder, Self and Cinema, (New York: Redgrave, 1980), p. 254.
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To offer a final interpretation of the film would defeat its purpose. The 
charm of the labyrinth, of its joy and its terror, is being in it. This is why 
Marienbad was so intriguing to Deleuze. The labyrinth is a metaphor that 
illustrates Deleuze’s approach to truth from his early writing and 
throughout his career. And why it appears in his work on Bergson, Leibniz, 
as well as his work with Felix Guattari. For Deleuze, of course, the truth is 
not at the centre of the labyrinth: the truth is the labyrinth. Robbe-Grillet 
and Resnais were unable to agree - in public at least - on the ‘true’ ending 
of the film, or indeed, the true events of the ‘last year at Marienbad’. For 
Resnais, they did meet ‘last year’, for Robbe-Grillet, they did not. Indeed, 
the apparent ambiguity of the film’s ending, as well as this authorial rift, 
has been the starting point for many different interpretations of Marienbad, 
not least of which being that Marienbad is ‘just a bad film’. But this would 
be to misunderstand the ambivalent efficiency of its ekphrasis. The 
combination of image and narration, working for Resnais as it does in the 
comic panel, is an agent to unfix meaning, as well as to fix it. Maybe that is 
the truth of L’Annee derniere a Marienbad after all.
*  *  *
Conclusion.
In an October 2000 feature review of Julien-Donkey Boy, a film directed by 
kids scriptwriter Flarmony Korine, Danny Leigh compares the film with the 
work of Nan Goldin, and particularly The Ballad of Sexual Dependency. 
The comparison suggests a ‘genetic’ connection in their collective use of 
the everyday, as both film and slide-show “...document the grimy, 
disturbing minutiae of modern day-to-day life, to provide a mirror to reflect 
what would otherwise remain unseen.”98
It is no accident that Deleuze found the time-image in the everyday. It is 
when the everyday is presented that the role of the camera, first as 
‘dominant specularity’ and then within its own shadow or frame, is 
foregrounded. The situations of the everyday (sunsets, memories) or 
everyday things (household objects and the still-lives created from them)
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are devoid of action, and offer an image from which time unfolds. The 
genetic element present in both Korine’s and Goldin’s work is the image of 
the everyday. In this chapter we have asked what is at the heart of the 
photographic image that connects the diverse forms of photography and 
cinema, and resolves the paradox of subjectivity that dogs the essays of 
MacCabe, Scruton, Kendall and others. We find our answer in this genetic 
element: in the any-instant-whatever.
As we found in In the Street and kids, the relationship of every with any is 
that of multiplicity in unity. The time-image unfolds from the everyday 
because the everyday reflects the camera and thus the subjectivity that 
perceives it. In the action-image the photography is not questioned, but 
instead the artifice of cinema and the false movement of the film-strip is 
hidden behind a veil of apparent truth; a truth that relies on the simplest 
equation of the photographic image with veracity. The time-image 
immediately places this under pressure -  ‘time puts truth into crisis’.
It is clear that any attempt to proclaim the photographic image as 
objective, to accept it as truthful, has a difficult task. But why has the 
photographic image been invested with such authority? For that we have 
to look to Descartes, and the post-Enlightenment culture that existed in the 
years prior to photography’s mass explosion. The cameras that furnished 
the work of the photographic pioneers of 1839 were not those that began 
life in the Baroque, but were instead instruments that supported an 
ideology of causality and order; and the scientific advances that 
augmented the new camera soon produced a machine that recreated the 
pictorial according to the conventions of painting. We should not ask 
questions of the authority of the photographic image, but instead of the 
autonomy of the photograph.
Rather than a site of truth, the photographic image is a mixture or 
exchange of fictions; an expression of compossibility. This is why the 
critical distinctions of realism and verisimilitude, and even the classical 
values of cinema and photography, exist. For each it is a question of
98 Danny Leigh, “The beat-up kid”, in Sight and Sound, (October 2000), pp. 20-22, p. 22.
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whether we are really seeing through photography, or fictionally seeing 
directly. Compossibility accounts for the existence of both values as 
perceived in the photographic image, and accounts for the documentary 
photograph (from which In the Street is descended) and classical cinema 
(from which the action-image is descended). Compossibility therefore 
accounts for our recognition of the variation of truth in cinema and 
photography: that such distinctions exist. But the time-image, as we have 
found, places the compossible within the frame. In foregrounding the 
camera-consciousness, the time-image is a tremendous vibration of both 
the values of truth and our perception of them. The time-image is the 
condition in which the truth of variation appears to perception: it is the 
envisioning of the exchange of fiction that occurs when an object 
photographed is viewed. The truth of variation is the truth that the 
compossible values of objectivity and subjectivity are, in fact, 
incompossible. Incompossibility leads to a web of time that unfolds from 
this image, as each variation is crystallised and leads on to another. When 
the photographic image refers to its own fiction it is the power of the false 
that takes over, and the photographic image presents possible, but not- 
necessarily true, pasts: This is incompossibility. Incompossibility is 
therefore the frame of perception around the photographic exchange, is 
the central fold that runs through the cinephoto monad, and is the ‘genetic 
element’ of the crystal.
What is at stake here is not the photographic process, the film-strip, or 
even the photogramme, but the photographicness of the photographic 
image. We could not be satisfied that the photograph was merely part of 
the sensory-motor schema, any more than Deleuze could be satisfied that 
the photogramme was a direct image of time. Like Deleuze, we might write 
a taxonomy of the photograph, separating time-image from movement- 
image as he did, according to how direct they are. But this leads us to a 
more important conclusion: the genetic element of the time-image, the 
opsign, is not in the photograph (as a material object), but exists in the 
taking of it, as we found in Metz. The opsign exists in the photographic act, 
and moreover in the perception of that act. The photographic act, not the 
photographic object, is the camera-consciousness.
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As we have found, Deleuze’s approach to cinema was influenced by the 
philosophy of Leibniz even before he started work on The Fold. Already in 
the Cinema books we see that the crystal image is reflected labyrinthine 
house in La Regie du jeu. But the fold between them is also reflected. The 
camera follows the gamekeeper; the photograph blends Audrey and Jo in 
Funny Face\ the camera plunges into Resnais’ comic-strip tableaux; in 
fact, the camera-consciousness reflects the fold -  the camera- 
consciousness is the fold.
The Leibnizian investigation that we have conducted has led us to this, 
because of Leibniz’s particular view of the world. Leibniz saw the multiple 
and the one were not incompatible, but in fact necessary to each other, 
and this lead us to conceive of the cinephoto monad as a singular, albeit 
labyrinthine form. But Leibniz also saw how the material was reflected in 
the soul, so that the shape of the cinephoto monad was reflected in any, 
and therefore every, part of the image. Finally, our study of Leibniz is a call 
to recuperate the Baroque camera obscura, the camera that internalises 
its image, and that places its view of the world within its own architecture.
A return to the principles of the Baroque camera offers the conditions of 
incompossibility, the truth of variation as it appears to the subject: we can 
see that it is the Baroque camera that forms the camera-consciousness.
*  *  *
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Introduction
Having understood the relationship between cinema and photography in 
Chapter Two, we must now ask what led to a division of cinema from the 
photograph. What were the ideas that led to such a division made by 
Bazin, for example, and hence Deleuze? How, if at all, does it relate to 
time? The photographic image is a foundational element of both the time- 
image and the movement image, whether in cinema or, as we have now 
seen, in the photograph. Most importantly, the photographic image 
provides the zero-ness of the time-image, and always has the potential to 
be a time-image before montage in cinema, whether organic (as in Griffith) 
or dialectic (as in Eisenstein) exploits its perceived immobility and places it 
within the sensory-motor schema. The project of Cinema 1 is Deleuze’s 
explanation of this process. It is also an exegesis of his understanding of 
time, particularly as Bergson described it, and it is this understanding that 
becomes our focus in this chapter. We cannot understand the crystal- 
image without understanding the division of time -  of duration -  that is the 
operation of chronology. We have to understand how chronology opposes 
the open-ended and indivisible duration of the time image, and how 
photography has come to represent the former -  for Deleuze and others. 
Deleuze’s description of time undergoes several changes throughout his 
career, and what he was to later call Chronos (chronological time) and 
cronos (non-chronological time) in the cinema books he had already 
elaborated on (as Chronos and Aion) in 1969 in The Logic of Sense \  
Since these two descriptions of time, separated by more than a decade in 
his writing, approximate to each other well, it is these that we will be 
considering.
The central thrust of much of Deleuze’s work is a critique of the cultural 
organisation of the universe into ontologically understood phenomena -  
the creation of sets from the wider becoming of the universe. His 
understanding of time is no different. In Cinema 1, his critique centres 
upon the organisation of duration into discrete elements; photogrammes, 
shots, montage, etc. in film. In The Logic of Sense this appears on a more
1 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic o f  Sense, trans. by Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, (London: Athlone, 
1990(1969)).
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conceptual level, and displaying a less noticeable reference to Bergson. In 
spite of this, much of Deleuze’s understanding of time in both studies 
relies heavily on Bergson’s principles of cinematographic perception from 
Creative Evolution 2. Creative Evolution came at a time of wide critical and 
philosophical discourse on the nature of modern experience, and in which 
the relevance of time to this experience was necessary. Leo Charney has 
described the fin de siecle and the decades surrounding it as 
characterised by an intense philosophical debate around the idea of 
moment, and in which the ephemeral was taking shape as the defining 
concept of the modern industrial experience. This widespread 
philosophical concern outreached its own time to include the work of 
Martin Heidegger and, most importantly for us, Walter Benjamin 3. 
Benjamin was influenced by Bergson’s 1896 Matter and Memory, and, like 
Bergson, placed heavy emphasis on the relationship between photography 
and perception (or experience, for Benjamin).
Both Bergson and Benjamin had an understanding of technology as 
responding to the needs of a population experiencing rapid change and 
heightened sensory awareness. For Benjamin this has routinely been 
interpreted as his understanding of ‘shock’, a theme that surfaces 
repeatedly in his work, including that on cinema. For Bergson, a similar 
example is his understanding of photographic, and most importantly, of 
cinematographic perception. Developed in Matter and Memory and taken 
up later in Creative Evolution, Bergson surmised that perception is the 
stringing together of discrete images into a becoming, in the same way 
that cinema strings photogrammes together to create a total image of 
movement. For Bergson, as for Deleuze, all cultural discourse proceeds 
on this basis -  of the stringing together of arbitrarily individuated elements: 
We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these 
are characteristic of the reality, we have only to string them on a 
becoming...Perception, intellection, language so proceed in 
general. Whether we would think becoming, or express it, or even
2 CE. Mitchell translates Bergson’s concept of perception as ‘cinematographicaP.
3 Leo Charney, ‘In a Moment: Film and the Philosophy of Modernity’, in Cinema and the 
Invention o f  Modem Life, ed. by Leo Charney &  Vanesa R. Schwartz, (London: University of 
California Press, 1995), pp. 279-296.
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perceive it, we hardly do anything else that set going a kind of 
cinematograph inside us.4
There are two problems here. Firstly this ‘becoming’ is taken for being 
direct experience whilst only being an image of it, and secondly such 
perception is only characteristic, or mimetic,, of reality, inviting a false 
perception masquerading as pure perception. Just as this is a false 
perception of experience (each image being a discrete memory-image), so 
too is cinema an illusion of movement. This, of course, is the central thesis 
of Deleuze’s work on the movement-image.
But in terms of Bergson’s earlier understanding of photography and 
memory from Matter and Memory, his concept of cinematographic 
perception rings true. Deleuze largely agrees, but notes very early on that 
‘cinematographic illusion’ is simply a new name for an older problem -  that 
of the organisation of perception into discrete images; the very action of 
the sensory-motor schema. Deleuze’s answer is to turn to Matter and 
Memory. Bergson’s earlier work suggests, for Deleuze, that cinema is 
immediately a movement-image, but that Bergson does not see it because 
montage has not made the movement-image mobile:
...what was cinema’s position from the outset? On the one hand, 
the view point was fixed, the shot was therefore spatial and strictly 
immobile; on the other hand, the apparatus for shooting was 
combined with the apparatus for projection, endowed with a uniform 
abstract time. The evolution of the cinema, the conquest of its own 
novelty, was to take place through montage, the mobile camera, 
and the emancipation of the view point, which became separate 
from projection. 5
Thus Bergson could not see the movement-image because cinema was 
not in the highly developed state of which Deleuze was aware at the time 
of his looking back. However, Bergson was describing, in cinema before 
montage, a zero-ness of cinema: a cinema in which a different
4 CE, p. 323.
5 M I, p. 1.
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understanding of time applied. The erasure of the markers of the 
movement-image (dialectical or organic montage, for example) takes away 
language and reveals the zero-state of cinema; the cinema of Bergson’s 
experience. Rather than make this cinema necessarily static or immobile, 
it instead reveals that early cinema has a potential to be a time image that 
had not been curtailed by the sensory-motor schema at the time of 
Bergson’s experience of it. If, as we saw in Chapter Two, the movement- 
image is a move from the possible to the real (a ‘closing-down’ of 
potential), then early cinema exists as a cinema of possibility -  and that 
includes the possibility of the time-image. Deleuze’s criticism is convincing, 
but Bergson’s ‘cinematographic illusion’ suggests that, despite the fact that 
cinema was useful for Bergson to make an analogy with perception, a 
deeper understanding of early cinema is necessary. When Bergson says 
‘cinematographic’, what exactly does he mean?
Firstly, what is the model of perception that Bergson describes? Bergson 
imagined the process by which perception might recreate the movement of 
objects for the screen -  he picks the passing of a regiment along a street. 
For him, perception would automatically try and build such an image of 
movement by animating the movements of individual bodies:
...to give each of them the movement of marching, a movement 
varying from individual to individual although common to the human 
species, and to throw the whole lot on the screen.
Such a project would be overwhelming, and would not begin to express 
the movement of objects independent of the regiment: “How could it, at 
best, reproduce the suppleness of everyday life?”6 The answer, of course, 
is cinematographic perception.
What Bergson was suggesting is that memory might create an image of 
movement, but to do so would be to try and actualise discrete elements of 
a virtual, durative, and ever-changing world in which movement could be 
individuated or isolated to bodies that act as discrete elements of the 
whole. Given the enormity of such a task, it is not surprising that
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cinematographic illusion is so seductive. Cinematographic perception 
takes a pre-actualised image of the virtual -  the snapshot -  and links it to 
a becoming in which movement is reconstituted abstractly.
Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we 
place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming 
artificially.7
Significantly, it is possible that contemporary technology had a strong 
influence over this concept. Was perception cinematographic before 
cinema came along? This is Deleuze’s question also. Furthermore we 
might ask: was perception photographic before photography came along? 
We answered this in Chapter One. What we see in this new case is the 
double operation of perception, one which recreates the whole by means 
of constituent parts, organised through memory, and one which recreates 
the whole by taking pre-actualised images of the past and stringing them 
together. One seems informed by the technology of the modern, one does 
not. Perception that is not cinematographic can never reproduce the scene 
that was initially appreciated, since the whole cannot be adequately 
subdivided or individuated. But it can produce the impression of virtual 
movement -  it can produce the perception of its becoming. What we can 
suggest is that after technological discourse had informed both popular 
perception and philosophies of it, only a rift or break from such a 
perception exposes it. This is the condition of Deleuze’s time image. This 
however also suggests that it is the rift itself which provokes the direct 
representation of time, and which triggers pre-cinematographic perception. 
This perception is created from the ambiguity in this rift, a distancing of 
objects that were once close. We might suggest that the pre-cinematic 
perception is an auratic perception, which is why we need to deal with 
Benjamin.
It is worth noting first of all that Benjamin’s final understanding of aura is 
ambiguous, given its recurrence in different forms throughout a project that 
is relatively unfinished. Consequently, it is a concept that occupies a great
6CE, p. 321.
7 Ibid, p. 322.
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deal of critical discourse in the academy. This chapter is not an attempt to 
completely ‘pin down’ aura. However, the nature of aura as 
simultaneously distancing and bringing closer is of great interest. Perhaps 
Benjamin’s most famous use of aura is in connection with the photograph, 
and in particular the photography that was most visible at his time of 
writing. The work of Blossfeldt brings the world closer through the 
technologies of vision afforded by the camera, whilst the slow exposures 
of Hill and Adamson allowed the sitters to grow into the photograph. 
Rediscovered by the academy after nearly 100 years, these images 
reproduce an aura that Benjamin was only to see in the work of Eugene 
Atget as a comparable example of his own time of writing. Atget’s work 
was, all things considered, an anachronism of photographic technology.
But it was an anachronism that exposed a temporal rift between the time 
of Benjamin’s writing and the nineteenth-century. It ‘stripped reality of its 
camouflage’; subtracting the crowds of the twentieth century and revealing 
the older city that remained 8. It was a revelation that Benjamin 
experienced himself through his own concept of aura. Combined with an 
ambiguity of distance is an ambiguity of time, since Atget’s pictures 
present a scene of action that simultaneously waits for new action as it 
evokes the old. These images provide an image of past and future, and 
are interesting to us because they are anachronisms. They are also 
photographs of the pre-cinematic world presented to people living in the 
cinematic, and this is perhaps why they had the enormous effect on 
photographic and artistic culture that they did.
This chapter’s textual and philosophical direction relies on a confluence of 
historical and conceptual trajectories and dates. As Miriam Hansen notes, 
Benjamin intended his famous essay, The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction’, to act as a telescope to view the nineteenth 
century 9. Indeed much of Benjamin’s work has, as its focus, the Paris of 
the nineteenth century: the Paris of the Lumiere pere, and also the Paris of
8 Walter Benjamin, ‘A Short History of Photography’ (1931), in Screen, (Spring, 1972), pp. 5-27. 
(SHP)
9 Miriam Hansen, ‘Benjamin, Cinema and Experience: “The Blue Flower in the Land of 
Technology’” , in New German Critique 40, Winter 1987, pp. 179- 224, p. 183.
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between the invention of cinema and Benjamin’s most famous period of 
writing, yet his photographs, mostly of Paris backstreets, boulevards, and 
countryside devoid of people, essentially presents a vision of a city still 
being shaped by Haussmannisation 11. If Benjamin’s essays provide a 
philosophical telescope to the nineteenth century, Atget’s images surely 
provide the visual image for this telescope.
Significantly, Matter and Memory was written whilst cinematic invention 
took its greatest steps: Edison had been experimenting with the 
kinetoscope for at least five years, moving images had been the subject of 
scientific debate for at least eight years, and the Lumiere brothers both 
perfected and demonstrated their Cinematographe (the practical model 
essentially behind Bergson’s concept) as recently as March 1895. As 
studies such asLaurent Mannoni’s of the prehistory of cinema suggest, 
Matter and Memory was written at a time of a ‘white heat’ in cinematic 
invention.12 Similarly, Bergson’s Creative Evolution was first published in 
1907, at which time the period of cinema that has come to be known as 
‘cinema of attractions’ was drawing to an end. Tom Gunning’s ground­
breaking essay on this period suggests that both the production and 
exhibition practices of cinema of the first decade of cinema demand a 
certain respect in examination, rather than being viewed simply as a 
primitive or undeveloped stage of cinema from which narrative cinema was 
a liberation 13. This is a challenge to orthodox cinema history; an 
orthodoxy also evident in Deleuze’s cinema books.
*  *  *
10 SHP. See also ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1936), in 
Illuminations, ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zohn, (London: Fontana, 1973), pp. 219-253 
(WA); and ‘Some Motifs on Baudelaire’ (1939), in Illuminations, ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by 
Harry Zohn, (London: Fontana, 1973). (SMB)
11 Atget’s itinerant practice of photography had amassed as many as 10,000 glass-plate images of 
the city of Paris and its surrounding countryside. He intended his work to be ‘Documents pour 
artistes’: photographs taken as reference material for archivists, illustrators, and painters. The latter 
included Man Ray himself, and Georges Braque.
12 Laurent Mannoni, The Great Art o f  Light and Shadow: archaeology o f  the cinema, trans. by 
Richard Crangle, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2000).
13 Tom Gunning, 'The Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, its Spectator and the Avant-Garde 
(1986)', in Early Cinema: Space Frame Narrative, ed. by Thomas Elsaesser &  Adam Barker, 2nd 
edn., (London: BFI, 1994), pp. 56-62.
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The Division of Time: Modernity and Moment
The historical context of Bergson’s writing, as for Benjamin later, was a 
period of wide social and cultural change, represented in the visual arts, 
commercial art, and the industrial arts of photography and cinema. Ben 
Singer has described this period as being characterised by 
‘hyperstimulus’, after the sociologist Michael Davis, a category of sensory 
effects that either caused or exploited the new technologies and which 
were the subject of popular concern and debate.14 Not only did new 
technologies bring with them new experiences of speed and rapidity, but 
the city also brought experiences of bustle and claustrophobia.
Spectacular and leisure activities exploited the sensory appeal of the 
dangers of new technologies and transportation, whilst cultural forms such 
as the ‘yellow press’ and cinema exploited their sensational appeal either 
by report or by mimicry. The new mechanised press used the new forms of 
storytelling available, such as comic strips, whilst simultaneously using 
traditional illustration to record the more spectacular crimes and accidents 
of the city. Similarly, cinema provided both a means of spectacle, as is 
evidenced by the popularity of travel films, sports films, or newsreels, as 
well as a commentary on the effects of modernity in general.
Modernity a had more subtle effect upon the experience of the everyday, 
and the technologies of vision, primarily cinema but also photography, 
responded to it. Miriam Hansen has commented on this period as being 
characterised by ‘shocks’, in Benjamin’s terms that merely coincided with 
the development of vision technologies:
The adaptation of human perception to industrial modes of 
production and transportation, especially the radical restructuring of 
spatial and temporal relations, has an aesthetic counterpart in the 
formal procedures of the photographic media -  the arbitrary 
moment of exposure in photography and fragmenting grip of 
framing and editing in film...film rehearses in the realm of reception
14 Ben Singer, Melodrama and Modernity: Early Sensational Cinema and Its Contexts, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 65.
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what the conveyor belt imposes upon human beings in the realm of 
production.
Hansen sees film as largely coincidental with the experience of industrial 
modernity, and only useful to ‘train’ the population for the real shocks of 
everyday life. However, Leo Charney suggests that, perhaps seduced by 
the modern, cinema made a virtue of its response to the population’s 
experience of it by “modernity’s potential drawbacks to become aesthetic 
advantages. Shock, speed, and dislocation became editing.15 Michelle 
Henning reinterprets Benjamin to stress how such representational 
technologies are a more direct response to changes in perception:
According to Benjamin, the new technology of film did not produce 
a change in perception, and hence in consciousness. Rather ‘a new 
and urgent need for stimuli was met by the film’ (her emphasis).16
Benjamin, Hansen, and Henning, view cinema from the modern position of 
a narrative-dominated representation, such as came to dominate after the 
development of montage strategies like that of Griffith and Eisenstein.
Such a cinema hides its apparatus in both conceptual terms (logical 
narrative etc.) as well as actual ones (hidden projector etc.). In these 
terms, early cinema, with its visible projector, sensational films, and 
flickering image, appears to neatly parallel the very ‘shock’ effect of the 
‘real’ world. However, this view underestimates the relationship that early 
cinema had with the population. Cinema was, in fact, a stimulus that both 
caused a change in perception as well as represented its effects. This is 
something discernible in photographic culture in general, rather than 
cinema in particular. The use of photography or cinema as an analogy, or 
metaphor, for the change in perception of time and space neglects the 
direct influences it had. Cinema’s division of time is evidence of a 
wholesale change in the perception of time, in which the durative was 
replaced by the punctual, and the attraction of the population to the 
mechanics and apparatus of cinema suggest a public awareness of this.
15 Charney, 1995, p. 293.
16 Michelle Henning, ‘Digital Encounters: Mythical Pasts and Electronic Presence’, in Martin 
Lister ed. The Photographic Image in Digital Culture, (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 217-235, p. 
229.
Damian Sutton -  The Crystal Image
128
However, Bergson’s use of a discourse of perception that is ‘flavoured’ by 
the technology of the day threatens to obscure this. In these terms we 
might answer Deleuze’s question and say that cinematographic perception 
was a fulfilment of a desire that already existed 17.
However, in a discussion of modernity, it is easy to rely simply on the 
effects of the modern to display an understanding of what had gone 
before: to use technological discourses as analogies. In one sense we 
have to strip away the modern, particularly the conception of time that 
came with it, to see what remains of time. From Bergson’s work in 
Creative Evolution and Matter and Memory come two very different senses 
of time that mutually coexist. It is these that Deleuze develops 
conceptually in The Logic of Sense and analytically in the cinema books. 
Bergson’s model of perception as discrete elements created from an 
indivisible whole is a product of this division. Crucially, this is the division 
of time that turns the photograph into an immobile section, and 
reconstitutes it into the movement-image as cinema.
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze conceives of an open-ended time, 
comparable to Bergson’s concept of the duree, expressed only as an 
impression of future and past. This potential time Deleuze names Aion, 
and it has the same characteristics of cronos, the non-chronological time 
that:
...splits into two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the 
presents pass on, while the other preserves all the past. Time 
consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we see in the 
crystal. 18
Deleuze initially conceives Aion from the point of view of the event, which 
exists as an aleatory or arbitrary point upon a line of “proximate past and 
imminent future.” Incorporeal and only potential, Aion is therefore the 
possibility of a past that has gone before and a future that exists merely as 
a promise. Since these exist only in the view of the event, any event “is
17 See M I, p.2. cf. Chapter One of this thesis.
18 TI, p. 81.
Damian Sutton -  The Crystal Image
129
adequate to the entire Aion”, containing the past as recollection and the 
future as contraction 19.
In conceptualising the event, Deleuze also describes an essentially 
incorporeal structure of time. The event is the subdivision of Aion, the 
separation of past and future to create the present. However, given the 
indivisibility of Aion, such subdivision is infinite. It is a subdivision of the 
future from the past ad infinitum. This has the effect of creating a sense of 
time that operates, as we might visualise it, like a funnel, the inside of 
which acts as the instant, encompassing the largest unthinkable amount of 
time and dividing Aion to create the smallest unthinkable amount of time. It 
is into this instant, as if into a whirlpool, that the corporeal is sucked to 
create the moment
Slide 32
Rendered entirely random, or aleatory as Deleuze maintains, any point 
becomes the potential for every point. It is any point whatever on the line 
of Aion. By the time of the cinema books, this has become the any-instant- 
whatever of Deleuze’s early treatment of Bergson.
However, the crucial element to Deleuze’s thesis on time in The Logic of 
Sense has to do with the division that does occur in perception. It is not 
enough to suggest that Aion, as a description of duration, is a true 
character of time; Deleuze’s thesis must cover the actual division of time 
that perception makes. Perception does, in fact, insert a corporeal element 
into the instant, making it tangible and sensible. This is the division of time 
that extends to chronology. Perception grasps the event and inserts itself 
to create the present, which “absorbs and contracts past and future”.20 
Deleuze insists that this present is random, and that Aion, if it is ever 
subdivided, is only a time made up of interlocking presents that overlap. 
The present is thus limited by the sense of the ‘now’, but infinite in that the 
‘now’ cannot be adequately extracted from the whole of duration as a
19 LS, pp. 63-64.
20 Ibid p. 61.
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discrete element. The present is infinite in the sense that there is no 
answer to the question “ when does the now end?” It is also infinite 
because it is indivisible, since no subdivision can ever place a boundary at 
the point at which the now ends and the future begins, or indeed at where 
the past reverts. Whilst Deleuze’s definition suggests the present as 
circular -  always returning perception back to present -  it is perhaps 
preferable to think of the present as a circuitry. In this understanding the 
cause-effect chain continues but does not return perception to any 
beginning that was once past, yet at the same time it still manages to 
express the change of the whole. It is from this circuit that the crystal 
image flourishes.
The crystal image flourishes from Chronos then, since Chronos is the 
description given to this living present: a contradiction of Deleuze’s later 
description of Chronos as if it were the perceptual backbone of the 
sensory-motor-schema. How can this be? There is a certain difference 
between the Chronos of the first thesis in The Logic of Sense (Chr) and 
the Chronos of Cinema 2 (Chr’). Indeed, there is a point at which the 
instant or living present is burdened with a regulated succession, in which 
the future and past are mapped out, either conceptually by chronology, or 
practically by the film-strip, for example.
A tremendous force of organisation regulates the living present (Chr) to 
become the chronological (Chr’) and in so doing inserts an element of the 
corporeal into the present that simultaneously coils up all relative presents, 
creating an actualised image of the whole. This is the memory-image, 
since it is viewed from the present and contains both the past in general 
and the past in particular, as we saw in Bergson’s cone. This has only one 
effect for Deleuze, an overwhelming sense of the past that clashes with 
the unquieted sensation of the present that still exists. The presents pile 
up creating a vertiginous effect of the ‘here and now’ that cascades into an 
uncontrollable ‘then’. Deleuze called this ‘the becoming-mad of depth’.
Deleuze’s development of his thesis on time and movement in cinema is 
much clearer now. The movement-image is a regulation of Chronos (Chr)
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to become the image of chronology (Chr’). However, the time-image, 
stripping away the processes of regulation, or otherwise revealing their 
role, presents the character of time that exists before they do their work. 
This is the living present of Chronos (Chr). We are not seeing a 
contradiction here, but time expressed in two forms of Chronos, the ‘good 
Chronos’ and ‘bad Chronos’ that Deleuze develops in The Logic of 
Sense.21 Opposing each other Aion and Chronos are incompatible since 
Chronos inserts the corporeal into the instant. Chronos cannot be 
envisaged without this corporeality: “The essential difference is no longer 
simply between Chronos and Aion, but between the Aion of surfaces and 
the whole of Chronos together with the becoming-mad of depths.”22 Thus 
there is a clear organisation from Aion into Chronos (Chr’), which passes 
through Chronos (Chr) toward its regulation. What should be understood 
here is that Chronos (Chr) does exist before the force of regulation 
overwhelms it. The task here is to reveal an image of Chronos (Chr) that 
exists before the corporeal is inserted into the incorporeal and, 
significantly, when the instant becomes the moment.
As Deleuze demonstrates, an understanding of time is central to 
understanding the development of cinema and, for us, the photograph. 
However, in this case the reverse is also true: understanding cinema and 
photography is essential to understanding the division of time. In the case 
of early cinema and the photography contemporary with it, this means that 
the regulation of time is represented in the media of the day. The period 
between the 1890s and the 1930s is replete with movement-images that 
express the regulation of time into chronology (Marey and Muybridge in 
chronophotography, or the Futurists in time-lapse photography). However, 
the same period is also replete with time-images that express the living- 
present of Chronos (Chr) as the infinite subdivision of Aion (or Bergson’s 
duree). Furthermore the transition of the public and private space from the 
open-endedness and continual change of duration to the staccato ‘jerks’ of 
the modern is not only represented in film and photography, but such a 
representation is necessary to the transitions of modernity and the
21 Ibid p. 164.
22 Ibid p. 165.
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appreciation of the moment. These images of time both reflect and enforce 
a change in perception.
Benjamin was deeply suspicious of Bergson’s duree, and instead was 
profoundly seduced by those “countless movements of switching, 
inserting, pressing...[and] snapping” that characterised the breaking up of 
time that was effected by the mechanised age 23. But Benjamin’s 
understanding of Bergson also displays ambivalence. Even as the open- 
endedness of duree threatens to eliminate the archetypal force of 
chronology -  death -  and thus achieve the perfect form of regulated time, 
elements of the living present remain, or images of the subdivision of Aion 
are revealed:
Even though chronology places regularity above permanence, it 
cannot prevent heterogeneous, conspicuous fragments from 
remaining within it.24
This is as much to say that within a new emergent sense of chronological 
time, perceptible in the workplace (the factory, the office) as well as in 
popular representation (photography, cinema, the mechanised press) 
there remained discrete elements of the former consciousnesses of time -  
the Aion that stretches out to become an intangible past and future, or 
Chronos (Chr), the ever-present present that expresses only the ‘here’ and 
‘now’. These are nomadic forms, constantly slipping through the grasp of 
ontology or phenomenology. For example, history finds it difficult to talk 
about the films of the Lumieres (how does one classify films made by 
filmmakers who had no interest in filmmaking?). The academy cannot 
neatly package the work of Atget, an artist who steadfastly refused the 
mantle of artist, or laid claim to any coherent artistic intention in his career.
Winsor McCay is another example. In developing the comic strip, his work 
seems at times anachronistic, other-worldly, charmed, or magical. The 
comic strip emerged alongside cinema as a new form of visual 
entertainment to express the popular consciousness of time. Significantly,
23 SMB, p. 171.
24 Ibid p. 181.
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as Tim Blackmore suggests, comics strips like cinema responded to the 
changes in the experience of space and time during this period: “The 
reader in 1905 welcomed the speed, compression and wit of the comic 
strip” which was, in turn, the “product of a new mode of thinking.” 25
For Blackmore, McCay’s work demonstrates a friction between a 
mechanical mode of illustration (that trope that would come to dominate) 
and a mode which opposed its division of time (McCay’s Little Nemo in 
Slumberlancf). Blackmore has no problem in reading McCay’s strip which, 
from 1905 to 1927, chronicled the nocturnal adventures of Nemo, as a 
knowing allegory of the mechanical onslaught of the modern world on the 
magical world of the pre-modern. McCay and illustrators in his style are 
described as if they were sorcerers, whilst his strip is described as a 
paradoxical hiatus between the magical and the mechanical:
It is as if there was a tiny pause before the onslaught of mass 
culture was felt; artists’ work reflected the perverse situation of 
needing the machinery which was publishing them, while showing 
that the same machinery guaranteed the slow demise of the 
artform, the gradual grinding down and wearing away of the comic 
artist’s fantastical powers.26
However, for us, it is in its demonstration of time through illustration that 
most directly expresses the strip’s difference from mechanical chronology.
It would be a mistake to suggest that comics are less sophisticated than 
the narrative devices of cinema in representing time. Little Nemo exhibits a 
high-level of sophistication in demonstrating time and space within one or 
two panels. Little Nemo's individual panels, like many other comics, 
represent the attenuated passage of time -  the characteristic moment -  
that both Martin Barker and Lawrence Abbott have noted 27. But whilst in 
most comic strips this approximates to the breaking up of time into an 
abstract chronology, in Little Nemo structuring elements appear that
25 Tim Blackmore, ‘McCay’s McChanical Muse: Engineering Comic-Strip Dreams’, in Journal o f  
Popular Culture 32, Summer 1998, pp. 15-38.
26 Ibid p. 21. Coincidentally, Little Nemo ran in its various publications between 1905 and 1927 
(the date of Atget’s death).
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present chronology as if it were in the process of regulation. Some panels 
present a discrete passage of time as defined by a movement or a 
collection of individual movements:
Slide 33
At other times McCay’s illustration serves to “squeeze and stretch panels 
to reflect the action they contain; the dynamic compositions which resulted 
are far from mechanical” 28. In the first case illustration is defined by and 
subordinate to the movement depicted, and perception follows suit. In the 
second case, movement is unending in the sense that the frame does not 
limit (or follow the limits of) the action depicted.
Slide 34
The time expressed in these panels is limited because no action within the 
panel breaks out of the ‘now’, yet the time expressed is infinite because it 
is not subdivided within itself or individuated completely from the whole of 
the strip. These frames are instantaneous in terms of their depiction of 
movement and time from a point of view that is aleatory or arbitrary. This 
could be any-instants-whatever of the action. On the other hand, the time 
in these frames seems elongated, since the movement and time is 
potentially infinite in its division and extension; the frame does not curtail 
movement or limit the time expressed. The suggestion here is that within 
the regulated patterns of illustration that were coming to dominate even 
McCay’s work, it seems that occasional images of Chronos (Chr) still 
revealed themselves. Is the same not possible with that other character of 
time -  Aion? Aion is a time of interlocking presents that make up duration. 
This means that perceptually, Aion is only visible through Chronos itself — 
it takes an understanding of the regulation of time, or the pattern of 
interlocking instants -  to reveal Aion.
27 Abbott, 1986, pp. 6-7.
28 Blackmore, 1998, p. 24.
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McCay’s illustrations reflect Deleuze’s ‘architecture of time’: The visual 
architecture of the image reflects the duration of our reading the image. 
They remain subordinate to perception, since it is the passing of the eye 
eccentrically across the image that defines the action depicted. Most 
notably, McCay demonstrates this by reversing it. In Slumberland, the 
represented space of Befuddle Hall and the events in it mutate and unfold 
according to the dreams of Nemo, and with which we identify. As he 
dreams, so we see; perception is foregrounded and placed within the 
frame of the illustrated perception of the strip. Then, as the shape of the 
Befuddle Hall changes, so the time sequence of events changes 
accordingly.
Slide 35
McCay thus highlights perception before movement and time, which both 
increases the charm of his stories, and makes an issue of the regulation of 
perception according to chronology. Once perception is made reflexive, 
the two senses of time collide, and they do so because the urge toward 
chronology (to follow discrete instances or frames), is in counter-point to 
the line of time upon which they rest and which they simultaneously make 
visible.
Slide 36
Along a sequence chronological panels, two perceptions of time are 
clearly visible. Each individual panel represents a discrete element of the 
whole, an illustrative trajectory that closely follows the emerging paradigm 
of comic-strip narration. Perception seeks to turn the movement expressed 
by the whole into a cause-effect chain that simultaneously represents the 
space in which it appears to occur. Scott McCloud suggests that we have 
been “...conditioned by photography to perceive single images as single 
moments. After all it does take an eye time to move across scenes in real 
life.”29 McCay’s strip presents the process of such a conditioning. The
29 Scott McCloud, Understanding Comics: the invisible art, (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 
97.
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individual panel edges break the space into discrete elements, according 
to an urge to see photographically, as it were, and in so doing reveal an 
indivisible space that has been there all along. By seeing chronology in the 
process of emerging, and by foregrounding the perception that achieves 
this, the strip reveals the duration underneath. Chronos (Chr’) reveals 
Aion.
*  *  *
Lumiere and the living present
Since Deleuze’s genealogy of cinema starts, more or less, with Eisenstein 
and Griffith, it is perhaps logical to be curious about the cinema that 
existed before them. For Deleuze, Lumiere and the other inventors of 
cinema were, for the most part, technicians who enabled the development 
of the moving image as a medium efficient enough to present the basic 
element of the movement-image -  the mobile section. The project of 
Cinema 1 is the classification of a cinema that takes as its defining 
paradigm the principle of cinematographic demonstration, mirroring as it 
does cinematographic perception (in whatever guise it existed before the 
name was applied). But Deleuze’s project was to see beyond that to the 
time-image, and this is what we must do.
Why was Deleuze reluctant to consider the Lumieres as anything more 
than gifted inventors responding to a popular urge for stimuli that both 
caused and was affected by modernity? Writing in the 1980s, Deleuze’s 
activity is separated from the advances made in understanding early film 
history that flourished towards the end of that decade 30. Deleuze’s cinema 
work is characterised by a unique ability to connect a philosophy of 
perception of cinema to philosophy of perception in cinema and finally to 
narrative and authorship. Since the Lumieres are not renowned for 
significant marks of authorship in their work (at least in the auteurist 
definition) and were famously disregarding of any intention to be 
filmmakers, it is not surprising that Deleuze gives them little more than lip 
service.
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Tom Gunning has described the period of cinema, from 1895 to 1907, as 
the period of “cinema of attractions” (after Eisenstein)31. He suggests that 
the period was one of considerable sophistication, fitting neatly into 
already existent and emerging popular entertainment forms which it either 
subsumed (ie. magic lantern shows) or with which it competed (ie. music 
hall). More importantly, he suggests, as does Charney, Singer et al, that 
cinema exploited a population eager for visual excitement, heightened 
stimulus, and exotica. This does not mean that visual excess and narrative 
are incompatible, as Gunning describes:
Rather, one can unite them in a conception that sees cinema less 
as a way of telling stories than as a way of presenting a series of 
views to an audience, fascinating because of their illusory power, 
and exoticism, (p.57)
Gunning thus characterises all cinema before 1906 as ‘cinema of 
attractions’, a classification based upon the consumption of cinema by an 
audience that desired its particular “accent on direct stimulation” (p.59), 
satisfied eventually by spectacular pleasures such as the close-up, which 
was “...not a device expressive of narrative tension; [but] itself an 
attraction and the point of the film” (p.58). This, of course, echoes 
Benjamin’s emphasis on the close-up in photography.
This distinctive picture of cinema before 1906-7 must be placed alongside 
Bergson’s account of ‘cinematographic perception’, based on the actual 
Lumiere Cinematographe. The Lumieres’ apparatus and films demand a 
deeper understanding since, because of this historical connection, they 
have much to answer for philosophically.
As Gunning develops, in the first decade or so of cinema the apparatus 
was itself an attraction for the patron 32. Similarly, we should not be 
surprised that Bergson uses this invention, whether Lumieres’ own or 
cinema in general, as a paradigm or metaphor for perception. He could
30 See Elsaesser, 1994 and Chamey/Schwartz 1995.
31 Gunning, 1986 (1994).
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hardly have failed to notice the worldwide public fanfare that arose shortly 
after the Lumieres’ invention, and which reached such a peak that, as had 
happened with the first demonstration of the Daguerreotype in 1839, the 
invention was reported to show colour faithfully. This suggests a populace 
only too eager for evermore exciting stimulus, even if, as Jacques Aumont 
recognises, it came as much by hallucination as in fact.33
Both the scientific and popular press eagerly anticipated their invention 
(spurred on, no doubt, as the brothers were by Edison’s success with the 
Kinetoscope), and the company provided photographs and articles on the 
Cinematographe to titles such as Le Monde lllustre, Nature, and La 
Science lilustree, to which they also directed interested clients when 
necessary.34
The popular impression of the Cinematographe seems likely to have 
included an awareness of the characteristics of the film-strip as a 
succession of still images. City-based patrons at least were likely to have 
appreciated the spectacle as made up of a succession of still images. 
Significantly, the Lumiere exhibitors’ stock included a representative 
cutting on the outer tin of each film, whilst the company happily supplied 
newspapers and journals with portions of film cut from existing footage.35 
The result of this may have been the double awareness of the cinema’s 
abilities to present incidental details of the scene with independence. Dai 
Vaughn’s assertion that spectators would have been astonished at the 
ability for “the inanimate to participate in [its own] self projection” should be 
reconsidered from the point of view of perception 36. That the lifelike 
should be revealed through a process that divides up time presents a 
film’s audience with a seductive idea that in fact reality is made up of 
individual and discrete elements in progression. Once again, we have to 
be careful with conjecture. Three things are clear, however: 1) Bergson
32 Ibid p. 58.
33 Jacques Aumont, ‘Lumiere revisited’, in Film History, Volume 8, 1996, pp. 416-430, p. 425.
34 Auguste and Louis Lumiere, Letters (original letters of A. and L. Lumiere), ed. by Jacques 
Rittaud-Hutinet, trans. by Pierre Hodgson, (London, Faber, 1995), pp. 3-117.
35 Ibid p. 111.
36 Dai Vaughn, ‘Let There Be Lumiere’, in Early Cinema: Space Frame Narrative, ed. by Thomas 
Elsaesser &  Adam Barker, 2nd edn., (London: BFI, 1994), pp. 62-67, p. 65.
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was writing within a culture likely to be aware of the practicalities of what 
they observed in the cinema. 2) This was a culture experiencing a social 
and work environment characterised by regulated shocks or pulses. 3)
This was a culture that consistently placed special emphasis on the 
properties of photography in revealing previously unappreciated truths of 
the world -  as is demonstrated in writing on the photograph from as far 
back as 1839, and in Benjamin’s writing as much as thirty-five years after 
cinema’s invention. Ultimately, Bergson was writing from within a culture 
that continually placed perception within the frame of the photographic. 
What photography was seen to reveal was the truth of reality itself, both in 
terms of movement and its revelation.
This helps to explain a little the difference between Bergson and Deleuze’s 
views on cinema. Bergson’s model of cinematographic perception 
complements this popularly-held view of reality. In describing this effect, 
however, the Cinematographe is more than just a metaphor. Cinema did 
not just reflect this change in perception, but actively enforced it from a 
privileged position by which it was a tool of both scientific investigation and 
leisure activity or popular stimulus. This is even suggested by Bergson’s 
own demonstration. In using the example of the passing regiment he is not 
imagining some event that might one day be of sufficient interest -  instead 
he is describing actual footage from widely distributed films of a popular 
public spectacle. According to Aumont, such procession films made up 
almost half of all films produced directly or indirectly by the Lumieres, 
giving him reason to suggest that it was not only their favourite topic for 
investigation and experimentation, but that it was a favourite topic of the 
patrons also.
Slide 37
Bergson’s experience of the cinema therefore not only included an 
understanding of its actual working but an understanding of its popular 
appeal. It also reveals a tacit acknowledgement of modernity (expressed in 
the photographic) as directing perception. Later in this often-quoted 
passage, Bergson gives a description of this false becoming that reflects
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not only on the photography behind it but also the emerging ‘characteristic 
moment’ of the comic strip:
The cinematographic method is therefore the only practical method, 
since it consists in making the general character of knowledge form 
itself on that of action, while expecting that the detail of each act 
should depend in its turn on that of knowledge. In order that action 
may always be enlightened, intelligence must always be present in 
it; but intelligence, in order thus to accompany the progress of 
activity and ensure its direction, must begin by adopting its 
rhythm.37
Thus Bergson describes the paradigm of comic-strip narration, cinema 
monstration, and ultimately the popular perception of time and space as if 
based upon the ‘pulse’. Given both impetus and representation by 
photographic means, this is perception subordinate to photography.
Interestingly then, Bergson is correct in proposing cinematographic 
perception, but Deleuze is also correct in opposing it. The cinematographic 
illusion is based upon the perception of movement and time as pulsing, 
and Deleuze’s project is to reveal a cinema that breaks such a paradigm 
and produces an image that represents time without the enforced pulse of 
chronology. Where the movement-image is perception subordinate to 
photography, the time-image is photography subordinate to perception. 
Finally, rather than forgetting the thesis of Matter and Memory by the time 
of writing in 1907, as Deleuze has it, Bergson’s cinematographic 
perception is a logical conclusion to make of a society whose experience 
had become dominated by the discontinuous moment.
However, let us assume that we should take Deleuze’s project to the 
cinema that actually existed before the paradigm of montage took hold. Is 
Deleuze correct in his reading of early cinema as “immediately [giving] us 
a movement-image” because, as we have found, the principles of 
cinematography were well known?38 Given this assumption, where does it
37 CE, p. 323.
38 M I, p. 2.
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leave the films of the Lumieres, which nevertheless exist as films a priori 
the development of movement-image cinema directed by montage? As 
mobile sections (shots) they fit neatly into Deleuze’s argument for the 
geneaology of cinema. But this would be to view them from the position of 
someone aware of the later historical development of cinema. Can we 
really think of them as ‘shots’ in this strictly defined sense, when they exist 
independently of narrative cinema as we know it? It is true that the 
Lumieres had few pretensions to being filmmakers in our generally 
accepted sense. Instead, they were undoubtedly happy as ‘film-makers’ -  
engineers of materials and equipment. The Lumieres largely made films to 
test and push the limits of the equipment itself, as Jacques Aumont further 
suggests, rather than follow the pattern of Edison and record pre-existing 
narrative sketches 39. Later, after the massively more successful 
autochrome colour still process had been perfected and released to the 
public (coincidentally in 1907), the Lumieres could be found taking pictures 
that exploited its particularly reliable properties of colour, upon which Max 
Kozloff has written 40. Whether exploiting a product’s dependability or 
flexibility, the Lumieres displayed an affinity with the process of 
photographing and the mechanisms with which they accomplished this. 
This is significant to us at the moment (such an affinity with the 
photography machine will be crucial later) precisely because the Lumieres 
knowingly unburdened themselves of the task of creating narrative for 
exhibition. The photography of the Lumieres represents a zero state of 
cinema.
Bergson and Deleuze's respective theses are separated by a simple 
equation: Bergson sees perception as film, whereas Deleuze’s re- 
invigorates perception of film. Since the Lumieres films exist independent 
of the cinema of the movement-image, can they be understood instead as 
cinema of the time-image? Most importantly, can they be seen as crystal- 
images, reliant upon their reflexivity as photography for their images of 
time? How then are we to deal with the widespread knowledge of the
39 Aumont, 1996, p. 423.
40 Max Kozloff, ‘Autochromes: The Bouquet of Lighted Air (1980)’, in The Privileged Eye:
Essays on Photography, 2nd edn. (Alberquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), pp. 269- 
277. KozlofFs treatment autochromes does much to suggest that they possess a certain ‘aura’, in
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giving away its principles? Knowledge of the apparatus may have led to a 
‘willing forgetfulness’ on the part of patrons because of their belief that 
photography revealed true perception -  as we have seen 41. Anthony R. 
Guneratne notes that both the early demonstrations of Murbridge’s moving 
images and the Lumiere Cinematographe to academic audiences involved 
presentations of the single static images before they were then shown to 
reconstitute real movement: a double reinforcement of photography’s 
ability to reveal movement as divisible 42. As Deleuze notes, the fact that 
the Cinematographe was both camera and projector dominates its control 
over perception, since it presents itself as both the imitation of natural 
perception -  the eye -  and the demonstrator of that perception. 
Simultaneously, the Cinematographe is an attraction as apparatus, yet 
transparent as an imitator of perception for the same reason.
The suggestion here is that at least some of the Lumiere films offer an 
image of time before it is forced toward chronology. This can be seen in 
two ways. Firstly, from the perspective of hindsight, Lumiere films can be 
seen as proto-narratives, or elements of narrative. This is the argument of 
Andre Gaudreault, whose investigation of narrative in the more famous 
Lumiere films leads him to the understanding that:
There are two types of narrative in the cinema; the micro-narrative 
(the shot), a first level on which is generated the second narrative 
level; this second level more properly constitutes a filmic narrative 
in the generally accepted sense.
He further suggests that not only has cinema therefore had narrativity from
Benjamin’s terms.
41 Audience foreknowledge may be accounted for by the widespread anticipation of cinema and its 
popular appeal in the press. However, there were a few visitors to the Grand Cafe who went out of 
curiosity and were unaware of the limited press attention that the first few days’ demonstrations 
themselves received. “Clement Maurice was to describe how success eventually came. ‘What I 
remember as being typical was some passer-by sticking his head round the door, wanting to know 
what on earth the words Cinematographe Lumiere could possibly mean. Those who took the 
plunge and entered soon reappeared looking astonished...’” (Lumieres, 1995, p.84.) This is also 
illustrated by the ‘panic’ effect, in which patrons mistook the images for real trains, cars, or boats. 
For a discussion of this ‘panic effect’ see also Stephen Bottomore, ‘The panicking audience? Early 
cinema and the 'train effect', in Historical Journal o f  Film, Radio and Television, June, 1999.
42 Anthony R. Guneratne, ‘ The Birth of a New Realism: Photography, painting and the advent of 
documentary cinema’, in Film History, Vol. 10, 1998, pp. 165-187, p. 170.
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its beginning (Gaudreault points to La Sortie des usines Lumiere, but most 
importantly to L’Arroseur arrose), but that photographs have no such first 
level of narrativity, since they reproduce no movement.43 He further 
suggests that all the Lumiere films are discrete narratives in the cinematic 
sense, implying the division of time from the whole 44. This appears to be 
an inability to envisage a concept of cinema that does not correspond with 
or rely upon narrative as a defining element. Films that appear to have 
either less narrative closure or a more limited structure are routinely seen 
as being proto-narrative, or as being primitive forms of later narrative 
paradigms.
Slide 38
In fact, the forces that give the Lumiere films their diegetic structure are 
less perceptible than Gaudreault suggests. The Lumiere films are not 
limited by their subject matter, but instead the Lumieres set out to film 
events that could be represented by the uniform length of a reel of the 
Blair film that the Cinematographe used (about 15 metres). Restricted by 
mechanics, the Lumieres were not necessarily restricted in time. Since the 
events depicted by the films existed in the everyday (unlike Edison’s 
narrative films, or the filmed sketches that were soon to appear) these 
events were representative of events that appeared every day, or indeed 
any day. In representing the aleatory event they naturally reflect the 
possibility of infinite time. The Lumieres were effectively exploiting the 
characteristic moment of the discrete element of time, according to 
Deleuze’s concept. Whether spectacular, such as the arrivals of the many 
trains recorded around the world, or discreet, such as the more famous 
film of Auguste Lumiere and his wife feeding their child in Le Dejeuner de 
bebe, none of these events were by any means unique, and few were 
special to anyone in the city.
Slide 39
43 Andre Gaudrealt, ‘Film, Narrative, Narration: The Cinema of the Lumiere Brothers’, in Early 
Cinema: Space Frame Narrative, ed. by Thomas Elsaesser &  Adam Barker, 2nd edn., (London:
BFI, 1994), pp. 68-75, pp. 71-72. Gaudreault follows the work of Roger Odin on LaJetee.
44 Ibid n 16, p. 74.
Damian Sutton -  The Crystal Image
144
This also suggests that, despite the occasional appearance of a Lumiere 
(or three) in such films (Louis supervising Demolition d’un mur for 
example), the activity of the Lumieres as filmmakers was imperceptible.
Yet the fact remains that the lack of recognition as filmmakers in the film 
studies community does not obviate the foregrounding of filmmaking: there 
is still a camera-consciousness in their films. Indeed, films of the everyday 
foregrounded perception by placing it within the frame, or as the subject, of 
cinema. The procession films recreate the view of the passed spectator, 
whilst the train films offer the audience the fantastic view from the track 
itself as the train rushes toward them.
Slide 40
The films create astonishment as much by mimicry of perception as it does 
by demonstrating that it is not perception of the real, but perception of 
film. By developing a machine that proposed perception as cinema (as in 
Bergson) the Lumieres produced a machine that enforced perception of 
perception (as in Deleuze). Since this means that at least some of the 
1,000 or so Lumiere films offer a camera-consciousness, it would suggest 
that they should be considered capable of representing time directly and 
thus being time-images. However, how do we reconcile this with the fact 
that many of the films in question are indeed discrete elements of time? In 
La Sortie des usines Lumiere, for example, the factory’s doors close once 
the building has emptied.
Slide 41
Deleuze is not necessarily opposed to the discrete element of time, but 
simply when its aleatory nature is subsumed by chronological 
organisation. This is when memory seeks to organise it, thus creating the 
cascade of moments that exists as the becoming-mad of depth.
However, at the same time, it is this operation of memory that provides the 
sensation of experience necessary for the free-indirect proposition -  the
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reflexivity of the cinematographic experience, in this case. What we now 
suggest is that the creation of moment is part of the new awareness of 
distance and proximity that is essential to experience. In terms of memory, 
Miriam Hansen suggests that experience is characterised by a ‘dialectic of 
remembering and forgetting’, or the distance perceptible between the 
present now and moments of the past. This is an extension of her work on 
Benjamin’s theory of experience.45 Hansen suggests a spatial correlation 
largely to emphasise this new understanding that the modern experience 
is actually the sum of experience plus the experience of experience. The 
proximity of the instant is counteracted by an awareness of the creation of 
moment. In other words, the passing moment is experienced both as the 
instant that passes and the instant that will pass; thus creating a sense of 
immediate loss. This is what seems to characterise hyperstimulus, since 
the spectacular sights and stimuli are experienced as ephemera, but are 
so with attention paid to the sensations itself. To see the modern as 
defined by shock alone is limiting, since it discounts the reflexivity of 
sensational apparatus, cinema being one of them. Benjamin adds 
something to this in his first essay on photography, since in the experience 
of the photographic, “the spectator feels an irresistible compulsion to look 
for the tiny spark of chance, of the here and now, with which reality has, as 
it were, seared the character in the picture.”46 Wiped out of narrative 
cinema by the re-take, this spark of chance is still apparent in the Lumiere 
films. They offer the potential of future action as well as the instantaneous 
creation of the past. This is an ever-present present. In truth, the sailors 
rowing out of the harbour will never leave:
Slide 42
Sometimes it will be said that only the present exists; that it absorbs 
or contracts in itself the past and the future, and that, from 
contraction to contraction, with even greater depth, it reaches the 
limits of the entire Universe and becomes a living cosmic present.47
45 Hansen, 1987, p. 216.
46 SHP, p. 7.
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Memory rushes in to turn this present into the moment, leaving Deleuze’s 
Chronos (Chr) as largely conceptual. But of course, it is this event that is 
represented in the crystal: the crystal-image is the image of Chronos (Chr) 
becoming Chronos (Chr’). Chronos (Chr) cannot resist the force of 
memory that seeks to regulate it. This means that the Lumiere films can be 
understood as crystal-images of time, as they represent not just Chronos 
(Chr), but the sensation of it from the vantage of memory. The 
‘sensational’ aspect of the Lumiere films guarantees that the experience of 
them is also the experience of their distance from real perception, but also 
their imaging of perception as an inter-relation between recollection and 
memory. They are at once the present that becomes memory, but also the 
memory that remains in the present; furthermore they are the image of this 
event. The time-image of the Lumiere film is not simply the instant of 
Chronos (Chr) as it immediately appears, but the point at which the loss of 
that instant to Chronos (Chr’) is felt.
Bergson’s formulation of cinematographic perception was accurate, 
especially in the sense that such a popularly appreciated apparatus 
enforced modern perception of the moment. Furthermore, the ‘sensation’ 
of early cinema guaranteed its reflexivity. The everyday subjects of those 
early films appears even to have heightened this sensation, since 
hyperstimulus appeared as much in the perception of minutiae of everyday 
life (the movement of the leaves behind the family in Dejeuner de bebe 
was a principle ‘attraction’), as it did of immensity, speed or danger. All of 
this suggests that early cinema can be considered a site of the time- 
image. But what makes some of the Lumiere films crystal-images of time 
is ultimately their forced contradiction of distance and proximity to those 
events. This is time felt in the instant, but time becoming the ‘moment’ as 
its loss is experienced. Such films are the images of the ‘living present’.
Whilst the Lumiere films do not actually appear instantaneous, the instant 
is as capable of being an infinitely large amount of time as it is an infinitely 
small amount. The instant could be any length, and indeed it is only the 
length of the film magazine that limits the film. In responding to this
47 LS, p. 61.
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restriction, the Lumieres presented aleatory, quotidian, or vernacular 
subject matter whose everyday occurrence reflected the whole of time as 
the ‘living cosmic present’. The everyday could be anyday, and by 
exchange any becomes every. A Lumiere film, albeit short by most 
standards, is still an elongated or elliptical impression of events that 
otherwise have the capacity -  in being indivisible -  to be infinitely quick.
These films demonstrate that it is not necessarily time itself, but the 
experience of time, that makes up perception. This also means that what 
we might expect to be instantaneous -  the still photograph, for example -  
has the capability of representing time as an experience of the infinitely 
slow. This is achieved when the prevalent character of time in the image is 
not Chronos (Chr) but instead Aion, and it is so in many of the 
photographs of Eugene Atget.
★  *  *
Atget and the movement of statues
Given the distance that separates Matter and Memory from Creative 
Evolution, a distance made more significant by the explosion of cinema 
upon popular culture, it is perhaps surprising to suggest that the central 
thesis of memory as based on a ‘photographic’ perception of the past is 
carried easily from the one text to another. Accelerated by the sensational 
apparatus of modernity, photographic perception becomes 
cinematographic as it creates a sense of the past as an ordered cascade 
of discrete events. Perhaps cinematographic perception does have a 
name before the invention of cinema? Perhaps, as we saw in the first 
chapter, it is the relation of 'snapshots of world history?
However, the understanding of time that underpins Bergson’s twin theses 
on photographic perception is one that is beyond the modern. It is from the 
ongoing change of duration that chronology plucks the instant and inserts 
memory to create the moment. This is a time that exists before modernity 
divides it; it is ante-modern. This sense of time is the antithesis of the 
modern sense of time, not least because its open-endedness opposes the
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loss felt at the passing of the moment. This is perhaps why Benjamin, as a 
scholar of the modern, confronts Bergson’s concept of duree. The sense 
of passing that is essential to the experience of the modern is in direct 
contradiction with the “miserable endlessness of a scroll” that Benjamin 
sees in the unfolding duration 48. Benjamin instead embraced the 
ephemeral moment, and its experience of sensation. The sensational 
experience was delicious for Benjamin because of its repeatability, its 
emphasis on the momentary, which was “at once a conjuring of life and a 
witness to death.” 49 The passing of that moment was an essential part of 
the modern experience. Benjamin privileged order and regulation above 
the permanence of duree, and was clearly aware of the organisation of 
time made by perception -  either in the creation of chronology as a means 
to make palpable the passing of the moment, or in the macro-level 
organisation of memory into history. Drawing on the writing of Baudelaire, 
but especially of Proust, Benjamin linked this to the latter’s memoire 
volontaire, the memory that perception organised so that it easily “obeyed 
the call of attentiveness”. Such a memory is structured by the experience 
of the present through a simultaneous recollection of the past-in-general 
and the past-in-particular, as we found in Bergson: “Where there is 
experience in the strict sense of the word, certain contents of the individual 
past combine with material of the collective past”.50
Benjamin adds to this, again after Proust, the memory that evades such 
ordered recollection and enters the present involuntarily. This memoire 
involontaire produces a heightened awareness of the experience of the 
past, appearing, so it would seem, out of nowhere. Such instances of 
memory reveal the proximity of the present and the distance of the past. 
For Benjamin, famously, photographs trigger such memories, often 
because of their “posthumous shock”.51 Referring to the photograph of 
Dauthendey’s wife, Benjamin cannot help but see in her image his own 
knowledge of her death reflected back: “...her gaze reaches beyond him,
48 SMB, p 181.
49 Rey Chow, ‘Walter Benjamin’s Love Affair with Death’, in New German Critique 48, Fall 
1989, pp. 63-86, p. 72.
50 SMB, p. 155-156.
51 Ibid p. 171.
Damian Sutton -  The Crystal Image
149
absorbed into the ominous distance.” 52 Memoire involontaire allows the 
photograph as an object the ability to look at us in return, as Benjamin was 
later to attest.53 This also suggests a perception of the image freed of the 
constraints of the moment, and in which memoire invoiontaire provides a 
sense of past and future. It suggests a direct connection with duration, 
since the photograph is filled with the past as well as the potential future. 
Furthermore it is so because it is seen through the awareness of the 
camera as a tool of memoire volontaire. Given the ability of the photograph 
to fix memories into actualisations of the duree, as Benjamin and Bergson 
both agree, such instances of memoire involontaire are emphatic as 
potential time-images. However, how can such examples of the ephemeral 
moment present a direct image of duration?
Of all the photography that Benjamin discusses it is the work of the 
Parisian artisan/photographer Eugene Atget that most clearly ‘looks at him 
in return’. Atget’s images are continually useful to him in the exegesis of 
aura that provides the backbone of his understanding of experience. The 
subject of aura remains largely ambiguous in Benjamin’s work, and the 
essays on photography are no exception to this. Mary Price writes of the 
two essays that “[one] fights with Benjamin (or struggles with his text) not 
to win an argument but to discover what the argument is.”54 The 
discussion of aura changes its object between ‘A Short History of 
Photography’ and The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction’, and it is not altogether clear exactly how Benjamin feels 
about his own concept when applied to Atget’s photographs. Since 
photography as reproduction brings reality closer, it destroys the aura that 
builds up around objects. But then even this does not fully encapsulate the 
idea of aura. On one level, in the second (‘Artwork’) essay, Benjamin’s 
discussion of aura takes on a political dimension. The descriptive term for 
the ritually-based importance placed on a unique work of art, aura inheres 
its history of production and embeds itself in tradition. This facilitates 
Benjamin’s discussion of photography, it both diminishes the aura of the
52 SHP, p. 7.
53 SMB, p. 184.
54 Mary Price, The Photograph: a strange confined space, (Stanford: University of California 
Press, 1994), p. 61.
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work of art (since it renders it ubiquitous, for example) and simultaneously 
has no aura of its own 55. However, aura has a clearly different meaning 
when applied to Atget’s images of Paris streets. Aura in this sense is a 
‘sticky’ or ‘stuffy’ atmosphere that Atget’s photographs cleanse or purge, 
and which clearly attaches itself to specific objects 56. Mary Price suggests 
that these two should be seen as if they are ‘cloud’ and ‘fog’ respectively: 
the first a reverence for an artwork that hides any political consequences 
of such rituals, and the second a “pretense hiding reality” in general57. 
Thus Benjamin is able to talk about both with ease, since the latter is an 
experiential (or directly personal) aura that corresponds, and occasionally 
conflicts, with a wider cultural aura of the former. Aura of the first kind is 
the product of memoire volontaire, since its incorporation of rituals serves 
to create distinct phenomena whose meanings serve a political purpose. 
The second aura is the kind that fills the instant with the rapidity or shock 
of the modern, particularly characterised in this case by the flow of people 
through the streets. It is only when this is taken away -  if there is one thing 
that Atget’s images are largely bereft of, it is people -  that a deeper reality 
comes to light.
Slide 43
This presents a contradiction in Benjamin, since his claim that Atget’s 
photographs “strip reality of its camouflage” is not supported in his 
apparent seduction by Atget’s images.58 Firstly, we must ask what exactly 
has been stripped away from the images of the city? Alain Buisine 
describes the photographs as if they momentarily distilled the purity of the 
city, in the face of its extraordinary capitalist bustle and modernity.59 In
55 The huge popularity, influence, and market value of Atget’s images have rendered Benjamin’s 
argument about great works of art (the most famous element of the discussion) moot in relation to 
the photographer’s work. Criticisms of the ‘Atget-industry’ are aimed at both the hierarchical 
ideology inherent in the canon, and also at the museum structure that feeds off it: canonical 
photographers guarantee a certain ‘box-office’. See Abigail Solomon-Godeau, ‘Canon Fodder: 
Authoring Eugene Atget’, in Photography at the Dock: essays on photographic history, 
institutions, and practices, (London: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 28-51.
56 SHP, p. 20.
57 Price, p. 48.
58 SHP, p. 20.
59 Alain Buisine, Eugene Atget ou la melancholie en photographie, (Nimes: Editions Jacqueline 
Chambon, 1994), p. 63: “ ...la ville, si souvent associee aux grandes convulsions socio-historiques
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short, it is the people, and hence the ephemera of the streets, that leave 
only the signs of their passing. Atget’s images are empty of the 
momentary, and they still dominate Benjamin’s discourse. Secondly, much 
is suggested by his description of some of Atget’s images as if a palpable 
atmosphere hangs in the air that evokes the past and future of a place.
It has been justly said of him that he photographed them like 
scenes of crime. The scene of a crime, too, is deserted; it is 
photographed for the purpose of establishing evidence. With Atget, 
photographs become standard evidence for historical occurrences, 
and acquire a hidden political significance.60
This contrasts slightly with Benjamin’s earlier description:
Not for nothing have Atget’s photographs been compared with 
those of a scene of action. But is not every corner of our cities and 
scene of action?61
One statement suggests the echoing of a past, the other a potential for the 
future. Both evoke the presence of people, but do so because of their 
absence; the silence of the image directly reflects the absence of the 
bustle -  in terms of sound no less -  in the streets. As Deleuze noted, such 
absences (which he describes as the out-of-field, and uses the example of 
sound in cinema) reflect the whole that spreads out from the time-image in 
crystallizations:
[The out of field] is connected in this case to the Whole which is 
expressed in sets, to the change which is expressed in movement, 
to the duration which is expressed in space, to the living concept 
which is expressed in the image, to the spirit which is expressed in 
matter.62
et aux ffenetiques agitations commerciales et industrielles de la dynamique capitaliste, semble 
momentanement retrouver une delicieuse fralcheur, une miraculeuse purete”.
60 WA, p. 228.
61 SHP, p. 25. Miriam Hansen, in a recent article on Benjamin and cinema, points to the possible 
unreliability of the more widely available translations of Benjamin’s most famous essay. Cf. 
Miriam Hansen, ‘Benjamin and Cinema: not a one way street’, in Critical Inquiry 25, Winter 
1999, pp. 306-343.
62 TI, p 236.
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Buisine suggests that such an absence constitutes the same kind of sharp 
affect that Barthes described as the punctum. Rather than something 
added to the image, as Barthes upholds, Buisine suggests that the 
absence in Atget’s images is a more skilful and subtle punctum that 
remains in part as an incompleteness, or emptiness63. The suggestion is 
that the punctum is an awareness of both presence and absence. If so, 
then is all of this not, in truth, as close to Benjamin’s most direct 
description of aura as one might get: “What is aura? A peculiar web of 
space and time: the unique manifestation of distance, however near it may 
be”?64 Benjamin’s seduction by Atget’s images appears more clearly now 
to be a result of memoire involontaire. For Benjamin, something comes 
rushing back to him from the past, whether his own or not, that inhabits the 
space left by the ephemeral or romantic city that Atget’s photographs have 
forsaken.
This is a clue to Benjamin’s interest. Even though photographed right up 
until the time of Benjamin’s writing, Atget’s Paris has subtracted the signs 
of the twentieth-century and left behind the city for which Benjamin 
lamented. As Price points out, this was the Paris of the nineteenth century, 
“a Paris that no longer exists” 65. When Benjamin looked at Atget’s 
images, he was reminded of the city that inspired him to write on 
Baudelaire, on Proust, and on the Arcades. Benjamin saw in Atget not a 
connection to the modern, but a connection to the past experienced 
through memory, and analogous to the bustle of modernity. What had 
been lost to modernity, and what Atget’s pictures stripped bare, was the 
experience of time not as a series of shocks, but as what Leo Charney 
describes as a “continuous cumulation” of the past66.
Benjamin was a victim of the entanglement of memory and perception. 
Atget has shut Benjamin’s eyes to the modern, and Benjamin’s memory -
63 Buisine, 1994, p. 64: “ ...en realite Atget introduit le plus subtil des <<  punctum »  dans ses 
photographies, nullement une presence etonnante, derangeante, transgressive, mais plus 
habilement l’absence en tant que telle... [e]n fait le punctum peut tout aussi bien consister en une 
incompletude, un manque, un dvidement.” See also, Christian Metz, 'Photography and Fetish', in 
October 34, Fall, 1985, pp. 81-91, p. 87. Metz also connects the off-frame to Benjamin’s aura.
64 SHP, p. 20.
65 Price, 1994, p. 64.
66 Charney, 1995, pp. 283-285.
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collective and experiential -  has taken over. He not only experiences his 
memory, but he is entangled in an awareness of memory.
Experience now means the dissociation of experience from itself. In 
shutting his eyes, Bergson registers photographically the only 
possible experience left to experience: the experience of our non­
experience.67
Cadava too notes the dominance of photographic language in both 
Bergson and Benjamin, and it proves appropriate here. This placing of 
Bergson/Benjamin inside the instant of recognition displays the operation 
of that instant as Chronos (Chr) contracting past and future. For Benjamin, 
however, unlike Bergson, it signals an awareness of the instant becoming 
moment, and thus predicting its passing; predicting its death. Photographs 
that have the ability to provoke such memoires involontaires clearly 
express a potential to be a time-image, yet for Benjamin they are only an 
affirmation of the momentary, and an affirmation made through the 
continual evocation of death and passing. Whether it is Dauthendey’s wife 
or Kafka’s eyes (“immeasurably sad”), Benjamin’s writing is also 
dominated by examples of the morbid and the melancholic. In his rush to 
fill the instant with something tangible, the tangible has become an actual 
body; the corporeal has become the corporal. This has led to a becoming- 
mad of depth, not unlike that of Roland Barthes’ experiences in front of the 
portrait of his mother whilst very young, or in front of the portrait of Lewis 
Payne.68 In all these cases the photograph, this time as the ‘bad Chronos’ 
(Chr’) (the “revenge taken on future and past by the present in terms of 
the present”) confronts the ‘now’ with the ‘then’69. The effect on both 
Benjamin and Barthes of this is as profound as it is famous.
However, in this similar rush to fill the instant with the corporeal, or with 
what are essentially memoires volontaire (and hence the paradox, the 
becoming-mad of depth?), the potential of such images has been 
forgotten. This is significant in the case of Atget. Other commentators have
67 Eduardo Cadava, Words o f Light: Theses on the photography o f history, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), pp. 88-89.
68 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans. by Richard Howard, 2nd edn. (London: Vintage, 1993 
(1980)). See also Buisine and Price.
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similarly noted the pregnancy of Atget’s images, which seem to promise as 
much as they evoke the past that cannot return. Both John Fraser and 
Berenice Abbott point to Atget’s images as suggestive of ‘stages’ waiting 
for their dramatis personae to enter. Fraser takes this further by 
suggesting a life to the objects depicted, rather than simply their passing 
away. Commenting on one of the more famous Atget images, the 
cobblers/boot shop on the Marche des Carmes, Fraser talks in the present 
tense, with an accent on becoming, when describing those who have worn 
(and will wear -  it is a shop, after all) the boots and shoes on display.
But the facts are that Atget does again and again work in terms of 
juxtapositions of natural symbols and that the total effect in the 
boots picture is a simultaneous apprehension both of the lives of 
other people animating those boots and thousands of pairs like 
them, and of one’s own shod feet upon the sidewalks.70
Memory inserts the corporeal in this case, but the photograph has caught 
it at the moment of insertion, hence the compounding of tenses (the 
memory of one’s own life -  one’s own future -  and the life and future of 
others). This photograph is not unique either, and a similar analysis could 
be made of the photograph of gentleman’s hats on the Marche du Temple, 
any of the photographs of mannequins, and any of the photographs of 
shirts and corsets arranged on shelves, across packing cases, and hung 
from windows. Atget’s images immediately present themselves as images 
of Chronos (Chr) becoming Chronos (Chr’) in the way that they force the 
present to confront both past and future. They are crystal-images as are 
some of the Lumiere films, because they present directly the plucking of 
the instant from Aion.
Slide 44
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69 LS, p. 164.
70 John Fraser, ‘Atget and the City’ (1968), in Peninah R. Petruck ed. The Camera Viewed: 
writings on twentieth century photography -  Photography before World War II, (New York: 
Dutton, 1979), pp. 197-217, p. 204. See also Berenice Abbott, The World o f Atget, (New York:
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However, Atget’s images would seem to contradict this. Benjamin 
maintains that there is some photography that does present aura, 
particularly the aura of nature to which he returns several times.71 The tacit 
connection made with Atget’s work is that the photography of David 
Octavius Hill (with Robert Adamson) possesses an aura that translates 
from the people photographed, who ‘grew into’ the photograph over its 
long exposure.72 The durative, it seems, has the potential for the same 
type of aura -  the experience of proximity and distance -  that Benjamin 
sees in the photographs of Kafka and the others. It connects to Atget 
possibly because of Atget’s preferred equipment, or at least because of 
the durative quality of the images that implies its use. Hansen’s allusion of 
the telescope to Benjamin is appropriate. Atget’s work echoes such a 
relationship in its very apparatus. Despite working in a period 
characterised by bustling, rapid change, and heightened public stimulus, 
Atget chose to record it empty, alone, and with a plate camera that had no 
mechanical shutter. Buisine compares Atget’s technique with those of the 
Lumieres, who exhibited just around the corner from the photographer. 
Resistant to the onset of fast exposures and their role in the new 
entertainment medium, Atget’s technique made it possible for him to 
“counter the heat and momentum of the period, to stifle its shocks, [and] to 
rein in its cinematic acceleration”73.
The work of Atget and the Lumieres both suggest the aleatory impulse of 
Chronos (Chr). However, without any temporality imposed on them at all 
(unlike the Lumiere films), Atget’s images immediately assume the 
universal character of time. They represent the potential of movement and 
action in the scene. Past and future stretch out as the incorporeality of
Paragon, 1964)
71 Cf. SHP, p. 20: “To follow, while reclining on a Summer’s noon, the outline of a mountain 
range on the horizon or a branch, which casts its shadow on the observer until the moment of the 
hour partakes of their presence -  this is to breathe in the aura of these mountains, of this branch.”
See also WA, p. 224: “If, while resting on a Summer afternoon, you follow with your eyes a 
mountain range on the horizon or a branch which casts its shadow over you, you experience the 
aura o f those mountains, of that branch.”
72 SHP, p. 17.
73 Buisine, 1994, pp. 112-113: “ ...fait tout son possible pour contrer 1’ardeur at l’allant du siecle, 
pour contrecarrer son emballement, pour ffeiner son acceleration cinetique.” (my translation)
Buisine uses the anecdote of a family portrait to explain how, unusually for a photographer at the 
turn of the century, the small movements of the sitters were inconsequential to his pictures, since 
they required long exposures.
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potential. This suggests that there is a different time in Atget’s images, 
though no less a crystal-image if there is.
What is curious about this particular character of time is that, as it took 
Chronos (Chr’) to reveal Chronos (Chr), this same passage from instant to 
moment (principally the insertion of memory) reveals Aion. It is here also 
that we must understand more clearly Aion’s relationship with the Cronos 
of Deleuze’s thesis on the time-image. Let us go back to the memoires 
involontaire of Atget’s photographs. As we saw, memory-images fill the 
instant of Atget’s photographs with the corporeal, particularly as a 
contraction of past and future, as we saw in Fraser’s description. This is a 
powerful effect of Atget’s images, since this type of analysis appears again 
and again. John Fuller suggests that the tranquillity of the backstreets and 
alleys depicted “will be interrupted by violence”.74 Max Kozloff suggests 
that such scenes are settings waiting for actors (in comparison with Atget’s 
petits metiers, who could be actors without scenes), whilst acknowledging 
that each picture is a “...frothing present conceived as a vision of the 
distant, immobile past: this could only be an hallucination, a long-term 
dream state...Every frame is a memory rehearsal of a dream.”75 Pierre 
Mac Orlan simplifies this to the powerful effect of Atget’s decision to 
photograph the everyday:
It is not the grand international hotels, the ministries and banks, the 
churches and temples that give a city its personality, but on the 
contrary one’s intelligent recollections of those popular quarters 
where bars loom into view out of the fog...76.
Buisine similarly describes photography, and in particular Atget’s work, as 
“un art du peu”77, but it is, of course, Benjamin who acknowledges such a
74 John Fuller, ‘Atget and Man Ray in the Context of Surrealism’, in Peninah R. Petruck ed. The 
Camera Viewed: writings on twentieth century photography -  Photography before World War II, 
(New York: Dutton, 1979), pp. 218-235, p. 226.
75 Max Kozloff, ‘Abandoned and Seductive: Atget’s Streets’ (1986), in The Privileged Eye: Essays 
on Photography, 2nd edn. (Alberquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), pp. 279-305, 
pp. 288-289. For more depth on Atget’s petits metiers series, see Jeff Rosen, “Atget’s Populism”, 
in History o f  Photography, Vol. 18, No. 1, (Spring 1994), pp. 50-63.
76 Pierre Mac Orlan, ‘Preface to Atget Photographe de Paris' (1930), in Photography in the 
Modern Era: European Documents and Critical Writings 1913-40, ed. by Christopher Phillips,
(New York, 1989), p. 45.
77 Ibid, p. 22.
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focus for Atget: “He seeks the forgotten and the forsaken...” whilst being 
able to provide a similar past and future for Atget’s images 78. Mary Price’s 
work on Benjamin leads her to the conclusion that “Benjamin has a talent 
for characterizing a still photograph as a narrative, implying the beginning 
and the end of a situation by his dramatic figuration of the middle.”79 This 
is indeed suggested by his description of Baudelaire, which is just as 
appropriate for pictures Atget took in the mornings before the city awoke: 
When Baudelaire takes the dawn as his theme, the deserted streets 
emanate something of that ‘silence of the throng’ which Hugo 
senses in nocturnal Paris.80
Once again it is the evocation of sound -  as a memory-image -  that is a 
structural force of the crystal-image.
The point to be made here is that the memory-images do not correspond 
to Chronos in any form because they do not create the past or future 
through discrete elements or contractions, but instead as an incorporeal 
whole or potential. These memory-images achieve what Bergson 
suggested in his hypothetical model of natural perception. However, these 
memory images of Atget’s work imagine the movement as a whole. All of 
these examples emphasise their subjects as becoming, especially 
Benjamin’s ‘throng’, a noun that is brought about in the vain attempt to 
actualise the bustling crowd in the past tense. ‘Throng’ always needlessly 
conflates ‘thronging’. The image of the Barde Cabaret, whose mirrors 
reflect the ghosts of the throng, might always be still, and to some suggest 
stasis or even death, but perception serves to recreate the life of the city 
through memory.
Slide 46
However these are not recollection images simply of the past: discrete 
images of ghosts. Instead they are images of the passing of time, time as 
becoming, and time as Aion. This image of time exploits the one potential
78 SHP, p. 20.
79 Price, 1994, p. 40.
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that the still image has over the cinema. It is the only medium with a 
preconditioned potential of representing indivisible time because the still 
photograph is in itself indivisible. Photographic images pluck the aleatory 
point from duration because the mechanics of photography divide up what 
is essentially indivisible -  they make use of the impossible task that faces 
them. Atget’s images demonstrate this by provoking the involuntary 
memory of the crowds, something new and peculiar to modernity, as a 
becoming. Most importantly, Atget’s images simultaneously force their 
viewers to be aware of this. He not only picks places where the crowd 
would naturally throng (in front of shops, along boulevards, along the rues 
populated by prostitutes) but he photographs them deserted except, of 
course, for him. Since his apparatus requires careful use and much 
attention, he foregrounds the perception of the photography/er. Atget’s 
images have a camera-consciousness; if there is loneliness in his images, 
it is because there is always someone there.
The above suggests that narrative ability -  or narrativity -  is an essential 
part of the crystal-image. Narrative ability presents an essentially unlimited 
past and future that leaves off from any point within the image. Limited 
only by memory in actualising narrative, even the implication of the term 
narrative is itself too limiting. A term must be applied that suggests the 
image of duration that exists to divide the past and the future to create the 
any-instant-whatever, and that represents the character of non- 
chronological time that this has. In Cinema 2, Deleuze calls this cronos, 
the time that allows the present to pass on yet co-exist with the past. In his 
earlier The Logic of Sense, this is the time of Aion.
Ultimately the conceptual connection between cronos and Aion is not the 
lengthy description that Deleuze gives to the non-chronological line of Aion 
that subdivides, but the effects of this subdivision. Throughout this 
discourse Deleuze’s argument employs a genetic, or organic, flavour. 
Deleuze’s ‘true genetic element’ from Cinema 2 has its parallel in his 
description of the instant that is plucked from Aion. Simultaneously he
80 SMB, p. 164.
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infers the dissymmetrical jets of cronos and the crystal structure that 
flourishes from them:
“[The present] extracts singular points twice projected -  once into 
the future and once into the past -  forming by this double equation 
the constitutive elements of the pure event (in the manner of a pod 
which releases its spores).”81
This suggests that the aleatory instant (Chr) is the division of time, yet the 
memory-images that actualise it follow the line of Aion. Interestingly, Regis 
Durand suggests a similar genetic theme for the point at which the past 
and future divides 82. Drawing on the work of Barthes as well as Deleuze, 
Durand follows the former’s assertion that the photograph becomes a 
palimpsest as meanings (actualisation is what is inferred) are overlaid 
upon the image. Photographs carry the potential for meaning as if 
composed of ‘marks’ or ‘accents’ that merely suggest directions. The result 
is that “...we are dealing here with the genetic element of all images, the 
very division where perception occurs.” (p. 143) Durand suggests that 
memory, both cultural and personal, provides the subjects for each image 
to become an “infinitely complex palimpsest” in the same manner as 
memory informs the actualisations of the crystal image -  as we shall 
investigate further in Chapter Four. However, as his appreciation of the 
photograph refers back to the photograph as lagging behind the present 
(because of its referral to the past, a “failure to keep time”), this is a 
division of perception that leads only to the becoming-mad of depth.
Such an analysis suggests also an emphasis on the contemplative in 
photography. But if time splits in the instant to become a projection of past 
and future, and that split is essentially random and will not be contained by 
any temporal mechanics (such as cinema), then how are we to see it? 
Perhaps the temptation to look for the instant in the ‘instantaneous’ 
photograph (eg. Cartier-Bresson’s decisive moment) is wrong after all. 
Perhaps instead we should look at the durative image of the everyday: the 
image that reflects in its frame the time that stretches to “the limits of the
81 LS, p. 167.
82 Regis Durand, ‘How to See (Photographically)’, in Patrice Petro ed. Fugitive Images: from
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entire universe”. Reflecting the “living cosmic present” (Chr) for Deleuze is 
the unlimited time of Aion: “...it will be said that only the past and future 
subsist, that they subdivide each present, ad infinitum, however small it 
may be...” 83. Such infinite subdivisions can only create a labyrinth of past 
and future, even if this is suggested as a single straight line (“a labyrinth 
more terrible still”). But to see this subdivision is to appreciate it through 
the slowness of time, rather than in speed. The time-image that presents 
Aion must do so by presenting a time that is indivisible. Many still images 
do this, especially, for example, Atget’s empty streets. However, it is his 
photographs of the statuary of Paris’ palace gardens that present Aion, 
and they do so because they offer the potential of movement and time, a 
potential that is palpable, though unfulfilled.
Max Kozloff s descriptions of these photographs are informative. Kozloff 
makes use of the juxtaposition of the statuary in the pare des Sceaux or 
Versailles with the nature that overwhelms it in those unkempt areas of the 
parks.
The images tell of neglect or disrepair and the mortality of human 
enterprise that fails, is in the act of dying, or has passed away. But 
that response is uneasy. Certainly he gives us some explicit 
portrayals of physical decline, where the subject alone confirms a 
message about the injurious passage of time. The seventeenth- 
century figures at the pare de Sceaux are being read the riot act by 
nature, which chips and fissures and has overgrown them in a 
tantrum of decay.84
Buisine parallels this by suggesting that a statue of a Gladiateur mourant 
at Versaille is not so much dying from those wounds given him in battle, 
but instead from ravages of time as a “ghastly leprosy gnawing away at his 
body” (I’affreuse lepre en train de lui ronger le corps).85
photography to video, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 141-151.
83 LS, p. 62.
84 Kozloff, 1986, p.292.
85 Buisine, 1994, p. 198. (my translation)
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There are three images of time presented here. 1) Kozloff and Buisine’s 
description immediately presents time ordered by memory. Chronos is 
here in the perception of the past that the statues enforce. When Atget 
photographs along a row of statues in the Tuileries, he presents an image 
of the past as a cascade of actualisations, provoking for Kozloff an acute 
awareness of their distance from the present -  a becoming-mad of depth.
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2) Kozloff s evocation of the acts of nature on the sculpted marble reveals, 
beneath the image of the past, a simultaneous contraction of the future. 
These statues will be overrun by nature, and those chips and fissures will 
open up to the extent that the statues will return to the natural forms from 
which they came. The image of time thus presented is both limited and 
infinite. The process will reach a conclusion that reflects the moment of 
their creation from the rough marble, but not only will this occur in a future 
unimaginably far away, the achievement of change is overwhelmed by the 
sense of duration which it covers. Like Bergson waiting for his sugar to 
dissolve, we are overwhelmed by the wait itself -  and thus we experience 
duration first-hand.
3) The longest unthinkable time of Aion is presented, as a contraction, by 
the smallest unthinkable time. The instant is presented in its infinite 
regress by the slowness of the statues in their movement toward 
dissolution. Always still, they always move toward the unimaginable future. 
Such an image of the future bifurcates to create the crystal structure, yet 
remains incorporeal. Only the becoming of time is evident: they always 
move in general. Underneath Kozloffs becoming-mad of depth, there is a 
powerful effect felt from the movement of the world emphasised not by 
speed but by slowness, which is no less emphatic. This is revealed in 
Kozloffs article:
One common misperception about Atget’s work is that since it is 
largely depopulated it must be lifeless. On the contrary, he was 
exquisitely attentive to the vitality of the world, but did not think that 
is was available on short or casual notice. With him, movement was
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never so affecting as when it was only a whisper of some 
imminence, (p. 291)
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Kozloffs urge was to categorise Atget's photographs as discrete images 
of the past, and follow the example of Benjamin and others. This is an 
urge to understand time according to the pulse, or shock. Kozloff expected 
to see images that remind him only of passing, just as Benjamin did. But 
both commentators, it seems, are confounded by the means by which that 
past is represented, since it is also an image of the future. Expecting 
perception that follows the punctuation of photography on the modern 
experience -  perception subordinate to photography -  they were 
presented with a photography that presented the limited and infinite 
perception of time as a passing in general. This is photography 
subordinate to perception, and to understand it, it seems, is to understand 
the movement of statues.
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* * *
Conclusion: The Death of the Photograph
As both conclusion and postscript, it is worth saying something about the 
effect of the division of time on photography, particularly as this has a 
great deal to do with how the photograph has often been accepted as 
metonymic of death. The work on photography and its link with death is, 
more often than not, influenced by an experience of the past that comes 
back, often as a deeply personal experience. This suggests that the 
connections with death rely upon a particular view of memory and a 
particular perception of time. But first, what is the problem with the 
photograph and death?
In his short article The Death of the Author' Roland Barthes aims a
Damian Sutton -  The Crystal Image
polemic at the cult of authorship that has come to surround the literary 
author.86 In an argument that translates across the creative arts, Barthes 
laments that not only has the author become accepted as the sole intender 
of meaning in a work of art, but that this has had important effects in the 
organisation of artistic history. It has not only led to a primacy of the 
author’s intention over any other possible meaning, but has indirectly led 
to a method of scholarship that establishes hierarchies of canonical texts 
and contexts. In such a case one particular interpretation dominates over a 
text, oeuvre, genre, or in the case of photography, even the medium. 
However, “[o]nce the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text 
becomes quite futile...” he suggests, acknowledging that the deciphered 
text is merely an actualisation of a becoming (p. 147). Barthes’ own call is 
for a liberation of the reader from the thrall of the Author and this kind of 
‘cult’ that surrounds him: “the birth of the reader must come at the death of 
the Author.” (p. 148) But Barthes’ title employs a complex metaphor, since 
it suggests that there has already been a death, that of the ability for a text 
(whether novel or photograph) to live. The Author and his cult guarantee 
the death of the text in duration, since it fixes it in history. The cult of the 
Author kills discourse.
The same can be said for the photograph. The photograph has become a 
dead space in critical discourse. There is the moribund intellectual debate 
that surrounds the photograph and finds its subject in the constant 
evocation of the photograph with death. This is one of the consequences 
of the photographic perception, since it conjures up a vertiginous image of 
the past that either terrifies or seduces (or both) the viewer. In truth, it is 
the consequences of the failure to see beyond the photographic 
perception as an organisation of memory. It is a failure to see perception 
as subordinate to photography, and a failure to reclaim perception, and 
thus reclaim photography. If photography is to be seen as a becoming 
then it must be because of this reclamation. ‘The birth of photography 
must be at the cost of the death of the Photograph\ Accordingly, a 
question remains: how did the photograph develop such a powerful link 
with death? The answer involves understanding the element of time that
86 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author (1977)’ in IM T, pp. 142-148.
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Deleuze was particularly suspicious of: the becoming-mad of depth.
As we have seen, photographic perception fills the instant with memory to 
become moment (“...the full is an embroidery on the canvas of the void”
87). These moments stretch back into the past as a co-existence with the 
present. Always interlocked by their connection to the past in general, they 
form a cascade that takes shape in Bergson’s cone. But perception is not 
entirely complete at this stage:
Our perceptions are undoubtedly interlaced with memories, and, 
inversely, a memory, as we shall show later, only becomes actual 
by borrowing the body of some perception into which it slips. These 
two acts, perception and recollection, always interpenetrate each 
other, are always exchanging something of their substance as by a 
process of endosmosis.88
The photograph offers itself up as an idea! body into which perception and 
recollection slip, firstly as an object that records the past, and secondly as 
an object that mimics visual perception itself. Each characteristic partly 
obscures the other, so that the photograph appears culpable in 
representing either (‘it’s just a photograph’, ‘a photograph is a memory’), 
and thus obscuring their mutual interpenetration. This is why the 
'Flashbulb Memory' is such a beguiling idea.
This easy connection of perception to the photograph is symptomatic of 
the becoming-mad of depth. Deleuze’s suspicion is focused on its 
seduction of the intellect, which enjoys the nostalgia of memories piled up 
like a stack of photographs. Photographs have become the simulacra of 
memories, and the photographic album, for example, is a practical 
facsimile of the becoming-mad of depth:
Family photographs are quite often deployed -  shown, talked about 
-  in series; pictures get displayed one after another, their selection 
and ordering as meaningful as the pictures themselves. The whole, 
the series, constructs a family story in some respects like a
87 CE, p. 291.
88 M M , p. 67.
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Annette Kuhn’s description above succinctly describes the ways in which 
public and private perception merges with public and private recollection to 
connect what are often disparate memory-images. Photographs in this 
case can exist as once pure events (Chr) into which memory has been 
inserted in the present to be recalled in the future. It is an attempt not just 
to put such memories in order, but to tame the ‘terrible labyrinth’ of 
disparate elements that would otherwise exist. Here we can see how the 
becoming-mad of depth, once recollection and perception have slipped 
into the photograph, inverts Bergson’s cone. In it memory images are 
discrete and connected only by histories and organic chronologies 
(memoire volontaire) in an (often vain) effort to prevent rogue images 
(memoire involontaire) from emerging out of its depth.(see fig. 2)
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It is these images of memoire involontaire that disrupt the order of family 
and social histories collected around photographs, and their peculiar 
power is all the more seductive in this disruption -  witness the 
extraordinary autobiographical theme of Kuhn’s study, and of course 
Roland Barthes’ much quoted Camera Lucida. Overwhelmed by the power 
of a single photograph of his mother, Barthes is compelled to write on the 
similar power that photographs can exert in their conflation of the ‘here 
and now’ of the past with the ‘here and now’ of the present. Barthes is 
unable to fully express such a paradox, and tenses conflate as if to mirror 
the past and future that take revenge on the present:
‘He is dead and he is going to die...’..A read at the same time: This 
will be and this has been\ I observe with horror an anterior future of 
which death is the stake. By giving me the absolute past of the pose 
(aorist), the photograph tells me death in the future.90
89 Annette Kuhn, Family Secrets: Acts o f  Memory and Imagination, (London: Verso, 1995), p. 17.
90 CL, p. 95-96.
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Mary Price notes how this is paralleled by Benjamin’s fascination with the 
Dauthendey photograph, and there is a parallel with the Kafka photograph 
also.91 Such memory-images constitute the becoming-mad of depth: a 
vertiginous array of present that extends back into the past, and that 
threatens to overwhelm us. This is the sickness of nostalgia. Presenting 
the past as if to haunt us, this is now the becoming-mad of death, and this 
is why Benjamin, and later Bazin, Barthes, and Metz are all drawn to 
photography. Deleuze was right to be suspicious of Chronos (Chr’), and it 
has taken revenge on the past and future instead. This is the price of the 
seduction by what Deleuze calls “the delirious future” and “delirious past”: 
“Chronos wants to die...”92
But Deleuze has already offered us the zero-state of the living present in 
the same manner. There is a conflation of tenses in the photograph, but 
these are the conditional tenses of the uncertain future and past, and they 
lead to a mutual annihilation in the pure event that proposes a different 
view of the photograph.
One cannot say of someone mortally wounded and that he will die, 
but that he is having been wounded and that he is due to die. This 
present does not contradict Aion; on the contrary, it is the present 
as being of reason which is subdivided ad infinitum into something 
that has just happened and something that is going to happen, 
always flying in both directions at once...The event is that no one 
ever dies, but has always just died or is always going to die, in the 
empty present of Aion, that is, in eternity. 93
Still, as we have seen, Barthes’ article has been unusually influential in 
photography and film criticism, perhaps more than Benjamin’s writing, and 
has much to answer for. But from where has such a melancholic and 
morbid connection in the photograph arisen? For this we have to go back 
to Eugene Atget, and in particular the promotion and influence of his work 
begun, for the most part, by the photographer Berenice Abbott, and which
91 Price, p. 96. In Kuhn’s chapter she confronts a photograph of her mother also. The 
auto/biographical urge is very strong in photography criticism, and Alain Buisine also submits to 
what he calls a “preface autobiographique” (p. 13).
92 LS, p. 164.
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has led to a melancholic visual style in photography that complements the 
theoretical influence of Barthes.
During the twenties, Abbott had been a portrait photographer and 
darkroom assistant to Man Ray. Whilst with the surrealist, she had herself 
become acquainted with the artisan (and Man Ray’s neighbour) Atget. She 
took his work home with her to New York after his death in 1928, and split 
the collection with Julien Levy. A few images had been published by the 
Surrealists, but it was the first monograph and its review by Benjamin that 
brought Atget’s work into the academic sensibility, a position it occupies to 
this day.94
The 1930 monograph had received reviews by American photographers 
Ansel Adams and Walker Evans. But it was Abbott’s role that ensured that 
the Atget ‘industry’ that flourished in the late-twentieth century did so in 
New York, and not in Paris. From this moment, the rise of Atget as a 
central figure in US photography, despite never having exhibited seriously 
in his own lifetime in France or in America, was assured. The promotion in 
America that secured Atget’s visual influence in world photography, 
particularly (but this is not the only case) in artistic terms. Both John 
Szarkowski and Max Kozloff have pointed to the visual comparisons 
between Atget’s images and those of Diane Arbus, Richard Avedon, and 
Lee Friedlander, clearly suggesting a knowing accession to the French 
artisan’s visual style 95.
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The publication of the four-volume Work of Atget by Szarkowski and 
Hambourg with the Museum of Modern Art in 1985 96, was met with a 
criticism by Abigail Solomon-Godeau that echoes Buisine’s praise. Atget, 
for her, is
93 Ibid p. 63.
94 Mac Orlan, 1903, pp. 41-49.
95 John Szarkowski, ‘Understandings of Atget’, in John Szarkowski and Maria Morris Hambourg, 
The Work o f  Atget, Vol. IV , (London: Gordon Fraser, 1985), pp. 9-33. See also Max Kozloff, ‘
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...currently positioned as the exemplar, progenitor, and patriarch of 
modern photography and [is] celebrated unanimously by the 
photographic community with an enthusiasm that brooks no 
question...97
There are two problems with this attack, however. The first is that although 
Atget’s position is undoubtedly canonical, it is so because the academy is 
arborescent, or hierarchical, in its structure before the work of any 
approved artist is attached to it. In Benjaminian terms, ritualistic aura 
surrounds a work of art to act as a stabilising force for a hierarchy that 
already exists without it: the circumstances of Atget’s discovery fits, albeit 
loosely. For example, Atget’s position as a progenitor of the documentary 
or surrealist aesthetic is difficult to maintain: he was one of many 
commercial documentarians who worked in photography since its 
invention 98. Similarly, Atget held no pretentions to artistic status 
identifiable in his work or his letters; the “most staggering detective work 
[has revealed] hardly a smidgen of artistic credo” is how Kozloff put i t 99 
Atget had even declined a credit for those images submitted to Andre 
Breton’s publication, in which they stood as generic images of an empty, 
surreal, Paris. Atget, it seems, had remained anonymous not in spite of the 
rarity or genius of his work, but simply because of its relative ubiquity.
The second problem is much more basic. There were many artisan 
photographers in Paris during Atget’s lifetime, and Solomon-Godeau’s 
accusations of cynicism do nothing to suggest a reason why Benjamin 
should take up Atget’s work, for example. It offers no reason why Abbot’s 
generation and the next, including Frank and Arbus, should want to take 
up Atget’s style at all, particularly if his ubiquitous style could at that time
96 John Szarkowski and Maria Morris Hambourg, The Work o f Atget, Vols. I-IV , (London: Gordon 
Fraser, 1985).
97 Solomon-Godeau, 1991, p. 31.
98 Documentarians such as Matthew Brady, Tim O’Sullivan, William Jackson, have since been 
‘rediscovered’ in the vaults of US public service archives and similarly ‘canonised’. Atget’s work 
was by no means unique: Solomon-Godeau mentions Charles Marville as an earlier such artisan. 
Local documentary projects in England and Wales in the nineteenth century that attempted to 
record the disappearing rural customs and landmarks, are similar examples. See Tagg, p. 168-9. 
See also Solomon-Godeau, 1991, p. 40.
99 Kozloff, 1986, p. 299.
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have been described as workaday 100 Indeed, Berenice Abbott herself 
leaves few clues to answer the question “Why Atget?”
Abbott appears as the photographer obsessed with the momentary that 
her position in history (photographing from the early 1920s) suggests. It is 
Abbott who, in her preface to her book on Atget in 1964, is one of the first 
to describe the emphatic nature of the photograph/er: “the photographer’s 
punctilio is his recognition of the now - to see it so clearly that he looks 
through it to the past and senses the future”.101 This is a statement that 
apparently pre-figures both Deleuze’s Chronos (Chr) and Barthes’ 
punctum. Similarly, in a 1951 essay, ‘Photography at the Crossroads’, 
Abbott had made a claim that the photograph should be related to “the life 
of the times -  the pulse of today”102. Do these sound like the words of 
someone who would be interested in Atget’s durative and patient images?
The answer is in Atget’s depiction of time. Pierre Mac Orlan, in his preface 
to the 1930 monograph, talks of photography as “creating sudden 
death...The camera’s click suspends life in an act that the developed film 
reveals in its very essence”103. But life revealed “in its very essence” was 
Mac Orlan’s claim, suggesting that it is the life of the city that Atget’s 
photographs offer. What they reveal is the sense of duration that has been 
lost to the momentary trope of modernity. This is the duration that 
provokes “intelligent recollections” of the crowds that throng in the day: all 
those feet for all those boots, and all those heads for all those hats. 
Extracted from the blur of the city’s bustle, they also echo Mac Orlan’s 
claim that “what reveals movement, is stillness” -  a thought that was 
echoed by Kozloff fifty-five years later.104
100 Abbott is criticised for dropping her sympathetic portrait style -  particularly, as Solomon- 
Godeau notes, her “extraordinary” portraits of the lesbian beau monde of Paris -  in favour of one 
that adopts Atget’s (and thereby ensures patriarchal approval?) pp. 34-35.
101 Abbott, 1964, p. xxvi.
102 Berenice Abbott, ‘Photography at the Crossroads (1951)’, in Alan Trachtenberg ed. Classic 
Essays on Photography, (New Haven: Leete’s Island Books, 1980), pp. 179-184, p. 183.
103 Mac Orlan, 1930, p. 43.
104 Mac Orlan, 1930, p. 44. Benjamin, was right, to a certain extent, new technologies do reveal a 
certain “optical unconscious”, but just as they reveal speed, they also reveal slowness. See SHP, p. 
7. See also WA, p. 239.
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For Benjamin, Atget’s photographs bridged a thirty year gap between 
himself and the era that interested him. For Berenice Abbott, Walker 
Evans, and Evans’ assistant Helen Levitt, all living in New York, Atget’s 
photographs as much served as a telescope into the past as they did a 
warning that the modern city had come to sweep away the old, just as it 
had done in Paris. (Abbott’s next major project was photographing the 
areas of old New York that were disappearing even as the city’s skyline 
ascended to become the new icon of modernity 105) The adoption of the 
melancholy look that would dominate American photography was by then 
firmly established: Buisine describes Atget as “pere spirituel” to the 
American school of photography.106 The later generations of 
photographers educated using Atget’s images and Benjamin’s, Evan’s, 
and Abbott’s texts photographed discrete instances of alienation: time 
distanced from us by speed; time that emphasised death; in Deleuze’s 
terms, time that wanted to die. What was adopted from Atget was a sense 
of past times, dead times, time as Chronos (Chr’). But this was a sense of 
time applied to Atget a posteriori: it was the melancholia of Benjamin, Mac 
Orlan and Abbott that was adopted, only imaged -  or imagined -  for them 
by Atget. Photography of the melancholy became a style that haunted the 
photography to come, from which it has since struggled to be free, and 
which spread -  like a virus, according to Kozloff -  through Bill Brandt and 
Robert Frank107. Since then every great photographer’s catalogue contains 
alienated city streets, shop fronts, or isolated artisans and tradespeople. 
“Melancholy objects”, is how Susan Sontag described them, and they have 
become the stock-in-trade of the educated photographer108.
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Left behind in Paris was a different sense of the life of objects. This is not 
the life of speed that modernism had made into a series of shocks -  
Chronos (Chr’) -  but a life of slowness; time as Aion from which the instant
105 Solomon-Godeau’s suspicion may be justified. As John Tagg notes, Abbott’s Changing New 
York project appeared in art galleries, not history museums. See John Tagg, 1988, p. 157.
106 Buisine, 1994, p. 11.
107 Kozloff, 1986, p. 301.
108 Susan Sontag, ‘Melancholy Objects’, in On Photography, 7th edn. (London: Penguin, 1989 
(1977)), pp. 51-84, p. 68.
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is plucked. Photographing with his plate camera, Atget photographed what 
few -  including perhaps, Jean Cocteau -  have understood. Kozloff recalls 
that Cocteau’s castle, in his 1945 film La Belle et la bete, is reminiscent of 
Atget’s photographs of Parc des Sceaux or Saint Cloud. But there is, in 
fact, a deeper connection between them. Death is also a recurring trope 
for Cocteau, but he effaces death by giving life to those most inanimate of 
objects. Cocteau’s restless and omniscient statues, “read the riot act by 
nature” as Atget’s have, present a sense of time lost to the modern world, 




Comparisons with Cocteau may only be taken so far, but it is clear that 
Cocteau’s film presents a division between the time of the modern and the 
time that subsists and that the modern seeks to order. This has brought us 
to the work for the next chapter. We have seen how the representation of 
time in the crystal is in fact the representation of the division of time from 
the infinite Aion to the ordered Chronos (Chr’). We have seen how various 
crystal-images have demonstrated this process, from the resistance to 
chronology in McCay’s comic strip, through the living present of the 
Lumiere films and to the movement of statues in Atget’s pares. The 
crystal-image above all relies upon the making and presentation of 
memory to perception: Aion to Chronos (Chr) to Chronos (Chr’). This 
suggests that there is a further, underlying, understanding of the crystal- 
image that awaits us. It suggests that the crystal-image is an image of 
becoming, and it suggests that this becoming has a character of its own 
that is peculiar to the photographic image.
First, however, it is important to have a clearer picture of the crystal-image 
as it flourishes from the indiscernibility created by the fluctuation from Aion 
(cronos) to Chronos (Chr’). Since this fluctuation occurs within the frame of
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a perception, this fluctuation is clearly a circuit. We have to see for 
ourselves a crystal-image and observe its structure. We need to 
understand it as an environment of actualisations of the virtual -  as 
Chronos (Chr’) made from the fluctuation of Chronos (Chr) and Aion. 
Lastly, we have to introduce ourselves to this process as a becoming, by 
observing how such images are informed by memory and actualised as if 
there were some ability of the photographic image to provoke this. If this 
means the application of narrative, for example, then this means 
understanding narrative ability, or narrativity. We move on to this with a 
clearer understanding of the characters of time in the crystal, and their 
representation of the creation of the corporeal in the incorporeal: the life of 
memories inserted in the movement of statues.
*  *  *
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Chapter Four:
The Crystal Environment: Narrativitv and 
the photography of Cindv Sherman 
Slide 56
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Some points to mention
After understanding the complex operations of time in Deleuze’s 
philosophy in the last chapter, we must return to a more direct analysis of 
that philosophy as it stands in the cinema books. More specifically, it 
remains to be seen whether that particular description of the crystal-image 
-  and especially cronos -  adequately fits the photograph. In terms of the 
‘photograph’, here we encounter the division that critical studies makes 
between cinema and photography, and the intervention of both art theory 
and film studies in analysis of the photograph as art. Just as there is a 
‘classic cinema’, in whatever guise it appears, there is a ’classic’ or 
routinely accepted concept of ‘Photography’. Photography, like cinema, 
has its pantheon of great names, including some -  Evans, Cartier-Bresson 
etc. -  we have approached already. Cindy Sherman is a relatively new 
addition to this pantheon; ‘new’ in terms of her adoption by photographers 
as a photographer, rather than simply an artist who chooses to work in that 
medium. Until recently, the reputation of Sherman’s work has been 
restricted to the art world and the academy, where she is the subject of 
discussions most closely associated with feminist issues.
Sherman’s work is interesting to us for a number of reasons. Her work fits 
uneasily between art practice and popular culture, as much of it references 
cinema and other narrative forms, whilst her later work references the 
vernacular imagery of hardcore pornography, for example. The visceral 
nature of her work, which often deals with personal issues and 
representations of women in late twentieth century culture, has meant that 
critics such as Laura Mulvey and Rosalind Krauss have used appropriate 
psychoanalytic approaches, particularly that of Julia Kristeva, to interpret 
her photographs. Flavoured by personal approaches, these analyses are 
interesting because they demonstrate a striking element of Sherman’s 
photographs: their ability to provoke multiple interpretations that will not 
easily be fixed by discourse. In fact, the prevalence of a diverse feminist, 
psychoanalytic approach only serves to demonstrate the inability of any 
one of Sherman’s images to have any one unified meaning. The 
photographs, particularly the ‘film stills’, suggest so strongly certain films in 
particular that they immediately confound such an interpretation. They are
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clearly not from any film they might immediately appear to reference, and 
this realisation only heightens the artifice of the images. These are very 
self-conscious photographs, not least because they make the critics 
quoted here conscious of their own self-image -  particularly (as in the 
case of Judith Williamson) as women.
The fact that some of Sherman’s images make reference to cinema in 
general makes them a useful object of analysis in this chapter. They 
photographs and not films, but this does not make them any less 
labyrinthine. They are photographs that reference film (if not films), and 
that makes them appropriate enough for analysis. Most, if not all, of the 
articles on Sherman discussed here treat the work of the artist as a 
general body of work, in which one image more often than not speaks for 
the others. Similarly, critical discussion of Sherman's work in retrospect 
regularly gives primacy to those early film stills and other ‘untitleds’ that 
helped create the artist's reputation 1. This contrasts with Deleuze’s 
treatment of the cinematic auteur, but only slightly, and it is the standard 
that we follow (Deleuze routinely uses the nominatives ‘in Resnais’, ‘in 
Renoir’). Whether it was the artist’s intention or not, discourse surrounding 
Sherman’s work deals with it in the singular, and makes an Artist (if not 
auteur) of her. It is this approach that is our object of study as much as it is 
the images themselves, since Sherman's work and Sherman the Artist are 
both bodies fought over by those interested in the photographs, the 
cultural representations they portray, and the issues surrounding them 2.
Ultimately, the task at hand is to take Deleuze’s notion of the crystal-image 
to the work of Cindy Sherman. It is hoped that, in understanding both the 
formal characteristics of her representation of time and space, first in their 
reception by critics, we shall see the shape of the crystal emerge. Reading
1 Whilst all of Sherman's images remain untitled (they are only numbered), her early work 
garnered attention in being introduced as 'Untitled Film Stills'. Much of Sherman's early popularity 
was due to these images appearing as if  taken from actual films, and much of the written criticism 
of Sherman's work focuses on these images and the narratives they suggest.
2 See Judith Williamson, 'Piece of the Action: Images of “Woman” in the Photography of Cindy 
Sherman ', in Consuming Passions, (London: Marion Boyars, 1983), pp. 91-113: "I was certain his 
anger must have come from a sense of his own involvement, the way those images speak not only 
to him, but from  him - and he kept blaming Sherman herself for it, as if  she really was a bit of a 
whore".
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the interpretations of her work is to view actualisations of the virtual 
spaces created in each image. It is to see the crystal-image in its most 
dynamic movement outward from the point of indiscernibility; as the 
superficiality of the Photograph merges with the various references to 
memory, popular culture, and to Sherman herself in the image. Above all, 
this chapter is neither a critical attack on feminism, nor even of its analysis 
of Sherman per se. There can be no denying that Sherman's photographs 
did speak to certain women and raise certain issues at a time when they 
needed to be raised. What is being questioned here is less the ability for 
the photographs, but rather the ability for critics provoked by them, to 
highlight these issues. Different social and gender issues have been 
raised in response to these photographs, but they highlight the crystal 
structure because of their difference. Each is an actualisation in the 
crystal: Cindy Sherman’s work provides a case study of photographs in 
which the crystal-image can be seen in action.
*  *  *
Introduction.
In his final chapter of Bergsonism, Deleuze reconsiders the actual-virtual 
exchange that we see in the crystal, and firmly identifies this as a creative 
force. This is a development of his study of Bergson which, as Michael 
Hardt has noted, has focused on Bergson’s own attack on negation as an 
ontological force. Instead of difference being a negative supposition, in 
which virtual and actual negate each other, this difference should be seen 
as an exchange that leads to a positive emanation of being 3. Art is a 
creative process from actual to virtual, from real to possible, and from 
singularity to multiplicity. But this situation can only occur when 
organization is unforeseeable, and this is what leads Deleuze to look for 
the creative image of time in cinema that disrupts homogeneous language 
in favour of heterogeneous creativity. Without the ordering principle of 
chronological narration in cinema, which is a reduction of the possible, 
creativity unfolds as a true image of creative duration. As Hardt notes:
3 Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze -  An apprenticeship in philosophy, (Minnesota, University of 
Minnesota, 1993). See also B, Chapter V.
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“Without the blueprint of order, the creative process of organisation is 
always art.” 4
With the photograph separated from chronological order in so many ways, 
we can now see how an approach to creativity in the photograph can be 
made on the same methodological basis as Deleuze's approach to the 
creativity in cinema. Sherman’s Untitled Film Stills demonstrate an 
abstract connection to time in their implication of the temporal ellipsis of 
film narrative. Each image implies a narrative of which it is a part, and 
which projects backwards and forwards in time around it. In responding to 
conventional codes and practices of mainstream filmmaking, these images 
correspond to Deleuze's first thesis on the cinema of the movement- 
image. Each photograph presents a set of objects as an immobile section 
of abstract time. Time, in this sense, is presented only by its connection to 
movement in cinema. Initially, these images appear to ache for sequential 
movement to be returned to them. They await the next frame to create 
their third (and only possible) meaning, as Barthes suggests, as if the next 
frame needed to be laid upon it like a 'palimpsest'5. The images that so 
closely imply specific filmic genres, narrative structures and even directors, 
express this connection most strongly. The cinema of the movement- 
image, which Deleuze described as reaching its zenith in the films of 
Alfred Hitchcock, reverberates inside those pictures that possess 
recognizable cinematic signifiers of that director’s work. With visual 
signifiers that are so strong, is it surprising that the photographs should 
invite interpretations that are as critical of those films’ representation of 
women as they are celebratory of Sherman’s subversion of it? As Shelley 
Rice demonstrates, this representation, and its rationale, has a long 
history that is eviscerated by the photographs:
No longer the object of a male painter’s gaze, the woman in this 
picture [Untitled Film Still #21] is both artist and 
subject...Recreating, as her own personal artist statement, a role -  
that of the young, urban, working woman -  made archetypal in the 
1950s by the (male) directors of Hollywood films, Sherman refuses
4 Ibid p. 18.
5 IM T, pp. 52-68, p. 67.
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to exercise her option of subjectivity; private points of view, in her 
works, merge with the public icons of femininity.6
Slide 57
Cindy Sherman's photographs comprise a substantial body of work from 
her first exhibition in 1977, all of which deal implicitly with the role of 
narrative in still images. Her work can been recognized as dealing with the 
address of the spectator in both cinema and popular culture, and 
references cinema, advertising, classical painting, pornography and other 
aspects of visual culture. Notions of textuality dominate critical studies of 
Cindy Sherman's work. The majority of texts written on the artist have 
taken a broadly similar path that started almost from the moment of her 
first one-woman show. These studies have generally followed two central 
analyses. Firstly, in an article for October in 1979, Douglas Crimp summed 
up the notion of the post-modern as important to the formation and 
reception of these photographs7. Summoning up a sense of deja vu with 
regard to cinema, magazine cultures, and later by abstraction art history, 
fairy-stories, and social conditions marked as post-modern, the images 
have since attracted theoretical criticism that has largely accepted this 
interpretation as a given. Sherman's images are routinely viewed as re­
presenting identity stereotypes that already exist, and are continually 
marked out as part of a vast post-modern intertext of connected media as 
a result of the perceived subject matter of her pictures. When they do not 
appear to reference particularly stable identity types, they instead reflect 
(for some critics) the very same fluidity of identity as a post-modern 
anxiety. Secondly, critical analysis of Cindy Sherman's images has 
generally followed the structuralist, gender-based theory that emanated 
from the pages of Screen media journal in the 1970s. Laura Mulvey rightly 
suggests that it is feminism’s investigation of the fluidity and 
interchangeability of gender stereotypes -  which analysis lends itself to 
Sherman’s work -  that partly led to the recognition of such a fluidity in
6 Shelley Rice, ‘ Inverted Odysseys’, in Shelley Rice ed. Inverted Odysseys: Claude Cahun, Maya 
Deren, and Cindy Sherman, (Massachusetts: M IT, 1999), pp. 3-26, pp. 7-8.
7 Douglas Crimp, ‘Pictures’, October 8, (Spring, 1979), pp. 75-88.
Damian Sutton -  The Crystal Image
179
identity by post-modern critics in general8. Focusing on the issue of 
spectatorship, 'Screen theory' seeks to identify the signifiers in texts that 
are proof of a subjective response to cinema. Study of Sherman seemed a 
logical step to take after her first popular exhibitions of (imaginary) film 
stills from 1975-1980. Feminist critics Mulvey and Williamson have been 
joined by art historian and cultural critic Rosalind Krauss in demonstrating 
how theories of gender representation, including the male gaze, 
masquerade, and abjection, are central to Sherman's artistic practice9. 
The result of this trend is that, as early as 1992, review essays of 
Sherman's work had as much to say about the various approaches that 
feminism makes to it as any particular image in particular. Articles such as 
Jan Avgikos', for Artforum, tend to adopt the indefinite pronoun ("many 
critics" is a good example) when faced with having to describe the myriad 
interpretations that feminism (or feminisms, as Avgikos reminds us) places 
on the work 10.
A large amount of this critical work on Sherman's photography 
concentrates on the 'Untitled Film Stills', and the earlier 'Untitleds' for their 
analysis. In the case of Mulvey, she was able to view the earlier work of 
the artist in the context of both her current output, and in the broader 
context of her own articles on cinema and psychoanalytical approaches to 
cinema and gender. Mulvey is best known for her inspirational 1975 article 
for Screen, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', which has since 
appeared in numerous anthologies 11. That article is still relevant today 
(despite the criticism heaped upon it in the twenty-five years since) in 
understanding a gendered-visual culture in general, and psychoanalytic 
approaches to it in particular. Sherman’s work can be put up as a 
testament to this. In other essays Mulvey makes use of Julia Kristeva's
8 Laura Mulvey, ‘Cosmetics and Abjection: Cindy Sherman 1977-87’, in Fetishism and Curiosity, 
(London, BFI, 1996), pp. 65-76, p. 69.
9 Williamson. Laura Mulvey, ‘ Phantasmagoria of the Female Body: The Work of Cindy 
Sherman’, in New Left Review, (Autumn/Winter, 1991), pp. 136-150.
Rosalind Krauss &  Norman Bryson, Cindy Sherman: 1975-1993, (New York, Rizzoli, 1993).
10 Jan Avgikos, 'Cindy Sherman: Burning Down the House1, in Artforum, (January 2000), pp. 74- 
79.
11 Laura Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ , in Screen, vol.16 no.3, 1975, pp. 6-18.
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essays on abjection, amongst other approaches in interpreting the work 12. 
Krauss, Mulvey, and Williamson's use of psychoanalysis and the 
construction and representation of gender relies on the two essential 
components: an acquired reception behaviour (which is sometimes 
informed by education); and a search for signifiers within the diegesis that 
reinforce this. The structural analysis logically connects these fragments of 
narrative with a projected context that has clues lying in the mise-en-scene 
of each image. In a feedback loop of critical engagement, these analyses 
search for signifiers within the image that lead to psychoanalytical 
readings of her work according to the generic narratives to which they then 
appear to refer:
In the Untitled Film Stills we are constantly forced to recognize a 
visual style (often you could name the director)13.
The viewer is subject to a series of double takes, estrangements 
and recognitions 14.
Slide 58
Significantly, the projected context for each image is not just an imaginary 
film or picture story but includes the intertext of each image and its subject 
matter. These are seen to display Sherman's apparent knowledge and 
exploitation of the subjective gaze, its theory, and its interpretations.
Sherman's arrival on the art scene certainly marks the beginning of 
the end of that era in which the female body had become, if not 
quite unrepresentable, only representable if refracted through 
theory15.
It is central to these critiques that Sherman is making a conscious 
reference to cultural representation based on dominant social experience. 
This only works during the suspension of disbelief which Sherman's work
12 Sherman herself has gone on to direct the film Office Killer, which cannot but have helped her 
mythic status, and has drawn psychoanalytic readings of its own. Sherman still remains one of the 
few photographers whose name is easily recognizable in the critical field of film studies.
13 Ibid Williamson, 1986, p. 92.
14 Mulvey, 1991, p. 141.
15 Ibid p. 137.
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inherits from cinema exhibition. This is then disabled by the recognition of 
the spectacle and artifice of the image; her self-conscious references to 
popular cultural forms have lead to an analysis of her work as 'saying 
something'. The context of Sherman's work is not only one of visual 
signifiers of cinema and its subject positioning, but the enforced subjective 
gaze itself. Sherman's use of cinematic conventions of the gaze is seen as 
a sharper weapon than open subversion of these conventions -  by parody 
or pastiche -  precisely because it is the viewer’s memory that gives her 
images meaning. Viewer effectively reveal to themselves the workings of 
visual culture because they are forced into the self-conscious awareness 
of their own part in accelerating the representation of women in visual 
culture. As Judith Williamson notes (of the film stills and early 'untitleds'): 
Because the viewer is forced into complicity with the way these 
'women' are constructed: you recognize the styles, the 'films', the 
'stars', and at that moment when you recognize the picture, your 
reading is the picture. In a way, 'it' is innocent: you are guilty, you 
supply the femininity simply through social and cultural 
knowledge.16
That identity should rest in representation seems an entirely post-modern 
notion, and one that is still supportable, according to Lucy Lippard:
[Sherman] began to explore female experience -  more important to 
her than female appearances for which she is better known...This 
search for the artificial rather than the “real” epitomized the 
postmodern aesthetic.17
That this is a post-modern phenomenon is quickly refuted, however, if we 
include Shelley Rice’s assertion (in the same volume) that Sherman’s 
version of the masquerade should be put into an historical perspective in 
terms of popular photography that parallels the artist’s place in art history. 
Sherman’s photographs echo the practice of cartes-de-visite, and the 
masquerade as heroic, pious, or otherwise ideal types that the middle 
classes performed in their own self-representation:
16 Williamson, 1986, p. 95.
17 Lucy Lippard, ‘Scattering Selves’, in Shelley Rice ed. Inverted Odysseys: Claude Cahun, Maya
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Clients confused in front of the camera were encouraged to identify 
with [actors on stage]...Before long, the fantasy aspect of these tiny 
photographs began to supersede their documentary exactitude. 
Clients insisted on renting formal clothing, on posing in elaborate 
furnished rooms, on aping the gestures of the rich and 
famous...Any fantasy scenario could be played out, for a price.18
Regardless of historical antecedents or exceptionally personal readings, 
and whether or not Sherman’s images really are ‘taken for’ pared down 
film narratives, it is clear that the images represent flash-frames of a 
totality of representation and self-representation of women. “There is a 
narrative here, an actual life, interrupted by the artifice of public 
presentation imposed by the camera", suggests Lippard, who looks back 
on Sherman’s work, and that particular moment of feminist criticism, with 
measured hindsight19. Sherman’s images, in many senses, are “Now 
Print!” orders for a particular generation of feminist critics 20.
Sherman’s work addresses a perception that flows from recollection, as 
her texts require the recollection of past experiences in culture. As 
carefully constructed stagings of fictional moments -  each image appears 
as if taken from a much larger visual narrative. In this case, the images 
represent a mise-en-abyme of a virtual narrative, or a perception-image 
that is based upon recollection. Crucially, this happens as a dual action of 
splitting. The recollection is internal to the duration of the photograph, as 
discussed in Chapter One, but the perception unfolds outward and delimits 
the visual boundaries of the texts. It is here that we see Sherman’s images 
as crystal-images of time. Instead of acting as closed sets of narrative, the 
images represent an outward projection of story, genre and context.
These 'Film Stills' and the later work broadly titled 'back projections' and ' 
centrefolds', have drawn strong attention for their apparent narrative ability 
or 'narrativity'. Their relation to narrative, and in particular to cinematic
Deren, and Cindy Sherman, (Massachusetts: M IT, 1999), pp. 27-42, p. 30.
18 Rice, 1999, p. 14.
19 Lippard, 1999.
20 Cf. Chapter one of this thesis.
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narrative, appears initially to make her images redundant as time-images. 
They appear to be arbitrarily dislocated from the sensory-motor schema of 
which they were once a part. However, such a dislocation also causes 
them to be reconsidered not as chronological images of time, but instead 
as purely optical situations. Furthermore this separation from ordered 
chronology reduces them to the zero-state of duration, and they must be 
recognized as free-indirect propositions, or dicisigns. The film still "scorns 
logical time" as Barthes suggests.21
This also invites a review of the concept of narrativity to which they can be 
so closely related. Narrativity, as we shall find, is a perception-image that 
flows from recollection. This is a recollection firstly of cinema in general 
(and hence the narrative organization in cinema), and then certain 
narratives in particular (through recognition of genre conventions, mise-en- 
scene etc.). Sherman's pictures exist not only as photographs, but each 
one is a nexus of perception-images formed around a basis of narrative 
experience, but within a self-conscious matrix of the photograph. However 
Sherman’s images are saturated with points of entry, and the singular 
image leads to multiple recollection-images. This entails a narrativity that 
is not a given, and a perception image that unfolds heterogeneously. The 
photographs project narrativity beyond the image into the past 
(recollection-image) and into the future (contraction-image), and do so in 
an asymmetric, heterogeneous action. Narrativity should be reconsidered 
as a quality of creative perception, and potentially an action of the crystal- 
image.
*  *  *
Deleuze and subjectivity again: returning to the free-indirect
discourse
We must return to the matter by looking at Deleuze’s work on the 
perception-image in Cinema 1 22. The objective and the subjective should 
not be conceived of as fixed categories of perception. To consider them as
21 IMT, p. 68.
22 M I, pp. 71-86.
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such would be to privilege the objective world of objects (which would 
deny perception itself) or to privilege subjective perception (which would 
deny objects their own existence). This is an intuitive view of perception, 
and one that Deleuze develops from Bergson’s own approach in Matter 
and Memory:
It would greatly astonish a man unaware of the speculations of 
philosophy if we told him that the object before him, which he sees 
and touches, exists only in his mind and for his mind or even, more 
generally, exists only for mind, as Berkeley held. Such a man would 
always maintain that the object exists independently of the 
consciousness that perceives it...For common sense then, the 
object exists in itself, and, on the other hand, the object is, in itself, 
pictorial, as we perceive it: image it is, but a self-existing image.23
Instead of envisaging objectivity and subjectivity as two differing 
perceptions, we should therefore consider them as nominal values in a 
continuum of perception itself, as we have previously found. One is neither 
totally subjective, nor totally objective. Whilst this seems intuitively correct, 
common sense even, spectatorship theory still largely clings to subjectivity 
as a separate value. Where this view sees a difference in kind, we should 
only see a difference in degree. However, this approach to the subject is 
not without foundation, for cinema of the movement-image, in hiding its 
manufacture and apparatus, creates a subjective position that does not 
waver. If spectatorship theory presents a rationalised discourse of cinema 
as subject and object, it is only because cinema itself creates such an 
organisation in reality.
Perception is not adequately described through concepts of objectivity and 
subjectivity, and Deleuze initially describes the perception that exists 
between these values as semi-subjective. However there are two 
problems with this term: firstly the term itself could seem to privilege 
subjective perception; and secondly (as Deleuze notes) the term is still 
inaccurate to describe the action of perception itself. Subjective positioning 
in cinema is seen by Deleuze as a direct discourse, in that it forces a
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particular perception. The objective is an indirect discourse, since there is 
no guarantee of a particular perception of the object itself. The action of 
perception that therefore exists between them is the free-indirect 
discourse, a combination of the objective, the subjective, and a perception 
or qualification of the subjective. This is analogous to the camera- 
consciousness, a formal presentation of cinema as cinema -  or indeed the 
photograph as photography. Thus the free-indirect proposition is one of a 
circuit: the subjective is a virtual image of the object, but the 
acknowledgement of this actualizes the image, which becomes the actual 
image of perception. The object is virtualized, since it is now superceded 
by a particular point-of-view of it, but the acknowledgement of this 
actualizes it once again -  hence point-of-view gives way to point-of-view 
ad infinitum. It is something that Deleuze develops in The Crystals of 
Time’:
There is a formation of an image with two sides, actual and virtual.
It is if an image in a mirror, a photo or a postcard came to life, 
assumed independence and passed into the actual, even if this 
meant that the actual image returned into the mirror and resumed 
its place in the postcard or photo, following a double movement of 
liberation and capture". 24
It is the third-order perception, the perception of perception, which creates 
the circuit and leads to the crystal. Rather than oscillate between objective 
and subjective, the action of this third perception creates an unequal 
exchange, since it is the recognition of perception as subjective. 
Experience is a combination of the subjective (the internal experience of 
duration) and the objective (the external experience of space) as Deleuze 
saw it in 1966 25. Perception is therefore a discourse between these as a 
self-consciousness. In order for the photographic or cinematographic 
image to be an image of duration itself, it must first reflect this. This 
discourse is the zero-state of perception from which the crystal-image 
unfolds.
23 M M , p. 10.
24 TI, p. 68.
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How can we relate this complex idea to the photograph in general, and 
Cindy Sherman in particular? The relationship of duration and space in 
the photograph is one of tensioned co-existence. Whenever a picture's 
formal characteristics of chemistry and physics - its value as indexic record 
- appear dominant, they are never divorced from the picture’s nature as an 
image of duration. To this end, the intervening characteristic of these 
photographs is their constant state of translation between movement- 
image and time-image. Now let us look to see how they correspond with 
Deleuze's own early description of the three-fold regime of the image, 
which he puts forward in his first chapter of Cinema 1, and which is quickly 
simplified below:
Sets, or closed systems of objects (immobile sections of movement in 
space)
Translation of movement to duration, (free-indirect discourse)
Duration as whole (time-images - images beyond movement).26
Photographs are thus immobile sections of movement that change 
qualitatively into duration through a process of translation. This process of 
translation transforms the closed set of objects, which is the picture-as- 
object and the pictorial space, into the image of duration. The constant 
present of the
photograph mirrors in actuality the virtual image of duration. The 
photograph is placed into a context of mental-images, change-images, 
and duration-images which is implied by this translation. The photograph 
always appears as if taken out of context, for the context only exists as a 
virtual image.
Context, in Sherman's work, is the implied narratives of films, magazine 
stories and other fictions. The closed set of objects is the narrative made 
explicit in the mise-en-scene and framing of each individual shot as 
immobile section. The whole is the implied contextual narrative of the 
fiction, and the alternation between them is the translation. This translation 
is what we shall call narrativity, and as we will see, narrativity is a potential
25 B, pp. 38-39.
26 M I, p. 11.
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action of the crystal. Therefore it is important that we understand 
narrativity as an analytical application.
*  *  *
Narrativity in literature, cinema, and photography.
Narrativity as a concept has a basis in literary criticism. Phillip Sturgess' 
account of narrativity, in both critical theory and in written practice, 
provides us with our immediate understanding.27 He highlights the unusual 
modernist text (James Joyce's Ulysses is the principle text under analysis) 
as provoking special interest. Texts like this, which emphasise a 
foregrounded narration to which traditional narrative movement is 
subordinate, are chosen as possible vehicles for a pronounced narrativity 
to be understood. By contrast, the traditional novel is seen as having a 
narrative that involves heavily regimented codes and little more than 
disguised conventions of narration that have, over time, become 
naturalized.
Sturgess’s approach to narrativity is to start by looking at these orthodox 
or traditional texts, which involve narratives of cause and effect in logical 
progression. In this respect, any particular part of discrete element of a 
narrative contains within it elements that identify the narrative to which it 
belongs. By this principle, any fragment of narrative will imply a narrative 
direction and resolution. This engages recollection by offering images of 
narrative in general, and certain narratives in particular. Narrativity in this 
sense is a perception-image based on chronological progression of a 
story. A text's narrativity is partly defined as the appropriateness of its 
length, and the relationship that any one part of the narrative has with this. 
Narrativity, in the established grammar of literature, is little more than an 
expression of relationship between texts, or between parts of the same 
text.
27 Phillip Sturgess, Narrativity: Theory and Practice, (London, Clarendon, 1992).
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Sturgess’ account can be simplified into an understand based on three 
principle elements. Narrative is the set of events implied by storytelling 
through the use of an established yet often arbitrary grammar. Narration is 
the exploitation of a naturalized grammar of story-telling which structures 
the patterns of narrative. A place of departure: Narration is not a collection 
of discrete units by which some possess more narrative ability than others, 
instead it is an immanent quality of any story structure 28.
Finally, Narrativity is the immanence of story. It is present in narrative as 
connections, or strands, between sets of objects and events, giving them 
the coherence to become a story. Sturgess conceives narrativity as a 
possession of any part of the text. Any division or unit of the text 
possesses this quality. As we have found from Deleuze’s study of 
difference in Bergson, the division of something that is by nature indivisible 
can only be arbitrary or abstract. Therefore, for narrativity to exist in any 
part of the text, it must be indivisible over the whole text. Narrativity is only 
expressed in movements and intensities of story: the operation of narrative 
as the telling of the story. Narrativity is an operation in time that is 
indivisible. Narrativity exists in duration.
Sturgess sees narrativity as a perceived possession of the text, but this 
factor itself makes it a perception-image. Whilst perception sees narrativity 
as an object, the action makes it part of that object:
We perceive things where they are, perception puts us at once into 
matter, is impersonal, and coincides with the perceived object.29
Therefore narrativity is a perception-image that is indivisible to the text, or 
any part of the text, but which is perceived as so in a false image of 
perception.
This quality is one of implication, of a story-ness, and that of a story that 
appears definite but is actually indefinite. It is a quality of contingency that 
implies a limited structure of movement and time, as in a traditional story, 
and hides a perception that is not given and therefore only exists within
28 Ibid p. 13.
29 B,p. 25.
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duration. Fragments of text, according to Sturgess are dislocated from 
chronology and have a quality which is a-chronic, that does not operate 
within chronology, but which is instead beyond it. Struck from the 
homogeneous chronology of narrative, and independent of it, these imply 
heterogeneity in narrative direction. Whatever discrete order or connection 
is implied by Flashbulb Memory or the “Now Print!” order to contain 
narrative, narrativity always exists as lines of flight that burst outward. Yet 
narrativity is not a liberation of the narrative from chronology, but instead 
chronology is a limitation of the quality of narrativity -  a quality that exists, 
as a perception-image, in duration.
Narrativity is ultimately a translation of text, a constant alternation from a 
distinctness of narrative and transparency of narration toward a 
foregrounded narration for which narrative acts as simply an armature; and 
from a reflexive narration toward a self-elaborated narrative. Narrativity is 
the movement or exchange between the two. Neither regular nor irregular 
in either direction, this translation from one position to another occurs with 
simultaneity. This is a translation that occurs in Cindy Sherman’s early 
work, and in particular her Untitled Film Stills. The Untitled Film Stills 
mimic the actual films stills that populate a cinema culture (in this case, 
mostly classical Flollywood and a few avant-garde films) that is already 
part of a huge intertext of imagery. They are not only photographs, and 
thus provoke recollection-images, but they are also explicit in their 
reference to film genres. Recollection in this case constitutes a leap into a 
past provoked on purpose, and for the purpose of recollection. The 
Untitled Film Stills offer an image of real narrative. Flowever, because 
these are not stills from existing films, they offer a fiction of a fiction, and 
instead draw attention to themselves as photographs-that-look-like-film- 
stills. They capture a popular imagination with ‘the odd allure of movies 
never made’ 30. Once recognized as fictions-of-fictions, the photographs 
are scrutinized for their attention to detail; the photography they use to 
refer to cinema becomes the focus of attention. The Untitled Film Stills are 
a translation from a dominant narrative that immediately appears, to a
30 P. Plagens, ‘The Odd Allure of Movies Never Made’, in Newsweek, (vol. 129, no. 26, 1994), 
pp, 74-76, p. 74.
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narration that takes over. Furthermore, once this has been recognized, the 
narrative becomes more important than ever before, for it is now laden 
with double meaning. Which is the true meaning in Sherman’s image? Is it 
the ‘original’ meaning of the image as part of a ‘real’ narrative, or is it the 
meaning exposed by the explicit narration? Ultimately we should 
reconsider meaning in the films that she represents. This is developed by 
Ted Mooney, who ‘invents’ a Beckett-like question and answer session 
that plays upon the misrecognition of the photographs as a ‘real’ film still:
Q What do you think is going on?
A Going on?
Q In the image.
A Well, I mean it’s pretty obviously posed. What’s going on is that a 
photo is being taken.
Q Any other possibilities?
A I guess it could be from the movies -  a still. The woman looks a 
little like Monica Vitti in an Antonioni film. L’Avventura comes to 
mind.
Q Good. Let’s stay with that. {Turns on recording device.} So if it 
were a film still, what would be happening in the film?
A The woman is a Rumanian named Krysha...Krysha 
something...31
As we have seen, this ‘imagination’ of the film narrative is the most 
dominant trope in critiques of her work, which draw attention to both the 
‘imagined’ narratives to which she refers, and her use of photography as 
the tool for this representation. It is suggested in these that the lack of 
stasis between narrative and narration is the key to their meaning.
Perhaps the ‘meaning’ of her work is just this:
31 Ted Mooney, ‘Cindy Sherman: An Invention for Two Voices’, in Rice, 1999, pp. 151-158, p. 
152.
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...by refusing to signify and to make sense in her pictures, Sherman 
succeeds in turning our attention to the fragmentary condition of 
photography.32
It is the characteristic of narrativity as a quality which means that a story 
falls either into the category of autonomy of narration or autonomy of 
narrative; or into the category of a free alternation between the two. In 
referring to an ‘imagined’ filmic text, Sherman’s images imply not only a 
connection to a definite narrative, but in their ‘refusal to signify’ they imply 
an indefinite and heterogeneous whole that is beyond narrative ellipsis.
Narrative and narration, as Sturgess' points out, are done so from a 
committed point of view. A fragment of narration is able to demonstrate its 
overall intentionality, as a mise-en-abyme, and such a fragment would 
demonstrate this implied ellipsis to the subjective spectator. The narrative 
world constitutes a fictional universe of parts and objects that act as a 
whole. Each set of objects and events is contained within an indivisible 
continuity of an open whole, characterized by duration and which is not 
given or limited 33. For Sturgess, any ‘slice’ 34 of narrative contains the 
qualitative narrativity to connect it to any other part of its own story. 
Furthermore, in all film the general rules and conventions of logic and 
causality mean that actors, mise-en-scene, music and dialogue all show 
continuity, and therefore imply contiguity, with each other and across the 
filmic diegesis. By displaying photographs as if they were film stills, 
Sherman re-enacts the relationship that the immobile section of the closed 
set has with the abstract time of cinema of the movement-image. 
Consequently, in demonstrating the still's connection with the abstract time 
of cinema, she also demonstrates the relationship that the photograph as 
mobile section has with concrete duration. The Untitled Film Stills’ direct
32 Antonella Russo, ‘Picture This’, Art Monthly, no. 181, (November 1994), pp. 8-11, p. 9.
33 M I, p. 10.
34 The term ‘slice’ is used here to imply the popular use of the term, in relation to a pie, as in the 
culinary use, or pie-chart in the statistical. The slice in a pie-chart represents a division of a circle 
(ie. that which is by nature indivisible) which, in being decomposed from it, always refers to its 
part of the whole. The shape of the slice implies both the whole (its curved edge) and its artificial 
division from the whole (the straight edges).
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connection with the narrative of the imagined film mirrors the connection 
that photographs in general have with duration.
Sturgess' analysis can be seen above to provide ample enough weight for 
us to make assumptions about narrativity and cinema. Sturgess also 
makes a more direct approach toward cinema and narrativity by using for 
his analysis the work of Robert Scholes.35 Scholes adapted his structural 
understanding of narrativity to show how he considered it as a quality of 
narrative which was crucial to signification, especially in traditional 
reception practices. Scholes offers a structuralist interpretation of 
narrativity in mainstream fictional cinema. Whilst not attempting an 
exhaustive study of individual films, Scholes uses his own interpretation of 
various cinematic scenes to demonstrate his thesis that narrativity is a 
quality possessed as much by viewer-as-subject as by the text.
For Scholes, narrativity is a property of the reader, but is promoted by the 
grammar of cinematic fiction. In cinema of the movement-image narrativity 
is the quality of viewing that places individual scenes, as immobile 
sections, within an imagined context. In this way narrativity also provides 
the context of unseen landscapes, and events, for scenes dislocated from 
such representations. Narrativity relies upon an intertext of memory- 
images from cinema, other media as well as the viewer's own experience. 
Furthermore, narrativity exists as part of the institutionalized grammar of 
cinematic signification. Narrativity is crucial, in Scholes' analysis, for logic 
and causality to have optimum effect, for narrativity is the process of 
acquiring the reading skills that are in turn required for narrative 
comprehension. The remembered reading experience is central to the 
future understanding of narrative. Narrativity is a useful description of the 
way in which narration is made transparent by narrative grammar, and it 
follows that disruptions to narrative grammar in radical or alternative 
filmmaking, such as in the foregrounding of narrational devices and 
strategies, would disrupt the processes of such a narrativity. The task now 
is to take Scholes’ narrativity and use it to develop an understanding of
35 Robert Scholes, 'Narration and Narrativity in Film1, in Semiotics and Interpretation, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
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conventional readings of Cindy Sherman's work, including its perceived 
psychoanalytical significance. These readings, and the importance of this 
idea of narrativity, are discussed in the last part of this chapter.
The account of narrativity as provided by Robert Scholes has the principle 
drawback of relying upon the subject, and in particular subjectivity, as a 
central part of meaning in cinema. This is problematic in a Deleuzean 
approach to cinema. Deleuze's understanding of subjectivity and 
objectivity is that they rely upon a homogenised and rationalised discourse 
of narration. Structuralism, as a branch of linguistics, relies on a system of 
codes and values which are in equilibrium, and whose signification is set 
by a homogeneous 'average'. Perception, in these terms, is centred on a 
unified and subjective spectator position. This does not take into account, 
however, the fact that any one subjective analysis of a character is 
automatically compromised by a simultaneous viewpoint from an objective 
position - that of viewing the character from outside the action in the first 
place. In order to deal with this dichotomy, Deleuze replaces this with a 
concept of heterogeneous perception that is based on a discourse 
between subjectivity and objectivity. Instead of having any fixed value, 
perception is a reversible alternation, or circuit, between these values, 
which in turn can now only be seen as classifications defined by criticism. 
Cinema of the movement-image organizes perception into the subjective, 
but this heterogeneity has the capacity to flourish under the right 
circumstances:
...if the cinematographic perception-image constantly passes from 
the subjective to the objective, and vice versa, should we not 
ascribe to it a specific, diffuse, supple status, which may remain 
imperceptible, but which sometimes reveals itself in certain striking 
cases?36
This question, to which the answer is Pasolini's concept of Mimesis, 
provides us with a crucial conclusion: Mimesis describes the quality of 
narrativity in cinema 37. Rather than a homogeneous system of signifieds,
36 M I, p. 72.
37 Ibid p. 73.
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perception is instead a heterogeneous array of dialects which negate any 
one subject position.
It is important not to dismiss Scholes’ structuralism simply because it relies 
on a unified subjectivity. Scholes’ is not producing a conclusive argument 
because that is not his aim. He is proposing a cinematic narrativity only, 
and duly acknowledges that he asks more questions than he can answer. 
There is a further dimension to Scholes' promotion of narrativity which, 
when used to understand certain crucial elements of narration and 
photography, becomes useful when looking at Cindy Sherman’s images. It 
is possible to look at her photographs through the concept of narrativity 
that Scholes’ proposes. Sherman’s work attracts critical analyses that 
search for signifiers in her images, and so Scholes’ structuralism provides 
a useful way of taking us through it.
Narrativity, which fulfils narrative expectations, does so by connecting the 
immobile sections of a discrete unit of narrative with the larger set of which 
it is a part. Narrativity is as much as the strand that connects the set with 
its larger set, and on to the indivisible whole. This correlation is apparent 
because both concepts deal with the movement-image. In using Scholes 
to analyse Sherman's work, the notion of narrativity not only highlights her 
images' connection with their imagined whole, but also expresses the 
nature of photography's relationship with time. Whilst the photograph 
might immediately offer itself as a slice of time, no more expressive than 
the shot in cinema, it actually demonstrates an aspect of duration that is 
independent of chronology. Its constant state of present not only attests to 
the past of objects, but to the future of them. Whilst this is obvious in 
Sherman's film stills, which imply temporal ellipsis and abstract time; it is 
no less apparent in her other works, which imply the open whole of 
indivisible time, and the nature of the photograph as a pure time-image (as 
is demonstrated directly with her other work). This assertion is one of the 
central points of this thesis and is supported by Scholes' structural 
analysis.
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From our understanding of Sturgess' conclusions on narrativity, we can 
simplify narrative and narrativity into a manageable concept of the content 
and the discursive apparatus of narration. Narrative is the story, for which 
narrativity is the immanence of the story telling. Whilst narrative is the 
fictional world and events depicted within it, narrativity is the quality of 
narration which determines the way in which the story is told and 
perceived. This simple understanding belies a very real complexity to 
narrativity which is extremely relevant to our new task of taking narrativity 
to Deleuze and the time-image, both in cinema and in the photograph.
One of the striking elements of Deleuze’s time-image cinema is that of the 
foregrounded construction that appears in so many of the films he 
analyses: from this is created the camera-consciousness. In these cases, 
the narrative is subordinated to the narration, the editing, its relation to 
sound, the creation of narrative through montage, these are all placed 
higher in significance. Instead of a narrative that flows from invisible 
montage, as in the movement-image, narrative itself does not have a solid 
foundation. Homogeneity is replaced by heterogeneity. A similar view can 
be taken to the photograph. But in our new context, it is clear that with the 
foregrounding of the photographic process, any perceptible narrative 
becomes subordinate to narration, and the reflexivity between objective 
and subjective becomes a seed for the time-image.
Just as we found when we took the concept of narrativity from literature to 
cinema, so the same process can be taken from cinema to the 
photograph. A photograph that expresses a dominance of narration over 
narrative, in which the construction of image is more significant than 
subject matter, lends itself to the study of narrativity. However, what gives 
the operation of the photograph a very different character from cinema, is 
that it can only offer what initially appears to be a discrete element of the 
past. Deleuze’s initial dismissal of the photograph as capable of depicting 
duration was in the light of Bergson’s own perception of photography as 
central to the imaging of memory through abstract and discrete elements. 
We can see this operation working in the same way with narrative, and 
therefore an understanding of narrative should prove useful. Narrative can
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be seen as the organization of recollection-images into a perception- 
image. (Once again we return to Deleuze’s original work on Bergson). 
Narrative constitutes a jump or leap into the past. This jump is made first 
into the past in general, and then into a region of the past which 
corresponds to our actual needs. This past is perceived as externally 
different from the here and now, the present, whereas in fact it is a 
perception-image that is co-existent with the present. This co-existence is 
seen in Bergson’s ‘cone’ from Matter and Memory35. This is the cone that 
we saw reversed as the ‘becoming-mad of depth’. The becoming-mad of 
depth is, of course, an example of the creation of narrative from “Now 
Print!” orders.
However, it is not the co-existence of memory with perception that 
interests us, but what Deleuze describes as its ‘psychologization’ or 
actualization. The past is actualized in a process of contraction, firstly of 
the past in general, and then regions of the past. We will retain only those 
recollection-images that are most useful to, or interest us (the Flashbulb 
Memory, or “Now Print!” order), and so this actualization is stripped of 
irrelevances. Furthermore, the perception-image of duration is one of 
chronology, because the passing of time is remembered as recollection of 
objects moving in space; and it is one of homogeneity, because those 
movements are self-contained according to our own interest. Thus is 
created an intuitive understanding of narrative, a sequence of events 
recounted in logical progression of cause and effect. The past, and the 
narrative, remain virtual in a more or less contracted state, and co-exist 
with the present. Narrative recounts the past as if it were a different time 
from the present -  an overtime; whereas in fact this is just a virtual image 
that occurs (co-exists) with the actual present. Since narrative is an 
organization of recollection into perception, we can see that narrative is an 
image of psychological consciousness because it is an aspect of this 
actualization:
This actualization has all kinds of distinct aspects, stages, and
degrees. But through these stages and degrees it is the
38 See chapter one of this thesis; Slide 7.
Damian Sutton -  The Crystal Image
197
actualization (and it alone) that constitutes psychological 
consciousness.39
Narrative thus presents a psychological actualization of recollection: the 
formerly exists as an image of the now, or the here. It should follow, 
therefore, that such a co-existence partly resolves DeDuve’s paradox of 
the photograph, which used just these terms. The referentiality of the 
photograph is its representation of the formerly, and this collides with the 
photograph’s existence in the present as a pictorial or superficial image of 
the here 40.
Narrative should now be seen as an aspect of the psychologization of the 
past, from recollection to perception. The actualization itself, the process 
of contraction, is narration. We see here the dissymmetric split that is the 
dual action of perception -  recollection (leap into the past) and contraction 
(projection forward into the future). This contraction is seen in the virtual 
image of the past that co-exists with the present. Furthermore, narrative is 
a discourse from one person to another, narration by a first person 
provokes an actualization of recollection-images into perception-images by 
a second. This is an action that enforces a subjectivity upon the latter. The 
latter places himself or herself at once into a region of the past, and again 
into a certain area in particular. They recall only those recollection images 
that they find most useful to fit the narrative they are told. This is the 
function of narrativity, a perception-image that flows from recollection, but 
through another perception.
So we can understand narrativity, according to Deleuze’s free-indirect 
discourse as follows:
The subjective is a perception-image in direct discourse with the 
narrative told, which is perceived as objective. However, the 
narrative attempts, but cannot guarantee, a direct discourse, and as 
such the objective is indirect. The discourse between them has
39 B, p. 63.
40 DeDuve, 1978, pp. 113-117. See also IM T, p.44.
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foundation in neither objectivity nor subjectivity, but a free-indirect 
discourse of the two.
In traditional narrative, and here we can see it as analogous to the 
movement-image, the objective discourse appears to be direct. The 
narration, such as language or any other storytelling apparatus, is 
subordinate (or imperceptible) to the narrative. Thus the free-indirect 
discourse is an unfulfilled proposition. However, this changes when the 
perception of the objective as indirect is acknowledged, and when the 
narration draws attention to itself as narration. This is a self-consciousness 
that leads to a perception-image seen through another perception: the 
free-indirect discourse. Sturgess’ approach to literature saw such a self- 
consciousness as an aspect of a story's discursive representation 41. This 
he terms narrativity. He saw Joyce as forcing a conscious 
acknowledgement of the language that he used, which subsequently 
forced a questioning approach to his intentions and the meaning of his 
prose. Narrativity is a quality of self-consciousness that we can take, in 
theory, to the photograph:
The subjective is a perception-image in direct discourse with the 
photograph, which it perceives as an objective representation of events. 
However, the photograph’s objectivity cannot be guaranteed, and its 
discourse is therefore indirect. The photographs indirect discourse is either 
hidden, which leads to a free-indirect proposition, or is exposed, which 
leads to a free-indirect discourse.
When the photograph is perceived as objective, it is a perception of 
objectivity that flows from the subjective. However, when the superficial is 
recognized within the photograph, it is a subjectivity perceived through a 
subjectivity - perception within the frame of another perception. Here 
Deleuze’s antagonism toward subjectivity is clear. Subjectivity is not a 
given, but is instead simply a point of classification of perception. 
Subjectivity, however, is an aspect of actualization in which recollection 
becomes perception. In so doing, it does not hide objectivity, but instead 
hides the discourse within which they both exist. Subjective positioning
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hides the free-indirect proposition that exists in cinema, as Deleuze 
argues. We might also say that it hides the same discourse that exists in 
the photograph also.
The impetus of narrativity comes from the manner of telling, and it is the 
rhetorical power of narrativity to advance a story through a discourse 
around telling. The narrative is advanced by the way in which it is narrated. 
In cinema, narration is through the editing and montage which Deleuze, 
early on in Cinema 1, proposes is the discursive matrix of the movement- 
image.42 However editing is also a manner of discourse that is often 
distinct from the narrative being portrayed. Cinematic editing often bears 
no obvious connection to events depicted. Editing advances the story 
through a qualitative power quite apart from logical storytelling. Absence of 
logic in editing manipulates the narration by using the editing value as an 
asyndeton. It has meaning precisely because the meaning is not 
immediately apparent. Editing effects as simple as those of Kuleshov and 
Eisenstein rely far more on a rhetorical narrativity brought about through 
the splice, or coup, than the individual frame or shot. Eisenstein developed 
movement from two static shots simply through the cut between them. The 
edit, as narration, produced an impression of movement through the 
composition of immobile units. In Battleship Potemkin, Eisenstein develops 
an impression of movement of a gunshot through the use of two static 
shots in succession. The portrait of an old woman is immediately replaced 
by the woman’s face having been shot. The impression of movement is 
given through the organic connection implied from one image to the next. 
Eisenstein called this instantaneous action ‘without transition’; that is to 
say, without fade-in or fade-out, a direct cut that is imperceptible. The 
impression of movement is perceived through logical progression 43. This 
constitutes the staple of organic composition in Deleuze’s movement- 
image 44 Eisenstein further composed a montage based on illogical 
movement in a montage of opposition. The statues of lions appear to rise
41 Sturgess, 1992, p. 11.
42 M I, Chapters 1-4.
43 Sergei Eisenstein, ‘A Dialectical Approach to Film Form’, trans. by Jay Leyda (1949), in Film 
Theory and Criticism, ed. Gerald Mast, Marshall Cohen, Leo Braudy, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 4th edn. (1974), pp. 138-154, p.145.
44 M I, pp. 32-40.
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up against the Odessa massacre. Movement is created in the quick 
succession of the rising lion, three statues creating one rising animated 
statue, whose implied movement opposes the march of the soldiers down 
the Odessa steps. Once again narrative is implied through the impression 
of movement, but the flow is illogical and creates a visible opposition as 
the two movements counteract each other. The affect of this comes from 
its visible difference from logical montage.
It is what Eisenstein saw as montage based on emotion that more 
completely provides us with an understanding of the asyndeton.
Kerensky’s contest with Kornilov in October is followed in a montage of 
attractions, a montage of ‘jumps’, or what Deleuze calls ‘qualitative leaps’ 
between attractions. In this case the sequence depicting the two is 
alternated with ‘plastic representations’: statues of Bonaparte. This creates 
a direct political message that is enforced by its lack of movement45.
Slide 59
The emotional composition is a rhetorical edit whose quality of narrativity 
is exposed in its break from the logical. Rather than convey narrative 
through implied movement, as in the logical edit, it conveys narrative 
through opposition. Thus Eisensteinian montage, one of the foundations 
for the movement-image, goes from free-indirect proposition to a direct 
discourse, in the break from montage based on logic to a montage based 
on rhetoric. This offers a return to the individual shot, which is at the 
beginning of Deleuze’s reading of Eisenstein. The shot, or film still, when 
separated from montage, neither offers logic nor opposes it, but in 
proposing the possibility of both draws attention to itself. Eisenstein’s 
direct political message, whilst eloquent, is a reduction of the power that 
the free-indirect proposition contained. Sherman’s Untitled Film Stills, on 
the other hand, offer neither logic or a break from logic, but in referring to 
cinema as a language which expectations of narrativity, offer this 
proposition as a subject in itself.




At times, in film, narrative appears propelled by its own causal 
conventions. As Sturgess suggests, these are often little more than the 
learned or acquired understanding of a widely accepted protocol of story­
telling, an organization of perception. In this case what is remarkable in 
cinema or any other story-telling is the narrative itself. The events in the 
narrative are distinct, and appear independent from any extraneous 
characteristics of narration, which remain transparent. Narrative remains 
limpid and actual, in that it performs its function without calling its own 
devices into question. In this sense limpid infers clarity, rather than 
transparency . The narration itself is what remains opaque and virtual, and 
thus indistinct. In mainstream cinema, for which verisimilitude is crucial to 
narrative comprehension, narration remains limpid so that nothing 
prevents the distinct opacity of the narrative itself. The story appears to 
propel itself logically and seamlessly.
The obverse occurs in cinema that runs counter to institutionalized 
storytelling. In alternative, or counter-cinemas, it is narration that becomes 
more distinct, and the narrative more subordinate. Narrative merely 
becomes an incidence in story-telling. As such narration is limpid in 
comparison to the opacity of narrative, and becomes dominant. The story 
is not so important as how it is told. The narrative is propelled by the force 
of a distinct narration.
However, once again it should not be assumed that these are separate 
states of affairs. Neither situation exists independently, and it is the quality 
of narrativity that ensures narrative comprehension. Narrativity can be 
expressed by the narrative as the set of codes which govern logical 
progression, and by narration as those codes which govern the incidence 
of telling. Narrativity is a quality of anticipation of the narrative to follow a 
pattern, or through narration to deviate from it. To comprehend the 
subversion of logical narrative one must understand the rules to which it
45 Ibid p. 36.
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normally adheres. Part of the organic development of the institutionalized 
narration that makes up cinema of the movement-image has been the 
exploitation of logic that began with Eisenstein. Logic is reinforced early on 
by apparent and well signposted opposition to it. Jump-cuts, unannounced 
flashbacks, digression from the story and picaresque illogicality are now 
mainstays as much of mainstream cinema as of the counter-cinemas 
which spawned them as techniques. Also, independent filmmakers rely 
heavily on general protocols of narration in order to go through the 
process of destabilizing them. As Deleuze notes toward the end of his first 
thesis on cinema, the cinema of the French New Wave involves characters 
whose identities and destinies exist in the any-space-whatever of a pure 
time-image only by opposing the characterization in the movement-image
46
We can add this analysis to that proposed by structuralist criticism, 
particularly that of Peter Wollen, which first saw such a radical filmmaking 
as one of conscious opposition 47. Deleuze's proposition goes beyond the 
simplistic one of the structuralists, in acknowledging the indistinctness of 
the any-space-whatever in such cinemas. Conscious opposition unfolds to 
become self-conscious discourse. What must be noted here is that it is the 
indistinctness of these situations that gives narrativity its rhetorical power. 
This power is gained from these situations never being stable, but rather 
always being in a state of flux. Narrativity unrolls from the indistinctness 
between narration and narrative. The flow from virtual narration to actual 
narrative is followed by a virtualization of that narrative by an actualized 
narration, and which continues in a circuit until the two are indiscernible 
from the exchange itself. As the exchange reaches this point of 
indiscernibility between the narration and narrative, it unravels from a 
singularity to create multiple directions of actualization and virtualization. 
This is a coalescence of narrative and narration that leads to a narrativity 
which is multiple in that it is a fragmentation, and yet all possibilities 
emanate from the single exchange. Narrativity is therefore a quality which 
has the structure of a crystal, in that multiplicity of image (refraction,
46 M I, p. 205.
47 Wollen, 1982. See also Peter Wollen, Signs and Meanings in the Cinema, (London, Seeker and
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reflection) emanates from one image. We can see now how narrativity is a 
structuring principle of the crystal-image.
The crystal-image is, then, the point of indiscernibility of the two 
distinct images, the actual and the virtual, while what we see in the 
crystal is time itself, a bit of time in the pure state, the very 
distinction between the two images which keeps on reconstituting 
itself. 48
Deleuze described the indistinct moment, or the point of indiscernibility as 
the mutual image between an objective actual image of distinctness and a 
subjective virtual image of indiscernibility. In this case it is not an exchange 
between subjective and objective, but between a point of discernibility and 
a point of indiscernibility. Narrativity is a quality of perception which exists 
within this internal circuit. We perceive the crystal as having particular 
states, or in effect, we see the circuit as resting at one particular point. 
However this is not a false image, and does not imply a division of the 
circuit, but instead implies the reflection and refraction of a crystalline 
structure which emanates from a particular origin, as Deleuze follows:
So there will be different states of the crystal, depending on the acts 
of its formation and the figures of what we see in it. We analysed 
earlier the elements of the crystal, but not the crystalline states, 
each of these states we can now call the crystal of time. 49
Narrativity is the action of the crystal-image as an internal circuit of actual 
and virtual, of narrative and narration, and from this circuit the photograph 
or film still constitutes a crystal-image that is a seed for an environment of 
the possible. Deleuze notes that the seed image comes from the reflexive 
text, from the film-within-a-film. The presentation of a film’s production 
within a film creates the reflexivity of the free-indirect discourse by its self- 
consciousness. This state of the seed is distinct from a mirror-image of 
cinema, in which a completed film within a film is a mirror of the overall.
The seed image is a film which is in the process of production, and 
Deleuze points to the films being made within Frederico Fellini’s 8 1/2 and
Warburg/BFI, 1972).
48 TI, p. 82
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Jean-Luc Godard’s Passion. In these cases, the mise-en-abyme does not 
create reflections of the overall narratives, but instead constitutes an 
environment of refractions of it. This film-within-a-film constitutes a 
translation from the real (a seed image) to the possible (an environment of 
perception-images) that we can trace back to Deleuze’s original work on 
Bergson. In Bergsonism, Deleuze notes that Being is misrecognized as a 
passage from the possible to the real, a ‘closing-down’ of possibilities. 
Instead, possibility flows from the real, for the possible must contain it. In 
this case, the actual gives rise to virtualization (perception) because 
recollection is memory of what has already passed 50. Photographs are 
popularly conceived as a translation of the possible to the real: they 
unnaturally divide movement into discrete units. However, in fact, they 
create environments of the possible because they annihilate chronology in 
favour of a non-chronological time that is indirect.
Cindy Sherman’s Untitled Film Stills also flow from the real to the possible, 
and exhibit the translation or growth from seed to environment. They 
expose their own production as well as the production of film in general. 
Film stills in general reflect their production only as a transparent 
apparatus -  they are derived from real movement-images, and express 
possibilities of the narrative only according to recollection-images of other, 
finite, narratives. A general film still constitutes a leap into ontology based 
on the recollection of film: we place ourselves at once into film, and then 
into regions of film genre, narrative resolution and so on, and perception- 
images of filmic narrative flow from this recollection. As photogrammes 
they have the potential of the free-indirect discourse, but not its fulfillment.
This can be further explained as a relationship of text and context. Mulvey 
and Williamson, and later Krauss, recognize the benefit of foreknowledge 
in analysing Sherman's work. As an example the terms 'grainy', 'Renoir- 
esque', 'New Wave', 'Neo-Realism', 'Hitchcock', 'Art movie', all appear in 
these articles as descriptions of the style of the images, and also the style
49 ibid.
50 B, pp. 17-18.
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of the films referenced, hinting at a perceived narrative of which the image 
is a fragment:
Something is worrying, not to say frightening, the women in photos 
like Untitled #80 - at least 90 minutes' worth of something 51.
These interpretations rely upon the action of memory in organising 
duration into discrete recollection-images as a becoming-mad of depth. It 
is the recognition of conventions of representation which prompts their 
analysis, and what they recognize as the common analysis by a spectator. 
Not only do they comment on the images as reminiscent of particular film 
styles, but further to this, in a double operation of narrativity and the 
perception of that narrativity, they acknowledge the reflexivity of the 
images themselves as images which explicitly reference established 
cinematic motifs. Furthermore, their approach to the work is on the 
condition of recognizing Sherman herself. Her visual presence in almost all 
the photographs is a visible marker of the camera self-consciousness.
But the obvious fact that each character is Sherman herself, 
disguised, introduces a sense of wonder at the illusion and its 
credibility. And, as is well known in cinema, any moment of 
marveling at an illusion immediately destroys its credibility.52
Once the illusion of cinema is broken, the image is released from the 
sensory-motor-schema of the movement-image. This has a double 
consequence for Sherman’s Film Stills, for they constitute a break not in 
cinematic illusion, but a virtual cinematic illusion. Sherman’s images are 
seeds precisely because they are not real film stills. They present a film 
within a film that is already a virtual image of possibilities emanating from 
the photographic discourse of cinematographic syntax. They are derived 
from real photographs that are in turn derived from possibilities of 
narrative. In Sherman’s work we place ourselves into photography and its 
possibilities, before placing ourselves into regions of filmic recollection that 
are already virtual because the Film Stills do not refer to actual films, but 
the possibilities in film. This environment is one of multiple states of the
51 Williamson, 1986, p. 99.
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c ry s ta l- im a g e s : virtual images of which none in particular is privileged. The 
particular interpretation of each image, whether it is finally identified as 
Renoir-esque, or ‘an Antonioni’, is highly personal and unique -  despite 
the similarities that communal cultural and social experiences will promote. 
(Interestingly, all the directors named imply a film experience of a 
particular level of education, class, and social and political experience -  
despite the ‘shlock’ to which they also refer. There are no Sirks, Hawks, or 
TV Movies individually remembered, and yet the object of Sherman’s 
perceived criticism is, apparently, Hollywood.)
The photograph is a real, limpid or actual text that implies a virtual, 
indistinct or opaque context of unlimited possibility. This context is a 
narration whose opacity is due to foregrounding. As the context becomes 
actual it becomes limpid, so the text becomes virtual and opaque. The text 
becomes a distinct narrative through the structuring of the narration as 
transparency, and obversely the context becomes distinct narration 
through the structuring of the narrative. In this circuit, text and context 
become indistinguishable from each other. Their indistinctness creates the 
environment of the time-image, for which it acts as the seed. Deleuze's 
regime of the crystal and its relationship with narrative, narration and 
narrativity can be finally depicted as follows, in which the action of 
narrativity is the translation or the circuit from which the seed emerges:
Actual _ Opaque/Limpid _ Virtual
Explicitness _ _ Implicitness
IN*
Seed/Environment
The seed crystallizes the environment of the image. It crystallizes the 
actual narrative with virtual narration. It crystallizes the opacity of the 
explicit and the limpidity of the implicit. The seed is within this internal 
circuit, acting as the actual image to crystallize a virtual environment, for
52 Laura Mulvey, ‘Cosmetics and Abjection: Cindy Sherman 1977-87’, in Fetishism and 
Curiosity, (London, BFI, 1996), pp. 65-76, p. 68.
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which it will then become the virtual image. The seed is a quality of 
indiscernibility between events depicted and the manner of their depiction. 
It is the virtual image that crystallizes the objects and events of the 
photograph, and yet which acts as the actual image in order to do so. The 
actual and the virtual, as Deleuze describes, are exchanged in 
indiscernibility. The future of the photograph is always virtual, crystallizing 
the objects within as an environment. In so doing, their quality as 
crystallizable renders the future of the image as actual. At any stage, these 
states appear as distinct, and yet are structured by the other. This 
appearance of distinctness, and the state of indistinctness which makes it 
possible, is the result of a relationship that is the internal circuit of the 
crystal. Furthermore, it is the result of a relationship in which its nature as 
a circuit is a quality. It is the quality of narrativity and it is narrativity which 
is the seed.
*  *  *
The crystal-image in the photography of Cindy Sherman
It is narrativity that enables Williamson and Mulvey recognition of the 
conventions of representation Sherman’s work. We can see all those 
facets of narrativity being engaged and subsequently demonstrated in 
analysis. Judith Williamson bases her interpretations primarily on her 
knowledge of cinematic conventions that require, enforce and reward 
narrativity according to Scholes’ definition. Both stress the effectiveness of 
Sherman's work in conveying meaning, underlining the nature of narrativity 
as quality perceived in the narrative. They point to the ambiguity of 
interpretation that develops from a restriction of mise-en-scene and a 
denial of linguistic message, with Williamson pointing to the role of women 
in cinematic convention as 'thermometers' of narrative. Williamson sees 
the role of women as an imprint of action in narrative cinema, most explicit 
in the horror genre. The perceived emotion of the women acts as a 
signifier for the imagined narrative in this way. This is continued by Mulvey 
in her developing analysis of the Untitleds of 1981, in which the women 
appear to react to the camera which Mulvey perceives as a parallel to the 
fetishized spectacle of the pornographic gaze.
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Slide 60
Sherman's work refers to the intertextuality of narratives which put 
pleasure as the reward for spectator activity, but these ‘thermometers’ are 
of virtual images of narrative. Narrativity is instrumental in the processes of 
interpretation in cinematic experience, and it is contingent upon the 
operation of memory at differing levels, or facets, in order to provide 
cinematic pleasure. Also, we can observe that narrativity, does not occur 
within the spectator, nor in the text as the spectator is directed to perceive. 
Instead narrativity is the translation from this opposition to a directed 
viewpoint. Sherman's accuracy of comment is perceived by Mulvey et al 
as effective through the artist's ability to demonstrate particular directed 
narratives and the spectator positions that support them. Narrativity is 
seen only as a reward for these directed readings. However the reflexivity 
of Sherman’s work as a dicisign, or free-indirect proposition, dislocates 
these directed readings and provides the seed for an environment of the 
crystal-image in which these directed images of narrative are simply facets 
in an ever-growing crystal form.
The sense of narrative in Sherman is a by-product of her direct work with 
imaginary film stills. In the first analysis, it is these images which appear to 
have an open association with conventional understanding of narrative 
and narrative processes. The narrative quality of her later work is assumed 
to generate from these early and highly structured attempts as 
photographic story telling. Narrative is a contextual link between the most 
disparate images in Sherman's collection. To know the narrative 
processes in one Sherman photograph is to know them all. Sherman’s 
earlier work becomes part of the recollection-image -  the context that 
merges with the text in an unequal exchange -  of this new photograph.
It is through this intertextual connection with cinema that Sherman's film 
stills also display their first dimension in time. The patterns of narrative 
which are evoked in traditional readings of her images mean that 
Sherman's work presents an elliptical narrative which extends as an
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affection-image around the still but remains limited by the conventional 
parameters of cinematic narrative. Their nature as film stills implies their 
imagined narrative's genesis and conclusion. A narrative-image projects 
backwards and forwards around the still to generate an affection-image of 
a complete film. It is this facet of Sherman's images which promote and 
extend structural readings of her imagined narratives as exemplified by the 
gender-based debate examined above. Narrativity, as a demonstration of 
a still's mise-en-abyme and of its nature as immobile section, is ultimately 
restricted in the first instance to the movement-image.
In a Deleuzean analysis such an approach is limiting. In metonymic 
connection with a cinema which presents time abstractly through the 
display of movement, these are simply affection-images of an imagined 
movement-image. Narrativity imposed upon such images justly responds 
to a sense of narrative time based on a depiction of movement in space. 
Conversely, whilst some of the photographs appear as if they were stills 
from European, avant-garde, or radical filmmaking, a filmmaking which 
Deleuze himself promotes as a cinema of the time-image, such 
assumptions are still similarly limited. For these associations are far from 
the free indirect discourse of narrative dialects that are by nature present 
in such cinemas, but are instead the result of a reading of complex but 
conventional textual signifiers. In such a limited analysis, they are limited 
by the cinema they are seen to represent, not freed by the time-images 
they really are. Inasmuch as some stills contain Hitchcock heroines, others 
contain women from eighties' art-house movies, or Godardian starlets, to 
name but a few. All the women represented in the 1981 images, and from 
then on, act as textual signifiers in much the same way. It is not in their 
textual significance as film stills that we will find Sherman's images are 
time-images, but instead in their independent textuality.
The key to these photographs as time-images lies in their indiscernibility 
as textual signifiers. They present narrative and narration as their subject, 
and immediately invoke a narrativity in the process. Rather than the 
structural narrativity of Scholes, it is the narrativity as seed of the time- 
image which is
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demonstrated by these pictures as texts. It is their textual indiscernibility 
which gives them the dimension of the internal circuit of the crystal-image. 
In focusing all imagined action into a fragment of narrative, the film stills 
present the virtual image of the film as a seed-image of the real image of 
the photograph.
In this event, a structuralist reading of Sherman's work is too limiting, as 
the crystal image is translated from immobile section into pure duration. 
Time splits in Sherman's photographs, not into the abstract notion of 
narrative ellipsis, but into a pure image of time which narrativity plants as a 
seed. The past of the image is constituted simultaneously with the present, 
and each is launched into a time-image - one of a past of the image, 
another of the future: "two dissymetrical jets".
It is in this splitting that the photograph encapsulates the moment of 
indiscernibility, the 'mutual image' or 'bit of time' that defines the crystal. 
The transparency of photography presents the crystal pane at its purest. 
The depth of the crystal is time seen in perspective in the image; moving 
back into the image and back in time. In this sense the crystal-image is 
not a time-image, but rather an image of the environment created by the 
time-image as pure optical situation. It is the image of the exchange, the 
point of indiscernibility reached, and the structure created by the 
emanating interpretations of the dicisign: Flashbulb Memories, “Now Print!” 
orders; actualisations. The photograph as object is the plane of 
immanence that is the limit between the virtual and the actual, yet in 
freezing the past, delivering it and yet not delivering, the photograph 
presents the future as heterogeneous and unbounded. It is an unequal 
exchange of virtual and actual that is perfectly presented in the 
photograph, in which the pane of the crystal, the transparent surface of the 
picture, marks the limit between the objective and the subjective and 
freezes its affect. The finite of the actual image gives way to an infinite 
virtual, an eternal potentiality which extends into a future made up of 
passing presents, and of making up pasts.
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Sherman's photographs are a coalescence of the virtual and the actual. 
What has formerly been called the photographic language of her 
photographs, the narration, can now be seen as in a state of 
indiscernibility with the narrative. Narrativity liberates her photographs from 
their part in the sensory-motor schema, rather than confines them to it. 
Rather than images in chronology, they can present only non- 
chronological time. In this sense, chronology should not be seen as 
something to be added to Sherman’s photographs to make them ‘work’, 
but instead should be seen as a limitation or organization of their depiction 
of time. Without chronology, we are caught in the cerebral intervalle, the 
point at which recollection-subjectivity (in which we choose those 
recollections which are most useful) and contraction-subjectivity (the 
perception of quality) actualize memory, according to Deleuze’s reading of 
Bergson 53. We see now that the narratives of Sherman’s images are 
aspects of memory, and memory is the experience of duration in its pure 
state. It is memory that unfolds the pure time that is in the crystal; that 
creates the complex structure of the crystalline; that enacts virtually the 
narratives of the photographs. We exist within the free-rewriting time of the 
photograph that Wollen described, and each time we write a narrative and 
it is crystallized, it is altered by the exchange within the internal circuit, and 
a new virtual narrative is formed that does not replace the first, but instead 
refracts it. The crystal image of time in its pure state emanates from this 
internal circuit, first in the two dissymmetrical jets, and as these are 
crystallized, so the whole grows and continues to project outward and 
heterogeneously with its incredible force.
Slide 61
The internal circuit in Sherman is represented initially as a relationship of 
text and context. Text and context are in constant alternation in the 
Sherman image. The textual is a set of objects - the immobile section. This 
is the actual image which crystallizes the virtual image or the context. This 
is seen in Sherman's Untitled Film Still # 4 (1977). The immobile section is 
the hallway, the door, and finally the woman. The virtual image is the past
53 B, pp. 52-53.
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and future of the image. The action of the internal circuit is the narrativity, 
the quality of the image as a potentiality. This is a horror film. She is about 
to die. This is a melodrama, she is about to enter a lover's hotel-room. 
Each new narrative is crystallized and becomes the crystal-image. The 
exchange from virtual to actual relies upon narration. The actual image of 
the immobile set crystallizes potentialities and they become the actual 
image. In reflection the set becomes a mobile, virtual image, capable of 
change. The horror film becomes a melodrama. In Sherman it is the state 
of the woman that focuses indiscernibility. Sherman's women are always 
in the act of ‘doing’ when they are photographed. They provoke no distinct 
future, nor do they portray any distinct past, they can only represent a 
point of potentiality between the two. Their movement, however slow, is 
always an indivisible intensity that divides past and future. This is the point 
of indiscernibility - the quality of the image which makes it the crystal 
image. Judith Williamson approached this potentiality when she described 
Sherman's women as ‘thermometers’ of action. The picture presents the 
past as real, the staging of the photograph existed for the photograph to 
exist. But the image presents a possible future, a virtual image of the 
possible is crystallized by the actual image of the staged past. It is the 
pose of the woman that crystallizes the virtual image, she remains in the 
act of doing, of moving forward in time, yet not moving forward. The 
potentiality is now actual, and the staged photograph now virtual, an 
image of time. The woman's pose represents the point of indiscernibility or 
the crystal image. In fact, Sherman's women do not reflect the time of the 
image, for they are within the time of the image. Sherman's women are 
internal to the non-chronological time of the photograph-as-crystal, just as 
we are internal to time in Bergson's analysis.
Slide 62
In another picture, Untitled Film Still # 16 (1978), a woman sits in a chair 
and looks out of shot. In this image, the crystal image is now more closely 
a mutual image, or unequal exchange. Its dislocation from a fictional world 
presents the limits of the crystal and the indiscernibility between a past of 
the image and a present. In this image the potentiality is focused on the
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distinctness of the past. Whereas in #4  the woman presented the 
potentiality of an indistinct future, the resting woman in # 16 presents only 
staged past and virtual past. It is the time of the image which launches into 
the future. There is no potentiality towards the future in this image, only a 
representation of past. And yet the mutual image still exists. The staged 
image remains as an actual image, which in turn crystallizes the virtual 
image of past narrative. As the narrative-image becomes actual, the actual 
image of the immobile set shifts, for it does not depict present, it becomes 
another virtual past. This is the unequal exchange of the Untitled Film 
Stills.
The most explicit crystalline structure in Deleuze's analysis is the mirror, 
and in Sherman the mirrors further concentrate the point of indiscernibility 
between actual and virtual. The virtual image assumes independence from 
its actuality through the reflection of its narrative into the narration. Mirrors 
in Sherman are almost invariably looking glasses. The exchange takes 
place in a space coded as feminine, coded as a place of masquerade and 
the creation, reflection and refraction of identity; focusing the exchange of 
actual and virtual through the potentiality of the actor.
Slide 63
Mirrors ensure a self-consciousness that immediately calls into question 
the role and creation of identity. Framed by the limits of the photograph, 
the face is further framed by a surface that becomes landscape, as the 
light sparkles off the dust on the mirror’s surface. Like Man Ray’s 
photograph of Duchamp’s Large Glass, this image too has a landscape 
from which a face emerges, only to draw attention to its surface as a 
landscape, and make it virtual again.
Slide 64
In Untitled Film Still #2 (1977) and Untitled Film Still # 81 (1978), the 
women checking themselves blur to become virtual images while their 
reflection, of which we only see a partially obscured face, becomes
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actualized. But unlike Welles’ The Lady from Shanghai, they will never 
escape from the internal circuit that the reflection has created for them. 
The virtual image in the mirror becomes actualized and the woman 
disappears from view, she becomes virtual. In return, the image in the 
mirror actualizes the virtual character who becomes distinct. This actual 
image includes her bathrobe, in #2, which only partly covers her, it 
includes the doorway which frames her (in both), and reflects abstractly 
the 'bit' of time, or stolen moment. The potentiality exists in this exchange 
of time. The staged actual image exchanges with the fragmented virtual 
time of the image presented by the covert look through the doorway. This 
becomes actual to push the staged moment out-of-field and complete the 
circuit.
Doorways are crucial to the depiction of these crystal images. In # 81 the 
doorway similarly acts as an element of the exchange that takes place in 
the mirror. In this image it is the gaze through the mirror towards the 
viewer which acts as the point of indiscernibility. The exchanges take 
place across this point, but instead of a present of the image, this 
photograph moves further to involve an explicit alternation between the 
subjective and objective. The actual image of the staged moment is 
detached from the subjective and exists as objective, but the framing of 
the doorway and the gaze through the mirror are actualized while the 
staged moment becomes virtual. This actualization becomes a complicity 
in the clandestine surveillance, before the woman-as-virtual-image is 
crystallized to become the actual once more. The mirror represents the 
smallest internal circuit, through which objectivity and subjectivity are 
exchanged as discourse. However, doubt always remains, and subjective 
or objective readings find no solid basis in this mutual image. Neither 
character or reflection is distinct in the internal circuit.
The mirror is finally central to the indiscernibility between the limpid and 
the opaque in Sherman's later images. Indiscernibility is focused through 
the mirror whilst around it the limpid and the opaque are separated by 
ground or earth.
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In Untitled #167 (1986) the mirror is the point of indiscernibility, but it is the 
ground that presents a barrier or plane between the two crystal states. The 
objects strewn across this blasted earth present the signifiers for narrative, 
according to a structuralist account. Each object serves to anchor further a 
concrete imagined narrative, made substantial by the strength of these 
signifiers. However, in a Deleuzean analysis, this is the visible, limpid 
narrative separated from the opaque by surface. In the Cinema books he 
saw water as a surface, both in Jean Vigo’s L’Atalante and John Huston’s 
Moby Dick, that turned the dualism of actual/virtual into one of limpidity 
and opacity. The surface of the water separated the knowable, limpid 
image of the decks of the ship, which constantly remain visible, from the 
dark and obscured opacity of beneath the waves 54. In this image from 
Sherman, it is the diaspora of domestic objects that remains visible, whilst 
the disturbed earth hides the opaque image of what might be buried. 
Indiscernibility has a shifting operation within this photograph. There is the 
mirror as a focusing nexus of indetermination between the actual objects 
of the set and the virtual image reflected in the compact, but in a departure 
from the circuit portrayed in the early film stills, there is no actual character 
immediately recognizable to reflect in the looking glass. Instead, this 
shifting action takes place with the fragmented face which, unearthed from 
the dirt, appears as if rising to the surface from a deep pool. This really is 
the face that becomes a landscape, the face that emerges from a 
landscape made into a “Now Print!” order of woman.
As occurs in the early film stills, it is the returned gaze through the 
compact's mirror which actualizes the reflected, or virtual image, within it. 
The objects half obscured by the earth pass into virtuality, but in being 
crystallizeable, are actualized to become the dead face which emerges 
from the grave. The face in the mirror, now virtual, becomes the ghost of 
the dead, liberating in the mirror the body trapped in the mud. But in being 
crystallizeable, the actual image of death makes the objects become more 
and more opaque, they slip back under the dark earth, to become an
Damian Sutton -  The Crystal Image
216
opaque image of disintegration. They return to virtual landscape. This 
returned gaze in Sherman’s photographs adds yet another level to the 
reflexivity of the image: it alters the state of the crystal from one of growth 
to one of decomposition. The ever-growing reflexivity has been altered by 
the returned gaze, once a circuit, it is now once again a direct image, only 
this time there still remain echoes of the exchange that once took place. 
Deleuze’s vision of the crystal in decomposition was in the incestuous 
world of the rich and aristocratic, inward looking, and incapable of 
escaping its own reflexive ontology except through decay 55. When 
Sherman turns to look toward the camera-conscious, especially in 
Untitled#167 from 1986 and #175 from 1987, the reflexive look leads to 
the crystal in a state of decomposition. Here the sense of foreboding, the 
horror, are turned inward.
In two of the more recent sets, the sex pictures and the fairy tale pictures, 
we can see the crystal in the process of decomposition. Just as Deleuze 
saw decomposition in the cinema of Visconti, it is the decomposition of the 
environment of the photographic scenes that demonstrates the last stage 
of the crystal image. Each of Sherman's images, from 1977 to 1993, is a 
composition. Each photograph is a composed scene, and a crystalline 
environment of pure duration, focused on a point of indiscernibility, a 
mirror, or a woman's stance. In the history portraits the plastic breasts, 
facial prosthetics, and opaque make-up create the surface as a landscape 
from which the faces emerge only to recede. Each circuit is focused upon 
the actual Sherman and the virtual image, either in the reflection of the 
mise-en-scene, or in the refraction through the mise-en-abyme.
Slide 66
In these later works, there is the limpid, actual image of the objects, and 
the virtual image refracted in mise-en-abyme. But Sherman's personal 
absence denies the internal circuit its plane of immanence. Shifting from 
potentiality to potentiality, the circuit has no point or peak around which to
54 Ibid p. 73.
55 Ibid p. 94.
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revolve. It unravels in a process of decomposition. As the crystal unravels 
and loses its autonomous integrity, the limpid slips into opacity. Unlike the 
unravelling of time within the crystal image, in which cronos is liberated 
from chronos, this is a chaotic unravelling or decomposition of time. The 
past disintegrates in integrity as an actual image, and the present only 
exists as a deeper and deeper abyss.
The limpid becomes ever more mysterious, dark and profane. Unlike 
Sherman's earlier images of horror, with their images of bodily viscera as a 
diaspora, there is no surface or plane to reflect the crystal. The images 
become ever more indistinct, as body parts lose their clarity and limpidity, 
and become mysterious shapes. They become echoes of the internal 
circuit, degenerating as the circuit unravels. As the image becomes ever 
more virtual, they do not cease to be crystallizeable, but instead this 
quality is an unfulfilled potentiality.
In structuralist criticism, such a narrative of death is focused in the objects 
themselves. In such an analysis narrativity is limited by the image as 
immobile section. Only the abstract narration of the movement-image can 
be envisaged as a result. It is only when the image moves beyond the 
visible and limpid and into the opaque and virtual that the image reveals 
itself as a time-image. The photograph is a time-image because it presents 
no time. More precisely, the image is not shackled to the constraints of the 
movement-image. It does not present time as chronological time. Decay in 
this sense is not the staccato death of Benjamin, but the evanescence -  a 
return to former shapes -  that we found in the statues of the Parc des 
Sceaux or the Tuileries. It presents no division of measured time, no 
abstract notion of a past or of a limited future, as do the film stills. Instead 
of presenting Chronos, a chronological time, Untitled #167 presents 
Cronos, the foundation, or seed, of pure duration, and it does so 
presenting the indivisible mutability of form. Similarly, just as the earth is 
indiscernible from excretia in this image, so it is presented in Untitled 
#175, whose new surface of food and vomit -  one is often indiscernible 
from the other -  demonstrates the indivisible change from one state to 
another.
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Mirrors and the diaspora resurface this image, and similar images from the 
set, which include Untitleds #179 through #235. Here the objects once 
again present an opaque surface that hides the virtual image. It is the 
circuit from virtual to actual, from opaque to limpid that is the narrativity, 
the seed of the time-image environment. The seed act as the abyss (mise- 
en-abyme) out of which the time-image grows as an environment. The 
seed refracts the image, enlarging and projecting it rather than reflecting, 
as the mirror does. The exchange exists between actual and virtual within 
this abyss, but it does so as a constant, outwardly moving repetition. The 
time-image grows through this repetition. The mirror is a seed, but in 
Sherman's images the seed extends to become the peak, or point, of 
indiscernibility in the earth, or on the blood, vomit, semen and sputum 
strewn carpets of her later images. These surfaces repeat the exchange of 
limpid and opaque, of explicit and implied, to create an environment of 
pure time. Narrativity is the seed and narrativity finds its plane of 
immanence most effectively demonstrated in these flat surfaces.
Deleuze's adherence to the seed of the crystal is emphasized again 
through his dissemination of acting and role-play. In Sherman’s early 
colour work, mise-en-scene is stripped bare, pared away to liberate 
narrativity from the constraints of the implied ellipsis of the film stills. Back 
projection, or deep chiaroscuro lighting, create a pure opsign, the image of 
time disconnected from any abstract impression of duration.
Slide 68
Absence of reflective mise-en-scene creates instead a mise-en-abyme 
which, following the nature of the crystal, refracts rather than reflects. The 
nexus, or plane of immanence of the crystal is no longer the mirror but the 
seed, and the seed is Sherman. Within a scene spare of the mise-en- 
scene of narrative, the image and its internal circuit are focused upon 
Sherman herself. The image gains mobility as the internal circuit revolves
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around the concentrated image of Sherman-as-actor. We saw a sort of 
back projection in Untitled Film Still #56, in which the mirror’s dust 
presented a surface that these projections now repeat. Faces emerge, but 
it is impossible, as Mulvey and Williamson found, to separate Sherman the 
actor from the fragments of character that she portrays. Untitled #86 and 
#96, (from the ‘Centrefolds’) pared even from the back projection of the 
previous set, the deep lighting focuses the circuit evermore on Sherman.
Slide 69
Yet the surfaces remain, whether a tiled floor, or the opacity of the deep 
blacks that suggest both surface and depth. Even so, these images are 
stripped of the heavy signifiers of the movement image, and are at once 
liberated from it and instead caught within the circuit of the crystal image. 
The virtual image, untied from direct connection to objects, becomes less 
certain and is invested with more potential. The simplified form of Untitled 
#96, rather than direct or restrict narrative potentiality, frees it. It is the 
absence of signifiers that makes them pure opsigns in themselves. With 
the actual image limited to Sherman herself, the darkness presents an 
abyss of virtuality. The actor embodies a crystal, according to Deleuze, 
and never more so than in the freakish, or the horrific:
...the more the virtual image of the role becomes actual and limpid, 
the more the actual image of the actor moves into the shadows and 
becomes opaque: there will be a private project of the actor, a dark 
vengeance...this underground activity will detach itself and become 
visible in turn, as the interrupted role falls back into opacity.56
Sherman becomes these women, becomes Sherman. It is easy to be 
drawn, in this way, to Sherman’s ‘history’ images, or the grotesques that 
make up a Grand Guignol in the fairy stories. Deleuze, after all, was drawn 
to the unfortunates who appear in Tod Browning’s work. But it is in these 
two photographs, with their play on surface and depth, that we see the 
crystal exchange most visible. The crystal is more complex because they 
lack the prosthetics, the make-up -  the plastic. It is the shadows that act
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as the surface hiding the mystery of an opaque darkness, which in being 
realized becomes actual. This new actual image dominates the textuality 
of the scene, it is the new limpid image. Sherman, now as virtual image, 
having crystallized the virtual image within the shadows, disappears into 
the opaque.
Sherman's later work with depictions of sex acts displays the seed image 
reflexively. Sherman's sex images begin once again as immobile sets of 
objects. Vivid and lurid sexual acts are depicted in situ, through the use of 
inanimate sex toys, medical dummies, and Halloween masks. In one 
image, Untitled #257, 1992, fluid is caught, mid flow, as a droplet 
suspended in mid air. This is the actualization of the immobile section. 
Freezing time as in a snapshot, cinema image, or pornographic 
photograph. Sherman destroys the abstraction of time in the snapshot by 
using dummies and glycerine (or resin). She confounds the chronos of the 
immobile section by photographing immobile objects. Their movement is 
not in space as a movement-image, it is in intensity as a time-image.
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These are seed images because they are works in progress, they are 
images within images, just as Deleuze saw the films-within-films of Fellini 
and Godard. The dummies present not only the construction of the image, 
the set of objects, but also the sex act itself, as if the sex act is a virtual 
image, always in construction -  a virtual image always being crystallized, 
and always being replaced. These are images of a becoming-sex -  but 
that is another story. The dummies are made virtual as each sexual foray 
is crystallized in imagination (we often say, of sexual imagery, that it 
leaves nothing to the imagination, but this is wrong). They are actualized 
by process to invite another virtual image. The crystal grows.
*  *  *
56 M I, p. 72.
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Conclusion
This internal circuit of narrativity is the seed for the time-image. What 
grows from this seed is the photograph as an image of duration. The 
photograph is liberated from the abstract connection to time, via the 
freezing of action, and the time of the image ceases to have any abstract 
chronology. The movement-image, which can imply only an ellipsis of 
time, is translated by the internal circuit, by narrativity, into the crystal. 
There is no sense of this abstract time in Sherman's later images, because 
they are liberated from their outward depiction of chronology. But this 
belies a liberation that took place in those Untitled Film Stills; a liberation 
that was all the more hidden because they were ‘film stills’, and yet 
because of this was all the more violent. Even Mulvey found the Film Stills 
difficult to fix analyses based on the treatment of the spectator, and her 
words echo the shape of the crystal in her description of the fluidity of the 
subjective:
But just as she is artist and model, voyeur and looked at, active and 
passive, subject and object, the photographs set up a comparable 
variety of positions and responses for the viewer. There is no stable 
subject position in her work, no resting point that does not quickly 
shift into something else. So the Film Stills’ initial sense of 
homogeneity and credibility breaks up into [a] kind of heterogeneity 
of subject position... 57
This brings us back to the beginning of the chapter, but lets us add to the 
Untitled Film Stills an understanding across Sherman’s work. Sherman's 
later images, with the sex objects, the masks, and also the prosthetics that 
adorn her in those images which reflect historical painting, re-emphasize 
the importance of acting which is first enunciated in her film stills, and 
which point to the heart of the crystal; acting presents the embodiment of 
the exchange between actual (actor) and (virtual) persona. This is why 
contemporary critics of Sherman have been unable to separate the women 
in her pictures from the woman who plays them, Sherman herself.
Whether attacking this duality of persona as willfully engaging in the 
female masquerade, or defending such an engagement with the
Damian Sutton -  The Crystal Image
222
masquerade as a criticism of it, it is nevertheless crucial that Sherman is 
both actor and character. It is not just the women who represent the 
potentiality of the point of indiscernibility, but Sherman herself. Her 
presence in each image actualizes the objects of the photograph. Each 
photograph is a scene in which Sherman belongs to the real, and yet her 
ability to become transparent crystallizes the virtual image or the 
characters she portrays. And yet the crystal nature of the photographs, the 
co-existence of virtual and actual, is the reason why the image of Sherman 
is never dislocated from Sherman-as-image. They are never fully 
distinguishable from each other. Sherman as actor cannot exist alone 
without crystallizing the virtual image of the character she portrays, and as 
her presence in the real becomes virtual, she retains the crystallizeable 
quality -  the quality of narrativity -  that enables the circuit to repeat. She 
never ceases to be Sherman, and yet she never ceases to be those 
women she portrays. The presence of Sherman returns us also to that 
condition of the time-image that is most explicit in certain photography, for 
each picture refers to itself as a subjectivity, a perception, which frames 
the discourse between the subject and object that cinema, pornography, 
classical painting, and magazine culture embody. Sherman is the marker 
of self-consciousness in her work.
The crystal exists around a focal plane, a plane of immanence. In 
Sherman's work, the plane of immanence is a point of indiscernibility that 
begins as an object within a set of objects and is embodied in her. In those 
images in which she is absent -  or becomes absent -  the crystal 
decomposes. She constitutes the peak between the distinct and the 
indistinct, but also is the translation from this immobile section toward a 
mobile section of pure duration -  a time-image. At times the plane of 
immanence is the mirror, which makes a continual reappearance 
throughout the work, at other times it is a set of objects which imply her 
presence but cannot replace it. Sherman is the ‘diffuse, supple’ object at 
the heart of the internal circuit. The true seed of the crystalline 
environment is Sherman herself. It is her appearance as actor and 
character in her work that demonstrates each scene as a whole, or an
57 Mulvey, 1996, p. 69.
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entirety. It is her presence that makes each photograph or scene a pure 
opsign, a purely crystalline optical experience and it is her absence that 
causes the delicate structure of reversibility within the crystal to 
decompose.
The point of indiscernibility is the concatenation of Sherman as actor and 
Sherman as character. Narrativity lies in this indistinctness. Narrativity in 
Sherman is a quality of the point of indiscernibility that translates the 
immobile images of her photographs to become facets in the crystal. It is 
the quality of the crystal -  the quality of this translation -  that can be 
described as narrativity. As we have seen the crystal in its most perfect 
state, we have seen narrativity at its most powerful; and was we have 
seen the crystal decompose, we have seen narrativity at its most 
powerless. Finally, narrativity suggests an indivisible process that can only 
be described as a becoming. Attached to narrative forms such as the film 
still, the becoming of photography assumes a quality appropriate to 
narrative. This suggests that if we take narrative away from the 
photographic image, we are likely to see becoming-photography in its pure 
operation.
*  *  *
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Chapter Five:
From Environment to seed:
Andy Warhol and becoming-photography 
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Introduction
One of Deleuze’s particular interests is in Jean-Luc Godard, whose 
cinema engaged thought by detaching perception from images as 
tracings of the world, and images of reality:
Thus modern cinema develops new relations with thought from 
three points of view: the obliteration of a whole or totalization of 
images, in favour of an outside that is inserted between them; the 
erasure of an internal monologue as whole of the film, in favour of 
a free indirect discourse or vision; the erasure of the unity of man 
and the world, in favour of a break which now leaves us with only a 
belief in this world.1
A bout de souffle, for example, was shot on silent film, creating scenes in 
which sound and image do not match, but which instead enter into 
discourse with each other. The free-indirect discourse is created not 
simply by a pure optical situation, nor a pure sound situation, but from an 
absence of the connection between the two. What this detachment, or 
absence, guarantees for us is a film time and space that is a priori 
movement-image; one that Deleuze describes as pre-hodological 2. 
Unable to make concrete connections, the crystal environment created by 
the free-indirect discourse of sound and image throws up a web of 
potential time-images.
To understand the opsign we have to consider it in lieu of the sensory- 
motor schema, and even in lieu of its relationship with the sonsign. We 
have to detach it from these, or look for instances in which it presents 'a 
beyond' of the sensory-motor schema. These new sites of investigation 
should be films that employ the very structure of cinema as their subject, 
since they are immediately self-reflexive - experimental films are common 
examples. These demonstrate, if not a link to the photograph, then a link 
to the genetic element of photography: the opsign.
As such, they certainly point to the kind of image-sound situation that 
Deleuze saw as the ‘beyond of the movement-image’:
1 TI, p. 188.
2 Ibid p. 203.
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...to cut perception off from its motor extension, action, from the 
thread which joined it to a situation, affection from adherence or 
belonging to characters. The new image would therefore not be a 
bringing to completion of the cinema, but a mutation of it .3
We can seek to understand the crystal environment, as we found in 
Sherman's photographs, but we also need to understand the process by 
which that environment comes-into being. We need to see the 
construction of cinema to see the crystal environment growing, or being 
made. We need to see its structures and materials at work, and in both 
production and in reception, in order to understand them less as a 
process, and more as a becoming. The indivisible structure of time can 
only be represented in an indivisible process of image-making - one 
without beginning or end - that presents the becoming of cinema. In this 
case, avant-garde cinema might be an appropriate place to look; 
particularly if we are indeed searching for filmmakers and/or 
photographers for whom the nature of photography, or the function of 
cinema, has a large stake in their work. Indeed, when such subjects are 
discussed, there are certain filmmakers -  Maya Deren, Stan Brakhage, 
Hollis Frampton, and Michael Snow amongst others -  who immediately 
develop a large gravitational field for critical discourse, or a ‘critical mass’. 
Deleuze, for example, describes Snow’s seminal 1967 film Wavelength 
as a film that “extracts a potential space [from a room], whose power and 
quality he progressively exhausts.”4 Avant-garde film is a vast subject; to 
attempt to reduce it to any particular set of dates, characteristics, 
philosophy, personnel, or critical discourse would be self-defeating in this 
respect. If anything, we should immediately acknowledge the potential to 
see avant-garde film as a molecular becoming: spreading by contagion, 
at once pack like and at once imperceptible, it is so difficult to define a 
genesis (Eiseinstein? Vertov? The Lumieres?), a nemesis (Stone? Scott? 
Spielberg?), or a coda, that instead we must see that it is an opening up 
to view of the functions and processes of cinema. Without a definite 
beginning (it is oppositional) nor end (new technologies bring new
3 M I, p. 215
4 Ibid p. 122
227
practices), it is only what Deleuze described as a milieu. Avant-garde 
cinema is thus the milieu of cinema.
Avant-garde cinema is a constant coming-into-being of cinema, since all 
films begin essentially with the same practices. But if it is a becoming, it is 
also true that historians continually seek to historicise or mythologise it. 
Many critics focus on mid-sixties New York, for example. Indeed, P. 
Adams Sitney has described this period as “the mythical stage of the 
avant-garde”5. The work of part-entrepreneur, part-critic, part-filmmaker 
Jonas Mekas’ had a huge hand in the development of criticism and 
practice of avant-garde cinema in New York in the sixties. Mekas has 
written about this time as having the “feeling that cinema is only 
beginning”, but also that filmmakers “demonstrated anew the immense 
capabilities of the camera to record life, its poetry and its prose -  a fact 
often forgotten since Lumiere took his first street shots.” 6 Alongside 
critics such as Sitney, Parker Tyler, Annette Michelson, and others,
Mekas helped develop a critical community which is only partly 
characterised by its home in New York, only partly by pseudonyms such 
as Structuralist, or Materialist Film, and only partly by its often simplified 
opposition to Hollywood. The avant-garde community was one that had a 
molecular structure, with filmmakers and critics forming groups more akin 
to animal packs, rather than families, and in which the term avant-garde 
belied any cohesion in the structural sense. The New York film avant- 
garde is poorly described by the term ‘avant-garde’, and better by the 
sense of becoming implied by ‘avant-garde-ing’.
The molecular nature of this film avant-garde is reflected in the much 
larger artistic avant-garde becoming that was also experiencing fruition in 
New York in the sixties. This was a widespread post-war boom in art that 
involved the coming together of both social and market forces. Diana 
Crane unpicks the commercial and social interests of the patronage and
5 P. Adams Sitney, Visionary Film: the American avant-garde, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), p. 371.
6 Jonas Mekas, ‘Notes on the New American Cinema’, in P. Adams Sitney ed., Film Culture 
Reader, (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 87-107, p. 92. See also Jeffrey K. Ruoff, “Home Movies 
of the Avant-Garde: Jonas Mekas and the New York Art World”, in Cinema Journal, Vol. 30,
No. 3, (Spring 1991), pp. 6-28.
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capital investment that invigorated the artistic community. For Crane, this 
time/movement/period was marked by a struggle for definitions of mass 
(or low) and high culture in which not only were such distinctions mutated 
and contorted to become relatively indiscernible, but in which those within 
the avant-garde of the sixties “internalised values and goals associated 
with the middle class and with popular culture”7. For many, this meant 
cinema and its place in culture.
Mekas and the others can be seen only as one part of a much larger 
’block’ of becoming -  larger even that the New York avant-garde itself. 
This is the block of becoming centred around Andy Warhol, for whom 
Mekas was a friend, colleague, and camera-operator. In fact, Andy 
Warhol was not so much a part of the New York avant-garde, but that the 
New York avant-garde was part of the block of becoming that we can call 
Andy Warhol. To understand Warhol as a block of becoming you cannot 
start at the beginning (since there is none), nor at the end (since again, 
there is none), you have to start in the middle. To understand Warhol, we 
have to start with My Hustler.
*  *  *
Odalisque
My Hustler was filmed in 1965 and shown intermittently until it had a 
general release in 1971. Its sparse structure is a mutation from the single 
shot ‘fixation films’ toward the more complex narrative and split-screen 
films of Warhol’s later work. My Hustler was Warhol’s first outing (in more 
ways than one) with Morrissey as collaborator-in-film, and marks a point 
of transition in which the time-image cinema of Warhol’s early work 
becomes rooted in the narrative, cause-and-effect, and sensory-motor- 
schema of the later camp action-image movies. My Hustler then, both 
historically and stylistically, is a film very much ‘in the middle’.
My Hustler is essentially divided into two single shots, an exterior and an
7 Diana Crane, The Transformation o f the Avant-garde: the New York Art World, 1940-1985, 
(London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 11
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interior, which each last for about 33 minutes (the length of a reel). Whilst 
the first exterior shot has a few in-camera edits and at least two 180° 
pans (both the result of Morrissey’s direction), for most of the time in this 
shot the camera frames the reclining figure of the hustler in question, 
played by Paul America, over which can be heard the conversation 
between his ‘john’ (owner/client) and the latter’s houseguests. The 
second static, interior shot covers the bathroom in which hustler, 
houseguests and subsequently jealous ‘owner’ banter, barter and bicker 
over each other. The film therefore sets up a number of dualisms, 
including those of inside and outside, movement and stasis, sound and 
image, looked and looked at, camera and screen, and even homosexual 
and heterosexual. However, these dualisms are disrupted and made 
arbitrary by the body of Paul America. My Hustler is what Deleuze 
described as ‘cinema of the body’. It is Paul America's body that prevents 
the image from becoming rooted to action, from becoming the action- 
image, and it is the body that ensures the pre-hodological space of the 
time-image:
It may be here that the cinema of the body fundamentally 
contrasted with the cinema of action. The action-image 
presupposes a space...which can be called ‘hodological’. But the 
body is initially caught in quite a different space, where disparate 
sets overlap and rival each other, without being able to organize 
themselves into the sensory-motor schemata...It is a pre- 
hodological space, like a fluctuatio animi which does not point to 
an indecision of the spirit, but to an undecidability of the body.8
The concentration of image upon the body of Paul America thus 
confounds the expectations created by action-image cinema. His body 
disrupts the organic flow of movement-images and from this disruption 
come new relationships of filmmaker and audience, looker and looked at, 
camera and screen. From this cinema, above all, comes a new 
relationship of subject and object -  the free-indirect discourse.
Tony Rayns notes how very little of the dialogue is actually about Paul
8 TI, p. 203.
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America, leading to the possibility that a print of the film exists without 
Morrissey’s edits and which frees the film’s discourse entirely 9. What this 
demonstrates is that the film's dialogue - its sonsign - increases the 
potential complexity of the crystal-image, but that it is not necessarily 
required to do this. Morrissey’s direction threatens to anchor the image to 
a sensory-motor schema based on a particular character (the ‘owner’ -  
Ed Hood) and his desire for another (America). But this is ultimately not 
carried through because of the strength of the opsign itself, particularly as 
the internal circuit of virtual and actual merges in the body of Paul 
America as odalisque.
Paul America as odalisque relies upon a reflexivity involving any 
knowledge of painting on the part of the viewer and Warhol’s own 
experience of art history. The exotic body of the odalisque in mannerist 
and romantic painting is easily recognizable, especially in Jean-Auguste- 
Dominique Ingres’ La Grande Odalisque (1814) and Odalisque and Slave 
(1839) 10. However, My Hustler draws on a wider significance of the 
odalisque, to include Edouard Manet’s Le Dejeuner sur I’Herbe but 
especially his Olympia (both 1863). Like Olympia, Paul America courts 
looking, and while he doesn’t return the gaze as Olympia does, the barely 
reflexive dialogue with its occasional reference to him still ensures that 
the viewer is caught looking. As in Manet’s Bar at the Folies Bergeres 
(1881-82), in Olympia the outward gaze is a point of indiscernibility of 
which there are many. However for Olympia, Dejeuner, and My Hustler,
(in which the whiteness of the odalisque is emphasized) it is the space 
created by the body that is indicative of the crystal at work.
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9 Tony Rayns, ‘Andy’s Handjobs’, in Colin MacCabe, Mark Francis &  Peter Wollen eds., Who is 
Andy Warhol, (London: BFI, 1997), pp. 83-88, p. 85. See also Tony Rayns, Review of My 
Hustler, in Monthly Film Bulletin, vol. 38, no. 449, (June 1971), p. 123, pl23. See also Callie 
Angell, ‘The Films of Andy Warhol’, in Callie Angell et al, The Andy Warhol Museum, 
(Pittsburgh: Carnegie Institute, 1994), pp. 121-145, p. 122: “Included within this massive 
accumulation of physical materials are many detailed clues to Warhol’s filmmaking practice 
[including] unused 33-minute reels shot for films such as My Hustler (1965)...”
10 Interesting visual comparisons can be made between the composition of Odalisque and Slave 
and the framing of Genevieve Charbon and Paul America, as can comparisons be made between 
the composition of Dejeuner and the framing of Paul America and Joe Campbell.
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The body of the odalisque as oriental concubine makes the distinction 
between the public space of commerce and the private space of 
sensuality disappear. This is explicit in the boudoir of Olympia, as in 
Ingres’ paintings, but it is also evident in Dejeuner, whose enclosed 
space suggests suggests a privacy broken and made public by the 
viewer's stare. This has a further dimension in My Hustler, whose Fire 
Island-beach location acts as a stage for the complex cultural codes and 
taboos involved in gay openness in public space. As R. Bruce Brasell 
notes:
Gay men enjoying the view are reminded of its public
inaccessibility within this supposedly gay space.11
Brasell carries this notion of inside/outside space into the second half of 
the film, whose single shot of the bathroom makes indiscernible the public 
and private space of the bathroom in gay culture.
This use, by Warhol, of both the beach location and the odalisque body 
suggest a rich appreciation of the art history that appears to have more 
than casually or coincidentally informed his work. The features of the 
body and the space of the odalisque in classical and modern painting are 
instantly recognizable -  its pose makes it a body-as-face. Thus Manet’s 
Olympia has antecedents in Titian’s Venus of Urbino (1538), and earlier 
in Giorgione’s Venus Asleep of 1510. Furthermore, Manet’s composition 
in Dejeuner is one whose features are recognizable in Marcantonio 
Raimondi’s engraving of the Judgement of Paris, 1520. Finally, the 
outward gaze of Ingres’ La Grande Odalisque appears no longer 
whimsical considering Ingres repeated the figure and her gaze in his 
grisaille version of 1824-34. 12
11 R. Bruce Brasell, ‘My Hustler: Gay Spectatorship as Cruising’, Wide Angle: A Film Quarterly 
o f  Theory, Criticism, and Practice 14, no. 2 (April 1992), p. 54-64, p.58. Similarly Le Dejeuner 
sur I 'Herbe is painting that possibly draws on the role of the banks of the Seine as a site of 
prostitution in the nineteenth century.
2 See John Berger, Ways o f Seeing, (London: Penguin/BBC, 1972), pp. 62-64. Thanks to John 
Calcutt for pointing out to me the visual connections between these pieces. Warhol may only 
have been vaguely familiar with the odalisque tradition, but both the Ingres grisaille (purchased 
in 1938) and the Raimondi engraving (1919) are in the collection ofNew York’s Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, one of whose curators, Henry Geldzahler, was Warhol’s close friend.
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The use of the repose of the romantic odalisque, as well as the 
public/private space, enforces a particular interpretation of Paul America 
as hustler. The signs of their profession are written on the body-as-face of 
the odalisque, as so for Paul America. Even the space of looking, as 
emphasised in so many odalisques who gaze outward from the canvas, 
appears emphasised in My Hustler by the dialogue. The camera has 
replaced the returned gaze. The visual genealogy of the odalisque does, 
in Warhol’s case, point to a deep knowledge of the odalisque as a sexual 
tradition, motif, and metaphor, and yet because of this something about 
Paul America as odalisque seems almost too easily recognisable; 
suggesting that such an interpretation should in fact be resisted.
In this sense then, if the odalisque is an actualization of certain forces or 
traits -  such as sex and commerce, looking and desiring, looking and 
owning -  then the dialogue in My Hustler has a hand in making these 
forces implode, rather than actualise, since the dialogue emphasises the 
act of looking. My Hustler reveals the potential actualizations that are 
inherent in the image, and simultaneously prevents them from occurring. 
The camp dialogue, with its references to the activity of hustling, only 
makes these implosive forces stronger, and hence makes the image 
more indiscernible.
But to assume that it is only the presence of the dialogue that makes this 
image a crystal-image is, as we have said, to discount the complexity of 
the image itself as an opsign. There is certainly enough of a resemblance 
to odalisques to make the signification collapse upon itself, but to assume 
that the framing of Paul America has an explicitly sexual implication over 
and above, say, a religious one, is to try and falsely simplify an image 
whose power rests in its indiscernibility. After all, why should a strong 
religious message not be possible since, asTony Rayns notes, Warhol 
never parted company with religion? 13 And there certainly is reason to 
think of the image in religious terms, not least because Paul America
13 Rayns, 1997, p. 84.
lying on the beach at Fire Island looks extraordinarily like the languid, 
attenuated figure of Adam, stretching his arm out to touch God, from 
Michelangelo’s painting on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel (1508-12).
Slide 74
But why should we make such a strong religious connection when My 
Hustler's photography seems so explicit in its homoeroticism (over and 
above any homoeroticism which might be perceived in the 
Michelangelo)? Perhaps it is because My Hustler so neatly fits the 
progression of Warhol's career as told by so many biographers. As 
Stephen Koch notes, “Warhol was shortly to begin -  more and more in 
collaboration with Morrissey -  his long filmic meditation on the male 
body...”; a process that would lead him to a more narrative orientated 
movement-image, in which sexual messages were linked to action and 
sexual aggression made safe by camp 14.
Warhol's is not the only artist whose whole career overshadows the 
ambiguities of individual works. Robert Mapplethorpe's photographs of 
Lisa Lyons represent a difficult strand of work that is not easy to equate 
with his images of sado-masochistic or openly homosexual (though not 
always simply homoerotic) subjects. Even his Man in a Polyester Suit 
(1980) defies a purely homosexual reading, one that develops this 
overtone only in the face of Mapplethorpe's public lifestyle. The 
photographs of the athletic Lisa Lyons can be understood on three levels. 
Firstly, they expose the ambiguous sexuality of the classical art that they 
echo (in this case classical sculpture). Secondly, they expose a similar 
ambiguity in Mapplethorpe's own work, since they also mirror his male 
nudes in style. The sexual message is itself left ambiguous; and that is 
the photograph's message. However, thirdly it must be noted that the 
photographs do all these things because they exist in the pre-hodological 
space created by Lyons' body before the camera, and before the viewer's 
gaze. Whereas Mapplethorpe's images of men such as Ajitto can be
14 Stephen Koch, Stargazer: Andy Warhol and His Films, 2nd edn. (London: Marion Boyars, 
1985), p. 85. See also, Brasell, 1992, p. 57.
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easily connected to his public homosexuality, a comparative reading of 
his images of Lyons as similar expressions of desire confounds this.
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Similarly, attempts by Paul Morrissey to inject Warhol's film with the traits 
of camp, that in the words of Brasell ‘partially mask’ the film’s ambiguity, 
only constitute a move from the possible to the real. Like any attempt we 
might make to ascribe a sexual misrecognition (as if he sees only the 
masculine in Lisa Lyons) to Mapplethorpe's photographs, to suggest that 
the subject-object relationship in My Hustler has a distinct homoerotic 
looked/looked-at direction would only be to demonstrate how such 
readings 'close down' the images. They hide other possibilities offered, 
including, in My Hustler, the presence of Genevieve Charbon. Both 
Lyons' body in the studios of Mapplethorpe, and Charbon's on the beach 
with Paul America, visually create a point of indiscernibility not adequately 
controlled by queer readings of the individual works or even the careers 
in which they are situated.
For Brasell, the banal conversation and tight framing create a 
claustrophobic space of heightened homoerotic sexual tension. That 
Brasell notes how other critics have missed this is evidence that the 
ambiguity of the image yet remains for those unaware of gay subculture 
15. Such readings are crystallizations, or actualizations of the virtual 
space of the image, made all the more reflexive by the later use of mirrors 
(the bathroom mirror), but also by the multiple gazes (those of Ed Hood, 
Genevieve Charbon and Joe Campbell16), of fictional characters not 
quite separated from the real people who play them. Significantly, it is 
when Charbon enters the frame that the previously detached sound and 
image fully coalesce -  except that this only serves to make more complex 
the crystal image by further making ambiguous the identification inherent 
in looking at Paul. Any attempt to create an action-image, such as a
15 Ibid, Brasell, 1992, p. 64.
16 Stephen Koch has Ed MacDermott credited in this role, whilst Tony Rayns has Joseph 
Campbell. The general consensus is that it is Joseph Campbell, cf. Koch, 1985, p. 81. cf. Rayns, 
1971, p. 123, &  1997, p. 85.
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directed queer reading, is confounded. The presence of Charbon cannot 
be brushed aside as simply the presence of a ‘fag-hag’ to make the ‘John’ 
jealous and provide camp comedy. When Ed Hood talks of Genevieve 
running her fingers through Paul’s hair, what is it that really prevents the 
assumption that Hood is jealous of him rather than jealous of hert There 
is much more at stake with the ‘fag-hag’ (and when she enters the 
homoerotic space) in terms of gay subculture, if not the Warhol coterie in 
particular, than readings such as Brasell’s suggest. Ultimately, the image 
and sound of this sequence of My Hustler ensure that we can never really 
be assured of just who exactly is desiring who:
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What this all suggests is that Warhol’s films, at least up to his work with 
Paul Morrissey, do not easily fit into the queer readings that his later films 
might do.
One of the dominant threads in the writing on Andy Warhol, and in 
particular the writing on his films, is that of sexuality in general, and 
homoeroticism in particular. What is clear for us is that the development 
of more conventional narrative in Warhol’s cinema -  and the 
simultaneous emphasis on camp -  actualized some of the images of 
sexuality more than others, and closed off many of the possible routes 
that Warhol’s cinema could have taken. When Mapplethorpe 
photographed Lyons, he exposed the process by which sexualised 
readings of his images might be made just as he exposed the process of 
making refined studio photographs. Mapplethrope's career is still 
dominated by its homoerotic culture, however. Similarly, My Hustler is an 
extraordinary film because it reveals that process of 'closing-off in 
Warhol's career as it was happening.
What this does reveal, however, is that Warhol was deeply interested in 
the signification involved in visual representation. It also becomes clear 
that it is necessary to consider the process that Warhol seems to be 
mapping in the static framing of My Hustler. This is the coming-into-being 
of the sexualised image, rather than its finite interpretation, whilst it
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demonstrates that the crystal is the photographic image that comes into 
being. In fact, we must consider whether or not we have, at the centre of 
this environment, a photographic ‘becoming’, and to do so we must bring 
into our study at last one of the other great planks of Deleuze’s 
philosophy, that of becoming itself.
Becoming-photography
A Thousand Plateaus, part of Deleuze’s work with Felix Guattari, is 
valuable to us because it demonstrates the various abstract machines 
that perpetuate the hierarchies of which they were suspicious 17. 
Structures of language are rooted in fundamental differences. Similarly, 
structures of visual language are based on a fundamental difference 
expressed in the face. The becoming-world is converted to a face, or a 
landscape that assumes faciality. Since the face forms an “important loci 
of resonance” in signification, we look at the face of a person speaking to 
concretise what is being said to us. Thus Deleuze argues that it is only 
part of our nature, our becoming, to facialize any image in this way18. But 
in so doing Deleuze opens up the potential for movement within the fixed 
image, in the form of intensity, that we can take to the photographic 
image. It is now clear at this stage of the thesis that the movement of 
objects in space and time is not necessary to the time-image. We 
therefore need to understand the way in which time unfolds within the 
image, since all the terminology that bases itself on logical progression is 
ultimately inadequate to deal with it. It is the particular interaction of 
tense, the ‘running into each other’ of virtual image and actual image that 
creates the crystal. It is this involution, or intension, within the image that 
creates its enormous, a-chronological power, the power that leads to the 
immense and complex structure of the crystal. This is a different 
movement within the image, still a variation of speed and slowness, but in 
speed and slowness in intensity, made by the ‘running into each other’ of 
elements of the image.
17t h p .
18 Ibid p. 168.
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But the real lesson of Deleuze and Guattari’s work on the face is that of 
deterritorialization. The abstract machine, the facialized image for 
example, reterritorializes the universe. It takes the open and diverse and 
enforces and often abstract order that constricts any possible 
permutations. Facialization is a 'closing-down' of potential meaning and 
effect. What Deleuze argues for is an understanding of absolute 
deterritorialization: the abandonment of conventions and hierarchies - the 
facializing discourse - and the open potentiality of progression -  a line of 
flight -  from the image. This is to understand the dualism of face and 
landscape and the potential to go beyond it, to create an image where the 
“cutting edges of deterritorialization become operative...forming strange 
new becomings, new polyvocalities”19 To cast off such ‘traits’ of the face, 
to create a deterritorialized image, one must exist as becoming.
The concept of the monadic continuum is expressed here through 
discussion of molecularity and molarity. Molar entities are abstract 
assemblages, created by abstract machines. Singular and fixed, they 
hide the multiple becoming of the universe. Becoming has its own parts, 
or plateaus, that make up a continuum. These are waves of becoming 
that intersect each other, but above all, intersect the culture that 
surrounds us. It is a mistake to assume that Deleuze and Guattari’s vision 
of becoming discounts the exterior, and merely deals with a sort of self­
becoming. Context is doubly important to becoming, since what we once 
called the context of a work, or a person, is now simply a point in their 
molecular becoming. Deleuze and Guattari conceive of becoming as a 
continuum of experience that includes the effects of the abstract machine. 
In one of the most elemental molar hierarchies, they see in particular 
‘man as a standard’, against which becoming-animal, becoming-woman, 
or ultimately becoming-imperceptible are ranged. To avoid such 
hierarchies, one must be imperceptible in their terms, but to be so, one 
has to negotiate these plateaus (and more) that intervene, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari. Care must be taken to avoid stumbling into
19 Ibid p. 191.
238
essentializing difference however. For Deleuze and Guattari, to see man 
as the standard is simply the acknowledgement of a majority in fact:
When we say majority, we are referring not to a greater relative 
quantity but to a determination of a state or standard in relation to 
which larger quantities, as well as the smallest, can be said to 
minoritarian...
Becoming is a negotiation with the molarity, or majority, of man in the 
sense that hierarchies are organised with this majority in mind. Man is the 
molar entity against which molecular entities are ranged:
It is not a question of knowing whether there are more mosquitoes 
or flies than men, but of knowing how ‘man’ constituted a standard 
in the universe in relation to which men necessarily form a 
majority.20
Becoming is molecular, and involves plateaus that in turn make up a 
block of becoming, but this is always seen in terms of its abstraction. 
Since the abstraction of film is the movement-image, and the abstraction 
of the photograph is the silent, immobile decisive moment, the time-image 
in photography (and of course, cinematography) is the result of 
becoming-minoritarian. Films, photographs, or any other part of our 
hoped-for becoming will reveal their relationship with the majority: 
becoming-minoritarian will be another plateau for them. This immediately 
suggests that to understand film, a study must at some point negotiate 
the molarity of filmmaker as author, as well as the molarity that has 
become 'avant-garde cinema'. We must avoid giving primacy to any one 
set of circumstances that influence film and photography.
An example that turns up in the Cinema books and in A Thousand 
Plateaus, is Moby Dick\ a becoming that encompasses John Fluston and 
Flerman Melville, film and book, not to mention the whale itself. For 
Deleuze, the narrative trajectory of Huston’s film/Melville’s book is as 
important as either author: “Captain Ahab has an irresistible becoming-
20 Ibid p. 291.
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whale”21. Deleuze’s view takes in the input of writer, director, and the 
possible exterior influences or projections (from J.M.W. Turner to Orson 
Welles) of this becoming 22. All these are quanta of the becoming that is 
most conveniently described as ‘Moby Dick’. This demands an alternative 
way of seeing Deleuze’s approach to the work not in terms of a 
relationship of author to text, but one in which each forms a greater or 
lesser part of a becoming that extends outward towards a whole that 
remains open. To centre a phenomenological approach to, say, 
authorship, around the text, the author, or even reception of the work, is 
to create a phenomenon that is molar in nature and centred only by 
abstract organisation according to rules of criticism. Such criticism does 
not look for patterns in such relationships, but moulds such relationships 
around pre-existent patterns. If anything, authorship remains central to 
becoming because authorship is a becoming which has a molecular 
structure involving these. The influence of one part on the other is by 
mutation or contagion, as we discovered with My Hustler. New readings 
may be made of Warhol's film, and each will be an actualisation of the 
whole of the becoming. Whether or not they take in the primacy of 
Warhol, they are restricted by the paradigms of authorship analysis 
around which his life is wrapped - his gayness, his campness, his 
Catholicism, and so on. Such becomings must be seen as assemblages, 
in the sense that they are, as Deleuze describes, “multiplicities with 
heterogenous terms, co-functioning by contagion” from which any order is 
the development of such assemblages into abstract organisations. 
Deleuze’s advance from this is not to differentiate between types of 
becoming as if they were different species of animal, but instead to treat 
all becomings as if they all had the same multiple characteristic -  as if 
they were an animal pack. It is these that we organise in culture, in order 
to make sense of them, by grouping them around a molarity:
That is why the distinction we must make is less between kinds of 
animals than between the different states according to which they
21 Ibid p. 243.
22 TI, pp. 72-73.
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are integrated into family institutions, State apparatuses, war
machines etc.23
In a closer analysis, film criticism is the organisation of the author/text into 
an abstract machine, limited to the direct influences on the filmmaker, his 
or her life, or the film’s social reception, or other dynamic yet abstract 
models. But to discount these processes is to miss the point: the 
understanding of becoming is not a destructive force that negates the 
study of abstract machines, it is the study of abstract machines. To 
understand the becoming of photography, we must understand it as an 
abstract machine.
Vilem Flusser proposes just such an understanding of abstraction in 
photography. Flusser work preceded (and predicted some of) the 
extraordinary influence of abstract ideological apparatus in photography, 
centred not on the image or camera necessarily, but instead on the 
culture surrounding it. For Flusser, this represents in fact an abstract 
machine. As we saw, the Cartesian image, connected physically to the 
camera as apparatus, is merely an actual image of a virtual world. This 
actual/virtual relationship does not escape Flusser, who notes that “...the 
world is only a pretext for the states of things that are to be produced, but 
[only] amongst the possibilities of the camera’s program”. Flusser’s 
expression of hope is that there are photographers who will realise that 
they exist within the camera, and the coming into being of photography of 
which they are a part. For us, Flusser’s “pretext for the states of things” 
tells us that not only is there a process or operation at stake, but that the 
photograph itself, as well as the camera, is part of it. The process of 
photography in Flusser is molecular: it is quantum photography24
For Flusser, the photograph as a ‘state of things’ is an abstraction of 
Manichean simplicity, of which the zenith is the black-and-white image.
But even colour photographs, that convert a more complex code (but a
23 THP, pp. 242-243.
24 TPP, p. 35 -  see also p. 67: “The photographic universe is made up of such little pieces, made 
up of quanta...”
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code nonetheless) only extend this abstraction. For Flusser this creates 
an interesting paradox, or more appropriately, a mixture of fictions:
Black-and-White photographs are more concrete and in this sense 
more true: They reveal their theoretical origin more clearly: The 
‘more genuine’ the colours of the photograph become, the more 
untruthful they are, the more they conceal their theoretical origin.25
Flusser therefore shares Deleuze’s suspicion of the flat image as abstract 
machine that reveals itself only in dualisms. For Flusser, it is the double 
dualism of black-and-white, and of black-and-white and colour. For 
Deleuze, it is the dualism of face and landscape. The abstraction of the 
image to become a face, even for images of everyday inanimate objects, 
constitutes a ‘facialization’ that in turn leads to an organisation of the 
picture plane, in a further abstraction, the face dissipates as a face and 
re-emerges -  reterritorialised -  as landscape. All images become 
landscapes, or faces. Again there is a further, double, dualism or 
articulation. Not only is the facialization one of ‘black holes on white walls’ 
-  shapes that are actualised once and for all, the black holes creating 
patterns on the plane as writing does on paper -  but this actual image 
becomes part of a larger abstract machine, as it enters into processes of 
identification and language that seek to fix its meaning:
Concrete faces cannot be assumed to come ready-made. They 
are engendered by an abstract machine offaciality (visageite), 
which produces them at the same time as it gives the signifier its 
white wall and subjectivity its black hole.26
Thus the odalisque, as we saw, is an abstract machine offaciality that, by 
reproducing the body in repose as if it were the “passional face of a loved 
one”, organises the space of looking into one of easily coded desire:
It is not the individuality of the face that counts but the efficacy of 
the ciphering it makes possible, and in what cases it makes 
possible.27
25 Ibid p. 44.
26THP, p. 168.
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The genealogy of the body-as-face In the odalisque, that includes 
courtesan and goddess, forces the facialization with such strength that 
any concrete interpretation -  not least in terms of gender, or orientalist 
exoticism -  actually collapses. The facialized codes of Venus and 
odalisque are so strong in Olympia that her gaze becomes a line of flight: 
Sometimes the abstract machine, as the faciality machine, forces 
flows into signifiances and subjectifications...to the extent that it 
performs a veritable ‘defacialization’...28
For My Hustler too, the instant recognisability of the odalisque frees the 
image from concrete interpretation. Rather than create a signification for 
the image, Paul America as odalisque deterritorializes it.
Thus Deleuze intersects all the dualisms or binary codes that inform the 
image: face/landscape; white wall/black hole; signifiance/subjectification, 
and he does so in the light of the face’s most important power: to signify. 
For Deleuze, a release comes in total deterritorialization, face becomes 
landscape, becomes face, becomes imperceptible as either. For Flusser, 
the release comes from a similar deterritorialization from the encoded 
programming of the black box, and the abstract machine of the 
photographic universe. The photographers that Flusser talks about have 
the potential to break free from the Cartesian program encoded in the 
camera by exerting themselves beyond it. They are the embodiment of 
the new abstract machines that Deleuze finally calls upon; freeing 
themselves from the faciality machine to become Deleuze’s probe-heads\ 
“breaking through the walls of signifiance and pouring out of the holes of 
subjectivity” 29
For a photographer to catch a glimpse of photography as becoming, they 
can no longer consider it in terms of singular elements. Becoming is not 
revealed in the molar, but in the molecular, and one has to be prepared to 
accept the multiple assemblages of becoming, and the multiple stages, or 
involutions of becoming that Deleuze sets out. Ultimately the task is to
27 Ibid p. 175.
28 Ibid p. 190.
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reveal the becoming of photography, to reveal becoming-photography, 
and that must include an understanding of imitation that reflects the 
photographic universe: photography does not imitate reality, but 
constitutes a block of becoming-reality.30 Flusser’s photographers, in this 
way, do not see the photograph as reality, but as an imitation of reality, 
since they appreciate that they can never know the full extent of their 
black-box. Perhaps the key to understanding the genetic element of 
photography, the becoming of photography, is to understand this type of 
photographer; who sees the abstract machine for what it is, and who 
constitutes a block of becoming-photography. To do so is to also 
understand Deleuze’s plateaus of becoming: becoming-animal; 
becoming-molecular; becoming-woman; and becoming-imperceptible. 
Perhaps, on the basis of My Hustler, Andy Warhol was someone who 
realised for himself both Deleuze’s and Flusser’s abstract machines in 
fact, rather than in writing.
*  *  *
Becoming Andy Warhol
It’s certain that Warhol’s life and work defy any simple classification. 
However, instead of considering how becoming is represented by any 
particular output of Warhol’s; perhaps it is better to think of Warhol in 
terms of a block of becoming that is occasionally revealed by such output.
The surface of Warhol’s work misrepresents the complexity that is 
uncovered by many of the studies of his career. There are hints of a 
carefully sequestered private life, private even from the social life that 
Warhol enjoyed as a figurehead of New York’s avant-garde. In his 
contribution to The Andy Warhol Museum, the book published in 
conjunction with the inauguration of the museum in Pittsburgh dedicated 
to the artist’s life and work, Richard Hellinger points to facets of Warhol’s 
persona that were only revealed after his untimely death in 1987, and 
indeed seem to have been unknown to all but a very few of those who
29 Ibid p. 191.
30 Ibid p. 305: “Becoming is not imitating...One does not imitate, one constitutes a block of
knew him. Hellinger notes the enormous collection of fine art that helped 
fill to overflowing some of the rooms of Warhol’s Manhattan townhouse, 
an understanding of art history that was only hinted at by Warhol’s 
‘Magpie-ish’ 1969 show Raiding the Icebox 1 with Andy Warhol.31 The 
townhouse and warehouses were also filled with Time Capsules, boxes 
filled with objects that Warhol took a fancy to, for some reason or another, 
over a period of time, sometimes a day, sometimes more, sometimes 
less. It seems, from the evidence of all this, that Warhol was not only a 
person for whom the strata of his life extend much deeper than his public 
persona, but that he was also a person who lived his life at various 
intensities of speed and slowness, and whose art continues to extend 
beyond the public person and the word ‘Warhol’.
However it is not wise to jump to conclusions over the way in which 
Warhol represents, or stands for, New York, its avant-garde, or certain 
values of modern art in general. Warhol defies the kind of metonymic 
concatenation that Barthes saw in Albert Einstein, who became facialized 
in signs that incorporated values that took over in language and culture 
from the person and outlived him 32. The two signs of Einstein, his own 
face and the equation E=mc_, have become facialized onto the surfaces 
of popular culture.
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Metonymy, in this sense, is a result of the abstract machine offaciality. 
But it fails to do the same to Warhol, however, not only because the 
reach of Warhol encompasses so many other things, but also because 
Warhol continues to change to this day, as new Time Capsules are 
opened by the archivists, and new elements of his work uncovered.
The irony of all this, as we shall see, is that Warhol the man may have 
even dreamed of becoming the abstract machine that could not define
becoming.”
31 Richard Hellinger, ‘The Archives of the Andy Warhol Museum’, in Callie Angell et al. The 
Andy Warhol Museum, (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Institute, 1994), pp. 195-203.
32 Roland Barthes, ‘The Brain of Einstein’, in Mythologies, 3rd edn. (London: Vintage, 1993, c.
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him. One of Warhol’s most famous images, and which hangs in front of 
the door at the Pittsburgh museum, is his self-portrait photo-silkscreen of 
1986. It is an implosion of the abstract forces of facialization: to be 
confronted by a self-portrait of Warhol, particularly a photographic one 
that lugs with it the baggage of truth to reality, is not to be confronted by a 
representation of the values of Warhol, but instead a probe-head. The 
image refers to the Warhol that cannot be facialized.
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Indeed, if Warhol is facialized in any way, it is through his silkscreens of 
Marilyn Monroe or Elvis, or any one of his Campbell’s Condensed Soup 
paintings of 1966. These images often ‘stand for’ Warhol, but never truly 
manage to stand for Warhol. It is often difficult not to think of Warhol at 
the mention of the name Marilyn Monroe. Just as, in the case of the 
Monroe images silkscreens, one is “ever mindful of her tragic life” as 
Deren Van Coke put it, it is just as impossible to think of Monroe and not 
immediately call the multiple images to mind 33. These people, even as 
myths, become part of Warhol, rather than him becoming part of their 
stardom or fame.
‘Warhol’ also extends through the people, the coterie, that filled and filed 
through his Factory, the establishment that was the workshop for much of 
his art. The names of Edie Sedgwick, Candy Darling, or Velvet 
Underground and Nico cannot escape the entity from which they are lines 
of flight. As David James notes, the actors of Warhol’s films became, and 
in many ways still are, the vocabulary of the public intercourse about 
Warhol 34: in some ways it is even difficult to watch Elizabeth Taylor on 
screen, especially in National Velvet. At present, it would be obvious to 
say that Warhol remains very much in the public eye through recent films, 
including Mary Harron’s I Shot Andy Warhol and Julian Schnabel’s 
Basquiat (both 1996). The word ‘Warhol’ continues to be uttered, or
1957), pp. 86-71.
33 Deren Van Coke, The Painter and the Photograph: from Delacroix to Warhol, (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1972), p. 73.
34 David E. James, ‘The Producer as Author’, Wide Angle: A Film Quarterly o f Theory, Criticism,
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facialized, every time someone becomes a minor celebrity, or when 
sixties graphics are back in fashion. Jonas Mekas, Amy Taubin, Gerard 
Malanga and others are still writing. It is becoming clear that this was a 
man who did not so much lead a double life, but a multiple one in which 
he as a person was startlingly anonymous. Indeed, seldom do we ever 
actually deal with Warhol the person, only parts of something much 
larger.
With Warhol, we do not so much deal with an artist who had a finite 
career, or who dealt with specific themes easily identified, or for whom it 
is easy to mark the limits of his influence. That particular Andy Warhol 
never existed. There is only becoming-Warhol. Warhol, it seems, has a 
molecular existence. No single part stands for Warhol, not even the man. 
New discoveries, new connections, new objects found in the Time 
Capsules: they do not make becoming-Warhol any larger, but instead 
reveal more strata that was obscured beforehand. Each box is merely a 
crystallization of an intensity felt in becoming-Warhol, just as those 
periods of excited activity and slow burn constitute variations of speed 
and slowness.
Any of the people or objects can be seen as lines of flight from the whole. 
They are all Warhol. This is the becoming-animal of Warhol: the pack-like 
nature of the people and works that make up Warhol. In terms of the 
plastic arts, he transcended the traditional disciplines of industrial design 
(illustration) and fine art. In terms of activity within those disciplines, 
widespread knowledge of his work extends far beyond the fervent periods 
of his career. Just as each piece of art facializes Warhol but fails to 
adequately represent the entirety of Warhol, so they also connect in the 
same way an animal pack connects. It is almost pointless to conceive of 
‘a Warhol’ film, print, or happening as any kind of singularity, or as if it 
had occurred in some kind of artistic vacuum. Nor would it be any less 
absurd to try and crystallise Warhol in his/its entirety. Critical discourse is 
instead quicker to isolate a piece as ‘a Warhol’ than it is defined as print 
or film, just as science is happy to classify animals by species. No single
and Practice 7, no. 3 (May 1985), pp. 24-33, p. 32.
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characteristic identifies Warhol, and it is not sufficient to consider his work 
historically, since its influence is felt today. As Deleuze might put it: 
Without a definite coda to Warhol, certainly not in his lifetime and now 
clearly not since his death, Warhol is a verb, rather than a noun. It is not a 
question of one or several Warhols, but that there is only Warholing 35.
It is difficult to find an origin from which Warhol’s personal motivation 
issued, since the great influences on his life might precede Warhol, but 
are fundamentally changed in the eyes of art criticism by his connection. 
Arthur C. Danto re-instigates the critical link between Warhol and Marcel 
Duchamp, whose own controversial use of mass-produced objects -  in 
particular the ‘readymades’ -  gives Danto reason to question Warhol’s 
originality. For Danto, Warhol’s Brillo Boxes (1963) fail because they are 
indistinguishable from the ‘real’ thing, and are thus pale imitations of 
Duchamp’s use of the real thing 36. But perhaps Danto misses Warhol’s 
point, and the point of Warholing: that originality is not, and never has 
been an issue, except for the status of art objects by those only interested 
in labels. Perhaps Warhol’s lack of originality, or more precisely, lack of 
origin, is not something to be considered a failure. The fact that Duchamp 
and Warhol shared ideas is clear, not just from their short-lived 
collaboration in film (Warhol was to shoot a 24 hour movie of a day in 
Duchamp’s life). But Warhol’s use of ready-made objects quickly 
extended beyond household objects to include household names and 
faces. It is unlikely that any urinal will be seen as ‘Duchampian’, but it is 
arguable that Marilyn Monroe, star, image and even person, is ‘a Warhol’ 
in popular culture before any other connection is made. Monroe was 
Warhol’s ‘readymade’.
Warhol defies an origin as much as he does a definitive public persona. 
Whilst there definitely was a famous decadent New York artist who called 
himself Andy Warhol, this was the pseudonym of a man who lived with 
his mother, Julia Warhola; who stood behind a barrier, snapshot camera
35 THP, p. 239: “The Wolf is not fundamentally one characteristic or a certain number of 
characteristics; it is a Wolfing.”
36 Arthur C. Danto, ‘The Philosopher as Andy Warhol’, in Callie Angell et al. The Andy Warhol 
Museum, (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Institute, 1994), pp. 73-91, p. 81.
in hand, to meet the Pope; and was a devout Catholic until his death.
Even the simplest biographies have to start with the Andrew Varchola 
who left Pittsburgh to make his fortune as an illustrator. Warhol the public 
artist appears to have had a severe reaction to the attention his activities 
received from the sixties onwards, particularly after the attempt on his life 
by Valerie Solanas (another ‘event’ which eventually becomes a 
Warholing, particularly through Harron’s film). However, instead of 
becoming a recluse in his workshop, Warhol only embraced all the more 
his superstar lifestyle. Given that his works are more recognisable than 
he was (a common occurrence in any of the plastic arts) Warhol might 
have felt complimented by Danto’s criticism that ‘he became what he did’. 
But even this undervalues the near total success and sheer innovation of 
Warhol’s becoming-imperceptible 37. For Warhol the artist and person, the 
best hiding was hiding in plain sight: disappearing could only be achieved 
by being ever present to the point that his attendance at parties, on 
television, at gala events, became passe. Whilst it is not unusual to 
change one’s name when entering public life (Warhol also dyed his hair 
grey from an early age), he also had himself on the books for modeling 
agencies, and was reputed to be happy to advertise anything. As his 
explicit authorship was gradually erased in his films, as David James 
notes, so his never-presence in public life was enforced by his ever-
O Opresence.
Naming his workshop The Factory gives only a hint of Warhol’s desire to 
become imperceptible within his manufacture of art. He was interested in, 
if not obsessed with, recording his life using machines: movie cameras, 
photographs, tape-recorders, video cameras -  but never writing. As 
Richard Hellinger writes, there is precious little written correspondence by 
Warhol, but plenty of recorded telephone conversations.39 So many, in 
fact, that the sheer number and volume becomes un-listenable in its 
entirety. Thus the constant availability of recordings only serves to make 
Warhol disappear even further. Warhol spoke to Benjamin Buchloch of 
developing a painting machine “that paints all day long for you and do it
37 Danto, 1994, p. 89.
38 James, 1985, p. 26.
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really well, and you could do something else instead, and you could turn 
out really wonderful canvasses” 40, demonstrating an understanding, even 
in jest, of the abstract machine. Whilst such a self-confessed ‘fantasy’ 
seems to eliminate the authorial process that Buchloch, and Danto, seem 
to hold dear, it actually demonstrates the author’s necessary role as part 
of becoming-molecular. The abstract machine offers a way for artists to 
free themselves from the molar identity into which they are sometimes 
thrust by art criticism, and hence the restrictions of its limited universe, 
and instead enter a molecular relationship with their work that involves 
other influences. Becoming-imperceptible, it seems, is not only the 
freeing of the artwork from the author, but the author from the artwork. If 
Warhol indeed shared Deleuze’s suspicion of molarity and desired to 
become imperceptible, he demonstrated this through his direct embrace 
with the abstract machine. Could it be that Warhol understood the power 
of the abstract machine, in Deleuzean terms, before Deleuze himself 
articulated it?
Perhaps, paradoxically, becoming-imperceptible is also ‘revealed’ in the 
increasing campness of the later film work, continuing through the Paul 
Morrissey-directed 'Andy Warhol' productions. Warhol was increasingly 
able to hide behind an easily recognizable visageity of camp as his own 
practical control decreased. The popular conception and appeal of ‘camp’ 
facializes aberrant sexuality, to the extent that it creates significances that 
no longer need to be negotiated but instead are treated as if they ‘go 
without saying’: Different sexuality becomes imperceptible because the 
fixing of cultural codes under the overly-generalised ‘camp’ makes the 
unspeakable unspoken. However this has the same effect as the 
development of narrative and movement-image: that is to facialize 
completely what had once been a free-indirect discourse. The fluid 
relationship that Warhol had with women, or more precisely woman, 
becomes imperceptible. Camp obscures such fluidity by making easily 
readable what was once ambiguous, and what was essentially 
ambiguous in My Hustler was the becoming-woman of Warhol.
39 See He 1 linger, 1994.
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If we are to understand becoming-Warhol, we have to consider Warhol in 
terms of becoming-woman, for as Deleuze put it: “...all becomings begin 
with and pass through becoming woman”. 41 But what is becoming- 
woman in terms of Warhol and his work? Warhol and Duchamp both 
assumed a transvestite identity (Warhol was famously photographed in 
drag by Christopher Makos; Duchamp -  as the character Rrose Selavy -  
by Man Ray) in photographs 42. Even on the surface there are clear 
parallels between the facialization of Duchamp’s becoming-woman with 
Warhol’s. Also, the sexual politics of men fighting over/for a man/woman 
in My Hustler also has echoes of Duchamp’s The Large Glass (The Bride 
Stripped Bare by her Bachelors, Even) of 1913. However, Warhol’s 
becoming-woman did not involve a desire centred on his person, or on 
how his body appeared, but instead involved his consumption of images, 
and in particular the images of stars. This was where his ‘readymades’ 
departed from Duchamp’s (and changed both in the process). The 
perfection of the camerawork in My Hustler, or the repetition of Monroe’s 
photograph, was part of a negotiation with the image, particularly the 
photographic image of the star, and this negotiation was the major 
element of Warhol’s becoming-woman.
There is a strong tendency to classify immediately Warhol’s cinema as a 
queer cinema, or his gaze as a homoerotic one, and subsequently 
classify his treatment of women as one of ‘identification with’, rather than 
‘desire for’ them. The focus of much of this critical writing on Warhol’s 
film’s, when not on the homoerotic gaze exclusively, in any case 
organises the various representations of men and women into roles in 
which homosexuality, its attendant anxieties, and the cultural mores 
attached to it are further crystallised. For example, Amy Taubin writes
40 Benjamin Buchloch, “Conversation with Andy Warhol”, October 70, (Fall 1994), pp. 37-45, 
pp. 44-45.
41 THP, p. 277.
42 David Hopkins, “The Politics of Equivocation: Duchamp’s Compensation Portrait and 
Surrealism in America 1942-45”, seminar paper given at the University of Glasgow, 14th 
February 2001. See also, David Hopkins, 'Douglas Gordon as Gavin Turk as Andy Warhol as 
Marcel Duchamp as Sarah Lucas', in twoninetwo, issue 2, 2001, pp. 93-105. Hopkins uses a 
recent photograph by Douglas Gordon to emphasise the visual (and thus metonymic, or 
symbolic) connections evident in Gordon's appearance in drag, which Hopkins connects to 
Monroe, Myra Hindley, and Warhol.
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that Warhol’s identification with Shirley Temple constituted a “deeply 
transvestite position”. But this assumption precludes any fluidity of 
identification based on stardom itself, or even the possibility of a not- 
easily-identified sexuality: Warhol was homosexual, ergo his identification 
with Shirley Temple, Mae West, or Marilyn Monroe was organised along 
specifically (and culturally) queer lines that have been cemented in 
popular culture. Whilst Taubin claims that Warhol ‘destabilised’ sexual 
identity, her understanding of this destabilisation is only in terms of a 
reterritorialisation of identity onto other fixed notions:
In Warhol’s films sexual identity is never naturalised. Constructed 
as a masquerade, it’s an imperfect shield for a terrible anxiety 
about sexual difference. The Warhol superstars are either drag 
queens (Mario Montez, Fred Herko, Candy Darling), or women 
who exaggerate their femininity out of fear of being mistaken for 
boys (Edie Sedgwick, Viva), or studs (Gerard Malanga, Joe 
Dallesandro), whose obsessive focus on their own groins suggests 
a secret suspicions things might not be in order.43
What is interesting about this interpretation of Warhol’s coterie, or their 
representation on screen, is not the interpretation itself, but the fact that 
the abstract machine upon which these interpretations are formed is not 
discussed. Warhol’s superstars for the most part were made so by their 
roles in either the events or the art that came from the Factory. The 
identities they assumed, or which are pinned on them afterwards, are 
facializations, and yet critics seem to know or care little about the process 
that creates them. Such readings have difficulty dealing with the 
possibilities of desire involved in Warhol’s photographing of women. The 
photography that precedes My Hustler, particularly of women, resists 
such simplistic interpretation. For example, if Warhol’s later films, such as 
Bike Boy or Lonesome Cowboys (both 1967) are homoerotic “meditations 
on the male body”, then are we to think of The Thirteen Most Beautiful
43 Amy Taubin, ‘* * * * ’ in Colin MacCabe, Mark Francis &  Peter Wollen eds., Who is Andy 
Warhol, (London: BFI, 1997), pp. 23-32, p. 29. See also Amy Taubin, ‘My Time Is Not Your 
Time’, Sight and Sound 4, no. 6 (June 1994), p. 20-24.
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Women, or Poor Little Rich Girl as hetero-erotic meditations on the 
female body
To pigeonhole sexuality runs against the Deleuzean understanding of a 
‘thousand sexualities’ that constitute sexual becoming. For Deleuze, 
sexuality is “badly explained by the binary organization of the sexes,” and 
this is true in terms of both hetero/homosexual identification and its 
cultural mores, and masculine and feminine identification itself45.
Similarly becoming-woman cannot be facialized in terms of transvestism. 
All becoming passes through becoming-woman, since becoming- 
molecular has to negotiate the central dualism of culture: woman 
culturally opposed to man. But rather than this leading to a continuance of 
the fundamental binarism of otherness that underpins psychoanalysis for 
example, becoming-woman is the primary quantum of becoming that 
leads to becoming-imperceptible.
The difficulty with dealing with Deleuze’s understanding of becoming- 
woman is the ever-presence of the binary system that it deconstructs, but 
is easily capable of falling in with. Flowever, becoming-molecular does not 
issue from the binary values attached to male/female. Instead 
molecularity is an opposition to the molarity of masculinity and femininity 
that such values create. In this way, the cultural constructions of 
femininity, particularly involving the masquerade of feminine identity, only 
constitute becoming-woman because they are cultural constructions. It is 
the negotiation of these that constitute becoming-woman, not the 
adoption of any essentially female characteristic:
When the man of war disguises himself as a woman, flees 
disguised as a girl, hides as a girl, it is not a shameful or transitory 
incident in his life. To hide, to camouflage oneself, is a warrior 
function... Although the femininity of the man of war is not 
accidental, it should not be thought of as structural, or regulated by 
a correspondence of relations. 46
44 Koch, 1987, p. 85.
45 THP, p. 278.
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In this sense, any becoming-imperceptible involves becoming-woman. 
Thus My Hustler relies upon the odalisque as a feminine role in history: 
any multiple identification or desire for Paul America as odalisque, 
whether crystallised by heterosexual or homosexual interpretation, must 
pass through becoming-woman. The odalisque, like the masquerade, is 
part of becoming-woman that constitutes the becoming-molecular of man, 
but that is only later organised into homosexual or heterosexual 
identification by interpretation. Similarly, the ambiguities of those 
photographs of Lisa Lyons constitute a becoming-woman also, since it is 
the femininity of the work that is the aberration in the career of the 
photographer - a destabilizing presence. Genevieve Charbon now takes 
on a further dimension, since her presence as a girl opposes all possible 
molarities of identification -  man, woman, child, adult (Deleuze), to which 
we can add sexuality-as-a-fixed-identity. She is the destabilizing 
presence, preventing the body of Paul America to completely facialize as 
a purely homoerotic odalisque. This is why, for Deleuze, the girl is a ‘line 
of flight’, since her presence prevents, rather than fixes, concrete and 
organised identification. Genevieve’s body does not simply complicate 
the sexual tension of My Hustler, but instead prevents desire from 
assuming any final identity.
The ‘girl’ in Deleuze’s ideas on becoming-woman therefore has a 
particular power -  that of destabilizing, or deterritorialising identity, and 
particularly desires based around perceived identities. However, to 
conclude that this particularly powerful role is gendered would be to 
misunderstand the sense of becoming that Deleuze aims to explain. 
“Becoming-woman produces the universal girl” was Deleuze’s particular 
way of expressing how there is a universal value of becoming woman that 
exists before it is bifurcated toward heterosexual/homosexual desire and 
identification. For Warhol, what this suggests is that before his film 
production turned toward narrative, the ambiguity that created the free- 
indirect discourse of his camera-work was centred on the role of the girl. 
Again we should not jump to the conclusion that this excludes John 
Giorno, the sleeping Adonis of Warhol’s Sleep, or The Thirteen Most
46 Ibid p. 277.
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Beautiful Boys (1965), but instead take note of how the girl is a stage or 
plateau of becoming-woman, as Deleuze notes:
The girl or child do not become; it is becoming itself that is a child 
or girl...the girl is the becoming woman of each sex, just as the 
child is the becoming young of every age. 47
Thus the girl is a plateau of deterritorialized identification and desire, later 
facialized by culture, according to classifications and structures of 
sexuality. It is this ambiguity of identification and desire that is presented 
by the early portrait films of Warhol, as well as the Monroe silkscreens. 
Indeed, this as-yet-unfixed discourse of desire is evident in his connection 
to the stars of these pieces -  both the very public stars of Monroe, Elvis 
and Kennedy, but also the clique of ‘superstars’ -  Giorno, Paul America, 
Viva, Candy Darling, and International Velvet-who populated the 
Factory. So much so that the ‘universal girl’ is expressed through his, and 
their, becoming-star.
*  *  *
Adventures of the face
Both Tony Rayns and Matthew Tinkcom suggest that the consumption of 
stardom as a particular characteristic of gay culture -  to the extent that 
the two are inseparable. Tinkcom notes how fans “are rendered helpless 
in the sight of the star’s image”, and recognizes that “the ways that stars 
embody gay images...has been notoriously complex to document, 
especially given the ways that many gays have identified with female 
stars while desiring male stars.”48 Rayns, on the other hand, points to the 
uplifting effects of star glamour through negotiation by isolated gay men 
“exulting in vintage Hollywood fantasies of class, wealth and emotional 
fulfillment”, and for whom star consumption is an immensely fulfilling 
experience involving the ability to “mentally edit or re-direct movies, to
47 Ibid.
48 Matthew Tinkcom, ‘Warhol’s Camp’, in Colin MacCabe, Mark Francis &  Peter Wollen eds., 
Who is Andy Warhol, (London: BFI, 1997), p. 107-117, p. 113.
255
take from them what’s interesting, exciting or sexy and to repress or 
ignore the rest.”49
However, quite apart from the assumption that heterosexual fans do not 
consume stars in a similar way, this approach mis-recognizes as an 
essentially gay practice the complex identification and desire at work in 
the relationship between fan and star of either sex. Furthermore such an 
approach does not explore the abstract machine of photography at the 
heart of this relationship. By discounting the possibility of homosocial (or 
any other) identification these approaches nonetheless treat the star/fan 
relationship as a fixed discourse. But how else can this relationship be 
viewed?
For Richard Dyer, audience reaction to stars is one of consumption of 
values of which the star is a sign. Dyer notes the development across 
time in which the star moves from the status of god/goddess to that of 
person-in-the-street, a move demarcated by the coming of sound:
...in the early period, stars were gods or goddesses, heroes and 
models -  embodiments of ideal ways of behaving. In the later 
period, however, stars are identification figures, people like you 
and me -  embodiments of typical ways of behaving.50
However this involves a dualism difficult to fit over many of the stars in 
question: whilst Greta Garbo and John Gilbert might be godlike, or 
Woody Allen a face in the street, it also asks us to believe that stars such 
as Marilyn Monroe or Robert Redford are typical, whilst stars such as 
Buster Keaton or Mary Pickford are ideal.
Jackie Stacey, on the other hand, points to an active relationship between 
the female fan and female star that involves both senses of Dyer’s 
identification. Stars offer the fan images of ideal femininity that they 
acknowledge as being remote or unattainable. However, this is 
accompanied by, rather than being opposed to, various attempts at
49 Rayns, 1997, p. 84.
50 Richard Dyer, Stars, (London: BFI, 1979), p. 24.
becoming-star, the most common of which are the copying and imitation 
of stars through mimesis of performance, or extra-cinematic consumption 
of related fashions and products. This is therefore an acknowledgement 
of the ideal status of stars, but one that is not seen as something that 
cannot be made typical through a process of becoming. The pleasure is 
in the desire itself, rather than in the hoped-for stardom. Their desire to 
become stars is really a desire as becoming. Their acknowledgment of 
the “gap between star and fan” suggests that their imitation is the 
facialization of a real becoming-star.51
From this we can suggest that facialization is a particularly visible 
element of becoming-star, either by imitation, or by the consumption of 
star images via photographs. In this way Warhol’s cinematic relationship 
with women, realized to strong effect in The Thirteen Most Beautiful 
Women (1964), constituted a chance for him to do in film what he had 
done with Monroe in silkscreen. The adventures of identification 
associated with the star are reflected in the adventures of the very lines 
and shapes on the surface of the screen or print. Furthermore, Warhol 
seems to have been happier in these cases as audience, rather than as 
filmmaker, as Amy Taubin writes:
Like all newcomers to the factory, I was screen-tested: I was 
escorted into a makeshift cubicle and positioned on a stool; Warhol 
looked through the lens, adjusted the framing, instructed me to sit 
still and try not to blink, turned on the camera and walked away.52
Examples such as these constitute not only an awareness on Warhol’s 
part of the abstract machine, but a desire to be part of its becoming. In 
Warhol’s work, the facialization of the star no longer fixes the 
identification, but by repetition and deconstruction of the abstract machine 
-  photography -  allows it a line of flight toward total deterritorialization. It 
is the reduction of film to what Peter Gidal describes as “one extreme
51 Jackie Stacey, ‘Feminine Fascinations’, in Christine Gledhill, Stardom: industry o f  desire, 
(London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 141-166, p. 151.
52 Taubin, 1997, p. 25.
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function” that releases it from any sensory-motor schema 53. The face on 
screen becomes an adventure of the line on the surface of the image.
This is shown throughout the 'direct-view' screen tests that Warhol 
conducted (personally or not) through the sixties, and which make up the 
constituent parts of The Thirteen Most Beautiful Women and other films. 
This loose collection of filmed portraits (each 4 minutes in length), in 
which sitters do little more than stare at the camera, comprises both the 
anonymous and the notorious of The Factory's coterie of stars. Some of 
those filmed for the screen tests 'played up' to the camera: Eric Andersen 
and Debby Green kiss, whilst Nico drinks a beer from a can that catches 
the harsh lights of the studio. In these cases, they move towards the 
action-image, since they replicate or parody the shot in narrative cinema. 
On the other hand, the implacable and unblinking stare of Marea Menken, 
for example, opens up the shot to the contemplative. It is impossible, in 
watching the screen tests, not to let one's eyes wander across the image, 
constantly reinterpreting these stares. These are time-images, since they 
not only confound the expectations of filmed shots and photographic 
portraits at the same time, but also present the body as a locus of 
indeterminacy in response. The pre-hodological space waits to be filled 
with interpretation, yet simultaneously escapes it. In hers, Edie Sedgwick 
can be seen to break down as the effort of 'staring-out' the camera is too 
much. This moment draws the image back into action-image, and thus 
reveals the time-image that existed before. Once the stare (and the spell) 
is broken, one is free to return to the safety of the movement-image.
Edie's distress is our comfort. The time-image is revealed in the shot's 
movement from it. Previously the movement of the face was in the 
intensity of the fixed black-and-white image that threatened to move and, 
in her case, did.
Warhol and these films of his ‘stars’ demonstrate that the photographic 
image in general is dominated by facialization: photography should be 
seen as ‘adventures of the face’ (Deleuze saw music as ‘adventures of
53 Peter Gidal, ‘ ’The Thirteen Most Beautiful Women’ and ‘Kitchen” , in Michael O ’Pray ed., 
Andy Warhol: Film Factory, (London: BFI, 1989), pp. 118-123, p. 118.
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the refrain’) 54. It is the stasis of the screen tests that reveals their 
intensity, and the movement of black holes on white walls that prevents a 
total facialization. Billy Name's screen test, also completely still, involves 
such a vivid pattern of black and white that its negative image remains on 
the retina even as the film finishes and Billy Name fades to white. Nothing 
else could present Deleuze's black-hole-white-wall system with such 
efficacy, nor emphasise the racial ambiguities of both Warhol’s coterie 
and the black-hole-white-wall system themselves. The fade out is the 
recurring element in the screen tests that fully ensures deterritorialization, 
since, as the image fades to white, it is not replaced by another shot but 
instead by the memory of the face and its whiteness. Such memories, of 
course, possess unlimited possibilities, since there is no unifying chain of 
meaning into which the image fits. If one has no personal memory of 
Nico, an overt significance of her swilling beer is lost - but the image itself 
is no less significant. Nico's life, as does Dennis Hopper's, merely adds 
another layer to the crystal that emerges from the images. Memories of 
them simply actualize the virtual that is offered. Hopper's youth in the 
image (demonstrated by his preppy awkwardness) contrasts strongly with 
present day public perception of him, and his intervening life simply 
makes the crystal structure of actualizations more complex. In the face of 
this molar hierarchy of representation, his youthful awkwardness simply 
brings us back to Deleuze's molecular and universal girl.
Slide 79
Paul Mattick notes how the Monroe images in particular have a similar 
historical dimension because of the death of Monroe recent to their 
production. Mattick is critical of Thomas Crow, whose Barthesian view of 
the Monroe images is a fetishization of the person through the keepsake 
of the photograph, But he does note how influential the image of the 
superstar is to the gay subculture within which Warhol moved. Mattick 
crucially acknowledges a further dimension to the (in this case, gay) 
identification of stars, in that Monroe and other female movie stars were 
“representatives of desire and desirability, of the artificiality of gender
54 THP, p, 302.
259
roles”. This star identification is made even stronger when the star retains 
a youth and beauty through the image: “Monroe dead, for some 
purposes, can be superior to Monroe alive...”55
Thus the star is the universal girl; made only stronger by the mythology 
(even in the Barthesian sense) that surrounds Hopper and Monroe. 
Monroe presented desire itself as a becoming, beyond any sexualised 
constriction of it. Warhol engaged this mythical status, since as Mattick 
notes on Warhol’s immersion in mass culture, “the myths mattered”. In 
extending her myth, Monroe is made imperceptible in favour of desire and 
desirability. Hopper's career, independent of the New York avant-garde, 
has intervened in his case, to cloud over the image of desire that his 
youth represents. Not so Monroe, whose mythology was already in place 
and became part of something much larger through the silkscreens. The 
images no longer stand for Monroe, or Warhol, but becoming-Warhol, 
and the relationship with Monroe as star was an essential part of his 
becoming-woman. Since photography was so essential to the becoming- 
star of Monroe, it was only logical that it should be her photograph that 
Warhol was to deal with. The screen inks that colour the already 
simplified images of Monroe and the others add what Mattick describes 
as a “thin Warholian layer” to the image. Warhol was trying to insert 
himself into the process -  trying to become the abstract machine -  and 
thus continue his personal becoming-imperceptible.56
The serial repetition of the silkscreens emphasizes the coming-into-being 
of the image. Hand marks on the silkscreen reveal the human 
intervention in the manufacture: a presence that must be revealed in 
order for it to become imperceptible. In the same way, the apparatus of 
filming is inseparable from the image produced, since the sitters for the 
screen-tests know about Warhol’s presence, and for one reason or 
another are made to ignore it, often because Warhol indeed wasn’t there. 
This is a reflexivity that creates a circuit with the camera as abstract 
machine, in which Warhol as operator is imperceptible. There and not
55 Paul Mattick, "The Andy Warhol of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Andy Warhol", Critical 
Inquiry, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 965-987, p. 978.
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there, the presence of audience and filmmaker becomes audience as 
filmmaker. This is the free-indirect discourse at work: the camera- 
consciousness. The screen tests have a particular effect of creating a 
camera-consciousness by conflating the event of photography, the 
camera, and the screening. There are several legends of Warhol 
arranging screenings of early Vitascope films before setting out to begin 
filming in 1963 57. As in early cinema, camera and projector cannot be 
separated. Peter Gidal explains:
[In The Thirteen Most Beautiful Women] the filmapparatus can’t be 
meta-physically subtracted from the from the film, from the effects 
produced, which are given, here, as specific transformations of 
and in film and film-meaning.58
The ‘specific transformation’ here is the facialization of the sitters; the 
‘filmapparatus’ and film together are the abstract machine: “unstoppable, 
durable, unendurable” 59. Part of this abstract machine, part of this 
camera-consciousness, was Warhol.
Most prominent amongst Warhol’s ‘superstars’ was Edie Sedgwick, 
whose background as a spoilt rich-kid placed her in a milieu between the 
attainable stars of the Factory and the unattainable stars of Hollywood, 
the real-life star factory that Warhol’s establishment seems to have both 
admired and opposed. Sedgwick's films with Warhol included Beauty #2 
and Lupe (both 1965), however it is Poor Little Rich Girl (involving 
references to both Sedgwick’s own life and the 1936 Shirley Temple film 
of the same name) and the Outer and Inner Space (both 1965) that are 
both remembered. Both form parts of a series of films that Callie Angell, 
curator of The Andy Warhol Film Project describes as:
...basically extended portraits [that] can be regarded almost as 
documentaries -  straightforward, unscripted filmings of Edie simply 
being herself...In Warhol’s opinion, Edie was self-possessed and
56 Ibid pp. 984-985.
57 Tony Rayns notes that the Kiss series was possibly influenced by a screening of the single shot 
film The Kiss o f May Irvin and John C. Rice. Rayns, 1997, p. 83. Similarly, the Screen Test close 
up of John Cale's Lips (1965) mirrors such early sensation films as The Big Swallow.
58 Gidal, 1989, p. 118.
59 Ibid p. 121.
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fascinating enough just to carry a feature-length moving just by 
playing herself.60
Both films are bipartite in their own way. Like My Hustler, Poor Little Rich 
Girl consists of two 33 minute reels projected consecutively. Filmed and 
then re-shot by Warhol because of a focusing error on the first attempt, it 
is a combination of latter reel in and the earlier reel out of focus.
Slide 80
Outer and Inner Space, on the other hand, involves the projection of two 
similar 33 minute reels simultaneously and side by side. In a further 
mirroring or doubling, Edie is filmed in front of a video of her recorded 
earlier.
Slide 81
Where My Hustler involved the facialization of the body, what is at work in 
the first half of Poor Little Rich Girl is the deterritorialization of face into 
landscape. What was the figure in the landscape for My Hustler, is the 
figure (and face) as landscape in Poor Little Rich Girl. The abstract 
machine of photography, that Warhol was attempting to become a part of, 
has a double articulation in the first reel of Poor Little Rich Girl.
Similar deterritorialization of the face occurs in the image of Outer and 
Inner Space, although this time it does so because the doubling of Edie 
on screen forces further contemplation of her face and each image of it. 
This is reinforced by Edie's own reactions to the video behind her. The 
space created by the 'live' Edie and the recorded one is uncomfortable: 
the video image is often larger than the "slightly livelier 'live' Edie”. “Space 
is flattened, perspective destroyed", as J. Hoberman notes.61 Callie
60 Callie Angell, The Films o f  Andy Warhol: Part //(Screening Programme), (New York:
Whitney Museum of American Art, 1994), p. 22. Thanks must go to Callie Angell for providing 
these items personally.
61 J. Hoberman, 'Nobody's Land: inside Outer and Inner Space', programme essay for Andy 
Warhol & Sound and Vision exhibition, Institute of Contemporary Art, 28th July - 2nd September 
2001.
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Angell recognises "emotional fractures" that demonstrate an "increasingly 
unhappy subjectivity" as Edie is seen to wince at her own recording.62 
Such 'emotional fractures' are given visual presence in the refracting and 
reflecting image, whose differing camera angles of Edie's face act like a 
hall of mirrors. It is in this space that the time-image is given seed, and 
the space created is its environment. The pace of the film further 
compounds this as the two reels oppose each other - one zooms in whilst 
the other zooms out. The sense of linear past and future is made 
nonsense by these movements, since they seem simultaneously to open 
up and close down the image, suggesting the same occurs in time. 
Without a linear pattern, time can only unravel or unfold as in the time- 
image.
Both films are often virtually soundless, with only an ambient soundtrack 
audible. Such a deterritorialization of sound even gives the sensation of a 
screening of something else going on in another room. If the abstract 
machine is essential to becoming-star, it is so not least because of a 
dependence upon sound. Sound is essential to the abstract machine 
through its absence. It was the absence of sound that elevated stars to 
the status of gods, according to Dyer, and their becoming-star was one of 
total facialization. My Hustler1 s free-indirect discourse results in the first 
reel from a dislocation of sound and image, and in the second reel 
through the absence in dialogue (about hustling) of the subject of 
discussion (cruising). The dislocation of sound from action in the films 
with Edie Sedgwick further abstracts the face. As in the screen-tests, the 
absence of sound creates a vacuum that is filled by the internal circuit, 
and thus the crystal image, as Peter Gidal writes:
The silence, durable, brings itself forth against the possibilities of 
(imagined) off-screen sound...The vacuum established in that 
noiseless period of duration is full [sic] as the noise of so many 
other Warhol films...Again and again it brings one back to the film, 
its concrete abstractions...63
62 Callie Angell, Programme notes to Outer and Inner Space, Whitney Museum of American Art, 
15th October - 29th November, 1998.
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It is the absence of sound in a world of sound that creates the 
environment of the crystal and liberates the time-image; leading us to 
suspect the same about photography in general. The mistake has always 
been to consider the silence of photography as an agent of limitation by 
absence. But these films show us that this silence instead is an agent of 
liberation by absence: Liberation from its connection to movement in 
space. The bodies in these films are faces/landscapes created by the 
shifting and merging of black shapes on the white screen. There are only 
intensities of black and white that form and reform, never concretizing 
long enough to be interpreted as a face, and yet they remain a faciality as 
landscape through the apparatus. This is most evident in Poor Little Rich 
Girl. Unaware of the technical hitch that produced it in recording, Warhol 
himself can only have become aware of this as he (as we) watched it for 
the first time. This facialization of a star refuses to signify, refuses to 
create a subject: is it a face on a screen or a screen on a face? 
Simultaneously, Warhol had erased his own presence by embracing the 
star and by making the image an adventure of the face. Warhol, Edie, the 
camera, the film, and the projector were together the abstract machine. 
But the abstract machine that turned the face into a landscape in Poor 
Little Rich Girl, had, it turns out, already turned the landscape into a face.
*  *  *
Adventures in Landscape
As Warhol's career was turning toward narrative and a more concretely 
homoerotic position (but not totally, given the ambiguity, if not 
ambivalence, as late as 1968 in Blue Movie) influenced by his 
collaboration with Paul Morrissey, Warhol’s use of the camera changed 
from a fluid or free discourse to one that was also concrete. What had 
gone before was a becoming imperceptible that saw Warhol making 
explicit the abstract machine. In My Hustler there is an emphasis on the 
fixed, or fixated, image in the early reel that is brought into narrative just 
as in Poor Little Rich Girl the blurred image is brought into focus. It is 
much easier to make interpretations on the later reels than their ‘difficult’
63 Gidal, 1989, p. 120.
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earlier ones. They are difficult to decode either because they are difficult 
to see (Poor Little Rich Girl) or because the image is too easy to make 
quick interpretations.
All this suggests that those ‘fixation’ films of 1963 and 1964 (Sleep, 
Haircut, Eat, Blow-Job, Empire, Henry Geldzahler) were not simply 
experiments with the camera, but that they themselves had deeper 
significance for their filmmakers (because they had so much possibility in 
interpretation) than they would outwardly appear. But how do they figure 
in the larger, encompassing becoming-Warhol? If they are a means to an 
end, and represent a development in form, this development reached its 
coda in My Hustler, at which time Warhol and Morrissey laid it to rest. 
They certainly present becoming in many respects, but each seems to 
have a flaw. Sleep invites too strong a homoerotic interpretation, Haircut 
sounds too camp, as does Blow-Job. All of them, including Eat, seem too 
much like film ‘essays’, as Deleuze noted, with conclusions to be made, 
and catharses reached, even in their depiction of the everyday 64: Billy 
Name’s haircut is ready; Robert Indiana finishes the mushroom; John 
Giorno wakes up; and the anonymous teenager comes. Even Henry 
Geldzahler appears to reach a final endpoint: as Warhol re-enters the 
room, the gallery-owner seems to brighten what was an otherwise 
deflated expression. Warhol re-enters both the room and the apparatus, 
perceptible in the film again. This is a visibility of Warhol the filmmaker 
that is otherwise missing from his other films, and indeed cinema in 
general65. It is too easy to think of the end of the film as a blessed relief 
for Geldzahler.
Slide 82
There is nothing emphatic enough about these everyday events to 
suggest that they are interminable, or that they will never end. These 
events create a sense of time, rather than reduce chronology to
64 TI, p. 191.
65 Angell, 1994, p. 20 “This withdrawal of the artist’s encouraging presence was crucial to the 
film’s purpose, which was to use the unmitigated scrutiny of the camera to gradually evoke 
hidden aspects of Geldzahler’s personality.”
nonsense. That is, all except for Empire.
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In Empire, the Empire State Building will not react to the presence of the 
cameraman, or cameramen, even when they are visible in the window’s 
reflection (it remains a rare example of Warhol appearing in his own 
films). Empire may be eight hours of the Empire State Building, but there 
is nothing to suggest that it will fall over when the camera is turned off, or 
even that the film will continue until the building topples. Whilst its 
audacity has been described as egregious, there’s nothing finally camp 
about Empire, and yet the building itself attracts fans including, of course, 
Warhol. Could it be that Empire is the film that presents the unrefined 
genetic element of photography? Could Empire, perhaps Warhol’s most 
notorious film, reveal becoming-photography?
But why should Empire, a film of such little apparent purpose and of such 
a recognisable object, present becoming? Firstly it is clear that, as 
Gregory Battcock has attested, the building filmed will never be the same 
again. Empire has already entered any mythology that exists of the 
building. To this end, like any of the hangers-on of the Factory, it remains 
a part of becoming-Warhol (and is certainly the most famous of the 
Factory’s stars) 66. Thus Empire and the Empire State Building make up 
quanta of becoming-Warhol, in mythology, but also in practice.
Just as the face of the star was a creation of the abstract machine, so 
Empire exists as a facialization of the Empire State Building, and as 
Warhol himself famously said during filming: “the Empire State Building is 
a star!” 67 However, the difference, as becoming-star, between the 
Monroe silkscreens and Empire is that where Monroe’s image expands 
outward from its surface to encompass Monroe’s stardom, making a web
66 Although J. Hoberman suggests that Empire is a forerunner of contemporary video 
installations, it might be better to think of the film in terms of media less connected to the 
temporality of video. For example, it is now possible in 2001 to watch the sun set over the 
Empire State Building on the Internet. The timing of Empire, however, is only roughly 
chronological, since the projection time at 16fps is longer than the shooting time at 24fps, cf. 
Angell, 1994, pp. 16-18, also Hoberman, 2001. At this time the Empire State Bulding is again 
the tallest building in Manhattan, as a result of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre - 
an ironic fact suggested by Angell in conversation with the author.
67 Koch, 1987, p. 60.
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of crystallised images of her performances that saturate the image,
Empire on the other hand reduces all the stardom of the Empire State 
Building to the flat surface -  black holes on white walls -  and outlines the 
rarefied shape of the building with such strength that the facialization 
bursts forward as probe-head. What deterritorializes the Empire State 
Building is the intensity created by its own immobility. The black 
hole/white wall system is an effect of the static building in open space that 
changes around it. In fact, the first reel of Empire seems to demonstrate 
precisely the abstract machine that Deleuze describes.
From Deleuze:
The face, at least the concrete face, vaguely begins to take shape 
on the white wall. It vaguely begins to appear in the black hole.68
From Callie Angell:
...the film begins with an image of total whiteness in the midst of 
which, as the sun sets and the light decreases, the shape of the 
Empire State Building gradually flickers into view...until the 
floodlights on the building’s exterior are suddenly turned on 
creating a brilliantly illuminated shape which seems to hover in the 
sky over the city.69
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The image therefore becomes a face in close-up, like any other in 
cinema, a face that “is a visual percept that crystallizes” out of an intensity 
of stillness. Angell’s description continues to resonate with Deleuze’s 
wall/surface, and builds an entire career for the film’s star in one breath: 
For most of the film’s duration, however, the glowing, free floating 
shape of the lighted tower is the sole claim to the viewer’s 
attention, its unwavering presence suggesting at various times (to 
this viewer at least) a rocket ship, a hypodermic needle, a 
heavenly cathedral, or a broad paintbrush that has been dipped in
68 THP, p. 168.
69 Angell, 1994, p. 16.
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white paint and placed on the surface of a dark gray canvas.”70 
Slide 84
This is a strong example of how the white wall/black hole system acts as 
a seed of the crystal image, but as we have seen before in both cinema 
and photography, the crystal image is by no means guaranteed.
Deleuze’s attack is on the signification -  the significance -  that is 
attributed to the image, rather than the abstract machine that makes it 
work. As ever Deleuze is not interested in the final truth of an image, but 
only in the discourse from which others attempt to derive it. The power of 
Empire is that it is a landscape that not only becomes one face, but 
many, and of which none takes precedence. No sooner is the landscape 
actualised as the Empire State Building, but it becomes virtual again, and 
then a rocket, and then virtual again, and so on. This is a glimpse of the 
abstract machine at work, not just through the possibility envisaging a 
crystal environment that grows from this internal circuit, but because the 
duration of Empire enforces an awareness of this. The singular duration 
of cinema becomes, in Empire, multiple duration by each crystallisation.
Warhol’s awareness of the abstract machine is emphasised by his 
producing in Empire, as he had done in the screen tests, the apparatus 
as ‘one extreme function’. However, as apparatus, Warhol’s 
understanding clearly extends beyond the camera to encompass the 
image, and the experience of watching Empire as a film. As Peter Gidal 
notes, this extreme function is one of “choice, a selection, a part, a 
difference” 71. In this way the extreme length of Empire, its black and 
white image, and its absence of sound, constitute choices made by 
Warhol to emphasise the abstract machine at work and lay bare its 
operation.
70 Ibid p. 16. Gregory Battcock also compares the opening reel, in which the building emerges 
from a combination of actual fog and image flare, to the sequence of Anna Karenina (Clarence 
Brown, 1935) in which Greta Garbo emerges from the steam of a train -  a ‘star’ comparison that 
Warhol would probably have liked. Gregory Battcock, ‘Notes on Empire’, Film Culture, no. 40, 
(Spring 1966), pp. 39-40, p. 39.
71 Gidal, 1989, p. 118.
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It is certain that Empire’s absence of sound results from Warhol’s choice, 
since Empire was filmed using his new sound-synch Auricon camera 72. 
But this is as much a presence in Empire, as it is an absence. 
Furthermore, the silence and the length of these fixation films are, for 
Gidal, connected. Without action to guide the film, especially enforced by 
sound, its only coda is material:
Limit is the film’s 100ft ‘end’ (or 1200ft ‘end’) not ontological and 
necessary but convenience given as such (enough is enough, 
philosophically and materially).73
Thus Empire demonstrates that it is the silence of the photographic image 
that frees it from movement, or allows it to remain free of any narrative 
trajectory or closure. The length of the film remains important only in 
material or exhibition terms. This is what Malcolm Le Grice has stressed 
as the importance of equivalence -  the experience of a film’s length as 
equivalent to its action -  to Warhol’s films, and avant-garde cinema in 
general 74 To remain a single reel film would invite comparisons with 
timed-exposure photographs -  or as a ‘filmed photograph’ -  whereas 
several reel changes instead emphasise an attempt to represent the 
several lived durations of the Empire State Building that no discrete 
element can portray. With silence, once one reel change is effected, the 
project assumes a potentially endless length that is only curtailed as both 
Mekas and Warhol become tired of returning to the camera. The film 
assumes multiplicity because it could be any length, and as a film made 
up of barely changing repetition of a single photogramme, it assumes a 
potentiality of every length. One can sit and look at the Empire State 
Building indefinitely, but what will that add to your knowledge? This does 
what few photographs are capable of -  it emphasises its temporal 
dimension as unregulated by chronology, and does so by making its 
projection time a central issue. It is time that deterritorializes the 
face/landscape, but not time connected to movement: instead it is time as 
intensity. This is what the photograph can offer, and what Empire does 
offer. For Warhol, the fact that Empire could be a photograph is the
72 Koch, 1987, p. 60. See also, notes on Mekas, p. 145. Rayns, 1997, p. 85.
73 Ibid p. 120.
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reason it needs to be a very long film. This is given a double significance 
by the building's own immobility:
It becomes apparent that the slowest of movements, or the last to 
occur or arrive, is not the least intense.
In this way, a photograph would indeed express nothing of the intensity of 
the Empire State Building. In this case, only a succession of photographs, 
or a film, might be appropriate to do this, It is the stillness of the building, 
and of Empire, that creates the intensity of black holes on the white wall, 
and vice versa. As Flusser writes, it is remarkable stillness in the 
photograph that elevates it from redundancy:
It is precisely this permanently changing situation that we have 
become accustomed to...the changing situation is familiar, 
redundant; progress has become uninformative, run-of-the-mill. 
What would be informative, exceptional, exciting for us would be a 
standstill situation...that would surprise and shock us. 75
This is Empire as probe-head, bursting from over-signification brought 
about by its lack of event and movement and the extraordinary intensity 
of the ‘holey surface’ that can be created by nothing other than the 
stillness of a building.
The same can also be said of the black-and-white image. At its simplest 
level, black-and-white photography is an abstraction from colour 
photography, as Arthur Danto writes about Empire:
A black-and-white photograph may be taken of a black-and-white 
object -  a zebra, say. But it does not show the blackness and the 
whiteness of that object, it merely shows the difference.76
These thoughts are echoed by Gregory Battcock, who adds to this an 
importance of the role of the image (as opposed to blank film) as 
abstraction:
The decision to film an object allowed for the presentation of the
74 Malcolm Le Grice, Abstract Film and Beyond, (London: Studio Vista, 1977), p.95.
75 TPP, p. 65.
full range of tones, from black to white.77
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Finally, for Flusser, the black-and-white image constitutes an attempt to 
reveal the concepts behind representation within the representation. The 
use of black-and-white is not a reduction by abstraction, but an extension 
of the abstract machine’s operation:
Many photographers therefore also prefer black-and-white 
photographs to colour photographs because they more clearly 
reveal the actual significance of the photograph, i.e. the world of 
concepts.78
This suggests a reason for Warhol’s choice to use black-and-white film 
(or at least resist the expensive move to colour) in these early films. In its 
simplest terms it makes the Empire State Building and its surroundings 
more difficult to recognise (and only, in that event, recognisable by its 
shape); and in more complex terms it makes elements of the black-box of 
photography explicit. Warhol was not concerned with recording eight 
hours of the Empire State Building in a way that could be interpreted as 
an image of the state of things (facialized), but instead, by employing the 
extreme functions of cinema available to him, he was concerned with 
providing an image of the building that could not finally be facialized.
This interest in the building as unable to be completely actualized is made 
all the more emphatic by Warhol’s own becoming-imperceptible that is 
evident in Empire. Empire was filmed by Warhol and Jonas Mekas, from 
an idea by John Palmer. Whilst Warhol was a cameraman for the film, 
and can clearly be seen returning to the camera in its later stages,
Warhol was unfamiliar with the new model, and hence Mekas took most 
of this responsibility. Given that the concept for such a film was not 
entirely his, especially as we have seen how the conceptual abstraction is 
the film’s philosophical drive, and that he was remote from the process of 
filming, there is not much of a case to describe Warhol as the auteur of 
Empire.
76 Danto, 1994, p. 76.
77 Gregory Battcock, ‘Notes on Empire’, Film Culture, no. 40, (Spring 1966), pp. 39-40.
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Empire therefore presents a problem for David James’ approach to the 
“erasure of authorship", Warhol’s “most characteristic authorial gesture” 
that progressed during his film career79. This is what became clear in 
Warhol’s self-portraits, but also became clear in his becoming-star. 
Becoming-star simultaneously involves the erasure of the molar identity 
of the self, in favour of becoming-woman, and becoming-imperceptible. 
What is clear is that the Monroe silkscreens were a simultaneous 
becoming star and an erasure (at least in part) of Warhol’s self. This is 
finally why the Monroe silkscreens are as much a facialization of 
becoming-Warhol as the self-portrait. Warhol’s imperceptibility at such an 
early stage demonstrates how it was not a progression, but a milieu, or 
becoming. It is clear that, rather than such a degradation of the traditional 
authorship role occurring over time, Empire is an example of Warhol’s 
becoming-imperceptible at a very early stage in his career.
Warhol’s significant part in Empire was to step back from direct contact 
with the project and become an imperceptible part of the abstract 
machine. Becoming-Warhol is experienced not through any traditional 
authorial signature, but instead the experience is a molecular one of 
camera, filmmakers, image, viewer/s, and the information that flows into 
all of these from Warhol’s reputation, the building, and cinema and 
photography in general. To describe Empire as by Warhol is to create a 
distinction where there needn’t be: Empire is a Warhol. The difficulty 
experienced in pinning down Warhol’s input in Empire does not diminish 
it, but if anything makes it more a part of becoming-Warhol. In reel seven, 
Warhol’s reflection in the window of the Time-Life building office 
(Empire’s shooting location) overlays the floating image of the building in 
the distance. In a few brief minutes, Warhol is perceptible in the 
filmmaking. However, this only makes clearer his near complete absence 
from the film, since the image is fleeting, translucent, and finally 
disappears.
Slide 85
78 TPP, p. 43.
79 James, 1998, p. 26.
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*  *  ★
Conclusion: Inside the black-box
This finally brings us back to photography and its genetic element. 
Warhol's approach to art, culture, and life in general, was as an 
experience of becoming. Warhol saw the photographic image as a crucial 
element in the organisation of this becoming into abstract phenomena. It 
is through photographs that he first encountered stardom (Shirley Temple 
and Mae West), and through the manipulation of photographs (and rarely 
the taking of them) that he negotiated with stardom. Warhol's becoming- 
woman had little or nothing to do with the trajectory of his sexual life. 
Rather, his becoming-woman was a becoming-star, realised in the 1986 
self portrait, when he put that ‘thin Warholian layer’ over his image as he 
had done with Monroe, Jackie Kennedy, Elizabeth Taylor, and the others. 
At that point he had achieved the plateau of becoming-imperceptible.
It was his becoming-star that gave life to his relationship with Edie 
Sedgwick. Poor Little Rich Girl demonstrated the facialization of the star 
in process. The first reel, from which Sedgwick appears as landscape and 
unfacialized body, literally gives way to a facialization of Edie the star as 
the image cracks into focus. As in the mythology of stardom, Edie is 
literally plucked from obscurity.
His film of the Empire State Building, like the screen tests, demonstrates 
that a part of this becoming-star was a deeper interest (certainly at this 
stage) in the mechanics of stardom -  the abstract machine at work that 
facializes the star. What these show is photography at work: the creation 
of the image as a ‘state of things’, but in this case suspended by its 
extreme abstraction. The landscape in Empire is so recognisable that 
within a few minutes it assumes another crystallization, and another face. 
The faces of Billy Name and Dennis Hopper are so recognisable that they 
become new landscapes as familarity is drawn from them. What Empire 
therefore also demonstrates is an apparent awareness on Warhol’s part 
that the actual machine, the camera, was part of a wider process. As P.
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Adams Sitney notes, the only way to “permit ontological awareness”, is to 
direct it -  to see the process at work one has to expose its mechanics 80. 
These mechanics are what a Deleuzean study might call the abstract 
machine: becoming-photography.
It is the abstract machine that really informs our understanding of 
photography. Where Deleuze was so quick to dismiss the photograph as 
tracing, he was unprepared to consider it as a bifurcation, or branch, of 
the hierarchy created from becoming-photography: that of cinema and the 
photograph. Just as cinema labours as movement-image, from which the 
time-image bursts all too rarely, so photography as a discipline labours 
under the program. This is what Flusser demonstrated, in his remarkably 
Deleuzean project. Flusser’s comments about the standstill might just as 
easily be applied to Duras’ sunrises, Ozu’s still-life compositions, as they 
are applicable to Sherman’s Film Still’s, or Atget’s early morning streets. 
What Flusser was also able to describe however -  the project of Towards 
a Philosophy of Photography -  was the abstract machine whose 
mechanical and ideological workings inform the movement-image in both 
cinema and the photograph.
Empire shows an awareness of this abstract machine since it draws on 
the information that crystallizes - the reputation of Warhol himself, that of 
the building - and makes it indiscernible from the program that informs the 
photography. The shape of the Empire State Building emerges into the 
image from a white ground because Warhol chooses a medium (black- 
and-white film) that will not detect the presence of a blue sky or a grey 
building. Thus the program of the camera, film and all, informs the crystal 
environment as a process of abstraction: silent black-and-white cinema 
offers a time-image because it presents abstraction in the face of colour 
sound cinema. And of course this program is inseparable from the 
apparatus, so that the experience of watching Empire is equivalent to the 
experience of filming it. This is the apparatus of cinema of attractions, as 
Gunning described. Warhol, in watching the Edison films was not 
returning to the year zero, since cinema has no year zero. Warhol was
80 Adams Sitney, 1974, p. 374.
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uncovering the zero-ness that had been obscured by the transformation 
of the shot into montage. He was returning not to any historical 
antecedents, but a genetic one, since the Edison films, as do the 
Lumieres’, present becoming-photography. As did the audiences of early 
film, to watch Empire is to watch the apparatus, but in the latter sense it is 
to watch the apparatus of facialization, the apparatus of culture.
But, of course, we still have to deal with the image. It is the magical 
image that excited Flusser: the image that existed before the technical 
image (the photograph), and that constitutes the subject of his lament; an 
image that acknowledged its surface, and that presented time according 
to the gaze:
While wandering over the surface of the image, one’s gaze takes 
in one element after another and produces temporal relationships 
between them. It can return to an element it has already seen, and 
‘before’ can become ‘after’.
But for Flusser even the magical image had its own turning point:
They are supposed to be maps but they turn into screens...Human 
beings ceased to decode the images and instead project them, still 
encoded, into the world ‘out there’, which meanwhile itself
becomes like an image -  a contexts of scenes, of states of things.
81
This is the creation of mythology, especially in the Barthesian sense, and 
it is against this that Flusser ranges the magical image proper. This is the 
problem Deleuze also saw, especially between painting (“adventure of 
the line”) and photography; one a map and the other a tracing: Flusser’s 
magical image is facialized, and Deleuze’s opsign is turned into ‘states of 
things’ by the abstract machine. In the abstract machine, the image is 
inseparable from the apparatus, from the program, and from the 
information. The abstract machine extends from object to image, 
actualizing the virtual world. This is mythology at work. Barthes was only 
able to describe the ‘states of things’ that are created, that are facialized.
81 TPP,pp. 8-10.
275
It is Flusser who describes the components of the abstract machine that 
facializes.
But of course Flusser’s magical image is the time-image, and the ‘’before’ 
that can become ‘after” is the crystal. At first glance this implies a return 
to a primitive image, but as both Flusser and Deleuze note, this is the 
image within the abstract machine, rather than antecedent to it. The 
possible always remains, but the abstract machine makes it real. To find 
the magical image is not a question of going back into history, but of 
decoding the genetic element.
Flusser and Deleuze demonstrate the becoming-photography of the 
photographic image. Becoming-photography is the operation by which the 
virtual world becomes actual, and by which the universe becomes states 
of things. Unhappy that this should be final, Deleuze’s search for the 
time-image was a search for probe-heads that rely upon the abstract time 
of cinema -  photograms on a track -  in order to burst out. Time-images 
are so because they draw attention to the abstraction of cinema, rather 
than obscure it or render it imperceptible, and the same can be said for 
the photograph as time-image. It is the free-indirect discourse, the 
camera-consciousness, drawing attention to a picture’s surface, letting 
the eye wander over it and ‘create its own temporal relations’, that 
provides the seed for the crystal-image.
Flusser’s final importance is due to his belief in the sheer scale of the 
abstract machine at work. Even when dealing with the photographic 
universe, he places it as one black-box within another. It is impossible to 
know every code and connection in the super-black-box, and this is the 
desperate message that runs through Flusser’s study. However, this is 
why Empire is all the more important as a demonstration. What Flusser 
and Deleuze developed on paper, Warhol developed on screen. By 
taking the function to its extreme, Warhol managed to reveal the 
molecular structure of the black box: its reliance upon image, program, 
apparatus, and information. He revealed the black-box as abstract 
machine, but in suspending the image, by making it redundant, he
276
revealed the genetic element of photography that remains within it.
Empire reveals the black-box because it cannot be finally facialized. It is 
impossible to know all the connections to actualise it.
That Warhol should present this shouldn’t be a surprise, Warhol too is a 
black-box, since again we cannot know every connection that makes up 
becoming-Warhol. But finally, when considering Warhol, something else 
rises to the surface. Writing about the criticism of Warhol’s 1963 Brillo 
Boxes, Paul Mattick rounds on Arthur Danto over the subject of labels:
It is the recognizability of the sign...that allowed Danto to think of 
the artwork and the original as indiscernible and the difference 
between them as therefore problematic. But the point of the Brillo 
Boxes, it seems to me, is not so much the difference as more the 
visual similarity between the two, which the differences set off.82
From this, it is easy to make a quick impression of the role of labels in 
Warhol’s work -  the silkscreens of Monroe; of himself -  that develop 
Mattick’s criticism. The silkscreens of Monroe reveal the schism between 
the star and the life of the person. However, it is when we start to think of 
the facialization involved in the label, that we can see this operating in 
Warhol’s films. The odalisque pose and naked torso of Paul America is a 
label for homoeroticism, if not homosexuality. The face and body of Edie 
Sedgwick is the label for narcissism and minor-celebrity. And of course 
the image of the Empire State Building is the label for great architecture 
or even, alternatively, ‘a big nothing’. These are all interpretations 
encountered in this study83. But as Mattick notes, it is the label that 
interested Warhol: the label is the facialization, the product of the abstract 
machine. Most importantly, it is the ‘recognizability of the sign’ that leads 
to those interpretations and that obscures the workings of the abstract 
machine. To recognize the camera’s framing in My Hustler as the 
homoerotic gaze is akin to thinking that Brillo Boxes made a comment on 
industrial design, or even that the boxes simply contained scouring pads. 
Warhol’s effort was to make the abstract machine visible by changing the
82 Mattick, 1998, p. 970.
materials, exacerbating them, or taking them to the extreme.
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Warhol appears to have realized early on that the photograph is a label 
for the photographic image, one that obscures the nature of becoming- 
photography by appearing to stand for it. The early film work was, it 
seems, not an attempt to re-introduce cinema or the photograph, but the 
becoming-photography that they label. Empire is the most effective 
example of such an attempt. As a film in which the composition does not 
change, it might immediately be thought that any one photogram might 
represent (or be the label for) the whole. But Empire defies this, and its 
longevity and inability to be defined by one photogram -  even though 
nothing appears to happen -  ensures that to know Empire, you really do 
have to watch i t 84 The relationship between one photogram to the whole 
of Empire is that of the action-image to becoming-photography. The 
action-image ‘stands for’ becoming-photography, but is unable to stand 
for it. This is what Deleuze reveals about the movement-image, which 
seeks to stand for cinema. And this is what is found with the photograph 
as action-image. It is this mis-recognition, labels standing for wholes or 
discourses, which Empire exposes.
It might seem like an anti-climax to find the perfect representation of the 
genetic element of photography -  becoming-photography -  in a film such 
as Empire. It is a film that holds little interest visually, and indeed it does 
not get a mention even by Deleuze. To the uninitiated, Empire would 
appear to tell us more about photographs in any case since it is, to invoke 
a cliche, little more than a moving photograph. Or else it might simply 
give support to those who criticise the mores of avant-garde cinema in 
general, since even during its recent showing at the Whitney Museum 
irate audiences stormed out (what did they expect from this film -  
romance?). Even for many champions of Warhol and avant-garde 
cinema, it still barely warrants a mention beyond the sheer audacity, or 
sheer monotony, or even sheer camp, of an eight-hour film of a building.
83 Brasell, 1992, p. 62; Annette Michelson, “Gnosis and Iconoclasm: A Case Study of 
Cinephilia”, in October 83, (Winter 1998), pp. 3-18, pp. 12-13; Battcock, 1966, p.39.
84 Callie Angell notes, in the 1994 Whitney programme, that the absence of critical comments on 
the final reels of Empire suggest that before 1994 no-one had sat through the entire film. cf.
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Part-vilified and part-ignored, people still stare open mouthed when 
introduced to its concept alone. It seems, even talking about it, to 
fundamentally oppose everything for which cinema is popularly 
appreciated. Surely the secret power of the photographic image does not 
reveal itself in such a cinematic aberration?
But this is exactly what Empire demonstrates: the genetic element of 
photography is not a holy grail. Deleuze’s project over the cinema books, 
realised alongside A Thousand Plateaus, was not merely to define the 
time-image. Instead it was to understand the drives that connect the 
image to the sensory-motor schema, or what frees the image from it. 
Similarly, there is much more for Flusser beyond his pessimistic vision of 
the black-box. The black-box-as-incomprehensible is an invitation rather 
than a bar to further study. Looking back, it has been important to come 
to these conclusions slowly. Above all, what matters is not the truth that 
appears to have been found, but the journey made in order to find it. The 
truth is not at the end of the labyrinth; the truth is the labyrinth.
*  *  *







The object of this thesis has been to ‘peel away’ some of the various 
understandings of the photographic image and its relation to time by using 
the influential analysis that Deleuze proposed in his two books on cinema. 
The thesis proceeds from what is essentially a ‘throw-away’ comment of 
Deleuze in relation to the photograph (here ‘photography’):
Photography is a kind of moulding: the mould organises the internal 
forces of a thing in such a way that they reach a state of equilibrium 
at a certain instant (immobile section).1
By invoking Bazin, Deleuze sets the photograph in opposition to the 
mobile section of the shot, and thus relegates the former as a static or 
abstract organisation of chronology. The whole project of this thesis has 
been firstly to re-view the photograph as capable of being a direct image 
of time, and to go on to understand the processes of photography that lie 
at the heart of both cinema and the photograph, and which are organised 
by perception into abstract time. The process continued by demonstrating 
that the photograph and cinema are always connected by the process of 
photography itself. The photograph as time-image is best understood in 
terms of the crystal-image, whose particular division of time is analysed in 
Chapter Three, and ‘imagined’ in the analysis in Chapter Four. At the heart 
of the crystal-image is the exchange or circuit from which it emanates. This 
is the constantly self-referential process of photography that is organised 
into transparency or self-consciousness, but which we can see is always a 
becoming from which these are abstractly deduced. This brings us to the 
end of the trajectory, but does not necessarily leave every possible 
question unanswered. This conclusion will attempt to cover some of these 
questions, and perhaps begin to answer them.
*  *  *
Time-image good, movement-image bad (?)’
Parts of this thesis have been presented as papers at conferences, or 
otherwise discussed at length. This has created a number of opportunities
1 M I, p. 24.
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to consider directions that the thesis might have taken and areas of critical 
theory that needed developing during writing. Primarily, they have helped 
to bring some of the threads of the thesis together, either by critical 
discussion or by simple example, and have also demonstrated important 
threads to avoid. At the risk of writing as if this were an introduction rather 
than conclusion, it is worth mentioning them.
This thesis has intentionally avoided any direct confrontations with the 
Deleuze 'pedagogies' that have emerged over the last few years. With the 
exception of texts by D.N. Rodowick, Michael Hardt, and the Buchanan 
volume, which were briefly mentioned earlier, this thesis has steered itself 
away from the commentaries and meta-commentaries that have recently 
been published. This is for two reasons. Primarily, this thesis might use up 
a whole chapter to develop a review of these approaches, and in some 
cases that would simply mean commentaries on commentaries (on what 
are already commentaries, as Deleuze's books are as much cinephilic 
reviews as they are philosophical classifications). This 'chapter' has been 
put aside in favour of the discussion and dissemination of photography as 
a critical discipline, which is not altogether a small task in itself. Whilst 
parts of this thesis employ the commentary approach, particularly in 
tracing Deleuze's ideas from Bergsonism, through The Logic of Sense and 
into the Cinema books and beyond, it does so in an attempt to illuminate 
photography criticism and its relationship with film. Commentaries may 
form the central thread of the thesis, but the intention has always been to 
take it to photographs and films, especially to those not dealt with by 
Deleuze. It has been the intention of this thesis to try to deal with 
Deleuze's work directly, when it provides the backbone of an approach to 
photography, and turn to such meta-texts only when absolutely necessary. 
The occasional redundancy of using multiple commentaries was shown 
when we dealt with Benjamin. Meta-texts such as Mary Price's or Eduardo 
Cadava's, whilst being excellent in their own right, overlap too often, and 
occasionally act merely as primers for the original texts. Similarly, 
Benjamin’s ambiguous notion of aura and experience provokes much 
discussion in any case, and has many commentaries. Whether it was 
because the relevant texts are so short, or because Benjamin died before
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completing the project, the subject is one held in the popular academic 
consciousness or domain: everyone has their ‘take’ on aura. It was the 
fervent questioning of aura at a conference that led to a renewed rigour in 
dealing with it in Chapter Three. Nonetheless, and despite the 
awkwardness of some translations, as Miriam Hansen has observed in 
Benjamin's case, sometimes it is best to go directly to those texts in 
question rather than simply deal with the commentaries.
On the other hand, some commentaries are unavoidable, since many texts 
make reference to principle thinkers in a particular field. This has the effect 
of snowballing if there is limited variety in writing on the subject. This is 
shown in a few cases with references to Benjamin and photography, but it 
is particularly prevalent in references to Barthes.
Barthes’ work, and in particular his Camera Lucida, is often the 'first-port- 
of-call' in discussions of photography, and turns up in varied texts by many 
authors. This is as much a result of the dominance of this particular work 
in photography study - particularly in an interdisciplinary context -  as it is 
the practice that ensures that dominance. The snowballing has reached 
such a level that the work must be mentioned if only in passing, since it is 
now the expected text in a bibliography on photography. Whether we want 
to or not, we have to deal with Camera Lucida, as we have done 
throughout the thesis, but having to deal with so many micro­
commentaries has been taxing. If nothing else, it suggests the need to 
look for other ideas and views on the photograph. Therefore the thesis has 
tried to bring together occasionally disparate or opposing approaches to 
visual studies, as is the case with Kendall Walton and Joseph LeDoux. In 
this the object was to demonstrate the common perceptual occurrence - 
perception of the image and its relationship with perception in general - 
from which they take divergent lines of study (or lines of flight).
There is a third reason for trying to avoid any Deleuze pedagogy. Deleuze 
has made a peculiar impact into film studies, and is fast becoming the 
object of love and derision in many of the already existent camps in the 
discipline. Psychoanalysis, for example, appears to regard Deleuzeanism
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with suspicion, perhaps in response to his approach to the subject in the 
cinema books (as well as in his work with Guattari). Cognitive semioticians 
appear to find Deleuze's Bergsonism difficult to agree with. Finally, there 
are any number of criticisms that may be made of Deleuze by those who 
hover in between. Is Deleuze not too cinephilic? Is he not too auteurist? 
How can we use him to deal with mainstream cinema when he appears to 
view it with some contempt? If we want to conduct an analysis of Hey 
Dude, Where's My Car? what use is Deleuze? (It is partly with this in mind 
that we looked at Funny Face, a film that appears to be diametrically 
opposed to the concept of the time-image, or the ‘serious’ cinema to which 
the time-image is often attributed in Deleuze and after) What all these 
criticisms have in common is their suspicion of the epistemiology that has 
cemented itself around Deleuze as a popular figure, and the totalising 
discourse threatened in his becoming 'the-next-big-thing'. This is an 
approach that sees the application of his philosophy to avant-garde 
cinema, the nouvelle-vague, or any other arbitrarily decided group of 
cinemas, as 'speaking for' cinema in general. It also threatens to demote 
action cinema, spectacle cinema, or other popular genres that can be 
identified as movement-image cinema, to an inferior position with regard to 
the preferred time-image cinema that has captured the academic 
imagination. It is not accurate to suggest that the cinema of the movement- 
image should occupy this position, nor that Deleuze's work suggests that it 
should. Quite apart from the fact that at least a third of the cinema project 
is devoted to the movement-image, his treatment of some examples - 
particularly the burlesque comedy of Keaton and Langdon - is complex 
and erudite. It demonstrates an awareness of the impact the movement- 
image can have when created by certain individuals. In comparison 
Deleuze's description of the cinema of Hitchcock is rather swift (even off­
hand); as if Keaton’s movement-image is more erudite than Hitchcock’s 
emerging time-image, even though the latter’s innovation “introduces the 
mental image to cinema” 2. The movement-image is too complex to 
dismiss lightly as the bete noire of academic analysis.
2 M I, p. 203.
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However, his treatment of Keaton and Hitchcock exemplifies Deleuze's 
adherence to the idea of the cinema author or artist, and this is perhaps 
the most difficult problem we have in using Deleuze. It is made all the 
more difficult given that much film reception occurs in popular theatres 
where choices are made according to star, genre, language, and other 
recognised markers of content and quality.
Even so, this is no real challenge to using Deleuze to study popular 
cinema, especially as those magazines catering for the non-academic 
cinephile (as well as the academic one - viz Sight and Sound) routinely 
promote the role of the director as auteur. Indeed some auteurs are 
fetishised above others; Stanley Kubrick is a good example. It suggests 
that between the ideal ‘characters’ of popular audience and film academic 
there exists a middling class of cinephile for whom the auteur is an 
important figure, giving Deleuzean analysis more potential. In fact, though, 
there should be seen an exchange, rather than any discrete and mutually 
exclusive values. This exchange is the only way to describe the fluidity of 
auteurs and auteur-audiences. Stanley Kubrick may now be considered 
the auteur par excellence (his self-indulgent Eyes Wide Shut, plus the 
quixotic ‘collaboration’ with Spielberg on A.I. before his death helped in 
this regard), but there was a time when he was considered rather obscure, 
even ‘difficult’. Auteur careers come and go, less so by their direct output 
and more by the waxing and waning of the love-affairs that various 
cognoscenti have with them. A number of directors singled out by 
Deleuze, including Kubrick but also Sam Fuller, have enjoyed and 
endured careers of this nature.
That Deleuze’s auteurism should not be entirely indefensible suggests that 
to question Deleuze perse should not necessarily be to dismiss him, as 
some critics of Deleuze appear happy to do. This thesis starts with a major 
criticism of Deleuze, and of the school of thought behind his approach to 
the photograph. The task has been to give his approach the benefit of 
other theories and critical studies, whether they emerged after his death 
(such as the leaps made in the nineties in studying early film), or whether 
the academy and literate culture of which he was a part had not
285
acknowledged them (as is shown by the limitation of his analysis of 
photography to that developed by Bazin).
In contrast to the auteur fetish that currently exists is a more general 
technological fetish of cinema that comes in part from the development of 
digital technologies. This has been noted by both Scott McQuire, and Lev 
Manovich, who independently suggest that the replacement of celluloid 
with digital media (whether in actuality, or merely in the perception 
audiences have of cinema ‘going digital’) has in turn led to a fetishism of 
the look of cinema 3. In a double affirmation of the auteur ideal, old classic 
cinema can be seen in ‘cleaned-up’ prints converted to Digital Versatile 
Disc, whilst Computer Generated Imaging gives precise control to the 
whim of the director in current film production. This occurs in the creation 
of worlds that appear with historical verisimilitude, such as in Baz 
Luhrmann’s Moulin Rouge! (2001), and also in the desaturated image of 
Steven Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan (1997). The nineties, on the other 
hand, saw restorations of the Star Wars trilogy, but also the George Cukor 
My Fair Lady (1964). Importantly, it saw the restoration of Anthony Mann 
and Stanley Kubrick’s Spartacus (1960), recently re-branded (with some 
difficulty) by popular magazines as assuredly a Kubrick product. Deleuze 
perhaps could not have predicted these developments, although Vilem 
Flusser certainly invoked them in 1983. Finally, digital technologies muddy 
the water considerably when they are employed by those directors who 
might otherwise be expected to adhere to the traditions of filmmaking. 
Jean-Pierre Jeunet’s Le Fabuleux destin d'Amelie Poulain (2001) has 
created controversy by using digital technologies to ‘clean-up’ Paris in 
such a way that simultaneously evokes both Poetic Realism and Cinema 
du look, but also le Front populaire and Vichy 4. Perhaps the biggest issue 
for us is that Jeunet was fast becoming the ideal auteur candidate, largely 
for the same reasons, yet chose to eschew the purity that might be valued 
in producing on untouched celluloid.
3 Lev Manovich, 'The Paradoxes of Digital Photography', in Hubertus von Amlunxen et al eds. 
Photography after Photography: memory and representation in the digital age, (Amsterdam:
G&B Arts, 1996), pp. 57-65, p. 58-59. See also Scott McQuire, ‘Digital Dialectics: the paradox of 
cinema in a studio without walls’, in Historical Journal o f  Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 19,
No. 3, 1999, pp. 379-397. p. 386.
4 For a report on the reception of Amelie in France, see Ginette Vincendeau, 'Cafe Society', in Sight
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Arguments over digital versus celluloid lead us to consider some of the 
films, photographies, and theories that have gone untreated in the thesis 
for various reasons. Some of these reached a late state of development 
and were left out at the last minute, whilst some remain faint whispers of 
projects perhaps yet to come. Still others were not taken up for very 
specific reasons. One film conspicuous by its absence is Chris Marker’s La 
Jetee (1962). La Jetee is probably the first film that one thinks of when 
connecting cinema to photography, and indeed Garrett Stewart gives it 
due attention. Its time-travel narrative, told in photographs, gives it an 
immense gravitational attraction for a Deleuzean analysis, but it is avoided 
here precisely because it is so obvious a choice of film for study. Instead, 
we chose a different film from the period of the nouvelle vague, L’Annee 
derniere a Marienbad. Despite its more subtle use of photography and 
photographs, it is no less labyrinthine in plot than Marker’s film, and 
probably more so. Marienbad is more interesting because of its history of 
interpretation, which allows for a more intricate crystal-image to be viewed. 
Despite the conundrum created by its narrative, La Jetee has a rather 
linear plot in comparison, and interpretation of it is much less divided. 
Similarly, the photographs of Cindy Sherman are interesting because they 
are still hotly contested, their meanings appropriated and defended, and 
their profile raised higher still, by art criticism in general, and feminist 
criticism (in art history, film studies, and cultural studies) in particular.
These reasons make them more useful as study than the work of Duane 
Michals or Tracy Moffatt.
Films that never left the notepad include Dziga Vertov’s The Man with the 
Movie Camera (1929), and a few films from the New York avant-garde: 
work by Stan Brakhage and Hollis Frampton. These were pushed aside in 
favour of the work on Warhol, whose relationship to both avant-garde 
practice and the mechanisms of cinema (and his role as author) 
encapsulated all the issues for discussion. Other films reached a more 
developed state of analysis for the last chapter, including Michael Snow’s 
Wavelength (1967), upon which Deleuze briefly wrote. Koyaanisqatsi
and Sound, 11.8, August 2001, pp. 22-25.
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(1983), directed by Godfrey Reggio and filmed by Ron Fricke, was to 
provide a counterpoint against which to draw the picture of Warhol’s films. 
The work on this was completed (it also included Fricke’s later Baraka 
(1992)), but then discarded. These films were to be seen as movement- 
images, in comparison to the time-images of Warhol, setting them as 
inferior because of this. This would have created the same hierarchy that 
we decried above, and which is to be avoided. The other reason that all of 
the films above were ‘lost along the way here’ is that this thesis already 
fights with the tendency in Deleuze scholarship to ‘claim’ or ‘reclaim’ 
certain films as time-images, as if Deleuze himself would be writing about 
them now. Whilst this is ultimately speculative (Deleuze was nothing if not 
guided by his cinephilia, rather than by the duties of film scholarship), if we 
simply search for undiscovered time-image films, to do so would preserve 
the hierarchy that is in danger of emerging -  that the time-image is good, 
that the movement-image is bad.
Nevertheless, this thesis is about the time-image, and so the process of 
discovery remains in part. This is why the thesis is more determined in its 
exposition of the optical situation that becomes the movement-image, the 
optical situation that is organised into the sensory-motor schema. The 
story of the photograph here is the story of its passage from pure optical 
situation, through organisation into an immobile section, from the possible 
to the real. This has the danger of creating a hierarchy of time-image over 
movement-image in the photograph also, and some steps have been 
taken to avoid this. It is the task of another thesis to question this 
rigorously.
*  *  *
Real and Representation
All of the above examples have been films (or photographies) that remain 
unwritten in this thesis. Some of them, like La Jetee, perhaps lurk under 
the surface. Similarly, writers such as Roland Barthes, or Marcel Proust, 
might deserve a chapter of their own, since they recur on a few occasions. 
But if there is an unwritten chapter, it is prefigured by the relationship that
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we discovered between Nan Goldin’s photograph of her friend Edwidge 
and Edouard Manet’s A Bar at the Folies-Bergere (1881-2). Indeed, Bar 
and its painter pose (and perhaps answers) some questions of reality and 
fiction, digital and celluloid, and author and spectator.
Slide 87
As an artist Manet cuts not too dissimilar a figure to Andy Warhol, 
especially if we consider some of the emphasis placed on their roles as 
authors of significant works that affected both the critical and public 
perception of art. This has inspired varied critical analysis intent on seeing 
them as artists whose lives are painted onto their canvases and 
silkscreens. As such they fulfil the caricature of the Author that Barthes 
drew in 'Death of the Author', and the various appraisals of them are 
testament to the difficulty of this type of authorship study. As a painting, 
Bar encapsulates the variety of interpretations of Manet and his work.
We have already seen a little of Manet. In contrast to Bar, Olympia's overt 
sexuality gives it a limited range of interpretations, no matter how risque 
they might have been at the time. Its exchange of glance and gaze frees it 
from the direct discourses of looked and looked-at, but as such, it remains 
a free-indirect proposition that is unfulfilled. On the other hand, there is an 
ambiguity in Bar that is evidenced by the greater diversity of interpretations 
that have been written on it. This has reached such a point that much of 
the new research into the painting springs from the fact that so many 
interpretations exist. Thierry de Duve’s recent article for Critical Inquiry 
begins from this very premise. Bar resists interpretation for de Duve, and 
nothing else can explain the existence of books such as the 1996 
anthology Twelve Views of Manet’s “Bar” 5. Manet’s painting acts as a 
personal inkblot test for each candidate because the formal and textual 
ambiguities allow for only individual interpretation 6
5 Thierry de Duve, ‘How Manet’s A Bar at the Folies-Bergere Is Constructed’, in Critical Inquiry 
25, (Autumn 1998), pp. 136-168. See also Bradford R.Collins ed. Twelve Views o f  Manet’s “Bar”, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
6 De Duve, p. 163.
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But de Duve’s article demonstrates how, for many reasons, Bar should be 
included in this thesis beyond the simple fact of its resistance to 
interpretation. Like Atget before him, Manet is described as an artist 
interested in the minutiae of life, or in the everyday. He is, for some 
authors, un peintre de morceaux7. This not only reflects Atget, but is also 
echoed in Nan Goldin’s photographs of her found-family in New York. 
Similarly, Manet’s use of the mirror in Baris given special attention by de 
Duve himself. It is the mirror, or more precisely its ‘turning’ within the 
painting’s space, that excites de Duve’s analysis of the many 
interpretations. Despite hints given to the contrary, de Duve is adamant 
that the spectator is not given an avatar in the figure of the dandy 
customer, but instead that the painting firmly addresses the spectator 
directly. This completes a series of conflations that the painting achieves. 
The turning mirror presents first one view of Suzon, and then another of 
Suzon and her customer. The painting manages, for de Duve, to address 
both the spectator in the Salon, and the posthumous spectator -  although 
in this case there is little difference. Manet interrogates the spectator, and 
does so because the painting appears correct to the immediate eye, and 
then shows its distortion gradually -  the mirror turns in space and 
annihilates time, or tense. The painting “obliterates the irreducible interval 
of time” between the views (of painter, of spectator, of client) -  instead of 
the viewer moving, the painting ensures that “the viewer never leaves his 
or her place and never takes the place of the client”8. It brings the two 
together in a free-indirect discourse.
The painting takes the rules of Albertian perspective and then rejects them 
to powerful effect. This confounds the relativity that is expected from time 
and space in painting, a relativity that Rudolf Arnheim suggests is a 
perceptual system assigned to objects or sets of objects9 Tension in 
narrative cinema is created by the misalignment of time and space (the 
static heroine saved by the hero in the speeding car or train is his best 
example), and this tension is prefigured in Manet’s intimate-yet-public
7 Paul Mantz, Jules-Antoine Castagnary and Theodore Pelloquet quoted in de Duve, p. 142.
8 De Duve, pp. 164-167
9 Rudolf Arnheim, ‘Stricture on Space and Time’, in Critical Inquiry 4, (Summer 1978), pp. 645- 
655, p. 654.
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space; this ephemeral-yet-eternal exchange of looks, this glance that is 
also a gaze. Pictorial space, for Arnheim, is an integration of systems of 
subwholes -  groups of objects in space and time -  that are organised by 
perception based on the expectation of relativity. Arnheim thus reflects 
Deleuze’s commentary on Bergson, who placed perception above the 
simple relation of cause and effect -  the relation of objects in time and 
space:
Bergson was [in Matter and Memory] working out new philosophical 
concepts relating to the theory of relativity; he thought relativity 
involved a conception of time which it didn’t itself bring out, but 
which it was up to philosophy to construct.10
This, of course, is what ultimately led to the conception of the movement- 
image and time-image.
All this suggests a crystal operation of time in Bar (the use of mirrors alone 
gives it a certain candidacy). But, returning to de Duve, it is worth noting 
that another exchange takes place between the expectations of Alberti 
and the expectations of a new style of painting which drew from the role of 
the artist as avatar for the spectator. The mirror initially separates the 
realism of the figure of the barmaid (identified as Suzon, a real barmaid of 
the Folies, something also noted by Novelene Ross 11) from the 
impressionism that de Duve sees in the rendering of the grande salle of 
the Folies itself. The ‘world’ of Baris therefore a “real-fictional” space that 
conflates the objects as seen with the sensibilities that sees them. Leading 
to a dual, or split, personality in many interpretations of the painting, this 
echoes the conflict between notions of the real and notions of 
representation that we previously considered only in photography. There is 
no position to be cemented in this exchange, but instead only a point-of- 
view, a concetto, that is to be had of the exchange as an exchange.
It is the conflict between the image as real and as representation that has 
structured many of the discussions in this thesis. Even in Warhol’s likening
10 N, p. 48.
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himself to the machine of the camera and its culture, there is always the 
figure of Warhol himself that intervenes. But to decide that Warhol’s 
images are simply always Warhol’s, that they separate us from the reality 
of the objects depicted, that they are always fictions, is to try and create a 
singular direction for an exchange that is free and indirect. The same 
occurs with Manet. On the other hand, however, how can we not think of 
the painting itself as ‘real’? Representation it might be, the carefully 
deliberated creation of a dying painter’s last gasps it probably is, but that 
never separates us from reality because the painting is reality. This brings 
us back to Bergson, whose off-the-cuff remarks on perception and 
objectivity can be seen in a new light: “Such a man would always maintain 
that the object exists independently of the consciousness that perceives 
it...” In fact, there is always perception of an object in photography and, 
now we can see, in painting. It might, for some, be the grande salle, or it 
might be Suzon. This is general consensus that leads to the awareness of 
the paradox created by the conflicting views. However, the object is also 
the painting itself, which exists in reality but not ‘independently of the 
consciousness that perceives it’. The problem for critical studies has been 
the separation of sensory, or cognitive, perception and perception-images 
in this manner. Bergson shows us that the two cannot be separated. But it 
takes the studies of Benjamin, and later Deleuze, to demonstrate it. 
Benjamin’s experience of experience, Deleuze’s perception of perception 
(after Pasolini) both demonstrate the ways that the mind deals with 
sensory perception -  the creation of time-images, in this case 12. The 
immense forces of organisation, which Arnheim noted, are what create the 
movement-image from this ‘dealing’: “the time dimension possesses no 
sensory medium of its own, [and] will anchor itself to any suitable 
perceptual embodiment.13” Thus it creates the ‘fossils of duration’ that he 
sees in Gaston Bachelard, or the becoming-mad of depth that we see in 
Deleuze 14.
11 Novelene Ross, Manet’s Bar at the Folies-Bergere and the Myths o f Popular Illustration, (Ann 
Arbor: U M I Research Press, 1980), p. 7.
12 For a review of Benjamin’s theories of experience and their use in understanding contemporary 
photography, see Rosalind Krauss, ‘Reinventing the Medium’, in Critical Inquiry 25, (Winter 
1999), pp. 289-305.
13 Arnheim, 1978, p. 654.
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This thesis has not confronted the issue of ‘real versus representation’ 
squarely, but has instead reached this conclusion in a roundabout way. 
Perception is characterised by a tremendous urge to organise the 
exchange of points-of-view or values that assault it. This is the urge to fix a 
particular point-of-view from this variation of truth, but an urge that does 
not recognise this exchange of values as having a quality in itself. Instead, 
this exchange is ‘directed’ by rational thought -  often in the Cartesian 
sense. Aberrations such as the exchange of fictions, the conflict between 
the real and the representation, are often referred to in scientific terms that 
describe a convolution, or inbreeding, of an otherwise natural cause-effect 
process: ‘feedback loops’, ‘chimeras’, ‘paradoxes’. However, photography, 
film, and painting continue to present this aberrance as part of their own 
‘nature’, and that is the power of their affect: ‘suspension of disbelief, 
‘hyperreceptivity’, the painting’s ‘istoria’ 15. Manet’s Bar emphasises this 
because, like Sherman’s ‘fake’ film stills, the various interpretations of the 
painting take for granted that this ‘aberrance’ is the result of a deeply felt 
political intention:
They have moved to an interpretive, ideological, sometimes 
allegorical level of reading and have unanimously aligned 
themselves with the "plausible hypothesis...”
The need for a unified theory -  to ‘know’ the painting once and for all -  
neglects the qualities that the exchange might have of its own.
But Manet’s Bar is a painting, and therefore presents a problem for its 
inclusion in this thesis. It is the reason why it does not have a chapter of its 
own, but also it presents one of the many directions the thesis could have 
taken. An underlying question that remains of all the analysis conducted 
here on photography, and also of all of Deleuze’s approach to the time- 
image, is whether or not the time-image is dependent upon the 
photographic image’s (perceived) connection with the object 
photographed. Since Deleuze draws his study of the ontology directly from 
Bazin, we can suggest that it does depend upon this factor. Perception
14 Ibid p. 646.
15 De Duve, p. 168. On ‘hyperreceptivity’, see also John Ellis, Visible Fictions, 2nd edn, (London:
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has to see bodies moving in space and time, and it has to believe the 
photographing of them in those conditions. At the time of his writing, 
photography satisfied this criterion easily, and painting did not. Painting 
instead could be trusted as a ‘dubitative process’, a point that Peter 
Lunenfield makes after Hollis Frampton’s wrestling with the ‘photographic 
agony’ 16 This was his own presentation of the paradox between real and 
representation.
However, even as Deleuze was writing, Flusser was envisioning the 
change that would occur as the technologies of photography moved from 
analogue formats to digital. The photographic image is now also a 
dubitative process, since potentially any image can be wrested from its 
indexical connection to the objects, subwholes, or conditions 
photographed. For Flusser, as for Lev Manovich, this has meant a 
renewed trust in the analogue image that belies its own manipulability. 
When faced with the possibilities of digital enhancement and manipulation 
promised by the latest blockbuster, the manipulations and enhancements 
of the nineteenth-century pictorialists is ignored and the chemical 
photograph is implicitly trusted. This places the time-image in potential 
jeopardy: With this ‘firstness’ stripped away, how can we envisage the 
‘zeroness’ of the opsign?
It is here that Manet’s Bar can present an answer. Curiously, de Duve 
compares the painting to the digital image, since its creation is as much an 
effort of cut and paste (a process that is carried throughout much painting 
and into photomontage) as it is the passing-off of the framed diegesis as a 
believable world: “[it could be] a digital image, and it would still obey the 
same laws of optics and be subject to the same demonstration”. 17
Routledge &  Keegan Paul, 1992), pp. 38-51.
16 Peter Lunenfield, ‘Art Post-History: Digital Photography &  Electronic Semiotics’, in Hubertus 
von Amlunxen et al eds. Photography after Photography: memory and representation in the 
digital age, (Amsterdam: G&B Arts, 1996), pp. 92-98, p. 95 (n20).
17 De Duve, p. 155.
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Both expose the exchange of values inherent in images -  their exchange 
of real and representation -  and thus require different conditions of 
spectatorship. De Duve suggests that the ‘way’ to view Baris to resist the 
temptation to direct the exchange toward a specific reading that ‘corrects’ 
or accounts for the quizzical optics. Lunenfield suggests that a similar 
‘mutable aesthetic’ is needed to view the photographic image in general 
after the development of digital technologies 18. Both suggest a final 
coming-to-terms with the fact that images are never real, and never fiction, 
but always in an exchange between those two values (a free-indirect 
proposition). This must be a central conclusion of this thesis also. This is a 
view that takes the emphasis away from indexical relations, since they 
have never been reliable. Deleuze’s theories of the time-image always in 
fact relied upon the spectator as much as they did the images of time and 
space, although he never openly acknowledged that. De Duve and 
Lunenfield’s suggestions decentre the emphasis in perception from that of 
the image, and embrace instead the relationship that perception has with 
the image as object, as well as the relationship it has with the image as an 
image of something. This is an approach that suggests that the concept of 
time in photography can be taken to the painting, and that such study 
could only be limited by questions of the figurative, the dubitative, and the 
contemplative -  a broad task in itself. It is an approach that suggests that 
the time of an image is dependent upon its relationship as an image with 
its viewer, operator, or spectator. It is an approach shared by Flusser, for 
example but, strangely enough, it is also very Deleuzean.
Slides 88-99 (Menu screens)
★  *  *
18 Lunenfield, p. 96.
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